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view. This he supports by two mciDn references: a} Mathematics, he 
1 . . 
says, is pre-natal divine knowledge by which man reaches the' 1 upper 
sun', in which he clea .. rly refHrs to the quotation from Pi:ndar in 
Meno 81B, and b) the Kinship of Nature is vital to every complete 
statement of Anamnesis, as in Meno 81CD and Phaedo 70D. 2 These are 
unfortunate references sinc:e _a) the quotation from Pindar is definite. 
ly Orphic and not Pythagorean. This is stJated by Stewart; 3 and EX 
explained by Guthrie4 as Opphic in that the reason given for the 
' 
sojourn in Hades is to give satisfaction to the Queen of the Under-
world for the original sin of the Titans (who slew Dionysus-Za.greus), 
and th.is is followed by Miss Freeman. 5 Again, b) the account· of the 
doctrine of rebirth in Meno 81CD is given a..s e. 'A.Jyo r of priests 
and priestesses, 8l:A, which, s ays Gruppe 6 , refers to Orphism 7 - and 
we certainly have no knowi:.idge of Pythagorean priests, much less of 
priestesses. The other reference, Phaedo 70D, has nothing to do with 
Anamnesis, and. in any case stewart 3 thinks the' ancient logos', which 
is Plato's source here, is Orphic8 • (Luce• s 9 rejection o~ Burnet's 
acsription of the word~ oyo~ in Phaedo 67C to Orphism does not 
really affect its status in 70C). Indeed, while Plato may have felt 
some corroboration t>or his doctrine of .Anamnesis and Transmigration 
in the teachings of pythagoras; his original source seems to have 
been Orphism. So Stewa.rt10 : 11Dieteri~h notes the agreement with the 
Golden Tablets of Petel1a and Thurii in the divine origin of the 
soul, the painful cycle of birth, the abyss of guilt on account "of 
old sins, the entrance to the ]'ield of Blessedness, Lethe on the 
left, and Anamnesis as a philesophical doctrine bapsed on the concret 
figure og Mnemosyne.u 
ii) Mathematic!,l While I belie~ve it is a mistake to regard mathema-
tics as the exclusive possession of the Pythagoreans, for there are 
'. . ·. 11 . . 
severEd expressions in the Meno that imply that at least the 
mathematics there expounded wa;~ taught by sophists or by 'geometers•, 
. 12 
we seem to be on surer ground ;when Field says, pythagoream 
mathematics undo.ubtedly impres,sed Plato. The precise nature of this 
Pythagorean influence has been hinted at by M1lhaud13 , that "Plato 
folloVted the Pythagoreans .•••• :-.· .•••• in gi'\!ll ng Number an intrinsic 
value and a mysterious significance." But more valuable on account 
of his greater detail 1s.Cameron14 that ttThere are three manifesta-
tions of Pythagorean Number in Plato: a) the mystical attitude of 
man praising the power of Number in the affairs of this world, 
b) .the attitude of striving to establish the absolute truth of the 
1. Op. cit. 70. 2. Op. cit. 76. 3. The Myths of Plato 67-9. 
· 4. Orpheus and Greek fteligion 16 5. 
5. The Pre-Socratic Philosophers. A Companion to Diels 14-15. 
6. Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschicbte %jt 1029. 
7. But pythagorean according to Dodds, op. cit. 225 note 5. 
8. Heracli tean a.s Dodds correctly states, op. cit. 150 & 152. 
9. Classical Review LXV•N.S.l. 66-7. 10. Op. cit. 158 note 2. 
11. Meno 85B, 86E. 12 Plato and his Contemporaries 187. 
13. Les Philosophes Geomt1tres de la Grace 309. 14. Op. cit. 68. ~ 
« 
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mystery of geometrical proof, and c) the theory of the Kinship of 
1 Nature. 
2 iii) Physics, etc.: While Taylor believes that the Timaeus is 
largely an expos"ition of the system of Timaeus of Locri, a Pythago-
rean, it is now, I believe, generally agreed that the doctrine is 
Plato's own, but, while the tale that Plato plagiariaed the book or 
books of Philolaus is undoubtedly an invention, probably of Aristo-
xenus' 3, it is reasonable to suppose tha.t Plato adapted much of the 
science of his day. Thus,. as Frank4 says, the mathematics, astronomy 
and physics5 e.re those of Archytas, and the medicfal theory that of 
Philistion. By physfcs Frank doubtless refers to the construction of 
the Four Roots from triangles, which are put together in the shape 
of the regular solids. 6 So Miss Freeman 7 : ttperhaps the pytha.goreans 
knew the five regular solids without perfecting their construction. 
Plato probably took over a pythagorean suggestion connecting them 
with the cosmic elerrents, but invented the account of transmutation 
and construction from triangles.n But this, she says, is not certain. 
iv) Education: Adam8 rightly points out that in Republic 530E9 
Plato confesses his debt in drawl:ng up his scheme of edmcation to 
the Pythagoreans. 
B. Metanhysi ca!.:, 
Turning now to the various ascriptions by modern CD mmenta tors of 
Pythagorean influence in the metaphysical field, these views can be 
roughly grouped under three heads according to the er!fbasis placed 
by their uph&lders &n one of t~e three modes attributed by Aristotle 
i to the Pythaeoreans, purporting to explain the relationship subs~st-
ing between things and Numbers. 
i) Thing~ exist by 1rnitation1~ of Number!ll The extreme form of this 
interpretat, ion of pythagorean influence on Plato is tm t of Burnet, 
who ViaS followed by Taylor an'd othess. The key-note of this theory 
i is that the Platonic dialogues are ft· rictly historical, and this is 
corroborated by strAssing one1 or two pointsfrom independent evidence, 
among which is Aristotle's te,stimony in Metaphys¢ics A.vi, that, 
according to the Pythagoreans, sensible things exist by imitation of 
11 Numbers. For convenience of discussion, this theory can be divided 
into three phases, as follows: 
1. I disagree in respect of ~), but this cannot be gone into here. 
2. See his Commentary on Plato's Timaeus 31-2 and 171, am e sp. his 
Plato, the Man and hlfls Work 436. 3. So Burnet, Early Greek 
Philosophy 323-5, and Field, Plato and his Gontemporcr::·ies 176. 
4. Plato und die sogenannten pythagoreer iifil 129. 
5. Cp. Lewis Campbell, Encjrclopedia. Britannica (Eleventh Ed1'lion) 
XXI.809:"Plato's intercourse with Archytas and others led him to 
include a theory of the cosmos in his purview. 11 
6. Cp. Conacher, Phillsophy XVIII.l03:"Pythagorean in:fl uence is the 
introduction of mathematics, i.e. number and measurement, in the 
conception of transmutation in quantative terms (sc. jn Tirnaeus)". 
7~ Op. cit. 223. 8. mhe Republic of Plato II.164. 
9. This should be Republic 530D\ 10. f'lf?O"tf. 
11. Metaphysics 987b11-12. 
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a) The Pythagoreans held a. theory of Ideas in which the Ideas were 
confined to mathematical concepts, separatefrom sensible things, 
which existed by imi tatiot} of them. That mathematical concepts are 
!dea.s1 is shown byBurnet 2 firstly from the use of the word t.ldof 
to denote the pattern in whlch the dots of figurate numbers like 
:: are arranged, 3 secondly from the alleged implication of separate-
ness in the regular pythagorean f'ormula of things existing by 
imi ta,tion of Numbers; 4 and thlirdly, from the assumption of the 
historicity of the dialogues, that "Plato• s ree.l philosophy is based 
on a. pythagorean doctrine of Ideas, reflected in the dialogues" 5, or., 
6 
as Taylor puts it, since the relation oft hings 1n Ideas in the 
Timaeus is ~ t'f? ,.c f • the standing pythagorean wor·d, 7 and since 
,, 
Timaeus is the only person besides Socrates to speak of Ec<f'? at 
all, the Ideas are Pythagorean. Each of timse three points has been 
8 
challenged. Gillespie has shown that, while the Pythagoreans used 
the word fU&f, it did not influence later development,. but was a 
collateral growth. Plato's word, and hence the meaning it has of 
'Idea' , comes from science and not from pythagorean mathematics. 
Ross9 commends his article, adding10 that we do not know that the 
'' r Pythagoreans called number-patterns f:co? at the time of Plato's 
youth. In the second place, Ross points out11 that Aristotle dtid not 
mean that the Pythagoreans thought things imitated separately Mxi::m±in .. 
existing Numbers, and Grube12 has refuted the notion that Ideas were 
a Pythagorean doctrine at all. Finally, Field 13 ha.s made it clear 
that Plato alone is responsible for the invention of Ideas, and his 
further remarks about the historic! ty of the dialogues will be 
referred to presently. 
b) Socrates was a Pythagorean; but differed from the regular school 
by extending Ideas to all concepts and by making Ideas immanent and 
sensible things to exist by ;participation in them. 14 That Socrates 
was a pythagorean rests chiefly on his use of nwe" in addressing 
certain pythagoreans in the dialogues, 15 and the rest of this part 
of Burnet's theory takes the Platonic picture of Socrates as d; rictly 
16 17 historical. But Field · has shown that there is no evidence in 
1. t!d? 2. Greek Philoro phy 52. 3. Cp. Cln.ssic;tl 
:Quarterly XXXI.l42. 4. Burnet, Greek Philosophy 89 & 166, and 
Plato's Phaedo 33 ad 65D; cp. Classical Review x. 92-5 a..vfi Chern iss, 
Aristotle's Criticism of Pre-Socratic Phillsophy 392:'i"M'f-'7tr'.S · 
involves separation".. 5. Burnet, Plato's Phaedo xlvi. 
6. Commentary on Plato's Timaeus 33 & 335 ad 51B. 
7. But a tlf!c.S ~~ yo'j-ttYo" according to Cherniss; Arist·otle' s 
Criticism of Plato 193. 8. Classical Quarterly VI.202-3 & 199. 
9. Aristotle's Metaphysics !.159 ad 987b8. 
10. Plato's Theory of Ideas 14. 
11. Aristotle's Metaphlltics !.163 ad 987bll. 
12. Plato's Thought 291-4, cited by Cherniss, op. cit. 186 note 108. 
13. Classical Quarterly XVII.l20. 
14. Burm t, Greek Philosophy 154-165, cp.Classical Quarter~ XX.76-7. 
15. Burnet, Plato• s Phaedo 33 ad 65D. 
16. Classical Review XXV.251, cp. Taylor, op. cit. 28. 
17. Classical Quarterly XIX.l3. · 
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the post .... Aristotelis.n tradition that the dialogues give an histori-
cal picture of' Socrates, and ne.xt to none to connect Soctates with 
. 1 2 the Pythagoreans; Mrs .Adam and Miss Williams have countered the 
theory that the dialogues present an historical picture of Socrates; 
and Ross3 sums up that 1 t is no longer necessary to argue against 
the view that the Theory of Ideas is Socratic. 
c} ibmx:fw. Burnet 1 s theory concludes that Plato adopted these Socratic-
4 Ideas of pythagorean provenance, but made tre m separate. That !!iaria' 
Plato 1 s Ideas were separate from sensibles and developed out of the 
Socratic DEFINITIONS is generally accepted, am· enough has been said 
above against the notion of Socratico-Pythagorean Ideas. 
But there is a modification of this theory that abandons the 
untenable thesis of pythagorean Ideas and the alleged hist or:i! city 
of the Platonic figure of Socrates, proceeding direct from pythago-
rean Numbers to Platonic Ideas thus: nFrom the mystical Pythagorean 
school Plato derived the conception of the mimetic relationshdp 
between the individual and the universal &i sharing in a common 
formula ....... Flux suggested separation.u5 This is more i:lear1y 
expressed by Ritchie, 6 that "Arist·.otle ascribes the non-Socratic 
element of separation to the· Pythagoreans, Meta.physics 987a30, blO, 
and their doctrine of the relation of phenomena to Numbers ••••• For 
the pythagoreans said that things imitate Numbers •••• But Plato saw 
what the Pythagoreans had not seen - that Numbers and Figures are 
abstract and exist apart from things. tt This is pro1babl.p what 
Cornford7 is referring to when he says that none root off the asser-
tio·n. of Forms is Pythagorean: Numbers as the Being ofthings - so 
JA«'ft?~c(- jAr'tfJc(c( • This~ makes the Forms entities having a 
separate existence in the in(telligible world where they replace the 
pytha€orean Numbers as the r~a.li ty which appearances represent. «8 
This has the a.dvantage over ~urre t• s thesis of ltnking the Pythago-
rean influence direct with Pla,to inetead of via Socrates, a.nd. of 
r· 
adopting the more usual view'. that the Theory of Ideas was Plato• s 
own, but slJlffers from two d.efects: firstly, there is no evidence in 
the dialogues of any Pythagorean influence having contributed to the 
hypostatisation of the 9Ideas, nor does Aristotle, despite Ritchie's 
reference, sug~ st it, but on the contrary it is difficult to 
understand how immanent Numbers - for this immanence is expltcit in 
Ritchie above, and in any ce .. se this is just the point where Plato 
differed from the Pythagoreans - could have led Plato to the 
1. Classical Q_uarterly XII.121-138, esp. 125, and Ross, Aristotle's 
Metaphysics II.420 ad 1078bll. 2. Classical Review XXVI.161 • 
. 3. Plato's Theory of Ideas 157. -~ 4. Taylor, Commentary on Plato's 
T1maeus 32. 5. Aristotle's Metaphysics, Loeb Classical Library, 
xxi. 6. Plato 49-51. 7. Dlato•s Theory of Knowledge 9-lo. 
8. Cp. Robin, Greek Thought 203. 
9. Cp Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas 14:"Aristotle does not suggest 
that number~patterns had anything to do with the inception of the 
Theory of Ideas, and there is 1i ttle in the dialogues to suggest 
it," and 161-2 to the same effect. 
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conception of transc~ndental Ideas. 
Hence, while Aristotle bears witness to the resemblance between 
pythagorean ft•r?~1 ( and Platonic p.ft/~rtf , this can har-dly mean 
that Pythagoreanism influenced the inception of the Theory of Ideas, 
and one ca~ only conclude with Ross1 that the Early Theory merely 
resembled Pythagoreanism in the one point of Participation, as 
Aristotle says. 2 
ii) Things are Numbers: Two opponents of Burnet, who rightly taka 
pythagorean Numbers as not separate f rom sensible things, and who 
consequently make Plato himself responsible for the separation of 
Ideas, fr.sten upon the best attested Pythagorean tenet, that all 
things are Numbers, in order to explain Aristotle's testimony that 
Plato later identified th.e Ideas with Numbers. Thus, Rogers3 says 
that Plato took the non-metaphysical definitions of SOcrates and 
turned them into a realm of entities, and later identif:h d them with 
4 pythagorean Numbers. Also Field :"In the final stage of his thought 
Plato identified Forms with Numbers; ind11.cations of this view had 
already ~jiiii~n in the attempt to attain scienti.fic knowledge of' 
the world involved in the expression of 1 t in ma.thematical terms. 
Plato took over this general idea from the Pythagoreans, but 
corrected their saying that N:umbers; which constitute intelligible 
rea.l1 ty, were in things; he said that the Forms of things were 
Numbers, i.e. the really real is what is expressible in mathematical 
terms. n I pass over the apparent contradiction in Field's view that 
this alleged LATE Pythagorisihg was xtsm also one of the inf~uences 
determining Plato's CONCEPTION of Ideas. 5 and being unaware of any 
' 
counter in the works of modern commentators, ask on my own behalf, 
How can one use Aristotle 1 s evidence of alleged pythagorean :t«f:Dum:c 
influence, and yet contradict Aristotle in the details of that 
evidence? For Aristotle does not mention any resemblance between 
! 
Platonism and Pythagoreanism in just this point of the identificatian 
of real entities with Numberst 6 
!!!) The ~~~m!ats of Numbers are the elements of all things: In 
my opinion, the correct line to take in regard to Aristotle's 
evidence concerning the relationship between Plato and the pythago-
reans is to emphasise this Pythagorean tenet, because, as will be 
shown ad lac., it is in this respect especially that Aristotle sees 
a resemblance between the two philosophies here in question. 7Along 
these lines, there are two differe~ theses to consider, that of 
Cornford And that more recently adopted by Sir David Ross. 
1. Aristotle's wletaphfsics I.xlv, and Plato's Theory of Ideas 161. 
· 2. Metaphysics 987bll-12. 3. The Socratic Problem 144. 
4. The Philom phy of Plato .134-5. (F. op. cit. 43: "So Ple.to reached 
the conception of Ideas via mathematics and moral xlim: ideals. u 
6. Cp. Metaphysics 987b27-8 and¢30. 
7. Cp. Pater, Plato a.nd Platonism 52: "Plato's Theory of Ideas is 
an effort to enforce Pythagorean 7l {f'e¥( upon 7'-o' ti'fft.(/-1 o y . " 
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1 2 In the words of Tate, Cornford shows that the Parmenides 
establishes as aga.inst Eleaticism an ontology Vlhich is the modifica-
tion of the pythagorean doctrine that sensibles, composed of Latmit 
and Unlimited, are evolved through Number end Figure from the One. 
Something vaguely similar to this, but referring to a later dialogue 1 
the Philebus, is stated by Taylor3 : 11Nothing like Aristotle's One 
and the Great and Snall is found in the Timaeus, but something like 
it is found :tn the Philebus, with Pythagorean categories instead of 
Platonic. But it is just that the One is not the first blend of 
Limit end Unlimited, but one of the ultimate categfories that 
distnguishes Plato from the pythagoreans.n Here it is the derivation 
of sensibles that resembles Pythagoreanism, aijd Ross agrees with 
this, but goes even further. In the first place he confines the 
main resemblance between Platonism and Pythagoreanism to the later 
, 
Theory of Idea-Numbers, but thinks that this was only a. resemblance, 
and that Aristotle did not mean to sugge..st that the one theory was 
derived from the other. 4 And yet he s·eems to me to contradict this 
when he say s 5 that pythagorean INFLUENCE is discernible in the 
composit:l.on of sensibles in the Philebus from the Limit and iUMi:tm:tx 
Unlimited. However, this he connects with Metaphysics A. vi by 
arguing that Plato later found Numbers to presuppose the same two 
elements into which he had analysed sensible phenomena in the 
6 . 
Philebus, ~nd apparently the bridge between Numbers and phenomena 
is to be found in the Ideas, since the Ideas had " a formal element 
which was a Number and a mB:tz:txi material element .in which the 
Number was embodied. n 7 This interpretation of the resemblance bet weer• 
the two phild.s:> phies, as depending on the construction of Numbers, 
Ideas and sensibles from elements, is brought into connection with 
that other phase of Pythagoreanism touched upon above, where things 
' 8 imitate Numbers, for, he Says, Plato's assignment of Numbers to 
'· 
the Ideas is on a par 1wi th the Pythagorean assignment of the number 
four to Justice. We mi~ht observe, however, that Cherniss9 denies 
' both that the Pytha.gcir[eans ever maintained that the elements of 
Num'bers were the elemeh,ts oft hings, and, as mentioned above, that 
. 10 things imitate Numbers. 
•ro sum up, while' there seems to have been pythagorean influenCE· 
in Plato's reverence for Number, his physics, his scheme of educa-
tion, ~nd possibly .. his doctrine of R:eminiscence, it is not relevant 
to a discussion of Metaphysics A.vi.l to deal with these aspects of 
alleged pythagorean influence, because the relationship between 
1. Classical RevieVI LV .77. 2. See Plato and Parmenides 138-9 & 
245. 3. A Commentary on Plato's Tima.e~s 31-2. 
4. Plato• s Theory of Ideas 161. 5. Op. cit. 162. 
6. Op. cit. 184. 7. Op. cit. 218. 8. Op. cit. 220. 
9 •. Aristotle 1 s Criticism of Pre-Sacra tic Philo ID~phy '1. 390. 
10. Op. cit. 392. 
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Platonism and Pythagoreanism there noted by Aristotle is confined to 
metaphysical doctrines. In respect of these, the above resume of 
modern views indicates that the discussion will centre around three 
modes of the relationship between sensible things and Numm rs which 
were maintained by the Pythagorea.ns, namely, i) that things imitate 
Numbers, ii) that things are Numbers, iii) that the elements of 
Numbers are the elements of all things, and while the central 
problem is the discussion of the question in which of these respects 
Platonism resembled Pythagoreanism, it will be further necessary to 
determine what the pythagorean doctrines actually were. For it has 
been seen that Burnet ascribed to the Pythagoreans a theory of Ideas, 
which others, however, have refuted; that Ritchie ascribed to them :tkl: 
the doctrine that things imitate Numbers which do not exist apart 
from those things, whereas Cherniss asserts that Imitation involves· 
separation; that some make much of this Imitation and of the composi-
tion of things and Numbers from elements, wh~le others deny that the 
Pythagoreans ever held either of these tenets. Hence, before it is 
possible to. determine the nature of the relationship asserted in 
Metaph~ysics A.vi.l and whether thiswas influence or mere chance 
resemblance, the nature of Pythagorean ism itself must be ascertained. 
2. pyth~goreani~m. 
We les.ve it for the main body of this work to go into the details of 
Pythagorean1sm, the aim here being only to set out the barest 
outlines of 1 ts various 1nterpretat ions. These can be grouped accord-
ing to whether it is regarded as a religious or as a scientific sect, 
and in the latter case whether its teachings are homogeneous or can 
be divided into successive schools. It might be expected that some 
reference should be made, in dealing with the reli§:ious side of 
Pythagoreanism, to its relationship to Orphism, but, as pointed out 
above 1 the religious side of Pythagoreanism is really irrelevant to 
this dissertation, and it is only for the sake of some sort of 
completeness that it is here mentioned at all. 
i.) Pythagorean1sm as a re.lig1ous sect 2!!.!l.: Frank is to my 
knowledge the only author· who he..s denied tha.t the Fythagoreans, 
from first to last, taught any science or mathematics whatsoever. 1 
According to him, Republic 600B shows that Pythagoras had nothing fu. 
do with science, but was only a religico-ethical teacher with nothing 
but the doctrine of Transmigration and Orphico-religious customs and 
2 ' 3 views. Further, the independent evidence reveals nothing of 
mathematics or science, only religious and ethical teachings. 4 And 
1. Cameron in his work The Pythagorean Background of the Theory of 
Recollection is similar: The teachings of Pythagoras are wholly 
religious, centering around Transmigration, Immortality and the 
Kinship of Nature ( p.l6), and professing recollected knowledge of 
previou~ lives, (po21), which wisdom, achieved by observation, is 
called t(?TO_,P''7 (p.23}, but he admits that later pythagoreans 
trans:rflormed this Number-magic into mathematics (p.27). 
2. Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer 67. 
3, D1els llB?, 12B40 & 129, 21Bl29, 25B4. 4. Op. cit. note 166. 
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what Plato indicates for Philolaus is throughout Orphic - no trace 
of any concern with mathematics or science. 1 Nevertheless he allows 
isolated thoughts like All is Number, and Bodies of Points, to have 
been held, 2 but insists th?t this was no more than a Number-mystic-
ism3- a pre-scientific mathema.tics; 4 for it was Cimpossible that in 
the VI century the Pythagoreans could have had any quantitative 
conception of rea11ty. 5 What, then, becomes of the body of evidence 
for mathematics and science usually ascribed to the pythagoraans? 
This is all relegated to Archytas, who was not really a Pythagorean 
but, in accordance with the literary convention of his day, e,scribed 
his discoveries to Pythagoras, and so is referred to by Aristotle 
as a "so-called Pythagorean n. 6 Some of Frank's arguments 7 in support 
of his tre sis have been nbly coun1e red by Chern iss. 8 
Against Frank it can be urged that the silence of Republic 
600B a>.ncerning Pythagorean mathematics is no argument, since the 
reference specifically concerns his Way of Life, and Miss Fi-eeman, 9 
making a. closer analysis than Frank of the independent evidonce, has 
shown tha.t it is evidence that pythagoras was in fact known for his 
learning, so that he was famous as a scientist as well as a religious 
teacher. Let us, then, pass by the many interpretations of his 
religious doctrines - which indeed all give much the same picture -
and turn to his scientific teachings alone. 
til One rzthagorean schocl from first to lasi: Tr.ere are only iJV 
t1flo views which fall under this heading, or perhaps only one, since 
Frank's alleged' "so-called pythagoreanism" is not pythagoreanism at 
all. The beliefs which he ascribes 1n this school, briefly, are that 
they held senst:ble qualities to be subjective, the Real being Space 
fil:B d with motions. The ultimate element of Matter is the point, 
and the line is the fluxion of the point, the plane of the line, and 
the solid of the plane. 10 But Raven11 seems to be correct in setting 
this doctrine of the line as the fluxion of a point as late -
contemporary with the Platonists. 
Cherniss12 takes the one ani only pythagorean school to centre 
around the tenet that Things are Numbers, i.e. bodies consist of 
aggregates of points having position, and that this is the butt of 
zeno's attack. The other tenets that Aristotle ascribes to the 
Pytha.goreans, viz. that things are derived from elements and that 
things imitate Numbers, arc incompatible w1 th the first and are to 
he dismissed as Aristotle's own invention. 
l. Op. c it. 68 • 2. Op. c 1 t. 13 5 • 3. Op. cit • 7 5. 
4. Op. cit. 79. 5. Op. cit. 71-2~ cp. 220. 
6. Op. cit. -69-75. 7. Qp. cit. 138. 
8. Aristotle's Criticism of Pre-Socratic Philosophy 395-6. 
9. The Pre-Socratic Philosophers. A Companion to Diels 76. 
lQ.Frank, op. cit. 102 & 125. 
11. Pythagorean& and Eleatics 108-9. 12. Op. cit. 387-392. 
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Cherniss1 is probably correct in insisting that these three 
modes of the existence of sensibles cannot belong to a single 
theory, but this does not seem to me to be sufficient reason for 
summarily dismissing two of them. The inCD n.sistency could as well· 
be explained by assigning them to differe~~ periods, and indeed ·one 
might ask Cherniss whether Pythagoreanism might not have undergone 
a change after Zeno had made it the butt of his attack. As Miss 
2 Freeman sa.ys:"When Aristotle's references are collected together, 
var:ic:tnt opinions among the Pytha.goreans em.erge, and it is not 
possible to gather what groups are meant or to what times the 
differences ore to be assigned. tt But some commentators, to which we 
now turn, have found a basis on which to make a distlilnction between 
earlier ahd later pythagorean schools - the Eleatic criticism of 
:Pythagoreanism • 
.!,ii) Three Pythagorean schools.:_ Cornford rightly adopts the 
position that the Eleatic criticism shows what the FythaGoreans held 
at the time of that criticism, so that a distinction can be made 
among the miscellaneous tenets ascribed to the Pythagoreans as to 
which were before Parmenides, whic"h were before Zeno, and which are 
compatible with that sort of change in their doctrines which would 
obviate that criticism. On this b..'lsis he distinguishes three 
successive schools. 1. The Pre-Parmenidean school. This has a 
monistic inspiration with a dualistic system of nature~ 3 From the 
One emerge two opposites- Limit aJ1d Unlimited- the latter being 
.Air-Void outside the universe. 4 This view he characterises by 
explaining the existence of sensibles as Imitation, that is, the 
\ 
relation of many analogous parts to the whole, as in Ba.cchic 
inspiration. 5 Against this Permenides rebelled: ti'io Opposites cannot 
' 
comefrom the One, and what is not Being (viz. tho Air-Void} cannot 
4 
exist at all. 2. The .Pre-Zenonic school. The answer to 
Pe.rmenides was to abandon the derivation of the two Opposites from 
the One, and to posit an indefinite number of 'atoms', i.e. unit-
points having magnitude, as ultimate. This he calls Number-Atomism, 
and this is what zeno attacked. 6 3. The Post-Zenonic school • 
... 
The answer to Zeno was to give up discrete magnitude, which led to 
the later view7 of the point flowing into the line and. so on up to 
the solid, together with the identififation of the regular solids 
with Emped&cles' Four Roots. 8 This latter Comford9 had already 
accepted as a doctrine of Philo¢:laus 1 • 
1. Qp. cit. 386. 2. Op, cit. 246. 
3. Classical Quarterly XVI.l37 •' 4. Plato and Parmenides 28 &40-1. 
5. Classical Quarterly XVI.143, which Ross takes to mean that things 
exhibit numerical relations, see Aristotle's il'etaphysics !.163 ad 
· 987bll. 6. Classical Quarterly XVI.l37~· and Plato and 
·Parmenides 57-60. 7. But see page 9 note 11 above. 
8~ Plato and Pa.rmen1des 12-16. p9. Classical Quarterly XVI.l'-3. 
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Raven has criticised Cornford, firstly1 for his derivation in 
the original school of two Opposites from the One, pointing out that 
Aristotle does not say this, but tre. contrary, that the One is 
composed of the two Opposites, and secondly 2 for interpreting the two 
tenets of Metaphysics 1092b8-22 - Number as matter and as formula -
as referring to two successive schools, whereas they are implicitly 
contemporaneous, the two tenets being compatible when referred to 
different orders of things. Hence the Pre-Pa.rmenidean and Pre-zenonic 
schools are one and the same, but in any case there can be no questio 
of Number-Atomism. 3 
Cornford' s arrangement seems to have been f. allowed by Miss 
Freeman and Robin, althQ,ugh there are differences in detail in the.ir 
interpretations~ Thus Miss Freeman 4 states that "Original is the 
conception of Numbers and Harmonies as the elements of all things, ••• 
•••• the construction of the five rqsular solids and the discovery 
of the Irrational." With this apparently goes Imitation, since she 
5 quotes Ross' commendation of Cornford's having placed this in the 
VI century and the tenet, Things are Numbers, in tho v. This latter 
refers to tNumber-Atomism', which she calls the majority view, 6 that 
the Monad limits Space and the Dyad 1~ the possibility of the 
' 
repetition of the Monad when multiplied in Space. Given, then, 
Elll~Xlll corporeal monads in Space, they plotted out different forms, 
from the Monad and E;Jxllt the Dyad coming Numbers, from the Numbers 
dots, as she calls them, from dots lines, etc., until the regular 
solids were identified with the Empedoclean Roots - which combines 
\ 
Cornford' s N.umber-Atomi rnJ with the do'ctrine wbic h he ascribes to 
I 
Philolaus. Hence, she is necessarily silent as to what came afterwardtl 
I 
unless 1 t is the remaining conceptioni of the ~ure of things as 
expressible by ratios. , ', 
Robin 7 takes the· reverence for N~mbers and Harmony, ard the 
elements of Numbers, as orig:.inal, together with Numbers as patterns 
imitated without being separate, although he allows the possibility 
that this last belongs to· "the younger Pythagoreans". To the second 
generation (which seems to mean· between Parmenides and Zeno) belongs 
. 8 
the Table of Opposites listed by Ar1~totle, and Number conceived in 
' extentlon- by which he seems to refer to 1 Number-Atomism•. He is 
silent in respect of later developments, which might be due to his 
having written before Conford' s Plato and Parrnenides e..ppeared, for 
only in this work did Cornford deal with the post-Zenonic school. 
1. Pythagorean.8. and Eleatics 22. 2. Op. cit. 51-61. 
3. Op.cit.. 76-7, that Atomism was an an.swer to Zeno; cp. Frank• Plato· 
und die sogenannten Pythagoreer 220, tha,t Bodies consisting of 
points ca.?l only have been a development of Atomism - which probably 
goes too far. 
4. The Pre-Socra~ic.Philosophers. 
5. Op. cit. 247 note al. 
7. Greek Thought 55-8. 
A Companion to Diels 82. 
6. Op. c .. it. 247-9. 
8. Metaphysics 986a22-26. 
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iv) Two Pythagorean .. School~: There are differences in the views 
of those commentators who maintain two Pythagoreal'l schools before 
Plato, but in respect of the early scho£1 most agree on three 
fund~ental .tenets: 1. the inhalation ~2 the One of the Void 
surrounding it, with the result that the One is split up into 
1 . 2 
numerous units; 2. these are points having magnitude; and 3. 
things are Numbers in the sense that t'ey are composed of aggregates 
of these unit~po1nts. 3 In this both Raven4 and Burnet5 agree, and 
while their two views have minor points of difference, both can be 
contrasted with that of Milhaud. 6 It is true that he also agrees 
that things etre Numbers, being composed of unit-points having 
magnitude, but he. differs in two important respects: firstly, in that 
heYtakes Numbers as both a material and a formal cause, the ¢latter 
being that Imi'tat:lon which means that Number is an external refiec.:.. · c 
tion of an internal reality, 7 which conjunct.ion of '~'hings are 
Numbers' and 'Things Imitate Numbers' is based on Metaphysics 986a.l6-
17,8 whereas Raven9 refers Imitation to a differe~ class of entitieE 
- abstract concepts like Justice - from sensibles which are composed 
of Numbers them selves, and secondly10 he places the Table of Oppo s-
ites of M~t4ph~ics 986a22-26 in the V century, by which he can 
hardly mean the pre-Zenonic school, wh\~reas Raven11 refers it to the 
original theory, which woulc. be better described as VI century. 
In respect of.. the later school Milhaud is silent, e.xcept perhaps 
• in regard to the Table of Opposites, as previously mentiaed, whereas 
Burnet b8ses his 
hin peculiar 
' 12 view 
So he says that 
• 
interpretation on the fra.gmen ts of Philolaus and 
of the Platonic dialogues. (See pages 4-5 above) 
I 
the Pythagoreans of Philolaus• school were familiar 
I 
· with Idea.s13 and that Philolaus identified the rtegular siblids with 
Empedocles' Roots, the triangles of which imitate triangular 
Numbers, 14 thus making double 'use of Imitation. As the view that the 
Pythagoreans held a theory of Ideas is now abandoned, we must turn 
rnther to Raven 15 for a satisfactory account of this school. He 
uses three tenets as t~ basis of his thesis: 1. lines are the 
Continuous bounded by two points without magnitude, triangles by 
three and tetrahedra by four points; 2. morecomplicated figures 
are made up of simpler, so that solids in general are defined by 
their surfaces (which is how he interprets the procedure ascribed w 
Eurytus); and 3. the regular solids are identified with the 
Four Roots by Philolaus, which is corroborated by the fifth 
Tetractys. Hence, there is one theory that embraces an analogous 
1. Pythagoreans and Eleatics 27-28 & 34. 2. Op. cit .• 45. 
3. Op. cit. 48. 4. Notes 1,2~3 above. 5. Early Greek Philo-
sophy 120 and Greek Philosophy 44. 6. Les Philosophes 
Gemm~tres de la Gr~ce 105-7 and 134f & 138. 7. See above, page 
10 note 5. 8. "These thinkers also consider that Number is tre 
principle both PS matter for things and as forming both their 
modifications and their permanent states.n 9. Qp.c!t. 52. 
10. Op. cit. 111. · 11. Op. cit. 11. 12. Pl~to's Phaedo xliv. 
13. See above, page 4. 14. Gr:'lek Philosophy 89. 
15. Op. cit. 150-5 and Classical Quarterly N.S.l. 147-8. 
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interpretation of geometrical magnitudes, of Empedocles 1 Roots 
{Philolaus) and the naturai species (Eurytus) • .But he enters upon 
controversial ground when he alleges that the whole theory is 
sUt-nrned up in Metaphysics 1090b5-13, for Bywater1 asserts that this 
reference is not pythagorean, and Cherniss2 , by comparing it with 
990al8-22, concludes that it refers to the Platonists. 
3. The Later Platonism. 
It remains to summArise the various interpretations of the later 
Platonism - later, since Metaphysics A.vi is mainly concerned with 
a phase of the Ideal Theory, geJJerally called the Doctrine of Idea.-
Numbers,3 which does not mccur in the earlier and is so little in 
evidence in the later dialogues that it has been doubted whether 
the doctrine was ever really helc.. by Plato, and those commm.tat.ors 
who have admitted that Plato did hold it have for that reason 
uni versa.lly assigned 1 t to a latest pre se of his thought • 
.!2s there a change in Platonism? Some critics, then, deny that 
there was ever any change in Plato's thpught, and accordingly dismiss 
Aristotle's evidence in Metaphysics A.vi and elsewhere concerning 
the alleged Doctrine of Idea-Numbers as either a·misunderstanding 
or a misrepresentation of what Plato held. So Shorey 4 insists on 
~ 
the unity of Plato's thought, and dismisses5 as more than doubtful 
the Aristotelian and post-Aristotelian tradition of a latest phase 
of his philosophy. S;) Bury6 states that the Idea is one ard many in 
Platonism throughout, and appears only in the late dialogues by 
. 7 
accident, and that Aristotle neither understood nor cared to 
. 8 
understand Plato •. p_gain, stewart , that a comparison of the Laches 
end the Sophist does not justify us in assuming a change in doctrine, 
. a 
but only in the subject discussed, while Cherniss-' lays down as a 
criterion that Aristotle is to be accepted inmfar a.s he is 
corrooo rated by the diGlo.gues, but his evidence concerning Idea-
Numbers, which is at variance with these, is to be dtsregarded since 
it has its origin in Aristotle 1 s own critical method, and much to 
the same effect is Ritter, 10 that 11 Since Plato wrote up to t:re time 
of his death, the contention that the latest form of Platonism was 
g_iven orally must be a fiction - therefore, when Aristotle deviates 
from the dialogues,we i reject him." 
1. J·ournal of Philology !.31. 2. Aristotle's Criticism of Pre-
Socratic Philosophy 42 note 161 - but I fail to follow Chemxiss• 
line of reasoninL. 3. Cp. Field's idDntification of Forms 
and NDHXE Numbers above on page 6 with note 4, and Ross' assign-
ing Numbers to Ideas above on page 7 with note 8. By Idea-Numbers 
is nmant that connection of Ideas in mme way with Numoors e,s 
mentioned by Aristotle in Metaphysics 1078b9-12; Ideal Numbers are 
incomparable numbers in contradistinction to mathema.ticel numbers, 
whether such are Ideas or not; and Ideas of Number are the Idea,s 
of Twoness, Threeness, etc., as in Pha.edo lOlBC. 
4. Whnt Plato Sa.id 67. 5. Op. cit. 50. 6. Journal of 
Philology XXIII.l81-2. 7. Op. cito 191. 8. Pleto•s Doctrine 
of Ideas 10. 9. The Riddle of the Early Academy 29. 
10. The Essence of Plato's Philosophy 31-2. 
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I cannot, however, believe that this point of view has been 
sufficiently established, since on the one hand Conacher, Field and 
others have shown that there is a change i.n view-point in the later 
dialogues, aG will be mentioned presently, and on the other hand 
whatever may be Aristotle's shortcomings as a witness the central 
point in the controversy about the value of his evidemce - the 
alleged doctrine of Idea-Numbers - is corroborated by a wholly 
independent source, Hermodorus. 1 In fact, as Frank2 says, the 
dialogues do not contradict Aristotle but show the system of nature 
known to Aristotle as tho basis of his evidence concerning Idea-
Numbers, the ground of that noture. 
As the subject of this section is the doctrine of Idea-Numbers, 
I omit ony mention here of the various interpretr>tions of the later 
Ideasas Categorj'.es, Spritual Forces, or Thoughts of God, and cite 
as ±ii example of the demonstrability of a change in Pla.to' s thought 
on the evidemce of the dialogues alone some of the views that centre 
around the causality and status of the Ideas. Here the Idea is no 
longer, as it was in the earlier dialogues, the sole reality, but 
now the Soul is recognised as really real, and supplements the 
ca.usali ty of the: Forms - previously. the sole caus~ih ty - by being 
the cause of motion and of change. Sa De Lacy 3 dist!in.guishes the 
lnter from the earlier Platonism by its allowing motion and change 
to be real, Soul replacing the causili ty of the Ideas, as in the 
4 Sophist, Philebus a.nd Timaeus. This is interpreted by Conacher as 
Plato's concern to make a scientific explGnation of the transmutatioz. 
of the 'elements' possible, scientific, because change 1~ quality 
is now interpreted in quantitative terms. Just what he means, ux:e::x::e: 
however, by saying that wha·t Aristotle calls the doctrine of Forms 
and Numbers is' the imposition by the Damiurge of Forms and Numbers 
on the Receptacle, is no,t clea.r. To the same line of thought belong£ 
Field, 5 that Plato'' s thought developed in two main directions: the 
prob¢lem of' process, and the nature of the Forms. 
Our concern, however, in not with interpretat-.ions of the 
Sophist, Philebus and Timoeus as such, but only with• the doctrine 
of Idea-Numbers, so, ta.king tt that there probably was some sort of 
change in ~latonism, let us tum to the various interpretations of 
the nature of Idea-Numbers as the most .striking aspect of that 
' change, and more directly connected with Pythagorean influence.¥ 
ll Ideas are ratios of Numbers: Tredennick~ states that the 
·formal principle both of Ideas and of things, Unity and the Ideas 
respectively, are numerical limits -¢probably based on the Philebus-
- and this led Plato to de scribe Ideas as Numbers, or rather as 
ratios, citing as an example the connection of Line, Plane and 
l.Clastical ftev1ew LXV. 29. 2. Platen und die sogenannten Pythago-
reer 94. 3. Clas~ii cal Philology XXXIV .110-2. 
4. Phillsophy XVIII.l03i-4, 109 & 111. 5. The Philosophy of' Plato 
113-4. m:xx:GJEXJ!XIDr:i:mm.x;x:pxgx 6. Aristotle's Mete.physics, 
Loeb gzaEE:i:ExixE Library Edition, xxiii. 
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Solid with Two, Three and Four. But how these can be called ratios 
is not made clear. 
1 More explicit is Field, who gives as instances of that 
development·mn the nature of the Forms mentioned above, moral Ideas 
as the right amount of something, the right proportion be1:w een 
different elements, and 'Horse' as n combination of different 
elements in a pmJportion which can be expressed numeritcally. But 
this line of interpret4 ion does not seem to me to fit the facts, 
for even if the evidence of the Philebus m ncerning the nature of 
the Limit can be taken as outweighing Aristotle's testimony that the 
formal principle of Ideas VIas the One - not a rAtio - this inter-
pretation still does not agree with the connection with Numbers 
whith it purports to solve, since the Greeks did not m n sider ratios 
2 to be numbers. 
11) Ideas and Numbers are differen!:._entitie.s. A very attractive 
theory, because it connects Idea-Numbers with the Platonic method of 
Division, is that put forward sometime ago by Becker, and supported 
3 in recent times by Brommer. Becker takes a genus as representing 
l, its two sub-genera as 2. one of these sub-genera together w ith 
the two species of the other as 3, the spec~ s of both together as 
4 
representing 4, and so on, so that, as Brommer makes clear, the 
essential feature of this theory is that Plato's Ideal Numbers had 
units, tt..e. the units of Ideal Numbers are Ideas. 'The difficulty in 
this interpret~.ion, however, is f&rstly that Numbers are here 
identified not with Ideas, but with groups of Clldeas, 5 and secondly 
it is F.lmost universally agreed that the characteristic feature of 
Plato's Ideal Numbers was that they did not heve units. 6 
Hence, Stenzel' s·interpretr:tion is an improvement, since he 
avoids these two objections. The essence of his view is the parallel 
origin of Ideas, Numbers and Mognitudes .• 7 If I understand him atight~ 
there are three parallel and interconnected diaereses: Not-Being 
makes possible the division of ~genus into sub-gem re., rurl these 
into species, etc. ; 9 this is subsumed under a principle of greater 
generality- the Dya.d- which, by m8king the One two, gives rise to 
the diaeretic scheme of integers, thus: 1 
f 
f 
,, 1 .----,-.c..---·, 
4 5 6 7 etc. 1 
which grounds Dialectics; and Space, in which Becoming takes place, 
is connected with Number by i~s subsumption under the Great and 
Snall as a more general term for Extesnion, 10 so that Number is 
1. The Philosophy of Plato 136 & 143. 
2. See van der Wielen, Die Ideegetallen van Plato 14-5 and 136. 
3. fieferred to by van der Wielen, op. c1 t. 233, e.nd Ross, Plato's 
Theory of Ideas 196-7... 4 .. Mnemosyne XI.iv.264, 273 & 280-l. 
5e So Hoss,lop. cit. 6. For example, Cook Wilson, Classical 
Review XVIII.251, and van der Wielen, op. cit. 88 note, and 89. 
7. Zahl und Gestalt 60. 8; Cp .. Ross, op. cit. 195: 11 Stenzel is 
so vague that it is impossible to see exactlyw hat his theory is". 
9. Op. cit. 48-51. 10~ Op. cit. 86-88 with 31. 
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both the symbol of the Ideas arranged as species and genera in the 
dichotomic scheme, and of the world built up of line, plane and 
solid. 1 Miss Nicol 2 has elaborated the latter by showing that Plato 
attempts to solve the problem of continuity by giving the monad 
poilition by means of the Dyad as Extension, and then it becomes an 
Indivisible Line; when this increases into a. line, this line is an 
Indivis.iible SUrfa.ce; and the surface, again, is an IndiviEitble Solid, 
so that theend of each stage is the beginning of the next. 
But it is difficult to believe that this ingenious interpreta-
tion, I mean Stenzel's, is th3 last word, since, a.s Ross3 points 
out, 2 and 3 are not species of the One, nor does this diaeretic 
scheme fit .:tlri stotle' s evidence on the generat:l.on of Number. 
A less fanciful, but very attractive theory, is that of Robin. 4 
According to him, Ideal Numbers are entities different in kind from 
Ideas, and higlhler in the scale of realities, being in fact the 
formal principle of the Ideas. The essence of this theory lies in 
1 ts preferring a passa.ge of Theophrastus, where the Ideas are said 
to depend on the Numbers, to Aristotle, and the application of two 
passages in Aristot~e to confirm this: Nicomachea:n Ethics l096al7-
19 and De Anima 404bl6-27t. There is a possibility, however, that 
Robin's interpretation of these passages is at fault, since van der 
Wielen 5 shows with plausibility that Theophrastus is referring to 
the dependence of the 'Ideas' of Magnitude from Numbers, since he 
has interpreted the De Anima passage along different lines, and since 
i.tis fatrly wellp established that l096al7-19 means not the denial 
of Ideas of Number but of an Idea of the Number ser.ies in genera1. 7 
8 However that me.y be, Ross follows Robin in assigning Numbers to the 
Ideas, i.e. the Ideas would.have a formal element which was a Number, 
e.g. Line is formed by Two,· Surface by Three, Solid by Four. These, 
however, are exceptional cases, and not only do the very passages 
which Ross cites9 to show that in the dialogues the Forms are 
referred to as Monads 1nd1Icate that· their formal element was not a. 
Number but the One - for one was not a. number according to the 
current Greek conception of number10 - but Aristotle himself is at 
least consistent in this, that with the exception of the Line, Plane 
and Solid, which may indeed have been a 'Fourth Class•, he everywhere 
names the One as the formal element of Ideas and nowhere else regards 
~1umbers as such. 
1. Op. cit. 102-3 & 117. 2. Classicco) Quarterly XXX.l22-5. 
3. Plato's Theory of Ideas 195. 4. Greek Thought 212, Platon 142-
8, 166, 237-8, and Classical Review XXIII.l98. 
5. Die Ide egetallen van Plato 152-4. 6. Op. cit. 161-9. 
7. So Cook Wilson, Classical Review XVIII.247; Taylor, Plato, the 
Man and his Work 506-7; van der Wielen, op. cit. 66 noto 105; and 
Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas 181·1 
8. Plato's Theory of Ideas 216-9. 
9. :Aristotle's lllietaphysics.I. lxix. 
10. So van der W1elen, op. cit. 14-15, and Ross, Plato's Theor.v of 
Ideas 178 .. 
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Jackson's view might well come in here, since it too distingu"-
ishes Ideas and Numbers, and makes the latter the formal elerre nt of 
·the former; but his view is complicated and rendered almost unique 
·by being worked out as a system of 1 thoroughgoing Idealism• •1 The 
. 
essence of the relevant part of his interpreta.tion is a distinction 
, .. ( 
between Ideas and Numbers based on the mention of jAfi;"~"~ l(lk.t. "!{ofl"o. v 
as the Limit in the Philebus. This he takes, by amending the textJ 
( 
of Metaphysics A. vi, as proof that while Ideas, as fAr if?' oy , are 
\ , 
·the formal principlep of sensible things, that of Ideas is 7o 1!oO"oY, 
Numbers. 2 But various scholars3 ha.ve shown that his dis;(tinction 
I I 
between ff~' o~ and 77o,..or is fanciful, and his system of thorough-
going Idealism has been attacked by mal'jy. 4 
iii) The identitl of Ideas and Numb~££: 
' n .. ' , 
a) aL' tl~o'- £l~~~A7 ":" (. : Arist:otle r,epeatedly characterisef 
the Platonic Numbers by two expressions, etV'~j3).7 ~oc. and Before 
and !After. The former word has sorre times been translated 'inaddible' 
because such numbers have a qua.li tati ve instea.d of a quantitative 
~ 5 6 . . 
nature. But van der Wielen has shown that it really means 
'incomparable', i.e. ne1tmert equajto nor greater nor smaller than 
one another, and. so such numbers are not quantities, which. seems 
7 to me to come to much the same thing. SO also Ross, that they are 
different in species. Ideas, then, can be identified with Numbers 
in this sense that it is made explicit with regard to Ideas of 
8 Number what was involved in their being Ideas. The other term, 
Before f!nd After; is generally9 referred to the serial order of the 
integers .• Hence, one way of interpreting the identity of Ide:). s with 
Numbers is to suppose that ~the Ideas of Number are made Ideal Numbel) 
by being given the serial order of Before and After. 
CX) Idea,s of Number as a.1 me among the Idea._§,: Ri tchie1~interpre"t 
Metappysics 1078b9-1211 as·evidence that Ideal Numbers have been 
added to the Theory of Ideas~ He seems to me to mean that Ideas of 
Number, as some among other Ideas, are made Ideal Numbers by being 
given a serial order, as explained above.-Twoness can exist without 
12 Threeness, but Threeness cannot exist without Twoness. Against 
this, several arguments can: be urged. Cook Wilson13 has shown not 
1. see Encp.clopedia of Religion and Ethics x. 57-60; Journal of. 
Philology XIII.32-3; cp. ~rcher Hind, Journal of Philology XXIV. 
52. 2 • .Journal of Philology x. 278-28 4. 
3. Grube, Plato's Thought 302; Dickenson, Journal of Philology xx. 
124; cp. Schulhof, Journal of Philology XXVIII.4-6; Ross, Pla.to 1 e 
Theory of Ideas 133-4. 4. Dicle nson, op. cit. 122-3; Davies, 
Journal of Philology XXV.8 etc.; Cook Wilson, Classical Review 
III.119-7-121. 5. So Frank, Plato und die sogenannten pythsgo-
reer note 259, Robin, Platen 143• 6. Die Ideegetallen van Plate 
65. 7. Aristotl~' s Metaphysics II.427 ad l080a19. 
8. Ross, Aristotle's yetaphysics I.li-lii; cp. Plato's Theory of 
Ideas 180; Classical Review XVIII.253. 
9. Cp. Cherniss, Aristotle' .s Criticism of Plato 522; van. der Wieler1, 
op. cit. 65J. 10. Plato 118. 
11. "Not connecting it in any way with the nature of Numbers" 
12. see Metaphysics 10t9a2-4. 13. Classical Review XVIII.249. 
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merely that Ideas of Number occur :I.n Phaedo lOlBC, i.e. in the 
Earlier Theory of Ideas, but that e'len there they were Ideal Number~ 
·so that what was original cannot be interpreted as the cha"lge in 
· Platonism. In any case Aristotle quite pl~.inly says that ALL Ideas 
were Numbers. 2 Thirdly, one mig!.1t wonder what object there could be 
in insisting that the Ideas of Number be themselves Numbers. 
This last point has been taken up by Taylor. He has given3 a 
very ingenious reason why Plato should have wished to make this 
otherwise rather a.imless ident1.fication - he had redefined Number 
so a fl. to include surds. This Taylor 4 tries to apply by using a 
continued fra.ction for determining the value of #2 and thereby to 
explain Plato• s use of the term 1 the Great and the Snall. D' Arcy 
Thompson 5 has shown that the series of side and diagonal numbers 
give the same result and are easier to work with. It is probably no 
real objection to this view, which Milha.ud6 accepts in principle, 
that, as van dt')r Wielen 7 has shown, surds or irrationals were not 
considered by the Greeks to be numoo rs, but to belong to geometry; 
8 
• however, as Ross objects,_ the whole procedure presupposes the very 
integers it is meant to explain end does not really have anything to 
do with the use of the term, the Great and small. 
~l Ideas of Number as the only Idea.s: We said a.bove that 
R1"hehie' s ident1f1e.a..tion of Ideas of Number with Ideal Nurpbers 
suffers from this defect that it does not identify all Ideas with 
Numbers, but only some. Van der Wielen9 escapes this difficulty by 
confining Ideas, i.e. the later Idea-Numbers, to Ideas of Number, a.nc 
then identifying these with Ideal Numbers, assplained above. }3ut it 
is in en nce1vable that Plato. abandoned Ideas of moral concepts and of 
natural kinds; dn fact, Epistle vii.J342DE written 353 B.C. gives a 
very long list of Ideas indeed. 
b) A one-one identification of.Ideas and Numbers: Nearer to 
the truth, then, i.s the view xkxtwhich identifies all Ideas, incl. u-
ding those of the natural kinds as well as Twoness and Threeness, 
with Numbers, and the most obvious such identification is a one-one 
ident:1.ty of Ideas with Numbers. 1'he mo stf striking evidence for this 
is Metaphysics 108lall-12, 108$4al4, where Man is 3, and l084a25, 
10 
where Man is 2, and this view Ross earlier adopted, but later 
recanted, 11 and rightly so, I think, since the very fact that 
Aristotle is uncertain whether Man is 2 or 3 shows that. he is ma.king 
his Ofln inference from the thesis that Ideas were Numbers, and that 
1. Cp. Cherniss, Riddle of the Early Academy 33-5. 
2 • .A list of pas.sages identifying Ideas and Nu.rnbers is given by van 
der Wielen, op. cit. 53-7, and Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics I. 
165, and Plato's 'Theory of Idees 216. 3. Plato, the Man and. hiE: 
Work 505; Commentnry on Plato's Tima.eus-366-7; Mind XXXV.427 •. 
4. Plato, the Man and his Work 510; Mind XXXV.430. 
5. Mind XXXVIII.45-6. 6. Les Philosophes Geom~tres ge la Gr~ce 
351, 358. 7. Op. cj_t. 14-6. 8. Plato's Theory of Ideas 183-
4. 9. Op. c'-t.· 58-70, criticised in Mnemosyne XI.iv.263. 
10. Aristotle's Metaphysics I.lxvii-lxx. 
11. Plato's Thepry of Ideas 218 note 1. 
....... 
. --· ,, 
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such a one-o,• identification wa..s not made by Plato himself. But 
there still remains another method of identifting Ideas with Numbers 
besides this-. 
c) MetaE_~£rical ident:tficatioQ_: 1 Cook Wilson was, I believe, 
the first to point out that Idea.s were Numbers only in a metaphori-
2 cal sense, an1 this has been made more explicit by Gillespie·, that 
Aristotle never calls Forms Numbers except in relation to the One 
and the Dyad, the Forms being Numbers only in respect of their 
origin. S> Comford 3, that Numbers can be analysed into two ~tDI~tp 
principles, ~~d Plato regarded all Ideas as in some sense Numbers 
because composed of corresponding principles. Also Milhaud 4 states 
that, while in Philebus 26AB the Continuum is characterised EJ as 
More and Less which, when combined with the Limit, transforms Ideas 
into Numbers, in his Oral Teaching Plato went furtm r and subsititu-
ted the Great and Snall, by joining which with the One Plato made 
Ideas as Numbers are made. This is the interpretation which has been 
adopted in this work, the reasons for which will appear in the course 
of the exposition. 
The above review, and this will be to some extent corroborated 
in the examination of what Aristotle said in Metaphysics A.vi.l in 
the nee section, indicates to some extent. the topics which are to 
form the subject-matter of this disBertation and the limi tro~ ion of 
its scope. For this sul)ject-matter would seem to be concerned with 
three topics: 1. the schools of Pythagoreanism and the doctrines 
held by each; 2. the hypo sta.ti sa.tion of Plato' s Ideas and the 
nature of Participation, but especially that phase of his later 
doctrine usually referred to as Idea-Numbers; and 3. the resemblances 
betl een Platonism and one or more schools of Pythagoreanism. And 
again certain restrictions must be imposed in the interests of 
relevancy. We she,ll omit ·1. the religious side of pythagorean ism 
together with Orphism; 2. any discussion of the nature of the later 
Ideas insofar as they are not Numbers or not treated numerically; 
a..nd 3. any non-philosophical resemblance between Platonism and 
pythagoreanism. For this dissertation is Eoncerned not with any 
Platonic resemblances to pythagoreanism whatsoever, but only with 
that phase thereof which is attes'-e d by Aristotle in Metaphysics 
A.vi.l, together with as much of the nature of pythagoreanism and 
of Platonism as is necessary for its interpretation. 
1. Classical Review XVIII.248. 
2. Journs.l of Philology XXXIV .152-3. 
3. Cambridge Ancient History Vol. VI. Ch. ix. p. 331. 
4. Las Philosophes Gemm~tres de la Gr~ce 356-7. 
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Section ii. What Aristotle Said in Metaphysics A.vi.l. 
A.vi;l. The crucial sentence, which forms the immediate concern of 
--- ·~ ... 
this work, is Meta.phJilics ~A..vi.l, and it reads as follows:r-fTtJC. df 
· T~f f'~f~t1'4:.\ <fc. ~oo-() (1/¢ ~ p' fJ ~a'J-'111-'o} EtT~)'tYEro 
o/t:t_Tf'Pr.T'f.r,A., Tct jtfY IT-o~~~ J-ov Tote a'f'o).ouilov<Tqi -rA' d't:' 
K4A (eft.~ 11ye:i rtjy T~~ 7!;-e,.)..r ~~v i:}ovl'et f'{ ~o v-o~'qY.. 
As a piece of Greek, it does not offer any great difficulty in 
translation, and Ross11 is as good a.s any: 11 After the systems we 
have named came the philosophy of Plato, which :ln most respects 
followed these thinkers, but had peculiarities which distinguished 
it from the philosophy of the Ital1ans.n2 
But while the sentence can be thus easilY translated, it is 
not so summarily disposed of. :A complete discussion of what Aristo-
tle said here reauires some comment, even explanation, on each of 
the seven phrases into which it can be anelysed. These are: 
1) •The systems we have named' ,?"ttf t/;??f"r'.Yrc) y1c).ol?'ofl/q>_ 
ii) 'The philosophy of PlAto' 1 'J: 17). C: )'o~vo f l""~q/ /"~ )'-~ / ec. 
I 
iii) 'These thinkers', T0'\1 J"o' f. 
iv) Tho respects in which Plato followed them, Itt reP Tro.l.~c! 
i'""O ~"rOlf a/(6}0fi~OVO'Dt. 
v) The meaning of ,, following' , 0: f,( o ~ 0 " cPa (;o- q · , 
" r... .. ,, ,... i' Lovt?-c::r. 
vi) Plato's peculiarities, .,....4 of l(a.c <. d' ~ • ~ · ~ · "7 
vii) 1 The philosophy of the Italians' ,T;aJ 1'~¥11-t:c't..•l(.~r' fJ1,).1)f1"oc/,~V. 
Before attempting to comment on these phrases, it is necessary 
to review the context of this sentence. · 
Its onntext. Aristotle .sets himself the task in this book, A., 
____..w ~ . h d 
of going over the views of those whoaattacked the 1nveEtigat1on of 
.... 
Being and had philosophised about Reality before himself, for by so 
doing he will either find another kind of Cause thah the four he had 
3 
_discovered, or be more convinced of their correctness. He starts 
from the first ph1losophers, 4 the Milesians, from whose beliefs one 
<; . 5 
might think that the only cause was the so-called material cause. 
. . 6 
To find the second cause he turns to those who make more elements, 
and discovers a principle different in kind from the material in 
the Reason of Ana.xagoras 1 
7 
and the two principles of Ernpedocles, 
. 8 Friendship and Strife. In order to .observe some semblance of 
1. In quoting or rendering the Metaphysics, here and elsewlere, I 
use the translation of Sir W.D.Ross, as it is rendered in The 
Basic Works of Jristotle, edited Richard McKeon, Random House, 
New York, 1941. 
2. This translation explains why, in tm title of th:Ls work, the 
words, 'the philo s:> phy of the Italians' , have been placed between 
inverted commas. We a.re to deal with Plato's relationship to 
the philosophy thus termed in A.vi.l, where Aristotle alleges 
some relationship between it and Platonism. 
3. Metaphysics 983bl-6. 4. Met. 983b7ff. 5. Met. 984al7-18. 
6. Met. 984b5. 7. Met. 984bl5-19. 8. Met. 984b33-5alo. 
21/ 
chronological order, he then gives a short account of Leucippus and 
Democritus, 1 the Atomists, which does not advance the argument at 
all, because these, like the others;J lazily neglected the question 
. '2 . 
of movement. The search for Essence,rtthe third cause., however, 
leads him to a slight ss.crifice of chronological order, for the 
philosophy he~e in question, that of the 1 so-called Pythagoreans•, 3 
is introduced as contemporaneous with the former and before them. 4 
After giving a short account of their beliefs, Aristotle brealjs off, 
• -1/ 5 d. digresses about,..,the Eleatics, and then summarises what has6 gone 
before. This summary evidently excludes the 'so-called pythagoreans': 
whom Aristotle a.t this po1nt6 calls the 1 Italian school', and he 
repeats himself that some introduce the source of movement, either 
as single or as two-fold, 7 and resumes the thread o.f his argument by 
turning to the question of Essence. Here he states that the Pythago-
reans began to make statements and definitions, but. treated tho 
8 
matter too simply. 
Then comes ;A.vi.l:";After the systems we have named came the 
philosophy of Plato, which in most respects followed these thinkers, 
but had peculiarities that distinguished it from the philosophy of 
the Italians. u 9 As the next word is 'for• ,yltf-' ,10 the following 
account, which begins with the origin of Plato's introduction of the 
Ideas due to the influence of Cratylus and of S>crates, 11 must give 
the reason for the peculiarities that distinguished Pla.to' s from 
the philosophy of the Italians. However that may be, Aristotle gives 
a fairly detailed account of Platonism, in the course of which he 
lists several poir1ts of agreement with and difference from the 
Pythagoreans. He then evalua.tes Plato's tenets in the light of the 
causes sought, and concludes that Plato used only two causes, that 
of the Essence and the material cause. 12 
·Analysis of A.vi •. l,: From this context the ans\vers to some of 
the_ qa:astions set above are immediately apparent, and the place at 
least is indicated where the am wers to the others may be found. But 
before these answers are 'given, it is necessary to make a point. It 
will be seen from the context above that after the summary of 
987a3-9, Aristotle proceeds to the question of Essence and instances 
the Pythagoreans, who made ·statements and defihitjons. 'J'he trend of 
ARistotle's thought and the fact that this characteristic can apply 
only to one school, which has been mentioned before, rpakes it likely 
that this is the same as the •so-called pythagoreabs' of A.v, and 
since the latter are called 'the Italian School' at 987alO, these 
are also the same as the 1 philo s phy of the Italians' from whom 
1. Metaphysics 985b5-19. 
3. I use inverted commas 
the 'so-called' has any 
4. Met. A.v.985b23-4. 
?.Met. 987all-13. 
10. Cherniss, Aristotle's 
YAI' makes no sense. I 
11. Met. 987a32-bl4. 
2. Met. 985bl9-21. 
until it h.as been determined whether or not 
special signifil cance; see page 9 a.bove. 
5. Met. 987a3-9. 6. Met. 987alo. 
8. Met. 987a.l$-22. 9. Met. 987a29-31. 
Crit.icism of Plato 191-2, says that the 
leave the decision to the readfer. 
12. Met. 988a8-lO. 
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Plato differed in A.vi.l. This identification will be proved in 
the main body of this work, am. can be here anticipated. 
1) 'The systems we have named': Aristotle has named or menti<md 
the Milesian school, Anaxagoras and Empedocles, the Atomists, the 
'so-celled Pythagoreans 1 and the Eleatics, the second last being 
also called. PYthagoreans and 'the Italian school t. But since the 
whole purpose of the review of these systems is to set out in order 
the anticipations of his own four causes, and Aristotle has a.t this 
point arrived at the third of these, that of Essence, which begins 
a new section.t so to speak, and is cut off from what goes before by 
the summary of 987a3-9, it 1s to the systems named in this connectioJ1 
that he particularly refers. This is the Pythagorean philosophy of 
987ali-22, and as this is the same as the 1 so-called Pythagoreanism 1 
of A.v, it may perhaps be coupled for the purpose of this back-
reference with Leucippus and Democritus, who were roughly contempo ... 
raneous with it. Hence, when ~istotle says; n;After the systems we 
have named came the philosophy of Plato", he means that Platonism 
came after, i.e. chronologically posterior to, the 1 so-called 
pythagoreans', Leucippus, and Democtritus, who were all roughly 
contemporl.llneoust .• We know that Leucippus predeeded Democri tus, and 
Aristotle says the 1 so-called Pythagorea.ns' were contemporaneous 
with and before themJ. Democxitus can be dated with fair accuracy. 
1 His floruit, according to Apollodorus, was 420 B.C., and even if 
. 2 
we take the latest date suggested by Frank, who gives his period of 
activity as 4 30-400, Plato' s philo sr> phy was still subsequent to th1::; 
since he is almost universally accepted as ha.ving commrmced his 
writings only after the death of Socrates in 399 B. c. 
, 
iii)' These thinkers•: The word for 'these thinkers', 70uTot r , 
is a demonstrative pronoun which refers bacl<: to the party last named 
who are the Pythagoreans of 987a1~-22. Plato, then, followed these 
Pythagoreails, who began to make statements and defin:t.tions .• But, as 
we have said, these are the1 same as 'the philosophy of the Italians' ,1 
from whom Plato differed. That is, Plato followed the Pythagoreans 
' I in most respects, but not· in all, for (Yt:t.;') he had peculia-rities 
of his own which distinguished his philosophy from that of the 
. --
Italians, i.e. these same Pythagoreans .• -SJ in the list of resemblan-
ces and differences in A. vi, Aristotle d'oe s not say that Plato 
resembled the Pythagoreans and differed from the Italians, but ne .. mer 
only the Pythagoreans. This, of course, raises a. further problem, 
viii}, why Aristotle calls this school Pythagoreans in one place, 
amd Italians or 'so-called Pythagoreans' in another. 
1. Diogene s Laertius IX. 41, cp. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy 381-
b?rn 80th Olympiad, 460-57 B.C., but Thrasylus dates him 10 years 
earlier, whence perhaps Frank's figure for his floru1t, 430. 
2. Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer 10. 
3. Cherniss, op. cit. 177 note 100, says "it should naturally refer 
back to the philosophies already mentioned" and since these are 
the .Pythagoreans, which by implication Cherniss denies, we must 
aJ_.}.ow more weight to Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas 154 note 1. 
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vii) ·,The philosophy of the Italians' : If, as we said, the 
'philo a:> phy of the Italians' is the same1 as the pythagoreanism of 
987all-22 and the ' so-called Pythegoreani sm' of A. v. 98 5b23-6a.21, 
then what ,Aristotle understood by this philoa::>,phy - i.e. its tenets-
can be gathered from an examination of the account of 'so-called 
Pythagoreanism' as given in (A.v.985b23-6a21. But why he uses three 
apparently different names for what seems to be one school, i.e. 
problem viii), cannot be ascertained from the context and must be 
gone into when the nature of Pytha.goreanism is investigated. 
ii) 'The philosphy of Plato': Whr:1t. Aristotle understood by 
the 'philosophy of Plato' IN THIS CONTEXT will obviously be dis.co-
vered from an examination of the account which he gives in A.vi. 
But this account ca.nnot be considered in isolation from iv), its 
resemblances to pythagoreanism, and vi) its p3 culiari ties, for not 
only does that account consist to a large extent of a list of these 
' peculiarities and resemblances, but the Y'¥' referred t o above 
implies that the whole first part of the account has been given with 
· the sole purpose of accounting for one at least of Plato' s di sttngu-
ishing chrracteristics. There is, in fact, very little in 
Aristotle's account of Platonism in A. vi wh:tch is not concerned 
either with accounting for a peculiarity distinguishing it or with 
' stating a resemblance between it and pythagoreanism. It is not,and I 
was not intended to be, a full account of Plato's philosophy, but 
had as its primary purpose the ascertaining to what extent Plato 
had anticipated Aristotle's four causes, and secondarily the 
substantiation of his statement of its relationEhip to pythagorean-
ism by detailing its resemblances and differentiating characteris-
tics, The account· is thus confined to what Aristotle calls the 
' ~ essen-tt"il and the material cap.ses,.end the agreementswith and 
differences from Pythagoreanism, and these two overlap to a great 
extent. As the sc<ipe of this work·. has been restricted to :5kx:t that 
phase of Platonism which A. vi .1 alleges to have stood in some 
relation$ll1p or other to Pythagoreanism,. the source for this phase 
will be A. vi,· where Aristotle deta.ils ijftstthat relationship between 
the two philos~phies, and will fall together with the discussion 
of iv), Plato's resemblarxes to, and vi),his differences from, 
Pythagorean! sm. 
v) 'Following': There remains to discuss the implications of 
the word 1 following' {al(o)\•v I} 0~ CT Cc... ) • The short stet em en t given 
above of the context of A.vi.l shows that it is not possible to 
decide from that con text whether Aristotle meant chance agreement 
or deliberate borrowing. Nor will a. decttion be possible until at 
l.Ritchie, Plato 11, looking Cb ubtless to their geographical seat, 
thinks that both Pythngoreans r,nd Eleatics are meant by the 
Italian philosophy. But Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics I.xlv11, is 
definite that the Eleatics are not included among the Italians 
here, and Cherniss, op. cit. 177 note 100, confines the Italians 
m to the Pythagorean:3 alone. 
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least the precise nature of the 'philosophy of the Italians•, of 
the phase of Platonism affected, and of the det&ils of the relation-
ship between them, have been determined. Until, then, such a 
discussion has ~ielded some definite conclusion, it will be advis-
able to render this word by some such nom-committal expression as 
'following•, 'resemblance', or 'agreement', withou~ thereby implying 
whether such resemblance was conscious or the result of chance. 
SUmmarl: We can, t~n, summarise the results of the above 
analysis as follows: 1) Plato's philosophy was subsequent to the 
systems named in the ~xmxiMME preceding two books of the MetaphySics) 
those of the 'so-called Pythagoreans' and the Atmmpists. ::J.ii) With 
these thinkers, i.e. the Pythagoreans, Plato showed many points of 
agreement, and viii) as they are also named 'the Italians', we must 
inquire the reason for the difference in nomenclature. vii) However 
that may be, what Aristotle understood by 'the philosophy of the 
Italians' iss et forth in A.v. With this philosophy ii) that of 
Plato stood in some kind of relation, and what Aristotle understlbod 
by Platonism in this connection can '~Best ~ elucidated by a 
consideration of iv) his list of resemblances and vi) of his 
peculiafr1ties, which are given in A.vL After an/examination of 
these points, it remains to -consider v) what was the precise m ture 
of this relntionshmp - deliberfiate borrowing or E«EEim:HE unconscious 
parallel development. This exhausts the content of Metaphysics A.vi. 
1, and since a sufficient am wer has been given to points 1 and iii, 
there remain.¢ for subsequent ~nve.stigation the threqtopics around 
which the other points can be grouped. 
. The scope of this thesisl These three topics, the discussion 
of \Vhich will exhaust the possibilities of ~etaphysics Avvi.l,centre 
around points vii and viii above; points ii, iv and vi, and point v, 
and can be headed respectively: 1 .• 'The philosophy of the Italians•, 
'7(.,.~~ 'J-r#t}ui(:Zy c/c~o~otJl~ ; 2. 'the philosophy of Plato', '7< 
l] ~a''l"c.uror ¥~1'~ ~£.../ ec. ; which. entails the eDJinat ion of a.) 'the 
\. ' \ ,, ~ J,; peculiar:!J.ies that distinguished 'it' ,Ia cf, ;(ac tdtq ~10Uf>Cc.. , and 
' ' b) the many respects in which it followed these thinkers, 7q, f'Fi" 
7To}t~e( ..,..,JJ",,r ~J{o~~~~~o~trec.. ; and 3. the nature of the relationship 
denoted by 'following', ~l[o""o"8"vo-~a; It will be seen that this 
scheme agrees in the main w1 th that set out from a study of modern 
interpretations centering around the relationship between Plato and 
the Pytha.goreans, as alleged by Aristotle here. 1 
Now this scheme, as set out above, is meant to deal exclusively 
with the evidence of Aristotle. Naturally this evidence will not be 
confined to Metaphysics A.v and vi, which supplememt the immediF.~te 
subject of this dissertation - the discussion of Metaphysics ~A.vi.l­
but will take cognisance of what Aristotle says elsewhere in his 
works, but chiefly elsewhere in the Metaphysics. Nevemeless, such 
an extension of the scope of this discussion will not be exhaustive 
1. See page 19 above. 
25/ 
if so limited, since this may be sufficient to determin~ what 
Aristotle meant by this sentence, but will not th~refore guarantee 
the historical correctness of his conceptions. Hence, this work will 
be divided intotwo distinct and separate parts: firstly, it must be 
determined from Aristotle's evidence alone what he meant by the 
• philosophy of the Italians' , how he ro ncei ved that phase of Platon-
ism which he hos brought into some relationship with that philosophy 
especially its resemblances to and ilifference s from it, and what 
type of rela.tionship he understood it to 1:e - whether chance agree-
ment or conscious bovrowing. This is, roughly, the scheme set out 
just above, and forms only the fir sit part of this work. For it is 
quite po ssllble either that Aristotle mi sun de r·stood or that he 
deliberately misrepresented ell thpese points, so that the inve'Bti-
gation envisaged must be supplemented by a second part dealing with 
· dvidence as fa.n as possible independent o.f Aristotle's in order to 
ascertain the histqrical correctness of his conceptions. 
Thus; and this cru1ngt be overemphasised, the first part of 
thisfwork will aim at determining Aristotle's meaning w1 thout, taking 
into consideration at all whether or not his account gives a 
correct or a fair interpretBft.,ion of the points dealt with, and will 
accordingly deal almost exclusively with Aristotle's evidence; on 
the other hand, the secord part will aim at checking the historical 
truth of hi~ statements, a.nd will do so, as far as possible, by 
treating evidence which is independent of hi.s influence - as far as 
is possible, becap:se in certain cases his is the only evidence 
extant. With this distinction in mind, then, I pass to the f:t'.:st 
part of this work - the attempt to d.etermiline what Aristotle meant 
in A.vi.l, based solely on his ev.idence in' the Metaphysics, supple-
mented where nect:: ssary from his other works. 
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Pa.rt I. What Aristotle Meant in Metaphysics A.vi.l. 
Chapter 1. rJ r4J ,/ 'j,.Q.},I{ /;#/ c.f, ~o P"o c/ / ~ • 
Introductor-y. 
Only one Pythag:orean school in book ,~: Before a. proper methodologi-
cal basis can be obtained for determining what Aristotle meant in 
Metaphysics A.vi.l by the 1 philosophy o~ the Italians', it is 
important first to realise that, with the exception of a single 
passage, throughout book A he has in mind one and the same school 
of Pythagorean philosophy., and secondly to demonstrate this. The 
first aim has been to a certain extent realised by our remarks in 
the Introduction, 1 that it is the same school to which he refers as 
Pythagoreans both in 987all-22 and in relationmip to Plato througnut 
A. vi-, as 1 so-called Pythagorean s• in A. v, and as the Italian school 
or the philosophy of the Italians in A. vi.l. It remains to extend 
this identification to lLL references to pythagoreans in the book, 
and in demonstrating this the promise previously made, that this 
equation would be more completely proved, w111 be thereby fulfiilled. 
For this demponstration I shall give a short account of the 
various places in book A where Aristotle deals with some Pythagorean 
school, 1rre·spect1ve of' its designation, make a grouping of passages 
where the context indicates that in that place the same school is 
obviously intended, and conclude by showing the essential identity 
of the· school¢ dealt with in these separate places, which number 
three altogether. 
The first pla.ce where such. a. school is mentioned is A.v, where 
Aristotle expounds the philosophy of what he calls 'the so-called 
2 pythagoreans', mentioning the Table of Contraries of "other mem¢bers 
of the same school",? After a digression about the Eleatics, he 
4 
summarises, preparatory to his introduction of tre cause of the 
Essence which he is searching for', and excludes from the summary 
the 'Italian school' • 5 He then turns to the question of Essence by 
outlining the beliefs of what are: here. called the 1 Pythagoreans'. 6 
'Then in A.vi.l he says that Plato's doctrine followed "these 
, ! 
thinkers'' ( T<H~7"'o' ~ ) , but hnd peculia.ri ties wh1 c h distinguished 
' it from the ·1 philosophy of the Italian s• , and in the course of A. vi 
he lists certain agreements of Plato with and differences from the 
'Pythagoreans' •7 He then turns to criticise tre systems he has 
• 
named, dealing with tm 'so-call(id Pythagorean a' in A~ viii, 8 and 
apart from the bare statement in a summary in A.vii that Plato 
"spoke of the Great and snall, the Itel1ans9 of the Infinite*', 10 the 
1. See page 21. 2. Metaphysics 98 5b23-6a21. 
3. Met. 986a22-26. 4. Met. 987a3-13. 
5. Met. 987alo. 6. Met. 987a13-28. 
7. Met. 987bllff, 22:ff, 31. 8. Met. 98 9b29ff. 
9. This ob~iously refers to Plato's following the Pythagoreans in 
making the other element than the One an Infinite, but differin~ 
in making this a Dyad in stead of a single entity, as in 987b2S-~ '/' 
3i. 10. Met. 988a26-7. 
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only ether place in this book where Aristotle mentions these parties 
is in A.ix.l, where, turning to his criticism of Plato, he says, 
"Let us leave the Pytha.gorea.ns for the pre sent." 1 
Now in this summary lt is clear that there are three intercon-
nected passages, which can be grouped a~ follows, a.ndeach of which 
deals· with one and the same school - in this grouping I omit the 
"other members of the same schooltt of 986a.22-26, whom Aristotle 
himself thus distinguishes from the main body of references. 
i) The account of the doctrine of the 'so-called Pythagoreans' and 
the criticism thereof:- In A. v Aristotle is olJviously dealing with 
I 
the same school, which~ he names that of the 'so-called Pythagorean~. 
from the beginning of' the chapter where he introduces them down to 
where he turns off to "others of the same school", i.e •. from 985b 
23 to 986a21. The plan of his book is to sta .. te tre system he is 
dealingwith, and afterwards to critid.'se it, hence; apart from tre. 
fact that the relevant criticism in A.vii1 is introduced as that 
of the 'so-called Pythagoreans1 , the whole plan of his book 
indii.cates that it is the same school which is desribed in A.v and 
criticised in ~.viii. 
11) The Pythagoreans of the Essence:- Pausing before he takes up the 
2 
search for the Essence, Aristotle excludes from the summary of 
7; 
what has gone before the 'Italian school',..~ and then tllrns to the 
pytha.goreans who sought the Essence. 4 Hence, despite the difference 
in terminology, these Pythagoreans of the Essence are the Italian 
school ex61uded in 987alo. 
iii) The followings and peculia.,tr'ities of Plato:-The balance of the 
sentence, A.vi.l, shows that, as stated in the Introduct1on, 5Plato 
followed e.nd differed from the same party; and in any case in the 
course of list1n~ these resemblances and differences in A.vi only 
one party is named as that which Plato both differed from and agreed 
with - the Pythagoreans .. Hence, as appeared in ii above, the 
'philosophy of the Italians' from which Plato differed, and the 
, 
pythagoreans -To~roc( - whom he followed, are one school, that of 
the Pythagoreans with whom he is compared and contrasted in the 
course of A.vi. 
Two places have been omitted here, and for the sake of making 
this grouping exhaustj.ve, they can be placed f4trthwith. The one lis 
988a26-7, and note 9 on the previous page shows this brief reference 
belongs to group 111. The other is 990a33, which, as it forms tte 
transi ttl on from group i - the criticism of the 'so-called Pythag&-
reans' - to the criticism of Plato, belongs to that group, group 1. 
A complete and exhaustive list of references to pythagorean schools 
in book ·'A, then, comprises just tre se three groups of passages. 
That all these passages refer to one and the same school can be 
shown as follows:-
l.Metaphysics 990a33. 
4. Met. 987al3-28. 
2. ~et. 987a3-13. 3. Met. 987alo. 
5. See page 22 above. 
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a) The identity of groups i end ii:- In the summary of group 
ii, Aristotle excludes wh2t he here C~llls the Italian school. This 
can only refer either to the 'so-called Pytha.goreans' of 985b23-
986a21 or to the 'ot~ rs of the same school' of 986a22-26. But the 
latter are mentioned only in connection with a Table of Contraries, 
whereas the former are dealt with in some detail and are said to 
have held Number a.s the principle of things both as their matter 
and as forming their modifications and permanent sta.tes. 1 When 
Aristotle turns again to the Italian school, calling them pytha.go-
reans, he distinguishes them as believing that Number was the 
2 
substance of all things, so that he must be referring to the 
'so-called Pythagoreans' and not to the 'others of the same school'. 
b) The identity of groups ii and iii:- The demonstration of 
the ident1 ty of these two gr&ups x:t.i turns on t~at T"Jr.,t f which 
was di ~cussed in the In traduction. 3 That is, it links up Plato's 
resemblances to the Pythagoreans of the Essence in group ii with 
the list of hisY resemblances given in A.vi to the Pythagoreans of 
group iii. 
Therefore, we conclude that in the whole of book A, except for 
the 'other members of the same school' who are characterised by a 4 . 
Table of Contraries, Aristotle hn s in mind one and the same school, 
and this is in fact the only pythagorean school whose doctrines are 
referred to in that book. This is an important concld"Sion, since 
many modern commentators pick a.nd choose from the various tenets 
expounded in book A as th~ please, so long as they find in them 
evidence for· the particular school they wish to demonstrate. This 
is one of the reasons for the variety of interpretations of 
Pythagoreanism; but a different, and in my opinion more correct 
picture is~ravm if 1 t be laid do:\"IJn us a necessary methodlltlogica.l 
procedure that all references to pythagoreanism in Book A, except 
of course the Table of Contr8ries mentioned above, MUST belong to 
one and the same school. As e.n example of this random selection of 
references I cite the following. 
Raven distinguishes two successive Pythagorean schools, of which 
. the earlier identified Numbers ahd things, which he illustrates by 
987b28, 5 and 98;6al7, that Numbers were 1 matt.er'. 6 Further, for immate· 
rial concepts they spoke of things im.i tating Numbers as in 98 5b29 
\ 7 8 
and 987bll-2. ./ill these references comefrom book A, and yet he says 
that 985b23-6a2l, i.e. A.v, refers to Philola.us, 'other members of 
the same_ school' meaning an earlier generation. But if the 1 others 
of the same school' are the earlier generation, and the Pythagoreans 
of the preceding portion of A.v are those of a later generation -
the school of Ph1lolaus - how can he use refdrences from this 
passage and elsewhere in book A, as cited above 1 to illustrate the 
1. Metaphysics 986al6-7. 2. Met. 987al9. 3. Pago 22 above. 
5. Pythagoreans and Elea.tics 48 & 53. 
7. Op. cit.51-2,56 7& 62. 8. Op.c1t. 113-4. 
4. Met. 986a22ff. 
6. Op. cit. 58-9. 
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earlier school which identified things and Numbers? 
The designation of ~his schooJ:.: Before going on to expound our 
inter~retstion of this school, one problem, that referred to as 
--
viii above, remains to be solved. If it is om and the same school 
that Aristotle has in mind in book A, how can he designate it by 
"' three different appellations - Pythagoreans, 'so-calle-d PJlthagoreans 
and the 'philosophy of the Italians'? This discussion fallB into 
three parts: a) the demonstration of the essential identity of the 
last two; b) the demonstration of the identity of the first two, at 
least in book A; and c) the explanation of the term 'so-called'. r 
a) The identity of 'so-called Pythagoreanism' and the 'philO,~l 
sophy of the Italians': In A.v1 Aristotle makes a back-reference to 
De Caelo ii.l3, where an astronomical system is expounded identical 
with that noticed there. The det.a.ils of this system do not here 
concern us; what concerns us is that he ascribes this system to 
2 
"the Italian philosophers known as Pythae;,orean", where in tte 
Greek the word for 'known as1 1 s the same as that for ' so-called 1 , 
viz.Kit~O~{Yoc.. • The meaning of this word will be discussed under 
c) below. This appellation shows that this school, which is the 
same as that dealt with in book A and similarly dubbed there, was 
specifically the Italian school, and that it laid claim to the 
t1 tle of Pythagorean, generically as one might say. So in 987a.lO, 
987a31 {i.e. A.vi.l) and 988a26-7 Aristotle names the school as the 
Italian, and in 985b23 (i.e. A.v) and 989b29 (i.e. A.viii) as the 
'so-ca.lled Pythagorean 1 • 
b) The identity of 'so-called pythagoreans' and Pythagoreans 
in book A: It is unnecessary to detail the places in book A where 
Aristotle name~his school as simply Pythagorean, since that has ~-~ 
been sufficiently dom in the summary of page 26-7 above .• Assuming 
that there was a reason for the addition of 'so-called' where it is 
fo~~d, for Aristotle is hardly verbose, one might say that he uses 
· saye the shorter term in order to save e word, but a more likely explana-
tion is that there was more than one school which claimed to be 
Pythae,orean~ This Itaiian school claimed to be Pythagorean - so that 
they could be called Pythagoreans -, but Aristotle feels now and 
then an urge to distinguish this school from the other or others 
by an epithet -'so-called]'- the force of which will be discussed 
under c) below. At this point we need to show that Aristotle knew 
of another school which claimed to be pythagorean, and the proof 
of this is found in 986a.22: 11 0THER MEMBERS of the same school 11 .Aga1n, 
in Metaphysics l09lal5-8 the Pythagoreans are said to "say plainly 
that when the One had been constructed, whether out of¢p1anes or rf 
surface or of seed or of elements which they cannot express, 
1. Met.986al2-3; cp. editor's note ad lac., referring the readfer 
to De Caelo 11.13. 2. De Caelo 293a20-27. 
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1mmedia tely the nearest part of the Unlimited began to be con strain-
ed and limited by the Limitu. N.ow the variety of modes in which 
the One is here said to have been constructed can hardly refer all 
to one and th.e same philosophy, since, whatever may have been tre 
case with planes and surfaces, Seed at lesst, as the manner of the 
construction of the One, is not compatible with its construction 
' 1 
from elements. It is perhaps this feeling that led Ross to state 
\,.C\ 
that "Aristotle's suggestion as to the mode of composition offb £Y 
is not necessarily based <in any Pythagorean doctrine, but may be his 
own conjecture." However that may be, either, if not both, of these 
passages indicates that Aristotle knew of more .than one Pyth~ oreo.n 
school; so that the school of book ''A was known es Pythrg orean, but 
Aristotle chose to distinguish it from the other Pythagorean school 
or schools by the addi ti· on of the epithet, ' so-called' • The reason 
for this addition lies in the meaning which he assigned to that word. 
c) Explanation of the term 'so-called,' K4:)..o~jA-rvoL: 
There are three different ways in which co mrnen t.ctors have explained 
this word. i) In his note ad loc. Tredennick2 sta>tes, "Aristotle 
seems to have regarded pythagoras as a. legendary figure". He gives 
no a,tuthority for this, but his remark reminds one of De Anima 410b 
22ff (= Dials 66Bll). This reads, "The same objection lies against 
the view expressed in the SO-CALLED Orphic poems", and Philoponus. 
explains the reservation a.s referring to Aristotle's doubt whether 
the author of the 'poems really was Orpheus, since Orpheus was a 
legendary figure. 3o also Raven', 3 that Aristotle· considers PythagorBG 
legendary. But this wilt not do for two reasons. Firstly, the word 
in the De Anima passage is notK"'l).ou'jtrvc.J( but~t7~rc'Poc f , and 
secondly if Pyth~~oreans were so-cal~ed ~cause Pythagoras was 
considered legendary, then this epithet should- b~ or could be 
applied to any Pythagorean school whatsoever, but I hope .to make it 
clear in the course oi this chapter that Aristotle so dubs only the 
Italian school. 
ii) Cherniss4 takes the word toimean no more than that the 
Pythagoreans were simply so nCDned, i.e. 'so-called Pythagoreans' 
is a mere per.iphrasis meaning si! mply 'Pythagoreans' • He cites 
Aristotle',..'Poli tic.S 1290b40, "the food-producing class, who are 
CALLED husbandmen." This undoubtedly fits such an expression a.s 
"the Italian philoSJ phers known as Pythagorean" or "who are C) 
CALLED Pythagorean 11 , but here tCIII),.Jfc""o<. has the force of a p~t 
participle; in the ttso-called Pythagoreans 11 it is an epithet. In 
-- ---any case the word could have two meanings or uses, am an example 
will be cited in iii) below where the word means more than this. 
1. Aristotle's Metaphysics II.483 ad l09la15-lB. 
2. Aristotle's Metaphysics, Loeb Library Edition, !.32 note a; cp. 
Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysi. cs !.143. 3. ·Pythae;;oreans and EftBx:t:i:Ex 
Eleatics 16. 4."'Aristotle' s Criticism of the Pre-Socratic 
Philosophy 38 4-5. 
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ili) Frank1 takes the • so-called' as an epithet in tended by 
Aristotle to distinguish this scientif.ic school flO m the gm;uine 
religious pytha.e,orean oo mmuni ty; this wets not a genuine Pytheg ore an 
school at all, but e,scribed their doctrines to Pyth~ora.s to get 
the weight of his a.utho:di. ty. Frank probably goes too far in denying 
that this school was Fythsgorean at all, but I think he is correct 
in interpreting 'so-callel'' to mean that Aristotle doubts whether 
their tenets go back to pythagoras himself. If, as we said above, 
ther..e was more than one pythagorean school, and if one of tbse was 
that of the genuine followers of Pythagoras, then one. other school 
which cla.irned to be Pythagorean, but which Aristotle denied or rather 
doubted to be really pythagorean ,might well be distinguished by him 
as a .~'so-called Pythaesorea:ll school". }(Just how such a school could 
claim to be pyth81::,orea.n and yet _Aristotle doubt that claim, cannot 
be demonstrated from Aristotle's works, so that this question can 
well be left over for Part II. But to substantiate this interpreta-
- . ( ' .F. .. (~-,.-tion, I pol.nt to Herodotus II.81 :dfto)..o7tot~fl>c t ...,_C(OI4 ocq-.<. 
'0f?{)<~(oitl"'- 1(4">..tof'/~'~<c-(. Ktt:- ba~<Kocci'(~ £.oa~( S·/ Ac'yvJ/-
, ' i"'t. (J , 2 (< lXlJ"<. K&(,c ''"174 YtJ/f<o'<7><.. This Dodds translates:"These Egyptian 
practic6s agree with the practices called Orphic and Dionysiac, 
which really origina.te in Egypt end s:ome of which were brought thence 
by pythagoras". Now it seems to me that ;,-;o-' .. fld{cl( o;~, ICet>..tt>}'/~cH (7"-t. 
1f? not just a periphrasis for -.CJ/'.t<Ko(~c.. , but that there is a 
. I 
definite and decided contrast between . ' called' , l(q}\'1 oft JY'oc: t>- ( , and 
' I . ' 
'really', ~ou~< dt . In other wor·ds, Herodotus says these rites 
\ 
are CALJ.. .. ED Orphic but are REALLY Pythagorean. Applied to the phrase 
I 
here investigeted, I would say that the force of the word in question 
\ 
is that the philosophy of the Italians was not REALLY Pythagorean in· 
the strict sense of the word, i.e. the philoro.phy that pythagoras 
originated and . taught, but only CALLED Pythagorel'm, 3 either bepause 
it laid false claim to that appellation or in default of some other 
name. Hence, while any Pyt.hagoref1n philosophy whatsoever, whether 
really Pythagorean or only so called, coul4s be E:lld:l:Hii referred to as 
Pythagorean, only the philosophy of the Italians, which was not 
really Pythaeorean but only so called, could rightly have its prove-
nance doubted by being referred to as •the so-called Pythagorean• 
philosophy - unless of course there was more than one such philosophy, 
which has, to my knowledge, never been asserted. 
We turn now to an exposition of tie doctrines of' this schooli, 
but with this reservation, tin. t our object 1~ notto attempt to disco-
ver what they re~lly were, but only es Aristotle conceived them. 
1. Plato und die sogenann ten Pythagoreer 69. 
2. The Greeks and the Irrational 149 note 96. 
3. That is, in Aristotle's opinion, just as the quotation above is 
only Herodotus• opinion. 
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Section 1. Exposition of the 'Philosophy of the Italians'. 
Evidence: Now if, as we have shown above, the whole of book A, 
except the digression concerning •other members of tre same school', 
deals with ore and the same school, that of the 'philosophy of the 
Italians', then an important corollary follo'Ars, namely, that this 
book will form the primary source for what Aristotle understood by 
this philosophy. And it must again be stressed that we are here 
concerned solely with what Aristotle rm ant, leaving over for part II 
the task of checking the historical correctness of his conception& 
This will have the advantage of enabling us to take his evidence at 
face value, allowing of course, where necessary, for a.ny obscurlilties 
of expression which mny need elucida.tion, but without any ref!.ction 
1 
oli whether he misunderst·ood, misrepresented or even invented. To 
this primary body of evidence can further be added those passages 
in his works where various tenets are ascribed either to the Italians 
or to the 1 so-called Pythagoreans', since tit ha.s been shown thti.t 
these are the designations which he applies to this school. But 
since there was more than one school called or laying claim to the 
name pythagorean, any passages referring to Pythagoreans E1 mply, 
much less anonymous references which commentators ha..ve ascribed to 
the pythagoreans, must be regarded with suspicion so far as concerns 
their being a source .for the philosophy here dealt with. The only 
criterion for such passages as relevant evidence will be their 
consistency with the results derived from the .study of the primary 
sources, and such as are thus consistent therewith can be regarded 
as secondary sources, but must be treated with caution. 
The core, then, of our evidence, the primary sources, will be 
book fA.- that is, exclud1ing unhelpful short references, A. v., vi and 
viii,- a.nd De Caelo 284b6-8, 29320-27, Meteorolog¢y 342b29ff and 
345a14ff, which are ascribed either to the Italians or to the 
' so-called pythagoreans• • But actually no account need be taken of 
three of these since they do not form any part of the system, so to 
speak, expounded in the other body of evidence. These are, namely, 
De Caelo 284b6-8, which says that they call om portion of the sky 
the Right and the other the Left; Meteorology 345a14ff, which gives 
a •pythagorean' myth about the Milky Way; and Meteorology 342b29ff, 
which gives their view of comets and its application to the rare 
appearance of Mercury. The evidence will be dealt with not in 
order of pagination, as it is repetitious amd confused in lay-out, 
but systematically so as to unfold their philosophy topic by topic. 
We begin by examining the procedure characterist~c of tlltschocal, 
l. See Appendix for Chemiss' allegation that Aristotle invented 
the account of the Pythagorea.ns of the Essence in order to bolster 
up his equally fictitious allegation of Pythagorean influence on 
Plato in •~taphysics A.vi.l. 
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which is differently expressed, but all to the same effect, in 
four sepa.eate passages. 
a.) The Proc.~qure Characteristic of this School:.. 
A.v.985b24-26: "The so-called pythagoreans who were the first to 
take up ma.thematics, not only advanced this study but ••••• thought :t:t : 
its~rinciples were the principles of all things •••••• " 
A. viii. 989b29-990a8: ''They treat of principles and elements stran-
ger than those of the physical philos:> phers (the reason is that 
they got the principles from non-sensible things ••••• , the objects 
of mathematics); yet their discussions and investigations are all 
about Nature ••••••• With regard to the parts and a.ttri bute s and 
functions (sc. of the hea.vens), they observe the phenomena, and use 
up the principles and causes in explaining these. But the causes 
and the principles which they mention are sufficient to act a.s 
steps even up to the higher realms of reality, and are more suited 
to these than to theories about nature." 
A.v. 986a3-8: "All the properties of numbers and scales which they 
could show to agree with the att~ibutes ro1d parts and the whole 
arrangement of the heavens, they collected and fitted into their 
scheme, and if there was a gap anywhere, they readily made additions 
so as to make their whole theory coherentV 
De Caelo ii.l3. 293R25-27: '"In this way they are not seeking for 
theories and causes to account for observed facts, bt.t rather 
forcing their observations and trying to accommodate them to 
theories and opinions of their own." 
These passages show that1these Pythagoreans were THE mathemati-
cians of Ant6quity, and, carr4ed away by zeal for their subject, 
they interpreted nature in terms of mathematics. Having determined 
what were the principles of mathematics, they applied these to 
nature, so that, instead of trying to account for observed facts, 
they did not hesitate to fore~· their observations to su~ their 
mathematical theories derived ;a priori, and where thj.s was irnpos.st 
, 
s:tble 1 t was S> much the worse for na tute - they simply made such 
additions to their body of data a.s were recpJ.ired to make a coherent 
theory of¢ nature. One can further dist·.inguish certain different 
departments of their conception of nature. On the one hand were tm 
properties of numbers and of scales, which probably belonged to 
their a priori deduction of the principles of mathematics, and on 
the other one can distiggu1sh the attributes, the parts and the 
whole system (or the functions) of the heavens, to which these 
principles were applied. It is not quite clear what Aristotle means 
by 'parts and attributes of the heavens•, 'but •the whole arrangement 
of the heavens' can fairly, I believe, be referred to the number 
and order of the heavenly bodies. But the closer examination of all 
this must be left over for detailed treatment below. 
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b) The Three Modes for EXf!lainin~ the Existence of Sensibles. 
We have seen in the Introdut1on1 that there are three modes for 
the relation subsisting between things and Numbers, wh:b h have been 
variously interpreted as the key to the Pythagorean conception of 
Number, either as things themselves, as ideal patterns or as 
composite entities formed from elements. All three seem to be 
2 
attested of one and the S8me school, since 987b27-28 has been :bl:i:Jir 
interpreted to mean that Numbers are the matter out of which things 
are composed, 987bll-123 to mean that Numbers are ideal patterns, 
and 986al-24 that Numbers, like sensibles, are composed of 'two 
elements. If· taken in these senses, ther·e is no doubt that Cherniss5 
is correct when he says: "Aristotle's account is self-contradictory, 
for he represents 1 t (i.e. the distinctive feature of pythagorean-
ism) as identifying Numbers and physical objects, as identifying 
the principles of Numbers with the principles of existing things, 
and as making things imitate Numbers •• · ••• The certain point is the 
incompatibility of the thesis that things are Numbers with the other 
two ••••• If Numbers are things consisting of a group of units (i.e. 
points having position), neither !{umbers not things derive from 
higher principles, and there is no meaning in the elements of Number 
being the elements of things •••• Things imitate Numbers again is 
different from the identity of Numbers and things. tl As just stated, 
Cherniss is quite correct: according to the current interprettt ion 
of these three modes,i.e. as here expounded by Cherniss, Aristotle 
is guilty of ascribing to this school three tenetswhich are mutu~ 
ally contradictory, and as the contradiction could hardly have been 
held by the Pythagorean:s, as 1 t\ is too obvious, Aristotle's evidence 
6 
would seem to be valueless. Nor. would Cornford• s solution, that 
11Ar1stotle, in speaking of the pythagoreans, sometimes refers to the 
original VI centfary system, sometimes to the later doctrine, and so 
seems inconsistent, e.g .• in saying that sensibles imitate Numbers 
and yet actually are Numbers, n .offer an escape £rom this dilemma, 
since, according to MY hypothesis, all three passages belong to one 
and the same school. 7 Nor~trom a methodological point of view is 
Burnet's interpretation8 more successful. For while he attempts to 
ind ude all three • incompatible' modes in one theory, he can only 
do so by dismissing the last - that the elements of Number are the 
elements of all things - as "only Arisfr.otle' s way of putting it 11 ; 
but methodologically speaking, there is no reason why he 81 ould not 
have said that 'things are Numbers' is only Arist~tle' s way of 
expressing the compos1tio~ of things and Numbers from the same 
elements. 
1. See pages 3-7 above. 2. "The things themselves a.re Numbers'' 
3. "(Things) exist by Imitation of Numbers". 
4. "The elements of Numbers a.re the elements of all things." 
5. Aristotle's Criticism of Pre-Socratic Philosophy 386-392. 
6. Classical Quarterly XVI.l38. 7. See pages 26ff. above. 
8. Early Greek Philo£ophy 332-3. 
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We must, thfl'..n, a.ccept all three references for the sa.me 
. I 
pythagorean philom phy and determine what Aristotle meant by each; 
and .,f the three modes, as Aristotle conceived them, turn out to be 
incompatible, then Aristotle's evidence, in this respect at least, 
must be quite unreliable. But I think that it. is the modern critics 
who are in the wrong. Let us begin with 987b27-28. 
1. "Things ere Numbers 11 : The error that modern commemtators 
make is either, like Ra.vcn1 , to make a. satisfactory examination of 
the doctrines of what he ca,lls 'the early school', and then seek 
confirmation of these doctrines in Aristotle WHEREVER THEY GAN BE 
FOUND. &>, correctly I believe, ascribing to this early school the 
tenet that things consist of Numbers ha.v·ing magnitude, he cites 
987b27-28 as evidence for this. But since on Ramen's own hypothesis 
Metaphysics A.v-vi must refer to a later school - since the •others 
of the same school' of 986a22-26 are taken to refer .to his early 
school2- he is committing a methodological error in using a passage 
referring to the later school to co~roborate the earlier. or like 
Cherniss, 3 to use Aristotle's evidence to determine what Aristotle 
means, but to use for this purpose PASSAGES SELECTED AT RANDOM. So 
he says, 11 The meaning Aristotle gives of the identity of things and 
Numbers is that bodies consist of aggregates of points h8Ving 
position." For the former he uses, indeed, 987b27-28, but for the 
la.tter, which is supposed to reveal Aristotle's meaning he uses 
passages in a much late.r part of the Metaphysics, which have nothing 
whatever to do with the 'philosophy of the Italians.• Hence, to 
avoid these errors, we must confine ourselves to what Aristotle 
meant, and in determinin& this we must confine ourselves to the 
passages listed on page 32 _abov~. If we do this, we shall find in 
this body o.f evidence two and only two stat~men ts which could be 
taken to bear witness that things are Numbers, as distinct from 
the heavens being a N~m~er or t~at Justice etc. a.re or resemble 
Numbers, which are something 
1
qui te different. 
The first of these .is the reference under discussion, 987b27-8: 
ttThey say thaf the things themselves are Numbers. 11 Now taken out 
1 ' 
of their context, as Raven has done, the,se words might indeed seem 
to irr.ply that a pyramid is 4, a -mnn 250, or such like. But if we 
examine the context, we .see thet this is not Aristotle's meaning. 
This runs: upeculiar to Plato is his view that the Numbers exist 
apart from sensible things, while (the Pythagoreans) say that the 
things themselves are Numbers. n This tenet, then, must. be interpre-
ted IN CONTRAST TO WHAT PLA'l'O ASSERTED, for it is only introduced 
for the purpose of contrasting.Pleto's.Number with that of the 
Italians. Now Plato held both that Ideal Numbers and mathematical 
numbers were separate, as immaterial etttti ties, :from sensible number:: 
1. Pythagorean s and Elea tics 4 5 & 48. 2. Op. cit. 11, cp. p. 28. 
3. Aristotle's Criticism of Pre-Socratic Philosophy 389. 
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If Pythagorean fiumbers, then, were not such separate immaterial 
entities, then for them •the things themselves were Numbers', i.e• 
Pythagorean Numbers were phenomenal numbers or sensible numbers or 
material numbers, as they have been variously termed. This does not 
mean that things a.re composed of unit-points having magnitude or 
that man is the number 250, whatever that might mean, but simply, 
as :Aristotle himself says, that the only number for the pythagoreans 
. 1 
was a number of things, and no more. So Euclid's definition of' 
number2 as an aggregate composed of un1 ts. But these units were, 
for the Pythagoreans, sensible things, cows, horses, bricks, etc., 
any aggregate of which was a number, and this was the only number 
that the Pythagoreans knew - they did not hold separate, immaterial 
Numbers, as Pl~to did. 
The other reference is quite different. It is 986al6-17, and 
runs as follows:"Evidently, then, these thinkere also consider that 
Number is the principle both as MATTER for things and as forming 
. 3 
both their modifications and their permament states.n Now I bell4ve 
that this passage also has been misunderstood and misapplied by 
modern critics. Nevertheless Ros~ is correct that, as opposed to 
'11 .. ~I'J: 
Matter,7TqcY7 "'rf ICt:t' t)Ctr (which he explains as distinguishable 
only as temporar·y and permament modifications) represert a formal 
cause. Now as Rr'J.Venr points out, such terminology must be Aristotle's 
conclusion, and not a verbatim report of pythagorean beliefs. Hence, 
the correct procedure is to discover what tenet Aristotle had in 
mind when he made this deduction, and what grounds 1 t afforded for 
this deduction - and the source for this must come f rom book A, not 
M and N, unless the latter can be shown t.o refer to the same Italian 
school as A. This can be done by .a comparison of two other passages, 
orie of which explains the· other. 986b6-8 :ttThey seem, however, to 
rabge the elements under the heed of Matter; for out of these as 
immanent parts they say SUbstance is composed and moulded. n 987al7-
19:"1nfinity itself and Unity itself were the. substance of tm thingf· 
of which they are predicated. This is why Number was the ru. bstance 
of all things." That is, because the pythagorea.ns said that tre 
elements, Infinity and Unity, were immanent parts out of which 
sensible things were composed, •Aristotle ranges these elemm ts 
under the head of Matter; and, although not eEplicit in these 
passages, Aristotle deduces for the purpose of his attempt to 
discover anticipations of his four causes, that lmecause this Unity 
and th.is Infiiity were the elements of Numbers, Number was the 
substance of all things, and that is what he means by saying that 
1. van der Wielen, Die Ideegeta.llen van Plato 40 note 49: 11 3:> in 
Aristotle,df'tlftqf C?.Jl be translated 'aantal'"· 
2. Euclid, Elements VII. Definition 2, quoted by Cherniss,Aristotle'E 
t£._ , I' Criticism of Pre-S:>cratlc Philoa:>phy 387. 3.1fa ..... / 1"'1 Ke:ec ~rHr. 
4. Aristotle's llletephysics I.147 ad 986al7. 5/. PythagorElans and 
Eleatics 60. So Cberni ss, Aristo+,le' s Criticism of Pre-Socratlc 
Philosophy 45. 
Number is tP,.~ 
be dealt with 
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1 principle as Matter. (Its 
in 2 below.). 
status a.s formal cause will 
Hence, there is no evidence in Metaphysics A that this school 
held either the identity of things and Numbers, as that is usually 
•derstood, or the composition of things from Numbers, much less 
units, having magnitude • An examination of the evidence enables us 
to conclude onjy tho.t Pythagorean Numbers were phenomenal numbers, 
and that because they held that all things were composed of the 
same elements as Numbers, Aristotle d.educed that they could fairly 
be said to have used Numbers, ultimately as the substance of things,-
as the Matter of sensible things. Aristotle says 'things are Numbers' 
but the context of' this sentence shows tl1a.t he means that their 
Numbers were phenomenal numbers, bathing more; he says 'Number was 
Matter', but an examination of releNent passages shows that this is 
his deduction from their tenet, that the elements of Number are the 
elements of all things, and was deddced in order to place their 
philosophy in some relation to his own - they had not conceived a 
material cause, but Aristotle thinks that they anticipated its 
discovery by constructing things out of elements as immane~t parts. 
Let us now turn to the question of Imitation, which incidentall} 
raises the interpretation of Numbers as formal causes, which was 
mentioned at the top of this page. 
& "Things exist bl Imi_:!!ation of Numbers~. 
one might be inclined to interpret Imitation in the natural sense 
of the word as implying that Numbers are separate from things and 
2 
serve as their pa.tterns, so that,- as Burnet deduces, pythagorean 
Irni tat ion left the sensible and the intelligible as two separate 
worlds, from which it is but a short step to the hypothesis of a 
3 ' . . 4 Pythagorean Theory of Ideas. But, as Cherniss points out, this 
asserts agreement with Plato on the one point where they actually 
differed - Aristotle is very clear that pythagorean Numbers were NOT 
separate as Plato 1 s were. 5 And yet, since patterns must be separate, 
it is difficult to see how they could have been "patterns imitated 
6 by things without being separate," as Robin believes they were. 
SUch difficulties arise when we try to interpret what Aristotle 
meant notfrom ~ristotle 1 s words, but from preconceived conceptions 
either of Pythagoreanism or of the implications of the terms he 
uses. The correct procedure is to seek his meaning from his text 
alone; hence we tmrn to 987bll-12. This reads: "The Pythagoreans 
I 
say that things exist by Imitation (,._.'f?c-t.c.. ) of Numbers.n 
1. SO Cherniss, op. cit. 225: "Since the pythagorean principles aee 
immanent, Aristotle concludes that Number is Matter ••••• so that 
all things consist of Numbers" - the last transcends the evidence. 
2. Greek Philosophy 166. 3. See page 4 above. 
4. Aristotle's Criticism of Pre-S::>cratic Philosophy 392. 
5. See pages 35-6 above. 6. Greek Thought 56. 
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This reference hardly enables us to determine Aristotle's 
' 1 
meaning, am were Cherniss correct, that this is the only place 
where Mimesis is applied to the Pythagoreans, one might despair of 
-
reaching a decision. But Ross2 has referred us to 985b33, and he is 
right. For Aristotle has given a fairly full account· of what he 
understood by Pythagoreanism in A.v, an:l he would hardly omit from 
that account all reference to this tenet, and introduce it wit•out 
explanation here, where he begins to set out the resemblances and 
differences between Platonism and Pythagoreanism, which to a certain 
extent was the purpose - at any rate one of the purposes - of the 
account of Pythagoreanism in A.v. 
Things m_2,delled on Numbers: We find. then, an anticipation of 
this Imitation,f''f'?rTc { , in 985b32-6al:nS1nce, then, all other 
things seemed in their whole nature TO BE MODELLED ON ,~{w~cH w~~a.c., 
Numbers, and Numbers seemed to be the first things in the whole of 
Nature •••• n Now that this isAwm t Ariet otle had in mind when in 987b 
11-12 he talkelof Imitation,f'/;'??cf, appfears from the Greek. This 
word is a derivative of tre verb f"'t?Zctrt1-a~, •to imitate or copy' 
and in 98 5b32-6al ~fwf' "' C:Ztrt9a~ comes ft.'rom tlf.itnn avr, 'to make 
like'. Literally, tPcen, since it is the perfect passive infiinitive, 
this word means 1 to have been made like', and if sensible things 
•have been maS:e like' Numbers, they are in fact 'imitations' of 
Numbers, and Numbers are separo. te -· not as patterns, but as groups 
ofthings. 3 'I'his hardly advances the rolution; but a further. examina-
tion of the context of this passage grings us to the heart of the 
matter. For this sentence refers ,back to a fuller statement, similar 
in expression, but elaborated by .an important par.a:athe sis. 
The example of Justice: This is 985b26-3l:"S1nce of these 
principles Numbers are by nature the first, and in Numbers they 
(. /., I 
seemed to see many resemblances, or· o, ""fA-~ 7'"ec.. , to the things 
that exist and come into being - more th8n in Fire and Earth and 
Water {such and such a modification of Numbers being Justice, another 
being Soul and Reason, another being Opportunity - and similarly 
almost all other things being numerically expressible) •••• " Again, 
c , 
'resemblances', cij'o'~-Vftt:r7"ec., is derived from the same verb as 
d. t/· wr OL tZ~ Jt:c (_ . Therefore;' we are justified in turning to the 
parenthesis here for the source of Aristotle's statement that things 
imitate Numbers. This me a.YlS in effect a colla ction of passages where 
certain modif1ca tions of Numbers are attributed to Justice, etc. 
~And the most obvious of these is in tm recension 4 of parts of book 
lA, viz. book M, where we have M.1 v .l078b21-3, much to tm same effect; 
1. Aristotle's Critici: sm of Pre-Socrat·ic Philom> phy 392, and 
Aristotle's Criticism of Plato 193. 2. Aristotle's Metnphysics 
!.163 ad 987bll. 3. Pages 35-6 above. 4. See Appendix. 
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"The Pythagoreans had before this treated of a-few things, 1 whose 
definitions - e .• g. those of Opportunity, Justice or Marriage - they 
connected with Numbers." 
985b26-31, our immediate source for Aristotle's conception of 
Imitation, illustrates the resemblances which the Pythagoreans JI-i.aw 
between things and Numbers by certain specific examples, among which 
is Justice. That is as far as the passage goes. But l078b21-23 
connects the attribut~on of Numbers there hin~ted at explicitly with 
the def:ini tions of certain things, among which is Justice. Hence, to 
understand what .Aristotle neant by Imitation, it is necessary to 
discover what was the Pythagorean definition of Justice - this one 
example will suffice - and then" to see in what way this definit1'on 
was or could be connected with Numbers. 
Now in Nicomachean Ethics 1132b21-3 the Pythagoreans are said 
to have defined Justr'ce without further qualification as Reciprocity. 
This is explained .in Ma.gna Ma.rnlia 1194a29-31 thus:"Reprisal is a. 
kind of justiceJ, but not in the sense that the Pythagoreans meant; 
for they thought it was just that whatever one did that same thing 
one shouJd suffer in ret.urn." The pythagorean,t definition of Justice, 
then,was Reciprocity in the sense that whatever one did one mould 
suffer in return .• Now the a:>nnection with Numbers is given in Magna 
Moralia 1182all-14:"Pythagoras was the first to under*6ke to speak 
about virtue,. referring the virtues to numerical relations. But in 
this he f: erred, for Justice 1s not the equally-equal Number." That 
. 2 1 s, as Ross has explained it, Justice is to treat another in the 
same we,y as he ba.s, treated you - Reciprocity - arid as Number is the 
simplest and most intelligible reality, the first thing of which 
this can be predicated is 4 - the equally-equal as being twice two -
the fit-.st product of two factors that treat each other 1n the same 
way. With this in mind, let us return to the original source. 
In both 985b32-6al and 985b26-31, besides the statement that 
things were modelled on or resembled l~umbers, 1 t is said that 
Numbers are by nature the first of all things. This is the reason 
why Num~bers and not anything else were connected with the d efini-
tions of all other things. Hence, these passages could be paraphrased• 
somewhat as follows: It was supposed that all things could be 
brought into a connection with NU!'nbers similar to that which was 
actually done only in the case of some few concepts, such as Justice. 
1. Part from the list being sl...igbtly different from that quoted 
before, it is remarkable that· Arist.otle here says "a few things", 
whereas he had before said 11 almost all other things". Perhaps in 
M • .iv Aristotle minimises the achievement of the Pythagorean s since 
he is here concerned with showing that SbcratesU contribution was 
the defiUtion, which the Pythagoreans anticipated only in a few 
cases. But it seems to me that tase expressions are not really 
inconsistent - the Pytha.goreans SAID that almost all other things 
were numerically expressible, but IN PRACTICE they connected 
c1efini tions with Numbers in only a few ca. ss s. 
2. Aristotle's Metaphysics !.156 ad 987a22. 
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For this, baing def:f.ned as rlec1proci ty, in the sense of one treating 
another in the same way, w~s connected with the number four, which 
ns the equally-equal, thrt is, the product of t~o factors which 
treat each other in the same 'itay, was also an example of Reciprocity .. 
Number was selected in this conacction because 1 t wo..s the fk st. of 
all things, so that as the firr.rt.r)'.a~'r«.7lrilovlo\ it was THE 
' n , 1 a.l"i'-1Tt71o,uo~ • It is thio resemblance which tho Pythac:~oreans 
affected to see betvreen things and Numbers the t Aristotle cnlls 
Imit~tion. 
Their nethod of Oe€in1t1on: Now this is prec~ely the method of 
d.efini ti on ~ascribed by Aristotle to the pytha.goreann in 987a2~-G: 
ttRegarding the question of Essence, they began t.o make statements 
a. d definitions, but t,reated the matter too simply. For they thought 
that the FIRST SUBJECT of which n given defin1ti"on WRS predicable 
was the substance of the thing defined, as if one supposed tm. t the 
1 double' and the 1 2' v1ere the same beea.use 2 is the FIBST THING of 
v.hich 'double' is predicated." And this takes us forward to the 
last step, that, as connected with the definition, Aristotle lnter-
predied Number in the Pythagorea.n philorn phy as the Essence. He so.ys 
that ttthey thought (the Humber) T~as the substance of the thing 
defined, ~1 but it is umlikely thet the Pythn0 oreans used the word 
'substance' or had any conception c:f what Ar1.stotle mean~ by that. 
In other words, a.l thou£h Aristotle attributes to tho pythagorenns 
the conception of Numbers o s the substances of things, 1 t seems more 
likely to have been his own deduction in order to restate Pythaeo-
reaniEm in terms of his own C3.tegor1es. And this brings us back to 
his interpretation of pythagorean Number as the formal causs, 
touched upon on pages 36-/J-7 above. Let us justify this. 
Number as the Essence •. 987a2G1-6 states thnt by the pythagorean 
method of definition a number was mado the Essence of the thing 
defined. When, then, in 985b26-31 be says that the Pythagoreans saw 
many resemblances in things to Numbers, our argument above indicet es 
that he must have meont the connection of the characteristic of a 
def'1n1endum with that Number as its'Essence 1thich displayed the same 
characteristic. But it is not clear haft this can be described as 
the modelling of things on Numbers - Just:i.ce is not made reciprocal 
because 4 is reciprocalmr even in the same way: it would still 
have existed and have been what it 1e even if the pythagorea.ns had 
been unable to count. Hence, it seems to me that it was not the 
Pytha§oreans who said that things exist by Imitation of Numbers. If, 
then, Aristotle says so, this must be his own intarpretaj!tion of 
Pytha[oreanism. However that may bet we ma.y ask how he can conceive 
this method of def1tlit.1on ns Imitation. The answer lies in his own 
conception of Essence as the substance of a thing, 1ts formal 
pr1oo.1ple, tha.t which determined. its characteristic nature and 
1. Sen previous page, note 2. 
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appearance. Thus, when he £mys that the pythagorean definitions 
-..... 
were an anticipation of his own formal principle, the Essence, it 
meens that he is interpreting such Numoors as 4, in the case of 
Justice, as its Essence, just HS in the passage last quoted 2 is t:te, 
Essence or substance of 'double.' 
Therefore, we concl. ude thAt the pythagoreans defined, to use a 
specific example,, Justice as Reciprocity, and then connected this 
defini11lon with a Number, the Number 4 whiik is the fir'st-, case of 
Reciprocity. Because Ar1.stotle sees anticipations of his formal 
cause in the deflbn1t1.on, regsrding the Essence of the definj.endum , 
as its form he deduces that the pythagoreans anticipated him by 
making Numbers the Essences of things. And be cause he thinks that 
things could be regarded as modelled on their Essences, he compares 
HIS INTERPRETATION of Pythagoreanism with Platonism in 987bll-12, 
saying that the pythagoreans made things exist by Imitation ofNumbers 
This interpretation of what· Aristotle meant by Imitation is 
not without precedents. Thus, Cherniss1 states that Aristotle•s 
evidence that pythagorean Number is the cause of substantiality was 
me~nt to show an anticipation of his own. formal cause, and this 
leads to Imitation. Also Milhaud, 2 that Mimesis has a. special sense 
as the external reflection of an internal reality andth:is is what 
. 3 
Aristotle calls the formal cause. Finally, Ross, that the pythago:-
reans recognised the formal cause, but this was marred by the 
supposition that th.e first thing to lthich a defllnition applied was 
the Essence, and Aristotle calls this relation of thing to formal 
cause Mi.mesis as in 987bll-12, which he connects with 985b32-33, that 
all things a.re made like Numbers. 
3. '1The elements of Numbers are the' ftlements of all 'thing.!!_" 
We have seen above 4 that whereas Burnet 5 dismissed the tenet that 
the elements of Numbers are the elements of things as only Aristo-
tle's way of expressing that things are Numbers, he might just as 
well have argued that the tenet, that things are Numbers, was only 
Aristotle's way of' expressing that the elements of Numbers are the 
elements of things. Indeed, our examination of the evidence does not 
give any grounds for believing that the Italian philposophy made 
much use of the identity of t.h1ngs and Numbers. The same¢object1on 
applies to Cherniss 1 remark6 that this temet is Aristotle's recasting 
owing to his inability to tmderstand things as Numbers. But what is 
there diffi.cult to understand in this, when, as Cherniss interprets 
it, it means nothing more than that bodies consist of aggregates of 
points having position? Tftis 1s no more abstruse than Atomism, which 
is one of the simplest of f-lll philosoph1c'3.l systems. Elsewhere he 
1. Aristotle's Criticism of' Pre-Socratic Philosophy 46. 
2 • .Les Philosophes G~ometres de la Gr~ce 105-6. 
3. Aristotle's .lilletaphys:r_cs I.l47 ad 986a17. 
4. Page 34. 5. Early Greek Philosophy 333. 
6. Aristotle's Criticism of Pre-Socratic Philosophy 389-390. 
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saY,s this tenet is Aristotle 1 s deduction since he reconstructs 
why the Counter-earth was invented - viz.. to make up the number of 
the heavenly bodies to 10. But assuming that this was Aristotle's 
reconstruction, Q.t was made from the mmception df thehea.vens as a 
Number, as Aristotle himself says, and so for from rendering 
suspicious the tenet th&t thepf elements of Number are the elements 
of things, casts doubt ra.tler on the alleged identity of things and 
NumbersL The pa.ssage here alluded to, however, willl afford a. 
sui table starting-point for our investt.gation. 
The 1dent11ty of el;ements a.~_.!!!e ontol£Sical ground of Imitation 
985b26-6a3: As this posse.ge requires careful analysis, I shall 
reproduce it with the addition of tebuler numbers to facilitate 
reference to its parts and to elucidate the relationship of tre 
parts to one another. It consists of two separate sets of premises 
and two conclusions, which can be set 'out as follows: 
First part:- i)ttSince of these pr1nc1.ples Numbers are bp nature 
the first; 
ii} and in Numbers they seemed to see many resemblances 
to the things thet exist and come into being; 
iii} since, again, they sa\:Y that the modifica.tions and 
the ratios of the musical scales were expressible in Numbers. 
Second part:- a} Since, then, all other things seemed in their whole 
nature to be modelled on Huinbers, 
b) and Numbers seem3d to be the first things in the 
whole of nature. 
Condlusions:- 1. The elements of Numbers are the elements of all 
things, 2. and the whole heavens are a musical scale and a 
Number." 
Nov1 premiss 111, unlike the other two, is not repeated in the 
second part, and leads to conclusion 2. One gets a. very ~reat 
syllogism by taking iii as major premiss, the fir&-t· J;>Ortion of the 
1 conclusion' as minor, and the oth~r part as the conclusion proper, 
thus:- The musical scale is a Number, 
The heavens are a musical scale, 
Therefore, the heavens ere ct Number. 
This will be discussed wh.en the Italian astronomy comes under 
review, but the above comclusion is necessary in order to clear the 
ground for the rest of the passage. If, then, premiss iii and 
conclusion 2::1 2 are removed as a syllogism complete in itself, what 
is left? Two premisses repfeated and one conclusion. Thus, premiss 1 
is repeated by premiss b, premiss ii is repeated by premiss a, and 
conclusion l must have bem. intended by Aristotle to comple1t the 
argument. This, it is true, cannot eastly be recast into syllogistic 
form, but the line of reasoning is clear just the same. We have seen 
that the priority of Number ond what Aristotle calls the resemblanee 
1. Op. cit. 45. 
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of things to Numbers refers to the Pythagorean method of definition 
wher«;tby Numbers were made what Aristotle calls the Essence of 
things. Because of this, then, they supposed that the elements of 
Numbers were the elements of things .• But 1 t does not follow that 
~cause things resemble Numbers they must have the same elements. 
And yet the argument points to the pythagoreans having sought to 
find an objective basis for this relation by connecting the elements 
of Numbers with those of things. I suggest that Aristotle's argument 
here sur,fers from over-compression. ~e line of argument suggests 
that the Pythagorev.ns held that both things and Numbers had elements 
and in order to account for the said resemblances, they deduced that 
the elements of each were, if not identice,l, i.e. one by number, 
they were at least one by analogy. Thus, things were ultimately 
constituted from the elements Limit and Unlimited, and Numbers from 
the elements Odd and Even; because things resembled Numbers, e.g. 
both Justice ond the Number 4 were Reciprocity, these two sets of 
elements were made one by analogy - the Odd was analogically the 
Limit, the Even the Unlimited. So 986al7-19:"They Hold that the 
elements of Number a.r:e the Evon and the Odd, and that of these the 
latter is limited and the former is unlimited.'' :Again, 990a9-10: 
"Limit and Unlim1 ted and Odd and Even are the only things assumed 11 , 
with which compare 987rl~~ "They sa.id that there are two principles." 
Hence, it seems definite that the pythagoreans, according to Aristo-
tle, sought an objective basis for the r~semblances between things 
and Numbers in an analogical identification of their elements. 
'lhe :t~nt~ity Of_Odd with Limit 1 et£.:_ Fuztler, they seem to have 
attempted to justify this identification from the figurate construc-
tion of Numbers according to Physics 203al0-16, but this offers some 
difficulties in interpretetion. The passage rcads:"The Pytha.goreans 
identify the Infinite with the Even. For this, they sa.y, when it is 
cut off a."ld shut in by the Odd, provides thimgs with the element of 
Infinity. An indication of this is whr<t happens ~~ill Numbers .. If 
the gnomons are placed around the one, in the one construction the 
figure that results is. always different, in the other it is always 
the same. But Plato has two Infinites, the Great and the Snall." 
While the reading is difficult, the sense is plainfenough: there is 
little doubt that it refers to the configuration of square and oblone 
numbers, which are the sums of the successive odd and even numbers. 
Placing the gnomon around the one refers to 3, 5, etc.J units being 
placed in L-shape around 1 unit, and the sides of the resultant 
square formed by the units thus disposed are alvvays equal in length, 
1. e .. in the number of units on eacp side. For example, the sum of 
1, 3, and 5 (= 9) is represented thus- t;:]: 
In the other case, where gnomons are placed. not around one bu~around 
two units, being tho sum of successive even numbers, such as 4t 6, 8, 
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etc., what results is an oblong whose sides are of different length; 
i.e. have a different number of units, al\?ays varying in 
proportion. For example, the sum of 2, 4 and 6 (= 12) xx2 is 
represented thus- . . . .• 
:--:-:-) . 
• --:1 .I ! 
This interpretation is the majority view, accepted by such 
names as Milhathd, 1 Cornford, 2 Robin, 3 Ross4 and Treden1jick, 5 as JllBli• 
vvell as by Raven, 6 who however offers as the interpreta1tion of the 
identity of Odd with Limit, not the constant ratio between the ~i«m~ 
sides of the square in the case of the sum of successive odn 1lll!ltJd~Rr: 
numbers, but the fact that a line dividing tt.e figure into balves 
passes through, and so is limited by, the central unit of tro 
figure. This, however, does not agree with Aristotle's stateme~, 
as can be seen from the translation given above. A real difficulty, 
however, as Raven points out, 7 is that the whole figure is certainJ.~. 
no, a demonstration of the identity of Odd and Limit, but only of 
each successive gnomon. In other words, the number resulting from 
the sum of 1 and 3 is 4, an even number; from the sum of 4,,3,5 and 
7 is 16, an even number, so that Aristotle ignores the alternate 
even numbers resulting from the sum of suecessive odd numbers. 
If Aristotle is citing an actual pythagoret:m example, the 
fault lies with the Pythagoreans, but it is possible tha.t Aristotle 
has himself provided the example. As Cherniss8 says, the Infinite 
as substance, shortly before the passage quoted, seems to be 
Ari.stotle' s own deduction from Numbers not bei-ng separate, ani if 
so, theequation of Odd with Limit may also be his deduation. This 
is highly problematical, but it does express a feeling of 
dissatisfaction with the example we are dealing with. I would rathel 
say, however, not that the equation of Odd with Limit is his own 
deduction, but only that the example he gives in support of it may 
be his ovm example. There is a. minority schoihl of thought that 
feels that the true reason or illustration given by the Pythagore-
ana for this identity w~s that even numbers were set out 'with equa 
~ ~ , legs' ,tli"CJtrX.t ? f , e. g. 6 as ::: and odd numbers as t limping' , 
<Til~~?~"'f , i.e. with one leg longer than the other, e.g. 7 as 
~~~X :::· as is alluded to in Euthyphro 12CD, and is there 
connected with Odd and Evan as the species of Number. 86 Heidel 9 
and Zeller10, which Milhaud thinks to be nonsense. Here the odd 
unit, especially if placed between the two rows, limits t.he 'flow' • 
I prefer this explanation re cause it stil.its the pythagorean genera-
tion of Numbers better than the other example, as will appear·below. 
1. Les Philoro phes G!fom~tres de la Gr~ce 114-7. 
2. Plato ru1d Parmenides 10. 3. Greek Thought 59. 
4. Aristotle's Metaphystcs 1.148. 5. Loeb Metaphysics xvi, note. 
6. Pythagorea.ns and Eleutics 192-3. 7. Op. cit. 189. 
8. Aristotle's Criticism of Pre-Socratic Philosophy 17 note 68. 
9o See Ross, op. cit. 149 and Loeb Metaphysics loc. cit. 
10. M11haud, op. cit. 113-4. 
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The strongest argument against this v·iew is thst there is no 
evidemce that numbers ns high as 8 or 10 were set out in this way, 1 
which is true. But the defect in our evidence may be due to chance. 
2 Ross has shown that Nicomachus and Theo represent numbers thus -
• •• 
1 2 
• 
• • 
3 
•• . . 
4 
• 
• • 
• • 
5 
• •• . ...
6 
? 
7 
? 
8 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
9 
? 
10 
Here 4, 6 end 9 tally with the formation of square and oblong 
numbers, it is true, but all the numbers here attes~ d, except for 
9, tally as well with 'equal-legged' and 'limping' numbers. 
There the matter must rest, except for one highly conjf!ctural 
argument. There·:i.s a close resemblance in the Physics passage 
quoted to Physics 213b23-28, \ihich is universally ascribed to the 
early pythatsoreans, where the Void is inhaled ani then serves to 
distinguish the natures of things, and to Metaphysics 109lal7-8, 
where the ne at1est part of the Unlimited is constrained and lim1 ted 
by the Lim 1 t. These passages w.ill be dealt with when we come to 
treat early pythagoreanism. But with this, compare fxmm part of 
Physics 203al0-6 above: "For this ••• when it is cut off and shut in 
by the Odd, provides things with th~lementt of Infiil.ity.n And yet 
the end of the passage quoted echoes 987b2i'tand 33~. Is it possibl( 
that the early pythagoreans, holding the inhalatj.on of the Void, KEJ 
used square and oblong numbers to connect things with Numbers, whilt 
the Italians preferred a method of f:letting out numbers more in 
keeping with their method of generation of numbers - i.e. set out 
as isosceles and scalene - and Aristotle elither compresses the two 
schools into one a:ccount in .physics 203alo-6, or intends to 
illustrate the Italian identification of the elements, but due to 
his context dealing with the: earlier school cites the wrong examplifs 
These three tenets are not inconsistent. However that may be, 
--· ---- -
it SLems then that the three tenets referred to on page 34 above 
a.re not at all !inconsistent< The functa.rr#'()tal tenet is that things 
and Numbers each have elements, and these elements are analogically 
the same - the Odd is the Limit, and the Even is the Unlimited • 
. 
This analogical identification ·of the elements v.as the basis or 
objective ground of. the resemblances noted or imagined between 
things and Numbers, which, arising from the Pythagorean method of 
definition by attributing what Aristotle calls the Essence to tha 
first case exhibiting the quality defined, is interpreted by 
Aristotle as Imitation, because }jle regards things as imitating 
their Essence, Number was pgenomenal, but the converse did not 
hold good: things were not really Numbers but only resembled 
Numbers, which is explained, by the 'identity' of their elements. 
L Raven, op. c:tt. 191. 
2. Aristotle's •etaphysics II. 494 ad 1092blO. 
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£l_!hc Stages of Generation. 
The One. Sterting from the generBtion of the One and Numbers, the 
elements in this case/are the Odd and Even. That is, while the 
fundamental elements are the .Limit and thfi Unlimited, the Odd and 
the Even are their exemplification in the sphere of Number. 1 The 
first product 2 of the Odd and Even is the One according to 986al9: 
"The one proceeds3 from both of these (the Odd and the Even)," and 
109lal5-18: nFor the Pythagoreans say plainly that when the One had 
been constructed, whether out of ••••• elements •••• n This latter 
passage was quoted on pages 29-30 above, where we argued thBt it 
bore witness to two (or more} Pytha.corean schools, one of which -
the part quoted here - belongs to the Itnlian school, as dealing 
with elements. But it is difficult to envisage how the One can be 
composed of such elements as the Odd and Even, and this ma.y have 
been no more than a, gere r:-~lised deduction from the conception of 
the One as both Odd and Even, since it made odd numbers even end 
even numl:e rs odd, in e,ccordance with the surmised setting out of 
numbers as isosceles and scalene, referred to on pages 44-5 above -
v4z. when added to each respectively. 
In 987al7-19, however, there is ~n apparent m ntroo iction to 
this, for the One is here not a product af Odd and Even, nor of 
Limit and lJinlimited or Infinity, 4 but seemingly sets as Limit on 
the Unlimited: '~~Infinity itself and Uni tyjitself W"ere the substance5 
of the things of which they are predicated." S:> Cherniss, 6 taking 
this to be a tacit identification of the One with the Limit, uses 
it a.e ev-idence that the earJ)er passage where the unit 1 s derived 
from both Odd and Even is Aristotle's own deduction and not a report 
of a pythat,orean tenet. But ·I believe there is a simple explanation 
of this npparent inconsistency, which· can only be understood after 
the examination of· the evidonce for the generation of Numbers. 
£!.umbers. 9861'a20-lj, that Number proceeds f. rom the One, is 
vague, but that two elements are here concerned is indi. cated not :mm:i; 
only by the previous mention of the elements of Number and by the 
~ requirements of the system in which everything is constructed from 
two elements, but also by 987al7-19: "Infinity itself and Unity i:X:mE: 
itself are the substance of t¥R.ings of which they are predicated. 
This is why NUMBER ~s the s~bstance 7 of all things." This implies 
that certain things are derived from Infinity or the Unlimited, 4 
1. Cornford, Plato and Parmenides 6. 2. Taylor, Plato the Man and 
his Work 508 note, and A Comentary on Plato's Timaeus 31-2. , 
3. ,cornford, Classical Quarterly XVII. 3 note 1, translates Tub~ :v 
· f~ 4/!.fo"t"y«-UP tlra(. "/tJJ/'UY as "The One consists of both of 
these", but Raven, op. cit. 10 & 22,po1nts out that this is wrong 
and should be, "The One is derived from both of these.n, 
4. Both Infinity and Unlimited are the sam.e in Greek - Ta c:rl'7f~a;.l • 
5. The mea.i1ing of 'substance' in this passage is elaborated dln pages 
82-3 below. 6. Aristotle's Criticism of Pre-Socr::>tic Philo-
sophy 45. 7. SUbstance here must mean the substrate that 
underlies a thing. 'SUbstance' has many meanings for Aristotle, 
see 1028b33-9a4. 
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and Unity or the one, 7'6 -t\1 • Since, then, 986a20-21 states thflt 
Numbers come from the One, it seems thRt the t certa..in thi.ngs' are 
Numbers, and 'Numb~rs as the substsnce of all things' implies that 
the elements of Ntunbers were the elements of all things. This means 
that the elements of Number were the One and the Unlimited., but 
they were previously1 supposed to be the Odd ar"d Even, which were 
sub-types of the Limit and the Unlimited. Is Cherniss right thn.t 
Aristotle contradicts himself in equating the one with the Limit, 
yet elsewhere making the One the product of Limit and Unlimited? 
I do not think so: I believe the nppa.rent contradict5on arises 
from conceiving the Limit as a substance, something tangible. But 
1 t is really only a name for whatever, in any pa.rtiru.~ls.r case, 
bounds or delimits some opposing prj_nciple which la.cks determinatior. 
and this gives rise to the sensible thing in question. The One is 
not the product of some chemical action between or even mechanical 
mixture of two substances, one of wlllich is called the Odd or the 
Limit, the other being the Even or the Unlimtedj. That is mociJ not 
only nonsense but a contradiction in terms, for then two would be 
prior to one. The one is, but because it partakes of the nature of 
both Odd and Even, as stated above, it was vaguely conceived as a 
producy{>f these two elements which "IB:td no prior existence as sepa•p{ 
rate entities. Each Number similarly was a product of two elements, 
but these elements could noJ'I have separate existence as each was a 
lini ty, atld one of these elements could be regarded as a limiting 
factor and so called the Lirni t, and thtJ other, a.s that to which 
the Limit was added, wa.s th~ Unlimited. But the Limit and the 
Unlimited, again, were not two individual substances, but simply 
. \ . 
the characteristic displayed by each in its role of element 
constituting the product¢, the particular number in question. What 
these were in any particular case seems to be indicated by the con-
ception of the One as both Odd and Even. The Even, then, according 
to the Pythagorean method of definition, was 2, the first even num-
ber, and from the One and E~en (s Unlimited) comes 3, the first odd 
number, and so THE Odd. Here the One acts as the Limit, thus 
explaining !.Aristotle's statement that Numbers came from Unity and 
Infinity. The One then n.cts as Limit with the Odd to give 4, and so 
on. Thus, Number comes from the Odd and the Even as a.l'berne .. te 
substrates or Unlimiteds, with the One acting in both cases as the 
Limit. 2 This implies the f,generation of Numbers ani their configura-
tion along the lines suggested by Heidel, 3thus : :. :: ::. 
1. See Page 43 above. 
2. Much to this effect is Raven, pythagoreans and Eleatics 135-7; 
but I cannot Pgree with Ross, Aristotle's ••1etaphysics I .149-150. 
3. See pages 44-45 above. 
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Magnitud~. The.next stage of generation is that of geometri..:.. 
cal figures. So 990a13-15 :"If one granted them that spatial magni-
tude consists of these elements •••• ", but this is too vague to 
help much, so that we have to turn to some anonymous pa.ssages in 
order to reconstruct Aristotle's conception of the generation of 
figures according to the philosophy of the Italians. RosE ascribes 
to the Pythagoreans, l036b8-13 :"Some people already raise the 
question in the case of the circle and the triangle, thinking that 
it is not right to define t~se by reference to lines and the 
Continuous, but that all these are to the circle or the triangle 
a.s flesh and bones are to man •••• , and they reduce all things to 
Numbers, and they say that the formula of the Line is that of two". 
This seems to refer to our school because it constr.ructs geometrical 
figures from elements, reduces all things to Numbers, agrees sub 
fin.om with the method of definition discussed at the end of Meta-
physics A.v- for the 'formula of the Line was that of 2' was 
doubtless m;derstood in the sense that 2 was the first thing exten-
ded in one d1mession1 - and finally this doctrine is associated 
with the Platonists (cp. :A~vi.l) since the quotation continues:"Of 
those who a..ssert the Ideas, some make •two' the Line-itself and 
others make it the Form of the Line." The passage, l036b8-13, then, 
implies that the Line was the Continuous, sc. as Unlimited, bounded 
by two points, sc. as L1m1 t, that the sureace (for the circle or 
the tria"le are only exempli gratia) was the Continuous bounded by 
Lines, and, by analogy, that the S>lid wa.s the Continuous bounded 
2 by Planes. SUch is Raven's ~nterpretation, and he cites in corro-
boratlon 1090b5-8, 3 an anonymous view, not 1denti:lfed by Ross in his 
commentary, ·but its general agreement with the tenet established 
ab&ve marks it as belonging to the seme school of thought. 
'fhis runs: u There are ·some who, because the point is the 
limit and extreme of the line, the line of the plane, and the plane 
of the solid, think there must be real things of this sort." So 
also 1028bl6-8 :"SJme 4think the limits of body, i.e. surface, line, 
point, and unit·, are substances, and 'more so than that body or the 
solid." The reason for such a view is apparently given in lOl?bl?-
22., wh•re ~Aristotle discusses the various modes of interpreting the 
relation of Before and After :"The parts which are present in such 
things, limiting them and marking them as individuals (sc. are 
prior),as the body is by the destruction of the plane, as some 4 say, 
and the plane by the destruction of the line; and in general Number 
is thought by .some to be of this nature; for if it is destroyed, 
they say, nothing exists, and it limits all things.tl That is, the 
1. So Alexander, quoted by Raven, op. cit.l46-7. That this was the 
Italian school is further corroborated by l036bl7-9, where one 
thing·is many, as in 987a27. 
2. Op. cit. 106-9, cp. Classical Quarterly N.S.l. 148. 
3. But see Bywaiter and Cherniss ad loc. on page 13 above. 
4. Listed as Pythagorean by Ross, .:Aristotle's Metaphysics, Index. 
-
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line is more real than the plane n, cause by its destruction the 
plane is also destroyed; the plane is prior to the solid bo'eause by-
its destruction the solid is destroyed. Therefore, the ultimate 
reals are not bodies, but points, lines and surfaces. It is to ·. 
these that 1028b51 refers:"For it is this (i.e. substance) that •••• 
some
2 
assert to be limited in number ••• "That is, the Milesians have 
but one substance - Water or Fire or Air-, the Atomists have an 
unlimited number (atoms), but the pythar:;oreans have only the limited 
number - NumbeEs, points, .lines and planes. 
Geometrical figures, then, were composed out of the Continuous, 
representing the Unlimited, and Points, Lines, Planes, in the case 
of lines, surfaces and solids respectively, representing the Limit. 
It is the relationship of Before and After that connects all these, 
making them types of the Limit. 
Raven 3 sees thib.s theory also in the allusion to Eurytus in 
l092b8-22, but this will be more conveniently discussed in part II 
below, since for its interpretation it depends tlll on the notices 
of the scholiast. We might note here, however, that the critics 
differ in respect of the second view here alluded 
Numbers as ratios. Cornford asr:igns the two views 
ratios) to two successive pythagorean schools, but 
to, that is, 
(Eurytus and the 
4 Raven demon-
strates that Aristotle's language implies they are contemporar-y; 
however that may be, he errs in assigning both views to the same 
school, 5 for Cherniss6 is undoubtedly correct in assigning tile JEJn~mr. 
second (ratios} to Empeciocles~ ias does Ross in his translation. 
This generation of spatial magnitudes seems to be the doctrine 
of the Tetractys,~ of which there is no definite evidence in 
Aristotle 1 s account of the philosophy of the Italians except in 
respect of one point. 
perfect and to ·com~se 
8 
explained by Raven to 
986a8-9, "The number 10 is thought to be 
' 
the whole nature of Numbers," has been 
mean tbat 10 embraces the whole nature of 
Numbers because lt 2t 3t 4 = 10, which is used to symbolise the 
Tetractys as a. triangle of Num~ers, thus - • ~. 
• • • 
• • • • 
From Solid to Bo2l_. Just how the transition was effected 
from geometrical solid to sensible body we are not told, but it 
would seem from Aristotle's criticism that solids were tacitly 
~~i~Sa to be the same as bodies. So 990al3-15: ''If one either 
granted them that spatial magnitude consists of these elements 
(Limit and Unlimited and Odd and Even), or if this were proved, 
still how would some bodies be light and others have i'leight?tt 
1. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics II.l62 ad l028bl6, refers us to 
l002a4, that body is less of n substance than surface, this than 
line, etc., since bounded by it. 2. Listed by Ross as pythagoren\J 
3. Classical Quarterly NS 1.147. 4. pythagoreans and Ele11t1cs 51. 
5. Op. cit. 58-61. 6. Aristotle's Criticism of Pre-Socratic 
Philosophy 240 n.l05. 7. Bee Raven, op. cit. 158-161. 
8. Op. cit. 140f. 
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This implies that sensible body was not distj.n.guished from geometri· 
cal solid, or at least that no distinctive characteristics were 
assigned to perceptible bodies over and sbov6 their shape, ard as 
the solid was composed of the Continuous bounded by Planes, ED 
apparently was perceptible body also. Hence, uTo judge of what they 
assume and maintain, they are speaking no more of mathematical 
bodies than of perceptible,n 990al4-16. 
To the same effect, apparently, is 990al6-18: 0 Hence, they have 
said nothing whatever about Fire or Earth or other bodies of this 
sort, ¢I suppose because they have nothing to say which applies 
particularly to perceptible things. 11 Raven1 points out that the 'I 
suppose' shows that the statement is Aristotle's own deduction, 
based on the observation that they ha.d l'lothing peculiar t,o say of 
sensible things, as just stated. So Ro ss2 explains: 11 &'"'ince the Four 
Roots are identical with geometrical figures, nothing d~stinctive 
is samd about sen a ble qualities.'* 
dl Harmonics and Astronoml• We return to the syllogism set 
out on pa.ge 42 above. This runs -
TL'le musical scales are a Number; 
The heavens ere a musicel scale; 
Therefore, the heavens are a Number. 
There is no other reference in Aristotle to explain the musical 
scales as Numbers, but it is common knowledge that this refers to 
the ratios of the octave, fifth and fourth being numerically 
expressible as 2:1, 3:2 and 4:3 respectively tD the key-note. The 
•modifications of the scales' being a Number in 985b3l-32 see•s to 
refer to the ratios betDeen the co~responding notes of the modifica-
tions of the scales, to wit, the enh;r'armon.ic, chromatic and diatonic 
forms of the scale. ·The heaven's :nij a musical scale seems to refer :i 
to some form of the conception •of the Harmony of the Spheres, but 
Aristotle is silent. 
The whole .arransement of the heavens. In respect of the heavens 
as a. Number Aristotle• s evidence i·s fuller. We have two relevant 
passages. De Caelo ii.l.3. 293a21-25: "At the centre (of the universe) 
they sa.y is Fire, and the earth is one of the stars creating day 
and night by its circular motion about the centre. Furt~ r, they 
construct another earth in opposition to ours, to which they give 
the name Counter-earth." Metaphysics A. v. 986a8-l2: 11 As the Number 
10 is thought to be perfect, ••• they say that the bodies which move 
through the heavens a.re ten, but as the visible bodms are only 9, 
to meet this they invent a. tenth- the Counter-earth." These quotes 
illustrate thE'!ir characteristic procedure. ~ecause of tl'e perfection 
of the Number 10, the pythagoreans had somehow to find 10 heavenly 
bodies. (At that time astronomy wa.s still geocentric and. the fixed 
1. Op. c 1 t • 15 3 • 
2. Aristotle's Metaphysics !.183 ad 990al5-16. 
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stars were usually regarded a.s a wheel or sphere enclosing the 
heavens; 5 planets were known as well a.s the sun and the moon. As 
this gave only 8 bodies, a. ninth was found by regarding the earth 
as a star. Slch were the nine visible bodies. In defa.ult of a tenth 
an 1nv1s1ble ·Counter-earth was postulated, making up the number to 
l 10. Now we have seen that Pythagorean Number was phenomenal', i.e. 
a number of phenomenal units, and this gives the sense in which 
the whole heaven 1 s said to be a Number, 986a3, 986a21. The ten 
heavenly bodies are, in fact, the number 10. 
But by removing the fearth from 1 ts central pos1 tt1on, some 
body had to be found to fill this post, for evidently the pythago-
reans could not endure a vacuums 'Ihis was filled by Fire, according 
to one of the above references, and the reason for this is given 
in De Caelo 293b2-4: "They hold th~t the most important part of the 
world, which is the centre, should be the most strictly gmarded, 
and name 1t, or rather the Fire which occupies that place, the 
'Guard-house of Zeus' • tt Here again we see the sa..me concern n:J. th 
a priori considerations: the centre is filled with Fire, not because 
it was so in fact or because this could be deduced from observed 
phenomena, but because the most important part of a figure, the 
centre, must contain the most perfect Simple Body, :F'ire. 
l.!£!-Earts an~ attributes. Relsva.nt to this discussion are 
990al, "They generate the heavens, u and 990a2021, "What happens in 
the heavens both from the beginning and now ••• 11 We have no further 
evidence in Aristotle bow they generated the heavens, but one might 
conjecture that, as the heavens were a Number, the generation of 
the Number-series from one to ten YJas regnrded as pari passu the 
generation of the ten heavenly bodies. 2 Raven 3 gives the Central 
Fire as the first thing generated, the One, then in order the 
Counter-earth, earth, moon, sun, 5 planets, and tenthly the Fixed 
Stars • 
. A last passage which refers to tho structure of the univvrse 
is 990a22-29, which, as the ebove refers to the whole a.rrabgement 
of the heavens, deals with the parts and attributes thereof. 4 It 
reads:nwhen in one particular region they place Opinion or Opportu-
nity, and , a little above or below, Injustice and Indec1 sion or 
Mixture, and allege, as proof, that each of these is a Number, and 
that there happens to be alre8dy in this place a plurality of the 
extended bodies composed of Numbers, because these attributes of 
1. Pages 35-6 above. 2. CoJtpare Raven, op. cit. 148 :"Cosmogony 
and the generation of Numbers went para.llel," and Cornford, 
Classical Quarterly XVII .• 5 and 10: ttThe generation of the heavens 
was confused with that of Numberst'/ 3. Op. cit. 169-172. But 
slightly different is Ross, Aristotle's ~illetaphysics II. 484; also 
Robin, Greek Thought 64, cp. Cornford, Plato and Parmenides 20. 
4. This passage seems to be ~>n elaboration of 986a.3-8: uAll the 
properties of Numbers and scales which they could show to agree 
with the attributes and parts and the whole arrangement of the 
heavens, they collected and fitted into their schemen. See p. 33 
above. 
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Number attach to the- various ple.ces - this being so, is this Nunieer, 
i 
which we must suppose e::.ch of these abstractions to be, the same~<\:. 
Number which is exhibited in the material universe, or is it another 
than this?" This is obscure in the extreme, ani all we can say with> 
certainty is that, in accordance with their characteristic procedure 
these pythago,rean s associated certain regions of the universe with r 
certain numbers, and then quite logically G.ssigned to those same 
regions extended bodies having the attributes of the Numbers thus 
distributed. An ingenious expl.anation is that of Ross, 1 that these 
extended bodies are the regular solids corresponding to the 
traditiona.l.Roots, and were doubtless the tetrahedron, cube, 
octahedron, and isocahedron., which were aosociated either with the 
number of their surfaces or with the number of points bounding the 
whole figure, in accordance with their conception of the structure 
2 
of magnitudes. '.As the tetrahedron has both 4 surfaces and 4 bound-
ing points it will serve as an~xample, but this is purely conjectu-
ral, a.s Aristotle do.es not make his mem ing clear. Fire, then, as 
associated with the number 4, would be· £ss1gned io one region of 
the universe, not because it had been observed to be there so much 
as because that region was supposed to have some particular connec-
tion with the number 4; and this region would also serve as the 
scat for an abstr3.ction such as Justice, whose Essence was 4. But 
how one region of the un1 verse m uld be associated with one number 
more thah another, or indeed with any number at all, nnd what 
. ' 
sllgnificance it had to place extended bodies or abstractions in 
different regions, is quite incomprehensible. 
ti Other iteferenc~. This concludes the entire body of referen-
ces in book A, and the others whi.ch are ascribed either to the 
philosophy of the Italians or to the 1 so-called pythagoreans'. 
Certain other anonymous or vague references have also 'been used 
where their relevance to the philosophy here discussed was fairly 
certain. To these may be added a'few more, which are not, however, 
of any great importance.· SUch ~re 996a6-8, 'ttWhether Unity and Being, 
as the pythagorea.ns and Plato said, are not attributes of something 
else but the substance of existing things," which seems relevant 
on account of a verbal similarity to 987b22-4 and the connection 
asserted between these Pytha.goreans and Plato. Shorter, but to the 
same effect, is 1053bll-13:uwhether we must take the One itself a.s 
being a. substance (as both the Pythagoreans in earlier and Plato 
in later times) ••• ", .and the sa.me notion seems to lie behind lOOla 
10-12 :nPlato and the pythagorenns thought Being and Unity were 
nothing else, but this was their nature, their Essence being just 
Unity an.d Being." These references bear out tho One as a SUbstance? 
1. Aristotle's Metephysics I.l85-6 ad 990a26. 
3. See page 46 above. 
2. See pages 48-9 • 
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i.e. as an element in the generation of Numbers and so indirectly 
of all other things, or else possibly in the sense of a concretum 
1 
according to ~ristotte 1 s conception thereof. 
·11 similar reference, but dealing with the other element, is 
Physics 204a32-34, taken with lines 8-ll:"It is impossible that 
the Infinite should be a thing which is itself infinite, separate 
from sensible objects. If the Infinite ••••• is itself a substance and 
not an attribute, it will be indivisible •••••••• Thus the view of 
those who speak after the manner of the Pythagoreans is absurd.With 
the same breath they treat the Infinite as a substance, and divide 
it into parts.n This would suit the early school, which will be 
doalt with presently., or may refer to the Continuous, which is the 
element of Magnitudes. :Aristotle sees from a consideration of the 
nature of infinity that if it is a substance iy4:1ll be indivi~ible; 
if divisible it cannot be a substance. The pythagoreans may well 
have believed it to be a divisible substance - the Continuous or 
Air-Void - without realising that this vwa.s a contradiction in terms. 
SUmmary of the Philo~n::hY of the Italians. 
rummarising what has beerfsaid above, the Italian philosophers were 
THE mathematicians of their da&r, a:rd were so much dominated by :kNBi 
their E~ subject that they applied the principles of mathematics 
to the visible universe, going so far as to force their observations 
to fit their a priori theories by making gratuitous additions to 
the data where necessary. Number was for them always a number of 
things., and ~cause their method of defini t1on revealed to them 
many resemblances between things and Numbers - so at any rate 
Aristotle expre'ssed his conception of their method of defini 'til on 
by which Numbers, as the first things in Nature, were made the 
Essences of other things - the~ accounted for this by postulating 
an analogical icentity between the element's of Numbers, Odd and 
Even, and the elements of things,· Limit and Unlimited. 
Odd and Even were said to be the elements of Number, and yet 
these elements were also named Unity and Infinity (• the Even), 
because Number was generated by the t:tdd1 tion of the One to 2 and 
age1n to the resultant 3 and so on. As 2 was THE Even abd 3 THE 
Odd, in terms of their method of definition, the elements of Number 
were ul t1mately the Odd and Even; but as Number originated from 2, 
the Even, by successive additions of tho one, it could also be said 
to be generated from the One and the Even, which latter was also 
the Unlimited or Infinity. Because the One, in this way, made odd 
numbers even and even numbers odd, it was said to be composed of 
both O!!Id and Even as partaking of the nature of both. The material 
element, so to speak, of Magnitudes was the Continuous, ani this 
was limited by two points to give Lines, by lines tog ive Planes, 
ar•d by planes to give Solids. Here tte Continuous served as the 
Unlimited, and points, lines, planes, res~ctively, as the Limit, 
1. See Met. 1028b33-9a4, dealt with on pages 82-3 below. 
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and were believed to be more rea.l thah bodies. They had no theories 
to acc.ount for sensible qualities, and hardly distinguished betwe~m 
the geometrical solid and the physical body. This makes it seem 
possible that they identified the Four Roots with four of the 
regular solids. 
However that may bet the generation of Numbers was regarded 
as being also the generation of the $Cosmos, slilnce the Cosmos, in 
order to equate it with the perfect. Number 10, had been !llJouc:~uix:tm: 
deduced to have 10 bodies, by the addition of the CoUJJter-earth to 
the visible stars. 1'hen, as the heavenly bodies were generated in 
order, so the Number-series was unftolded, the completion of the 
10 bodies of the Cosmos equalling the perfection of the Number 10, 
for 10 wa.s ,just 10 bodies. 'l'hi s conception of the heavens as THE 
Number 10 seems to illxmx have been connected ·with the numerical 
expression of the notes of' the scale, perhaps in order to account 
for or to allow of some conception of what is commonly called the 
Harmony of t.he Spheres. 
SUch was ,Aristotle's conception of the Philosophy of the 
Italians; what he believed of other Pythagorean sch~ools will be 
dealt with next. 
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Section ii. 'Others of the &:une School t • 
a) Early Pzthasoreanic~. 
Let us turn now to one of the two passages where a school of pytha.-
goreanism is referred to different from the Italian. This is Meta-
physics l09la.l5-18, where the assertion that the One is .seed is 
incompatible with the assertion that the One is compounded from 
elements, which occurs in the same line, ~M was pointed out above! 
The relevant part of the passage runs as follo~s:-
The One as ~!l~· 109la15-18: 11 There need be no doubt whether the 
Pythagoreans attribute generation to them or not; for they plainly 
say that when the One had been constructed ••• of Seed •••••• , immedi-
ately the nearest part of the Unlimited began to be constrained 
and limited by the Limit. But since they are constructing a lclorld., 
2 
••• (we let them off from tho present inquiry)" • we have already 
s))own1 that this passage refers to a pythagoreanism¢ diffeeent from 
the Italion school, and that this was early is shown by the 
animistic vie\t of Nature implied by regarding the One as Seed. 3 
Hence, we arrive at this position: we have here evidence for e 
school of pytha.goreanism different from and earlier than the 
Philosophy of the Italians, which is charecterised by an animistic 
and not a ma.thematical view of Nature, interpreting the One as a 
Seed, and constructing the v•orlc' by the constraining and limiting 
of th~ Unlimited by the Limit - so that the elements are Limit 
and Unlimited. 'l'hi s is me de clearer by another pe ssage. 
Physics 213b23-28:ttThe Pytha.goreans, too, held that the Void 
exists and that it enters the heaven itself, which as it were 
inhales it, from the infinite Air. Further, it is the Void which 
distinguishes the natures of thine:,s, as if it were like what 
separates and distinguishes the terms of a series. J.'his holds 
primarily in the Numbers, for the Void distinguishes their nature." 
This refers to the same school as above, firstly because their con· 
ception of the One as Seed fits the notion of Breathing, 4 and 
secondly because this passage :.:eveals the same animistic view of 
Nature as Inhaling and is further cha~acterised as early by the 
tacit confusion of Void with Air - it at least precedes Empedocles•· 
discovery of the air as a. s~bstance. 5 Thus, it seems that the 
1 constraining and limi tingy of the Unlimited' of the former 
reference is the same as the inhaling of the Void from t.he infini tf· 
Air here. 'Ihus, the Unlimited is·the Void conceived as, or rather 
6 
not distinguished from, Air, and so is R substane. But what is 
mee.nt by distinguishing the natures of things and of Numbers is 
1. Pages 29-30. 2. I cannot agree with Ross, Aristotle's 
Metaphysics II.483 ad 109la15-18, that Aristotle's suggestion 
a.s to the mode of compo si t1.on of the One may have been his own 
conjecture, since Aristotle says, "They PLAINLY say, tt see p. 30. 
3. I cannot accept Miss Freeman, 1he Pre-Socratic Philosophers, A 
Comp:>nion to Diels 254, that this means no more than that the 
Pythagorean s used the monad as the explana<~ion :1f life. 
4. Pythagorcans and Eleatics 47. ~· Diels 21Bl00. 6. P.53 note l 
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not clear!. However, if Aristotle's example of configura.te numbers, 
square and oblong, be token to have been mistakenly applied to the 
Italian school as suggested on pages 44-5 above, and to belong 
really to Early Pythagorean! sm, it v.ould suggest that Numbers were 
conceived as points set out on a ground, the Void, which thus 
separated and 8ist1nguished tb:ose points. So shortly before this 
exomple we read, in Physics 203a4-16, t~at :"What is outside the 
heaven 1 s inf1ni te, 11 and "The Even ••••• when 1 t is cut off and shut 
in by the Odd, provides things with the element of infinity," 
which is very close indeed to the procedure mentioned in the 
passages quoted above. Thus, both Numbers and things were conceived 
~.ls points separated by the Void, and the implication is that the 
points were the Limit, the Void the Unlimft,Jd. 
We can, then, summarise the Above in tabular form: 
J<~o.rly pythagorea.nism held i) a.n animistic view of Nature, 
ii) conceiving the One as Seed, which iii) breathed in the Void. 
iv) Void was confused with Air, and v) was equnted with the llJnlimi-
ted. vi) This Unlimited was constrained and limited by the Limit, 
or was cut off and shut in by the Odd, and vii) distinguished the 
natures of things, conceived as J!NiN:t-'SXEK composed of points 
separated and distinguished by the Void, and viii) distinguished 
the nntures of Numbers whi:Jt f( were set ott· geometricelly as points 
on a background. 
Units having Magn1.tude. 
Now the conception of Numbers as figurate implies thnt their units, 
what were called • points' a.bove, had magnitude, and al thJugh none 
of tm passages referring to this Early pythagoreanism in which the 
one inhales the Void, has any reference to units having magnitude, 
and none of the passages citing units having magnitude can with any 
certainty be shown to refer to Early pythagoreanism, the compati-
bility of the inha.la tion of the Void, which then separa._,s the B!lr.:J:± 
units of Number and of things, with the conception of the units of 
Number as having magnitude, makes it extremely likely that the two 
sets of passages referring to these tenets deal with one and the 
se.mo school. So Raven1 points out that spatial units f.it in with 
the brea.thing in of the Void; Hence, we turn to the passages where 
the units of Number are sa.id to have spatial mcgnitude. 
A good starting-point is De Caelo 300a14-19: t "The same 
consequences follow from composing the re rtvens of Numbers, as 
2 SOME of the pythagoreans do who make all Na.ture out of Numbers. 
For natural bodies are monifo stly endowed w1 th weight and lightness 
but an asc;emblage of units can ne:tther be composed to form a body 
nor possess weight." With this compare Metaphysics l080bl6-21: 
tt .And the pythagorean s also believe in one kind of Number - the 
1. pytha.goreans and Eleat1cs 45 and 54. 
2. This 1 s a further recognition of differences among the pythago.;. 
reans, see pages 29-30 above. 
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mathematical; only they say it is not separate bUt sensible 
substances are formed out of 1 t. For they construct the universe 
out of Numbers - only not of Numbers consisting of abstract units; 
they suppose the units to have spatial magnitude. But how the first 
l was constructed so as to have magnitude, they seem unable to sayU 
To this must be added 1080b31-34, which makes a baclc-reference to 
the latter passage: "All vlho say the One is o.n element and principle 
oft hings suppose Numbt rs to consist of abstract units, except the 
Pytha.goreans; but they suppose the Numbere to have magnitude, as 
has been said before." That the fk·st two passages refer to the 
same parties appears from tre characterisation of these Pythagore-
ans common to both passages, as those who compose or constr~ct the 
heavens of Numbers. What is meant by this is not clear unless it 
is only another way of saying that natural·bodies are composed of 
Numbers, which seems likely. That the third pa.ssage belongs to the 
same philosophy is obvious from its ba.ck-reference to tie second 
passage. Now by putting these three passages together we get some 
interesting information. This school says that the One is a first 
principle or element, and constructs their Numbers as having units 
with magnitude• which is as much as to say that their Numbers have 
magnitude. Next, sensible substances are formed out of this kind of 
Number - 1 t.s being ma.thema.tical only means that it hR s units and is 
to be contrasted with the ~1\ce.demical Ideal Number, whi.ch was not 
usua.lly the object of mathematics but its ground, end is not here 
l 
relevant. Now the meaning the.t Aristotle "'sslgns to this tenet, that 
thing·s are composed of numbers, appe?.rs f!'rom De Caelo loc. cit -
' 1 things, natural bodies, are assemblages of. units. Hence, we can add 
to the list on the previous page, 1that (=vii) things are aggreg1 te s 
of units; (=viii) that the units of Number have spatial magnitude; 
and ix) that the One was a principle. and element. 
That this cannot refer to till ¢Italian school appears from the 
incompatibility of things as aggregates of units here with things 
as composed of the Continuous limited by points there; by the 
incompatibility of the elements of Numbers being the elements of 
things there with the virtual identity of things and Numbers here. 
For if things are aggregates of units, and aggregRtes of units are 
Numbers, things must be Humbers. !Niilll Indeed, Phy•tcs 227a27-30 
implies the identity of unit and point:"Hence, if as some say, 
1 po1nt• and 'unit' have an independent existence of their own, it 
is impossible for the two to be identical: for points can touch, 
·vwhile tini ts can only be in succession." This implies that these 
thlnkers asserted the identity of units and points, agreeing with 
the description of things as Numbers, i.e. a number of units. Nor 
is 1 t any objection that the Italians said the heavens were a. 
1. Compare Cherniss, op. cit. 389. 
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Number, while this school said the her.vens were composed of Numbers: 
the two tenets are really quite different. The fact that th~re were 
supposed to be 10 heavenly bodies is enough to explain the heavens 
as a Number -10 -, but it may or may not have been composed of 
Numbers. There are a few other references dealing with units h:1ving 
ma.gni tude and things as Numbers, but these I leave over for a later · 
paragraph, as they require E:}? separate snd d:taile<J examination. 
The Table of Contrari~ The list of Contraries in .Metaphyst cs 
986a22-30 seems to belong to this Early Pythagoreonism, although 
this h3 s been ch~: llenged.. For example, Cherniss1 thinks the Table 
2 
may have been the work of Speusippus; Zeller refers 1 t to Philolaus; 
-.: 
while Robin.., thinks it belonged to tpe 'second generation• of 
Fythagoreans, by which he seems t.o mean a later school than the 
Early Pythagoreanism, and not just younger men of the Ear~y School. 
There are, however, certain primitive tra.its in this list which 
make me fDvour Raven• s belief4 thot the Table belonged to the Early 
School, and in any case it is clear, os will be explainec' presently, 
t:iiix% at leasth~~istotlc thought the Teble early and that is what 
most concerns this chapter .• 'T'he passage reads as follows: 
986a22-30: "Other members of the same school say there are ten 
principles - Limit 
Odd 
One 
Right 
Male 
Resting 
straight 
Light 
Good 
\. 
Unlimited 
Even 5 
Plurality 
Left 
Female 
6 Moving 
Curved. 
Darkness 
Bad 
Square· Oblong. 
In this way .Alcmaeon of Croton se P.ms also to have conceived the 
matter, and either he got this view from them or they eat 1 t from 
him; for he expressed himself similarly to them." That we are 
dealing with another school than the Italian is explicit from what 
Aristotle sa.ys: 11 0'l'HER members· of the sBme schooln, i.e. other 
Pythagoreans than the 'so-cAlled pythagorea.ns' mentioned. earlier 
in the chapter. It cannot be shown that this was THE Early School, 
but that they were early appears from certain items in the list. 
1. Op. cit. 391. 2~ Referred to by Ross, Aristotle's 
Metaphysics !.150 a.d 986a22. 3. Op. cit. 57-8. Jb:x@:pxxEi::t. 
4. Op. cit. 11. 
f/!5. If our surmise is correct, that this list belongs to the Early 
School, this shows that Odd and Even belonged also to this school, 
and may have been identified by them with Limit and Unlimited by 
means of' square and oblong rather than' by 1 so sceles ani scalene 
numbers. See pages 43-5 above. 
6. Cp. Phys11.cs 20lb25-27:"The reason why they put M-otion into these 
genera is that 1 t is thought to be something indefJin1 te, odd tb.e 
principles of the second column are indefinite. •• 
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1 Raven has explained Male and Female, that the Male Limit imple.n te(l 
the Seed in tho Unlimited c:.s the Female, Ylhich reveals both an 
animistic conceptlon of Nature c:.nC. a. view consistent w1 th the One 
I 
as Seed, ~hich nas been assigned to Early Pythagoreanism. Tho Light 
und Darkness remind us of Parmenide s' Way of &Jeming, where it is 
possible that he had in mind pythagorean categories. 2 But that 
.Aristotle thought it early appears from his uncertaintJ whether 
..Alcmaeon got the Tablerrom the pythogoreans or they from him, for 
he would hardly suspect that Alcmaeon was influenced by writers so 
near his own day as Philol '1Us and Speusippus. The concluding words 
of the passa.ge in our text, omit ted above, to the e ffect that 
.Alcmaeon v;as a young man when pythacSoras was old, are suspicious 
but likely, 3 and point very clearly to Aristotle's belief that the 
Table ma~ have been as ear:j.y as the time of pythagoras, ani w e~s at 
any rate not much later. Hence, I conclude that this Table was 
eerly and belonged, along with the One as Seed inhaling the Void 
and units having magnitude, to Early :Pythagoreanism. 
Now the chiefi interest in this list lies in one item only -
the Good. Other references to the Good in the Table of Contr(1ries 
I leave over for the moment and cite here only one -Nicomachenn 
Ethics l096b5-7:"The pythagoreans seem to give ~ more plausible 
account of the Good, v•hen they place the one in the column of 
goods, and it is them that Speus:f.ppus seems to have followed." 
This has difficulties. One could not say, in respe_ct of the Table 
quoted on the previous page,. that the i terns are listed in any 
particular order, and yet one would herdly call it a column of 
goods. This does not m•an, however, that Aristotle is mistaken or 
that he is referring to sorre thing else and not this Table. One 
could justify most, if not all, of the i terns as being good rather 
than evil, which occur in tho first column. pa.rmenides seems to 
have regarded Limit,One,Rest as good rather than evil; Odd and 
SQuare (if this refers to square numbers) ae sub-types of Limit, 
might be thought to be good. In augury the Right vms the lucky 
side. To a predominantly masculine society the Male was to be 
preferred. Straight naturallp. appeals t.o us rather th~"'l the 
.Cro~,ked. One might, then, call this Table a. table of godlds, and if 
the One was placed in the column of e,oods, it meant that it 
belonged to the first column, as shown on the previous page, so 
that the One was ase:ociated wi t.h the Good .. But .S'peu:Srtppus 
identified the Good not with the One but with the Tent I suggest 
that, as the Nicomachean Ethics is an early work, Speusippus at 
the time of composiion ma.y have held the Pletonic idenftiffcation 
of the One with the Good often mentioned by Aristotle, and only 
subsequently changed his ideas by identifying 1 t with the Ten. 
1 .. Op. cit. 47. 2. This is denlt with in Part II, Ch.l. 
3e So Ross, Aristotle's 1111etaphysics ·1.152 ad 986a29. 
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b} .'_The 'l'heolofi!§l~:· 
We have now dealt with two schools known to Arj_stotle. Uow \'l'e come 
to a third, which Aristo·· le names the Theologians in Metrphysic.s 
1091a34-b3. That this is a different school from Early pythae-;oreanG 
ism appears mainly from the po si 1ii on of the Good in their Table of 
Contraries, 1 and that it was again eli fferent/from the Italian 
philosophy rests on their having a comffion belief with the Early 
School in spAtial units, which we showed above was essentially a 
different view of Nature from the Italian. There are three pnssagss 
from tho Metaphysics which deal with this aspect of the Good. 
seem The Good.l09la34-b3: 11 The Theologians xgrrE to ogree with some 
of the thinkers of the present day ( Speusippus), who answer the 
question (wf,lether the Good is an element) in the nega.tive, e.rrl sa.y 
that the Good and the Beautiful nppear in the :aa:t:ure of things only 
when that nature has made some progress. This they do to avoid a 
real objection which confronts those who sc;y, as some do, that the 
One is a first principle. The objection arises notjrrom their 
ascribing Goodness to the first principle as an attribute, but from 
their making the One a principle, and a principle in the sense of 
element - and eenemt~ ing Number from the One." 
l072b31-35:"'I'hose vvho ~::uppose, as the pythagoreans anC. Speutippus 
do, that supreme Beauty and Goodness are not present in the begin-
nin§,, because the beginnings both of plants and of flnimals are 
cnuses, but beauty and .completeness a.re in the effects of these, 
are wrong in their opinion." 
107 5e.36-37: "But th,e other scpool (apparently Speusippus altd the 
Pythagoreans of the previous, reference) does not trePt the Good 
and the Bad even as principles." 
Now these three. passages make it clear that a} these pythago-
reans are followed in their view of the Good by Speusippus, b) that 
l 
they do not make the Good an element but place it later in genera-
not. 
tion, and c) that they do this to ovoid making the Good a principle, 
' "' but to avoid ldentifying the .Good with the One, for the one was 
held to be 8 first principle. The Early pythagorean s mode the One 
a principle. indeed, but virtuelly identified the Good with the One, 
since both appear in. the same column of Contraries. Hence, these 
.i.heologians cannot be the smne as the Early Pythagoreans. Now that 
these Theolo~ians nevertheless held much the same conception of 
Nature in other respects as the ~ar~y School appears from 
Metaphysics 1090a21-35, whe.re things as Numbers is brought into 
connection with Speusippus, and 108 3b8-19, which fundja.men tally 
resembles this passage. These two passages have certsin pecul1aritie8 
which suggest a solution to the relationship between the Theologi-
ans and Early Pythagoreanism. 
1. Miss Freemant The Pre-Socretic Philosophers, A Companion to 
Diels 248 with note 1. 
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Two Difficult Passages:. 
1090a.21-:-35:"Aga1n, the Pytha.gorenns, because they saw mnny attri-
butes of Numbers belonging to sensible bodies, supposed real 
things. to be Numbers - not separable ·Numbers, however, but Numbers 
of which real things consist._ But why? Because the attributes of 
Numbers are present in a musical scale end in the hea.'vens and in 
many other things. ( .Speusippus is preventeJ from following this 
argument, and in any case objects of mathematics do not exist 
apart). Now the pythagoreans in this point are open 1D no objection; 
but in tm t they construct natural bodies out of Numbers, things 
that have lightness and weight out of things that have not weight 
• 
or lightness, they seem to speak of r:mother hec.ven and other bodie!:f, 
not sensible." This pasn1ge falls into two parts: an exposition of 
their doctrine, and Aristotle's criticism thereof. I analyse the 
argument as follows: 
·A. Premisses and conclusion on which: they based their doctrine:-
1) .f'ecause they saw many attributes of Numbers belonging to sensible 
bodies, 
ii) because the attributes of Numbers are present in a musi CEtl scale 
iii) and in the heavens, iv) and in many other things, 
• •. they supposed real,tthings to be Numbers. 
B. Aristotle's crit1cism:-
a) The pytha.goreans are open to no objection on this point, 
b) but they are wrong in constructing natural bodies out of Numbers, 
because tl)ley make things that have lightness and weight out 
of things that have not;, weight or lightness, viz. Numbers. 
As point 1v obviously ~esume~oint 1, it can be left out of 
account. Then i,ii,iii and b· closely resemble plhrases from 985b26-
6a3 and 990al4-16, thus.: 
i) In Numbers they s-eemed to. see many resemblances to things •••• 
ii) They saw that •••• the ratios of the musical scales were expres4S1~ 
sible in Numbers, 
iii) that the whole heaven is a musical scale and a Number; 
b) still how could some bodies be light and others have weight? 
The resemblance is so striking that 1t seems almost inevitable 
to conclude th3t this passage also refers to the Italian school. But 
a serious difficulty is that here the premisses lead to the conclu-
sion that things are Numbers, whereas in book A the conclusion is 
that the elements of Numbers are the elements of things; further, 
criticism b in book A is turned against the construction of bodies 
out of the Continuous and Planes, whereas here it is turned aga.inst 
the construction of bodies out of Numbers. Now either the doctrines 
here are those of the Italian school or they belong to a different 
school. If they refer to the Italians, either Aristotle contradicts 
himself or the .berbal :tlih~mii: differences hide an identity of though~ 
If they refer to some other· school, then an explanation seems to be 
1. See note on the next page. 
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required of the resemblances in their arguments. 
I believe that a lot tfu:ns on the reference to 1 in this point'. 
What is it that Aristotle finds unobjectionable? If one excludes 
that part of the passage which has been condensed as a parenthesis, 
one might think he refers to the supposition that real things are 
Numbers. But this is difficult because it is just this point thn.t 
he criticises in the argument from weight and lightness. But if one 
ta.kes the reference more particularly to the parenthesis, which 
contra.sts Speusippus• separa..tion of mathematical. objects"i~hthe 
pythagorean non-separation, it would se'em that Aristotle does not 
object to the pythag orean immanence of mathematical objects. Now 
if we b'et!r in mind the distinction between phenomenal numbers and · · 
what we might call numerical thl.ngs, which l~tY behind our argument 
on pa.ge s 35-36 above , th1 s passage would mean tha.t these pythago-
reans believed that Number was phenomenal, wa.s not separate from 
tijings as Speusippus' Numbers were, a.nd to this Aristotle sees no 
objection; what he objects to is the furthet tenet that things 
were constructed out of Numbers, and it is to the last that the 
premisses set out above refer, not to phenomenal number, which only 
comes in by reason of the pa.n!llthesis about Speutfrppus,. We ha.ve, 
then, this peculiar state of affairs, that·by means of arguments 
similar to those of the Italians, this school erri ved at the ilitn:t:t1 
identity of things and Numbers, while the Italians deduced from the 
same premisses only the identity of the elements of Numbers and of 
things •. These two tenets are, so different that I cannot believe the~ 
amount to the same thing; 1he,nc~, this passage cannot 'refer to 'the 
Italiru1 school unless Ari sto~le is but a ·very indifferent witness, 
and I would rather try to fipd an explanation for the similarity 
between the two arguments thf,ln accept the latter al te1·noti ve. As 
for the criticism, it need not detein us. If the passage unde'r 
consideration refers to some· other parties than the Itnlian,i philo-
sophers, then the cr1tici sm from weight does not refer to the con-
struction of bodies from the Continuous and Planes, but, a.s AristotJ 
himself says, to the conttruction of bodie r/rrom Numbers. And why 
should Aristotle not use the same criticism against different 
tenets if it is applicable to both? lAnd it is: for whether bodies 
be constructed of Planes or of Numbers, things having weight are 
being constructed from things which have it not. 
Before attempting the promised explanation, however, it will be 
as well to examine 108 3b8-19: "The Pythagorean version affords fewer 
l. How far is it permissible to 'interpret' a reference? There is a 
possibility that "they supposed real things to be Numbers" •"Thing~ 
·resemble Numbers",so that Aristotle !)ere draws an intermediate 
conclusion, going a step further in A.v by gi.ving the ontological 
ground for this, which actually occurs as a.P premiss in A.v. He 
criticises the construction of things from Numbers in the sense of 
bodies out of planes, since the ultimate constituents are points• 
units? In this case, the passage would be recension of A.v amd 
not evidence for the Theologians. 
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difficulties than those before named (Platonists),. but in another 
way has others peculiar to 1 tself. For not thinking of Number as 
capable of existing separately removes many of the imposs-ible 
consequences; but tha.t bodies should be composed of Numbers, and 
that this ·should be mathematical number, is impossible. For it is 
not possible to speak of indivisible spatial magnitudes; and howeve!t 
much there might be magnitudes of this sort, unit4at least have not 
magnitude; and can magnitude be composed of tJlliiiiiig~es? But 
arithmetical number at len st consists of units, while thinkers 
identify numbers with real things; at any rete they apply their 
propositions to bodies as if they consisted of those numbers." Here 
again is a distinction between phenomena~ number -nnot thinking of 
number as capa.ble of existing separately" - and numbers identified 
with real things -"that bodies should be composed of Numbers." 
~Applying the previous quote, one could say Aristotle would not 
object to the former -''(This) removes many of the imposmi.ble conse-
quences" - but the latter he thinks impossible. If Ar~stotle has 
in mind the same disjunction as in the previous passage, which I 
believe to be the case, we have here an explanation of the tenet 
that real things consist of Numbers. It turns on the units of Number 
ha.v1ng spatial magnitude -ttUnits at least have not .magnitude". We 
saw in respect of the Early Pythagoreans that this tenet implied 
the identity of things and Numbers in the sense that things were 
composed of numerical units spatially extended. Therefore, Aristotle 
here cr1 t1o~;1ses. this, that such spe.tial magnitudes -units- could not 
be indivisible, or if there .could be indivisible. spatia.l magnitudes-· 
e.g. Indivisible Lines - suc;h could n<t be units of Number. In the 
f·ormer passage he criticises the tenet because it does not account 
for neight and lightness·. Even if the former passage has been 
wrongly interpreted and really refers to ~he Italian school, as 
indicated in the note on pa.ge- /62, neverthll'fless Aristotle is too 
expJfuit in 1083b8-19 for us .to escape this conclusion, that here 
he is dealing with a school that constructed bodies out of spatial-
ly extended units. 
The Solution of the Diffieulty: This is a ~ater School. 
,Assuming, then, that 1090a21-35 deals with things as aggregates of 
units, how is it possible to account for the similarity in the 
argument to iA. v? Confronted with the observHtions that many 
attributes of Number belong to sensible bodies, that the mu~cal 
scale, that the-heavens displayed the attributes of Numbers, why 
should not the Italians have concluded that the elements of Numbers 
and of things were the same, while the pytha.goreans of 1090a21-35 
concluded that things were actually Numbers, ns aggrege~tes of units? 
There is no real. difficulty if one supposes that, at some time, 
certain 1 discover,6ies' were made, e.g. that Justice resembled 4, that 
the hermonic rn.tios were 2:1,3:2,4:3, and that there was some sort 
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of 'Harmony of the Sphere s• • The Italian philosophers already 
constructed things and Numbers out of elements, and accounted for 
these new resemblances by assimilating the elements of things and 
those of Numbers; the others did not talk of things and Numbers as 
being constructed out of elements, but conceived things to be 
aggregates of units~ and simply concluded that these attributes of 
Numbers displayed by things, scales and heavens respectively simply 
confirmed' their doctrine that things were in fact Numbers. Indeed, 
there is a subtle difference in the otherwise so similar argument: 
the Italians spoke of things resembling or being modelled on Numbere 
but the school here in question said that the ;fATTRIBUTES OF. NUMBERf 
were present in things • 
Now since this school held the same doctrine about sensibles 
as the Early Pythagoreans, viz. that things were aggregates of 
units, were Numbers, they must be the direct descendants of that 
school. But the use of the premisses concerning the scales and the 
heavens in connection w1 th the much later Italian philom_ phy - for 
they were roughly con ternporeneous with the Atomists - in<l cates 
that these 'discovertfts 1 were comparatively late - about a. cen.tury 
nfter the time of Pythagoras. Hence, the school here in question 
would seem to be direct philoSJ:)phical successors of the Early Pytha-
goreans, keeping their doctrines substantially intact. but of a 
much later date. This argues that this school was the Theologians 
who al tared the original Pythagoreani sm by scpara ting the Good from 
the One, and this receives some measure of confirmation from the 
fact that both the Theologians and this school of 1090a21-35 were 
t.he pattern which Speusippus, followed or tried to follow, ,up to a 
certain point. In this connection one might add an argument which 
is not drawn from Aristotle' .s evidence. The Early Fythagoreans did 
' 
not commit anything to writing and seem to have been very secret! ve. 
It is then unlikely that Speuflppus would have drawn on them as e .. 
source, but possible that he might have used either the writings ~:f 
or the tradition of later thinkers, called by Aristotle ~heologians. 
With the exception of a. few unimportmnt lines, we have 
exhaasted all references in the MetAphysics and Physics listed by 
Ross in his Commentaries on these works under the headings of 
Pythagoreans or T/v Bery dj?t' o', and from my a. scription of these 
either to the Italians or to other P)thagoreans, it can be seen 
that the Italian school, exceptfor the Table of Contraries of 986a 
22-26, is the only Pytha5orean school mentioned from book A to book 
I in the Metaphysics., and tlbere after this school is not mentioned 
again except in the recension of :A.vi voncerning Justice, etc. -
1078b21-3, but we have one or two references to Early Pythagoreanism 
and the rest of the referen·ces refer to the Theologians. 
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Cond.usion. 
We have seen that Aristotle knew of at leust1 three Pythagorean 
schools. Thero was a philo ro phy which we have called Early Pythago-
rean ism on account of the primitiveness of its conceptions, and 
which believed that the One was a Seed implanted by the Male Limit 
in the Female Unlimited. 2Th1s One breathed in the Unlimited, which 
was the Air or Void - the conceptions were not yet distinguished -
surrounding it, and this separated the One into units having 
spatial magnitude. What re :W-1 ted was on the one hand Numbers, 
conceived as units set out in the Void, and on the other, things ns 
ag5regates of spatial units, for- not merely were Numbers phenomenal 
but they were the very stuff of which perceptible bodies were made. 
The two primary elements, Limit and Unlimited, were conceived as 
displaying different aspects in different milieum, such as Male 
and Female 2 in the generation of the Cosmos, One _and Plurality in 
the sphere of Number, Good and Evil in their religious aspect. 
:A continuation of this school, but i'lhich separated the One 
from the Good by pl~cing the generation of the latter later in 
. 
•evolution', was that called by Aristotle the ph\\losophy of the 
Theologians, which also held phenomenPl number and units having 
magnitude. 
A· quite different school was that of the Italian philo ID phy, 
I 
which sought the baslts of the resemlblances between things and 
Numbers not in an identity of the two, but in that of their e lemen 'ttl 
Aristotle refers to the last 8-S • so-called pythagoreontsm' 
because, apparently, while they laid claim to the title of Pythago-
rea:ns, their differences from the main tradi"tl.. on, ·that of Early 
Pythagorean! sm, And their spiritual heirs, the Theologians, were so 
great tha.t he doubted their right to the appellation. 
1 .• I say 1 at least•, bechuse there are tro.ces of a fourth school, 
which 1s characterised by the conception of the Line as a fluxion 
of a point, De :Anima 409a4. I would have thought the context 
referred to Xenocr.ates, but Cornford, Plato and Parmenides 12, 
ascribes it to his post-Zenonic school, and Raven, Op. cit. 108-9, 
makes it contemporary with the Platonists, see page 9 note 11 
above. Ross, .-Aristotle's Metaphysics II. 414 ad l077a24-30, sees 
ad loc. the Line as fluxion of a point, but leaves the ~scripU on 
anonymous. If Pythagorean at all, it is surely contemporary with 
the Platonists as Raven says, and $ll is 1rrreleva.nt to a study of 
Platots relationship to the Pythagoreans, who ex hypothesi must 
have preceded him. 
2. This contradicts the view of the relationship between the one, 
the Limit, and the Unlimited, given in part II. Chapter 1 belov1, 
where the One is original. J.;)ecause of this I am not certain of 
the el)rliness ~of the Table, but 1 t, may be that Male and Female 
were cosmoloe;Cbcal gods laying the One as a sort of Orphic Egg 
from which the Limit and Unlimited emerged, i~hus reconcil:i.ng the 
two bodies of evidence. 
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Chapter 2. ,f n ~~ .,.t.<JVOf o/1(/ r llf. Tt.-/ C%..... 
• 
General Remarks on the i3_t:.lationshi:£ pe~Y¥.~.e£_P!_ato and the !tali~ 
On the face of it, there should be little difficulty in ascertain-
ing}4what ~Aristotle meant in Metaphysics A.vi.l by Plato's doctrine 
and its agreements with and liiif.ferences from the philosophy of the 
Italians, since the rest of A.v1 is ostensibly devoted to an account 
of that doctrine together with a list, in the course of the exposi-
tion, of the alleged followin8s and peculiarities. But two remark-
able facts draw one's attention to there being something unusunl in 
this ?ccount. Firstly, only the first part of the account reflects 
what is generally known to be Flotonie from a study of the Platonic 
dialogues, and secondly, the list of agreements and disagreements 
enters, with one exception, at that point where the agreement with 
the dialogues seems to end. While the intention of this chapter is 
not to explain Platonism and its relationship to Pythagoreanism 
either as it was in fact or as it is presented in Plato's dialo·gues, 
but only to give an explanation of what Aristotle seems to have 
understood by it, becausehrs here presumably giving an account not 
A 
of some figment of his imagination but .of an objectively existent 
philosophy, 1-t is unavoidable to e.ffer some explanation of these 
two peculiarities in his account. But whether Aristotle was correct 
in his· conception of Platonism f:¥1d its relationship to pythagoreas-
ism will be the subject of another chapter: here we are solely 
concerned with what he understood by these two points, and this 
must be asc}'ertained solely from his l'liJ: own evidence. 
The kej: to Arist·otle 1 s meanjng appears from two passages. one 
shortly after this A .• vi and the other much later in the Metaphysics. 
The former, 988a18-20, runs as follows: 11 0ur review of those who 
bave spoken about first principles and reality and of the way in 
which they have spoken, has been concise and summary. n This 
indicates that Aristotle makes no claims to be and had no intention 
of being exhaustive in his.account of Platonism ar;d the other 
philosophies deAlt with, but his account dealt only with whatwas 
immediately relevant to his purpose. Hence, he states what is 
relevant to Platonism concisely and without distinguishing what he 
doubtless learnt from the dialogues, our source, e.nd what he derived 
from some other source. And th<-~ t he had some other source appfea.Es 
from 987a32:"For¢, having in his youth first become familiar with 
Cratylus ••.• 11 As Ross1 puts it:"From the dialogues we could not have 
known Pleto' s acquaintance with Cratylus, and this cannot be am 
inference of Aristotle's from the Cratylus e,nd the Theaetetus -
there is no.thing to suggest it." Indeed, the dramatic date of the 
2 former dialogue is 431 B.C., before Plato's birth. 
The second passage is 1078b9-12: "Now, regarding the Idea.s, we 
1. ·Aristotle's Metaphysics I.xlvii. 
2. Taylor, Plato, the Man and his Work ~xxi* 76 • 
. I 
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must first examine the Ideal Theory itself, not connecting it in 
any way with the nature of Numbers, butYtrea.ting it in the form 
in which it was originally understood by those who first maintained 
the existence of the Ideas." That this refers to Plato has been 
1 denied by Burnet , who says that 'those who first maj.ntained the 
were 
existence of' the Ideas' vewe the Friends of Forms, and consequently 
Burnet is able to say that Aristotle knows of but one Platonic 
philosophy and says nothing any~here of any chonge in Platonism. 2 
But Field3 has shown that this per1phrrs1s does mean Plato; and as 
the continuation of the passage can be shown, f. rom its close resem-
blcnce to the first part of 11.. vi, where Plato is named, to refer to 
Plato, the distinction, as Ross4 points out, is not. between two 
persons - the Friends of Forms and Plato - but between two forms of 
the Ideal Theory - the earlier and the later Platonism. lienee, 
Cherniss5 is correct, that Burnet's hyp.othesie, that 'those who 
first maintained the e~istence of Ideas' are persons other than 
Plato, no longer requires consideration. This passage, 
evidence thf7t Ari-stotle knew of an ea.rlier and a later 
then, is 
form of 
6 Platonism, s:tnce the form of the Ideal Theory there expounded 
agrees with the account of the first part of A. vi, as will be shown 
below, and this was the" Ideal Th6C'ry as ORIGINALLY understood, the 
connection with the na. ture of Numbers being a later form of Platon-
ism, generally referred to as the Doctrine of Idea-Numbers. 
Applying this to the account of A.vi, that first section which 
has just been referred to is the earlier Ideal Theo~y, that of the 
dialogues in fact, and the lc;ter section which is not reflected in 
the dialogues is the later connection of Ideas with the nature of 
Numbers. That Aristotle runs two distinct phases of Platonism 
together without mnking any distinction between them, is explicable 
from his rematks in 988al8-26 that he has given only a concise and 
summary account. Therefore, it would a.ppear that, with the one 
exception referred to on the previous page,. his 11 st of agreements 
and disagreements he s little to do with the ea.rlier Pla. toni BID. but 
only with the later piJase which he has distinguished as a connection 
with the nature of Numbers in l078b9-12. 
A Di Si~ inc!ion between Primary nnd Secondary Differe!l~e§.. Now 
a distinction must be made in respect of this list of agreements and 
differences. A glance at A. vi reveals that on the one hand Aristotle 
notes7 that Plato diff-ers from the Pythagoreans in such respects as 
separating Numbers and Forms, and on the other hand he states that 
1. Greek Philosophy 313. 2~ Burnet, Plato's Phaedo xlvi, cp. 
Taylor, A Commentary on Plato' s Timaeus 29. 
3. Classical Quarterly XVII.l19-120. 
4. ~ristotle' s Metaphysics I.xxxvi, and II.420 ad 1078bll. 
5. Aristotle's Criticism of Plato 186 note 108. 
6. See Field, op. cit. 123 and Ross, op. cit. II.421. 
7. These points will be detailed and citiscussed. below. 
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while Participation resembles Imitation it <i:iffers from it in name, 
and that while Plato resembled the Pythagoreans in making the 
Infinite an element, his Infinite differed from theirs in being a 
dyad. I call the former examples Primary Differences and the latter 
Secondary, since the nature and force of tre difference can only be 
explained after the resemblances on which they are based have been 
dealt with. Hence, while the Primary Differences can be dealt with 
in isolation from the agreements, the Secondary Differences cannot 
be grouped under the same heading, but require separate treatment 
after the resemblances on which they are based have been discllssed. 
Method of Procedure. This indicates a threefold division of 
this chapter: i} we shell explain the Primary Dif1 erences and what 
Aristotle understood by these peculiarities of Platonism; 11) the 
Resemblances to Pythagoreanism and what .Aristotle understood by 
thE:..t phase of Platonism which thus 'follovJs 1 Pythagorel3nism; iii) 
the· Secondary Differences and what Aristotle understood by them, 
and the. reason for such deviations from pythngoreanism. 
The discussion o.f tre se threesubjects, as will be seen from 
an examination of the text and the rest a ,tthis chapter, will cover 
all that Aridr.t1 has to sa.y about Platonism in A.vi, and covers A.vi 
as far as 988al, t®ther with 988a.l0-14. The rest of A.vi does .not 
concern us, as the first paragraph of tl'B remainder consists of 
.~ristotle' s criticism of one of the secondary differences, 988a2-7, 
and we are dealing in this work not with. Aristotle's criticism of 
Plato, but only with what he understood by it; the second paragraph 
deals with his interpretation of Platonism in the light of his four 
causes, but we are concerned only with his interpretation of its 
reln t1onsbip to Pythagoreanism; fina.lly, the last sentence., 988al5-
17, deals~ with the relation of Plato's elements to Good and Evil, 
which, since it does not refer to any resemblance to or difference 
from pythagoreanism noticed by Aristotle, but is related by him to 
his interpretation of the Causes, is again :f.rrelewant to our 
investigation. We start, than, with Plato• s Primary Differences. 
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List of Plato's Primary Differences. The pr1i.mary differences, 
which according to Aristotle in A. vi distinguish Platonism from 
pythagoreanism, are three in number, and are set out in 987b27-32: 
"(Peculiar to Plato) is 1. his view that the Numbers exist apart 
from sensible things, while they say that the things themselves 
are Numbers, 2. and do not place the objects of mathematics between 
Forms and sensible things. His divergence from the pythagoreans 
in making the One and the Numbers separate from, and 3. his 
introduction of the Forms, were due to his inquiries in the rebion 
of dcfinitions1 (for the earlier thinkers had no tincture of 
Dialecti~." With 3 must be taken the account of the origin of 
Ploto' s conception of Ide~s from Cratylus and Socrates in 987a32ff., 
since the word yafi 2 'for•, introducing this account explains the 
reason for his peculiarities in general, stated in A.vi.l, and 
clearly refers to the introduction of Forms in particular. Further, 
difference 2 seems to be explained in 987b14-18, which will be 
discussed in 1 ts place. It will be convenient to start with the 
thir."d difference. 
3. The Introduction of the FO.E!!'l£· This primary difference from 
pytha.goreanisrn, the introduction of Forms, is elaborated in 987a32ff, 
2 . . 
which, by reason of the word 'for', is explicitly given as the 
reason for this prima,ry diff'erenca. Where the account begins is 
obvious, but where does it end? It must extend at l~ast as far as 
the mention of the ,entities called Ideas, since this is the purpose 
of the accour,t - to explain the introduction of Ideas - and yet can 
hardly run .further than the explanation of the· second difference, 
987bl4-18, since 'the passage in question (987a32ff.) deals onl~ with 
difference number 3. But if the passage explain~g the introduction 
of the Ideas be taken as 987a32-b14, that is, as far as the 
explanation of difference 2, this will include in the passage one 
of' the resemblances with a. secondary difference - Participatiom. zZlatF 
This may or may not form part of the explanation ofi difference 3, 
but it certainly cannot be altogether excluded from this explanation 
since to do so would entail the exclusion also of the prebious 
sentence, which mentions this same Participation, and 1 t is in this 
sentence that the Ideas are first mentioned. As, however, that part 
of the sentence mentioning the resemblance between Participation and 
Imitation with the secondary difference of n&menclature must needs 
be dealt "'ith separately, and does not concern the question of the 
primary difference here discussed, I propose quoting down to 987bl4, 
but with the exclusion of what is irre1evant to the discussion of 
the primary di: f'f'erence here in question. 
f , 7i -
1. Ross, Plato• s Theory of Idee.s 163, explains that <J>f(t. tftr fiJ ~( f 
'\ I , • l'ojotr refers to Phaedo lOOA, where )\oyo<. =statements, but for 
Aristotle this word = definitions. :Sri, 2. Se.o pages 21-3 above. 
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987a32-bl4: "For, having in his youth first become familiar 
with Cratylus and with the HeraclittA:m doctrines that all sensible 
things are ever in a state of Flux Hnd there is no knoweldge about 
them, these viewo he held even in later years. Socra.tes, however, 
was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world 
of Nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical 
matters, and fixed thought for the first time on defin1tions;Plato 
accepted his teaching, but held that the problem applied not to 
sensible things but to entities of another kindt - for this reason, 
that the common defini t1 on could not be a def1n1 tion of any sensibl1 
thing, as they were always changing. Things of this other sort, 
then, he called Ideas, and sensible things, he said, were all named 
after these, and in virtue of a relation to these; for it was in 
virtue of pa.rticipstion thttt the Many have the same name as the 
Forms. 1 ........... Pla.to says that (things) exist by Pn.rticipation •• 
2 
•••• But what the Participation •••• of the Forms might be, they 
left an open question." In this we can distinguish the following 
tenets: i.) Plato adopted Heraclitean Flux for sensibles - that 'all 
things are ever in a state of Flux•; ii) he also adopted Socratic 
definitions - he sought ' the univers~l and fixed thought on defini· 
tions 1 ; i.ii) Plato made the object of the universal and defini t1on 
exist not as a sensible in Flux, but as an entity of another kind, 
because there is nopknowledge about Flux and there can be no 
definition of sensible things, as they are always changing; iv) 
these entities he called Ideas; v) sensible things are named after 
the Ideas and in virtue of the relation of Participation which they 
bear to Ideas of the s::lme name as they, and vi} this Participation 
accounts for the existence of sensible things .. This is a clear and 
consistent account except that no attempt is made to explain what 
was meant by Participation -here it is only a name, for •what the 
Participation of the Fo11I1s might be, they left an open question.• 
1. In this last clause I have followed Rost>' translation given in 
Plato's Theory of Ideas 154. His earlier translation had been: 
"For the Many existed by Participation in the Ideas that have tfce 
' tLI 
same name as they. 11 'Ihi s was based on, the MS readin17: fCA7~t ft-eut cl' 
ya;" £7~4-, T~ 7ro~~..Y Tc.VP ~IJYc.uYvftc.uP (7o'if tc&z<1",, ). rn 
.Arietotle' s Metaphysics I.l61-2 he pointed out.that to avoid an 
impossible use of the definitive genitive- •the Many which are 
synonyma with the Formst - he excises the bracketed words with 
Gillespie, Journal of Philology XXXIV .151. But in his Plato 1 s 
Theory of Ideas 194 note 2, he thinks his former translation 
unlikely, and suggests that a. copyist, taking Tl¥ 17o~&i. as 'the 
majority' j in stead of 'the fAnny' , in se:tted 7,;v trur~-urtf!w"a.s a 
gloss to complete the sense, and this later drdve out •r,;,"or' 
which is Aristotle 1 s usual turm in this connection. The vri~inal 
re!'di~g, then, was: Kec:7-~ _u~d'it'" ye«~ -rTya.. <../A' }To)~4 Jr~~ul'-"'-
7tHf tr6'l. g.c,.., , thus abancl'oning Gillespie' s seclusion ofl"•"tl t,rf~tHJ; 
2. A disputed reading in the text in this line wil~ be discussed 
when these lines are dealt with later in connection with Partic1-
pa~ion and Imitation. 
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One point, ho\'iever, is very noticeable: Aristotle couches 
this theory in his own terminology 'f: - for we cannot believe that 
Socrates used the word.A K«B:~ov , 'universalt'; our sources 
l \.. , 
rather .ind.ica.te that his own word was c'- r 0J'D c... But that this word 
correctly renders Socrates' meaning - for by it .Aristotle. understood 
tthe common term' - is clear enough from Euthyphro 6D: "Remember 
that I did not ask you to give me two or three examples of piety, 
but to explain the general idea which makes all pious things to be 
pious. 11 .Ari st otle, then, states the theories of his predecessors -
in this instance at, any rate - in hd:s ovm termin"logy, but seems to 
give a fair enough rendering of thej.r theor;ies. Naturally, we 
shall not find just %ki:E such an exposition of the origin of the 
Ideas in Plato• s dial .. ogues: Aristotle gives his own interpretation 
of this, just as he states that interpretation in his own 
terminology, but it is with Aristotle's interpretation of the 
origin of the Ideal Theory that we are here concerned, not with 
what Plato felt about the matter. 
Now as is to be exp/ected, there is no trace thus far of 
pythagorean resemblance to Platonism - for the question of Partici-
pation being another name for Imitation will be deo..lt with below -
and this is what we should have expected, since this account of the 
origin of the Ideas is given explicitly by means of two pointers 
as the reason for one of the most important of the PrimarJy Diffe-
rences from pythagoreanism - it is introduced by 'for', whihh makes 
the passage an explanation of the preceding statement that there 
were 'peculia,(rities distinguishing Plato's doctrine from the 
philosophy of the Italians', and in 987b32, 'his introduction of 
the Forms was due to his inquiries in. the region of definitions, • 
an obvious back-reference is made to Socrates' definitions as the 
basis of Plato's hypostatised Ideas. Therefore, whatever might 
have been the resemblance between Platonism and Pytha.goreanism, the 
primary and fundamental diff'erence between tm two philosophies is 
the introduction into Platonism of Ideas, derived according to 
Aristotle from Socratic~ universals, which, as objects of knowledge, 
could not be in the world of' Flux, but were separate~ Hence, the 
Ital.ians could not have held Ideas or any such entities separate 
from the world of sense. It remains to disctlver what Aristotle 
understood by or how he conceived these Ideas and the relationship 
in which they stood to sensibles. 
What Ari_§totle Understood by the _Fo,rms: 
1Q86a31-bl2:1 nrhose who believe 't in the Ideas make the Ideas on 
the one hand universal and on the other se:parate and individual, 
because they did not ident~fy SUbstance with sensibles; but they 
thought these were in Flux and those, the Universals, which they 
derived from Socrates, were apart from them. For .if' there were to 
1. ki'lightly condensed. 
• 
• 
-
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be any substances apart from sent:1ibles they must be separate, allld 
as these were objects of lcnowledge and Bo universal, it follows that 
they held univers~lly predicated substances.n The general trend of 
this pa.ssage makes itp! clear that Aristotle means Plato, the plural 
perhaps indi:t eating the inclusion of h.is early disciples~ ani 1 t will 
be shown in the Appendix that the passage is in fnct a recension 
of the account, or rather part of the account, in A.vi. The words 
'it follows that• show that Aristotle is m9king a deduction from 
the nature of Plato's tenets, which is just what is required for 
our purpose - since we are seeking here what Aristotle understood 
by the Ideas. Otherwise the passage agrees w.ith 987a32-bl4. in all 
respects except one. It states i) sen able substances were in .imi:x, 
Flux, ii) the Universal was derived from Socrates, iii) they did not 
identify substances, which the context shows here meant objects of 
knowledge, with sensibles, but thought they were apart from them~ 
were separate, iv) these substances are., by implication, Ideas, 
being so namJed in the f.ir st line of the quotation, and v) the 
naming of sensi bles after Ideas is implicit in the conception of 
Ideas as universally predicated substances, since, as we sa.id above, 
for Aristotle the universal predicate is the term common to a 
number of particular instances; but he is here silent as to Partici-
pation, i.e. the objective ground of such naming being the mode of 
the existence of sensible things. This point, then, will have to be 
separately considered below. 
·Again, Aristotle's own terminology obtrudes j_n hisjalling 
Ideas, and not only Socratic "'OJ"' Universals. He does so, apparent-
ly, because they were objects of knowiedge - •as these were objects 
of knowledge AND SO Uni versa1s•. This seerris to be n fnir deduction 
from, or perhaps we should say a reasonable 1nterpretrtt1on of, the 
fact that sen d.1 ble s were nc:med after their' corre fP on ding Idea, and 
that Ideas were postulajed because sensibles could not be objects 
of knowledge since in Flux. Aga.in., he call's them separate and 
individual, apparently because as separate substances Aristotle· 
deduces thEW" were individu?.l. Hence, Aristotle conceives the Ideas 
as universr.:>lly predicated substances, as t~~lltflH.i1 or particula.r 
entities, which, as the common cha.racteristic of a plurality of' 
sensibles, were the objects of knowledge in those sendbles. As 
/\ristotle himself believed in the existence of common dl·aracteris-
tics as objects of knowledge, it is the individuality of the Ideas 
that distinguishes Plato from himself in his own opinion that is, 
Plato's separation of the IdeA.s fromfone E~ensibles of which the 
Ideas were the common characteristic, and it is with this combina-
tion of universality and individuality that several criticisms of 
Ari stotle 1 s are concerned. 
The first type of criticism turns on the individuality of the 
universel, which he. argu~s is essentia.lly the same as the indiv1du-
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ality of the sensible particular. So Aristotle's conclusion from 
the terminology used at the end of the passage quoted above, 1086 
bll-12: n w that it followed that Uni ver:3al s · and Indi vidua.ls were 
almost the same sort of thing. 11 For thil3 reason, he affects to 
regard the Ide a of Man simply as an eternal man in l059all-l4 and 
997b5-13. Since Aristotle himself held 5.ntell1&ible entities, such 
as the Prime Mover, this seems to me to be a most unfair argument, 
since a. Universal could well be an IN'l'ELLIGIBLE particular, and so 
not merely a Sill~SIBLE particular distinguished by nothing except 
its longer duration. But we are concerned not with the validity 
of Arist.otle's criticism but with its evidence for his conception 
of what he criticises. Did he then understand Plato's Idea of Man 
as nothing more than an eternal man? I can see only two alternatives, 
1 firstly, as Cherniss believes, this analysis of the Idea into 
existential and essential moments is a mere dialectical trick in 
order to score a topical hit pfagain.e;t the Platonists; secondly, 
Aristotle does in fact conceive the Idea in this way because HE 
COULD NOT CONCEIVE ANY OTHER POSSIBLE MODE OF EXISTENCE FOR THE IDEA 
that as an enduring sena ble particular. I favour the ls.tter because 
of what Aristotle says in the very passage cited by Cherniss. 
1040b27-34: "But those who say the Forms exist, in one respect 
are right, in giving the Forms separate existence, if they are 
substances; but in a~other respect they are not right, because they 
saY the one over Many is a Form. Their reas'on for doing this is 
I, 
that they cannot declare what are the substances of this sort, the 
imperishable substances which exist apart from the individual and 
'· 
sensible substances. They make them, then, the same in kind as the 
perishable things (for this kind of suhttance we know) - 'Man-
himself' and 'Horse-itself', a ... ding to the sensible things the' word 
'itself'"· Tt1i s ·is illuminating. Aristotle states 'they cannot 
declate what are the substances ~ this sort• - they are postulated 
but not explained; further, they make them the samA in kind as 
I I 
perishable things by adding to the sensible things the word .c.\JTO • 
1'hey cannot explain the nature of their Ideal Entities, but since 
' I . they identify them merely by adding ab J-o , ITSELF, to the name of 
the sensible thing, Aristotle says that they make in fact the Ideas 
the same in kind as perishable things. And I am not sure that he 
is not right. It is very ea,.sy to talk about intelligible reality, 
but what does this reallY, mean? It can be posited but it cannot. be 
described, at least it can be desc~ibed only in terms of sense 
experience if it is to be described at all, as witness the Greek 
nnthqSopomorphic gods. 'l'herefore, Aristotle says in effect that the 
Idealists give no explanation of the mode of existence of the Ideal 
entities which they postulate,and according to the way in which they 
1. Aristotle's Criticif'm of Plato 3-4. 
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talk :;bout them, he can only suppose tt1at t!'ley are in fact 
distinguishable from sensibiJ:e particulars only by their et~rnity. 
The second type of criticism l~~ on their universality. 
Because his own conception of universality is to be the predicate 
common to a plurality of particularB, he regards it as a contradic-
tion in.terrns to talk about a separate universal, since if ?epa.rate 
the universal cannot be common to the particulars; if common to the 
particulars the universal cannot be separate. SJ iryl003a8-15 he 
argues that if universal, the Ideas cannot be substances; if not 
universal, they cannot be objects of knowledge. In fact, a majority 
of his criticisms rests on just this separation of the universal 
from its instances, for he does not himself separate. And this 
makes it clear thnt however absurd Aristotle thought or affected 
to think that such separa.tion of the universal from. 1 ts in stances 
was, he understood Plato as so separating the Ideas. 1 We conclude, 
then, that Aristotle conceived the Idea as an object of khowledge, 
as the universal common to a plurality of instances, and also as 
separate from these instances as itself an individual particular. 
In a. word, he conceived the Idea as a universal substance. 
2 l078bl3-32:1 We have already quoted the introduction to this 
passage; it continues: ''The supporter£ of the Ideal Theory were led 
to it because on the question about the truth of things they accep-
ted the Heracli tean sayings which de scribe all sensible things as 
ever passing away, so that if knowledge or thought is to have an 
'· 
object, there must be some other and permenent entities apa.rt from 
those which are sensible; for there could be,no knowledge of things 
which were in a state of Flux. But •••• Socrat.es wns occupying 
himself with the excellences of character, and in connection with 
them became the first to raise the problem of universal definition •. 
• •• • But Socrates did not make tf}e universals or the defin1!itions 
exist apart; they, however, gave them separr..te existence, and this 
was the kind of thing they called Ideas." 
Here we have four of the six points listed in A. vi. 
i) .Sensible thin{Ss are ever passing away, as is asserted by the 
Heracli tean sayings; ii) Socrates raised the problem of universal 
definition, iii) which could not be in a state of Flux but must 
have separate existence, if it was to be Rn object of knowledge; 
iv) such kind of thines the Idealists cslled Ideas. But naming and 
Participation lack. To these latter we must now turn. 
1. So Mabbott, Classical Quarterly XX.72: 11 Aristotle means by separa .. 
tion a severance complete and absolute." Stewart, Plato's Doctrin' 
of Ideas 3-4, thinks his harping on separation 1 s erroneous 
because he misunderc;tood Plato's methodological side and was kii: 
blind to his aesthetic side; and Ritter, The Essence of Plato's 
Philosophy 113, note 1, elso considers .Aristotle wrong; but, as 
Ross would say, Plato's ~:heory of Ideas 15, this is 11 a. product of 
XIX centmry conceptualism far removed from the simple realism of 
Plato's thought.'' 2. See page 67 above .• 
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!uat Aris~3tle_Q~stood bl P~_tiaEation:-
We have seen above1 that Aristotle alleges that Plato did not make 
it clear what he meant by Participation, but left it an open ~t4RE:ttnm 
question, just as2 apparently he did not explain what he meant by 
Ideas as separate universal substances, but Aristotle made his 
deductions from the actuel procedure of the Platonists and thus 
came to the conclusion that the Idea of Man wRs simply an eternal 
man .. We c?..n:, then, expect th8t here too, although Plato is said not 
to have made it clear what Participation wR.s, Aristotle has made 
his o?m conclusions as to the nature of par.·ticipation, for how else 
could he criticise it? To criticise at all one must know what one 
is criticising, or at least have a· conception of it. To ascertain 
this it will be convenient to start with the procedure of naming. 
Momon~ms and~nonyrns~ In his categories lal-12 Aristotle 
defines naming as having two senses: "Thint,s are said to be nemed 
( . 
'equivocallY'.,tlf""vu_ftoc..., when, although they have a common name, 
the definition corresponding with the name differs for ench. Thus, 
a. real man and a figure in n picture can both lay claim to the name 
1 animal t ••••• ,. but the deflmi tion corresponding Xi!l with the name 
differs for oach ••••• On the other hand, things .are sc.id to be hArned , 
'univocnlly', V'"VYt.cJYU ,fto<-, which have both the name and the 
li:R'f:tmi:timm: d f · · t · · t th i d niBxitxx:r~am:x e · ~nl. ~on en swer1ng o e nrune n common. A man an an 
ox are both 'animal' and these are univocelly so named, inasmuch as 
not only the name but also the definition is the s8rne in boj~h 
cases ••••• 11 This system of nomenclature Aristotle 8pp11es to Idees 
and sensibles, and concludes that if things are 'synonyms• of Ideas, 
a third form ~vill be common to both as th.eir 'synonym', and so lead 
to a regress, but if things and Idees e.re 1 homonyms' there will be 
nothing common to them, and the Ideas will thus not be causes as 
they a.re ouppo sed to be. As P result, he di smi sse s Plato • s theory 
of things being named after Ideas as unintelligible. This of course 
rests on the assumption of Idens as etern?l particulars. 
ED 991a2-8: 11.And if the Ideasand the particulars that share in 
them heve the same form, there will be something common to these; 
for why should 2 be one and the same in the pa-isbo.ble 2' s or in 
those that are many but eternal (i.e. mathematical 2' s}, and not the 
same in the '2 itself' as in tho particulAr 2' s? But if they heve 
not the same form, they must have only the name in common, and it 
is as if one were to call both Callias and a wooden image a. •man', 
without observing any community between them." The qae stion, "Why 
should 2 be one and the same in the perishable 2' s?n refers to 
Aristotle's argument that there is nog ground for making a unique 
Idea of Two, in which the particulars share, since the same process 
1. Page 70 sub. fin. 2. Page 73 above. 
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should yield a p¢seudo~Ideal Two in which the Idea of Two ( the 2 
Itself) and any particular 2 might share, 1 and this is his famous 
Third Man argument. 2 ,Aristotle, then, conceives the relation of 
naming here as the sharing of particulars in a common universal, 
and he argues that if thlls universal is itself a particular, albeit 
a universal particular, it should share along with sensible pa.rticu-
lars in a third such universal, the pseudo-Idea. In this part of 
univocallv 
the argument, the Idea and tte ·· thing are named HJ!H:XX~EEXXJ or as 
•synonyms•. 3 He then tries out the effect of conceiving the relation 
of naming equivocally, as 'homonyms', and concludes that, just as 
Callias and a statue have nothing in common except the designation 
'man', so an Idea and a particular, if named equivocally, could 
have only their name in commom, and so the Idea could contribute 
nothing to the existence of any part1cular. 4 Because Aristotle 
assumes that his disjunction of synonymity and homonymi ty is 
exhaustive, he concludes that things can be named after the Ideas 
neither· synonymously nor homonymously, but he overlobks a third 
way of naming, that assumed by Plato himself. 5 Nevertheless, what 
matters for the purpose of our agrgument is that this criticism, 
whether right x:tgkt or wrong, shows that Aristotle did dn fact know 
well enough that for Plato sens1.ble particulars were named a.fter the 
Ideas, although he argues that they could not have been, since named 
neither synonymously nor homonymously. Hence, it is obvious that 
Aristotle had no clear conception of the manner in which things were 
' 
named after the Ideas, but only the fact that they were so named. 
l 
Part1c1patiol} Proper. In the passage 987a32-bl4 quoted a.bove6 Aris-
totle, while /stating that Pla. to says thc.t things exist by partici-
pation, addsfthat what this Participation of the Forms might be was 
left an openlquestion. This means that Plato gave no precise account 
of the relationship. Just as in the que'stion how things were named 
after the Id~as, which has been discussed just above, it appeared 
that,in defa!ult of any clear statement by Plato, Aristotle appli~d 
his own terminology to find an .explanation for it, and having two 
' I 
1. The alternative, 'or in those that are many but eternal', refer-
ring to mathematical 2' s, makes no differen.ce to the argument: it 
is all one whether the Ideal Two gives its name to particular 21 s 
or to mathematical 21 s. 
2. For a discussion of the Third Man argument, see Cherniss, 
Aristotle• s Criticl:tsm of Plato and the Academy 287ff'. The same 
argument is found in Plato's Parrnenides, which refutes the error 
of conceiving the Ideap as a thing, as Stewart says, Plato's 
Doctrine of Ideas 62. Robin, Platon 122, thinks this argument was 
borrowed by Plato from Polyxenus, but Ross, Plato's Theory of 
Ideas 87 with note 3, shows that the Third Man of Polyxenus was 
quite different since it involved no regress. Aristotle, I believe 
borrowed Plato's argument against himself without acknowledgement. 
3. Compare l059all-l4 for roughly the same argument. 
4. In this I follow Cherniss, op. cit. 178-9, and Ross, Aristotle's 
Metaphysics !.162 add 191. 
5. Cherniss, op. cit. 278-9, 296-9, and 311. 6. see page 70. 
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terms by which in his Categories he had described the process of 
naming, he tried out each in turn in order to discover what meaning 
Plato could have given to the process, so here also - such ~. my 
conclusion - in default of any clear statement by Plato as to whet 
he meant when he spoke of things existing by Participation in the 
Ideas, ·he endeavoured to give his it t ti own n erpre a on of the state-
ment. There is, ho~ever, a difference in this case. The naming of 
particulars w.as common to both Plato and 'himself · 11 but there was 
no question. of Participation in his own philosophy. Hence, he XRlllMr:t,. 
resorts to Plato's dialogues; as we .shall see, and examines instan-
ces of the relationship between particulars and Ideas there, in Mrli! 
order to fo:rm soJre conception of what Plato mea.nt thereby. Hence, I 
maintain that while .Plato left 1 t an open question what Part1c1.pa-
tion was, doubtless by not giving any clear explanation of the 
processs, .Aristotle nevertheless had his own .interpretation of what 
Plato intended •. 1md again we must draw attention to the purpose of 
the investigation of this part I: it is concerned not with what 
Plato really said or meant in the present question,-that indeed was 
left an open question - but only with wha.t Aristotle, rightly or 
wrongly, understood him to have meant when he said, in this case, 
that things existe}'id by Participation in the Ideas. Hence, we must 
examine passages elsewhere in the Metaphysics - since no further 
refemnce is made to the matter in A.vi - where Aristotle deals 
with this :tenet in order to discover what meaning he gave it. 
991alf9-23: "'But,. further, all other things cannot come into 
existence )from the Forms in any of the usual senses of • from'. And 
to say that they a.re patterns and the other things share Cft:'ttfe't') 
in them i~'S to use empty words and poetical mete..phors. For what is 
'1 ,.., ' ' ' I tit that works, looking to the Ideas? (To yyt.t) o)'cvo¥ yc~r 'tltf c~t¢5 
J7To;4~C:7lotl )" 99lb4-6 :"In the Phaedo the ease is st\e.ted this 
way - that the Forms are causes both of Being and of Becoming; yet· 
when the Forms exist, still the things that share in them (-rei 
ft cr/1'~·y"~') do not come into being., unless there is something 
to originate movement ••• n The second passage implies Phaedo lOOC-
E as its source; both passages use the word most commonly applied 
' I\., dL 
by Plato to participation, viz.ft'fTt~Ctt>',~t"UC~t..r ; and the 
former passage uses terminology very close to that used by Plato 
' ' - ' in_his 'demiurgic]' passages, e.g. Cratylus 389B: 71/.?of fi(Z..r~'?_ ,..o 
J I " .._( ' ,.. • -~ 
cc.for ~~r1Tc-uV , or better, Timaeus 28A: o/" f To Kc, t4 '~"' qol' ~}..-t'TTt.ufl' •••••• '?"~ y (6/ql" •••••• arttyyd(? 7"t~«< , and 28C-
29A: TfPJr 11tf 'Y'"t' )"~v 7ly~S'-z,c.J'/-"4' r~VI'- ... ctlT?/' yq' fr i"'o. 
The closeness of the language sug[ests that Aristotle he.s referred 
to the dialogues for a.n explanation of Part1c1pa tion, and from an 
examination of these two passages one can fa,irly, I think, conc1ludt 
that Aristotle believes, from the study of Plato's actual usage, 
that there is little difference between saying that the Forms are 
78/ 
patterns, and that other things share in them. But this does not 
mean that Aristotle necessarily interpreted Participation as things 
being modelled on Ideas, but his language, •the; are patterns AND, 
Kttt, the other things share in thf)m', points that way. But he do~~ 
not allow the conception of patterning to be legitimate, since, 
failing to find an ontological as distinct from a mythical basis 
for this - for the Demiurge he must take to be mythical in view of 
his question, 'What is it that works looking to the Ideas?' - he 
rejects such An explanation as mere empty words, poetical metaphors. 
S:J in the second passage quoted, he tacitly equates Participation 
with patterning when he refers to the lack of a source of m,!ovement, 
that is, an efficient cause of generation. 
Other passages which refer to Participation add nothing to the 
above, but either state Aristotle's conviction that Participation 
is meaningless or look in vain for an efficient ca.use. SUch are 
992a28-29: nwe say nothing about the cause of change, for 'sharing', 
as we said before, means nothing." 1045b8-lO:.~.Some speak of 
'participation•, and raise the question, what is the cause of 
'participation and what is it to participa.te.u 1075bl6-20:"Further, 
why should there always be Becoming, o.nd what is the cause if 
Becoming? - this no one tells us. And those who suppose two 
; principles must suppose another, a superior principle, and so must 
. did . 
, those who believe in the Forms; for why xR:~ux!i: things come to parti· 
cipate, or why do they participate in the Forms?" , 
We conclude, then, that Ari~?totle found no clear explanation 
in Plato's works what Participa~ion was, but, by examining certain 
passages in his dialogues which dealt with the mode of the existencE 
of particulars, he found that Plato did not draw a very clear line 
between pe.rticipation - things S,!taring in Forms - ·and patterning -
the Forms serving as patterns on which things were modelled. We 
cannot be sure that Aristotle co.pifddered that these two processes 
were synonymous, but he seems tol
1
have taken them to be so, and 
·' 
dismisses both as virtually meaningless - mere poetical metaphors. 
His chief ground for this wa.s th~t he failed to find in Plato any 
sufficient cause whereby things shared in the Ideas or whereby they 
were made 11ke Ideas. 1 
1. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas 154 note 2, has little on the 
f~ ' •Lt. f , subject except:no1 .l(l"urc ••• is Aristotle's usual wa.y of express-ing the relation of the particulars to the Ideas in Plato's 
system, 990b6,- 99la6." The fottmer reads:"For to each thing there 
answers an entity which has the same name, of~vufd~ r<. , and 
exists apart from the substances, 11 which is concerned onjy with 
naming and not with the ontological ground of particulars; the 
latter reads:"But lf they have not the same form, they must have 
~u ' JA. only the name in common, or""vv,.-_4.. , and it is as if one were to 
call both Callias and a wooden image e" •man•, without observing 
any community between them, 1' which also is not conspicuously 
relevant. 
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1. The Sepat~eness of Numbers. Numbers for Plato, says Aris-
totle/ ad lac., exist apart from sensible things, while the Pytha-
goreans say that the things themselves are Numbers. This has Kirgx«· 
already been explained above, 1 where it was shown that this means 
that pythagorean Numbers were phenomene.l, a number of units ea.ch of 
2 
which was some sensible particular, whereas Plato's Numbers were 
Ideal - that is, Threeness is an immaterial entity separate from 
things, by participatimg in which any groupf of three things is 3. 
:As each Number was also an Idea, {at least, in Plato's Earlier 
.J Theory, Ideal Numbers were Ideas of Number, as can be seen from 
Phaedo lOlC~, it necessarily followslfrom his separation of Ideas 
that his Ideal Numbers were also sepa.ro..tefrrom sensible things, so 
that this difference from Pythagoreanism is only a specia.l case of 
his general stand clln Separation. 
~ .. The Objects of Mathematics. 987bl4-18: 11Further, besides 
sensible things and Forms he says there are the objects of mathe-
matics, which occupy an intermediate position, differing from 
sensible things in being eternal and unchangeable, from Forms in 
that there are many alike, while the li'orm itself i G in each case 
unique." This, as we have said, 4 elaborates Aristotle's statement 
that Plato differed from the pythat;;orean s in not placing the 
objects of mathematics between Forms and sensible things. This 
means that, in the case of Numbers, Plato held Ideal Numbers as 
Ideas ·of Number separate~from particular Numbers, a .. s stated above 
in 1, an:l between the·se Forms ,and sensibles were a third class of 
entities identical with neither but between them -mathematical 
numbers. Similarly in the ca.se, of other branches of mathematics, 
there were objects of mathematics - lines, planes and solids -
. . 
between the Ideas of these, the Ideal Magnitlildes, and particular· 
sensible magnitudes. These mathematical numbers, to take these as 
an example, differed from phenomenal numbers in being eternal like 
. are · the Forms themselves - they ~KrH not three sensible objects which 
parish and change, but are simply three units; but they differ from 
Forms because these are unique - there is only one Threeness -
whereas there are many 3' s whi.ch are the objects of a.ri thmetical 
operations .• On the o·ther hand, the pytha.goreans held only one type 
of number - phenomenal number - apparently identical with Plats's 
sensible numbers •• It is obvious, I think, that the difference is 
due to Plato's separation of Forms in general, of Forms of Numbers 
and Magnitudes in particular, or at any rate is connected with th1E 
1. Pages 35-6. 2. Mathematical number will be mentioned below 
separa.tely, and Plato's sensible numbers are not here ref' erred 
to, since, in this respect, he would agree with the pythasoreans .. 
3. This is without prejudice to the position in his later Doctrine 
of Idea-Numbers 4. Page 69 above. 
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separation, for,·r.s the Pythagoreans did not maintain that there 
were any sepa:rate Ideal Numbers, not holding sep.arate Ideas, they 
had no call to dist1t'J.:gu1sh mathematical numbers at intermediate 
between Forms and things. 
Therefore, we conclude that all three differences distlnguish-
ing Plato from the pythagoreans turn on the spurce of his concep-
tion of Ideas as separate from sensible things, i.e. on hypostati-
sed Ideas. His introduction of Ideas derived not from Pythagorean~ 
ism but from Cratylus and .a>crates - the logical necessity of 
positing separate entities as objects of knowledge, ani, we might 
add, as the basis of the existence of sensibles, if he was to 
accept on the one hand the s:>cratic Universals as objects of 
knowledge and on the other hand the Heraclitean conception of 
sensible things as in Flux, as always chonging. As his Ideal Nmm 
Numbers were Ideas, the seps.ra.tion of Ideas entailed the sepa.ra.t.ion 
of Ideal Numbers from sensible numbers, whereas the Pythagorea,ns 
held neither Ideas in general nor Ideas of Number in particular. 
And finally Plato differed in a third respect by placing the 
objects of mathematics between Forms, i.e. Ideas of Numbers¢ am of 
Magnitudes, and sensibles as a third class of entity, whell!aas the 
pytha.goreans were confined even in their ma.thema.tical operations 
to the world of sense for the basic reason that, not having 
conceived a realm of hypostatised intelligible entities, they knew 
1 
of only one world, that of the senses. We have shown tha,t 
.:Aristotle knew of two successive pha.se.s of Platonism, ani a El! 
comparison of that part of A.vi here discussed with other passages 
dealt with on pages 71 sub fin •. to 74, shows that what Aril:t.otle 
describes and understands by th,e 1 introduction of the Ideas' is in 
fact the Early Platonic Theory of Ideas as distinct from the Later 
Doctrine of Idea-Numbers, and thus it is in respect of the tenets 
of tHis Early Platonism as a whole, without prejudice to possible 
resemblances in i sola.ted details, that Plato differs from the 
pythagoreans. Whether Ideas of Numbers and mathematical objects, 
in whibh he further differed, were also part of this theory - for 
we have not seen any conspicuous Aristotelian references to them ir 
dealing with this Early Platonism - cannot be decided from 
,Ar1 stotle' s evidence alone, and, as will be seen, can hardly be 
discovered with certainty even from Plato's dialogues. But whether 
they belong to that Theory of Ideas or not, it is clear that, as 
differences from Pythagorea.nism, they derive from Plato's general 
pos1 tion, that he separated Ideas from sensible things, which, in 
a. word, was his Early Theory of Ideas. 
1. Page 67 above. 
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List of Resemblances: The resemblances between Plntonism and pytha-
goraanism, as listed in Metaphysics A.vi; are four in number. 
1. 11The pythagoreans say that things exist by 'Imitation• of Numbers, 
and Plato says that they exist by 'Participation'n, 987bll-12. 
2. nBut he agreed with the pythagorea.ns in saying that the One is 
a SUbstance and not a predicate of something else," 987b22-24. This 
is apparently referred to in three other passnges: 996a6-8:"Un1ty 
and Being, as the pythagoreans and Plato said, are not attributes 
of something else, but the substance of existing things. n 
lOOlal0-12: 11 Ph>to and the pythagoreans thought Being and Unity were 
nothing else, but this was their very nature, their Essence being 
just unity and being." l053bl0-13: 11 This is the very question that 
we reviewed in our discussion of problems (in which appears the 
previous quote), viz. what the One is, and how we must conceive of 
it, whether we must take the One itself as being a SUbstance, as 
both the Pytbagoreans say in earlier and Plato in later times, ••• " 
3. u.And in saying that the Numbers are the causes of the reality of 
other things, he agreed with them," 987b24-25. 4. It is implicit 
in 987b25-26 and 33-f, 1 that he agreed with them in making another 
element thl'in the One, corresponding to the pyth2gorea.n Infi•nite or 
Unlim1 ted. So also in 988a26-27: '*Plato spoke of the Great and the 
.o 1 
Snall, the Italians of the Infinite," and Physics 203a4-16 :"Some, 
as the pytha.goreans and Plsto, make the Infinite a principle in the 
sense of A.. self-subsisting Substance, and not as a mer~ attribute 
of some other thing •••••• Furt~er, the pythagoreans identify the 
Inf1n.1te with the Even ••• :.but p~ato has two Inf'inites, the Great 
and the Snel1. 11 We are not here concerned with the secondary 
difference in their respective concep~ons of the Infinite, but 
only with this point. of re,semblance between the two phi los:> phies, 
that the other element than the One was the Infinite or some analogy 
to this. 
The agreement between Aristotle's description of the One and 
the last of the references to the Infinite is so close that it will 
be convenient to deal with points 2 and 4 together. 
g and 4. The One and the analogu~ of the Infinite as Substance: 
' f 2 Th;e Meaning of SUbstance, Q'b~l A- : Cherniss is probably correct 
in saying that there is no evidence that the pythagoreans stated 
that the one is a SUbstance or even thought about the matter, that3 
indeed this allegation was Aristotle's own deduction. But our aim 
is not to assess the vc:lidity of tAristotle' s testimony, but to 
reach a conception of his meaning, of how he timderstood the tenets 
to which be bears witness. The important thing, then, is to explain 
why he calls both the One and the analogue of the Infinite 
1. See section iii belo,l!j. 2. Aristotle's Criticism aif Pre-
Socratic Philosophy 37. 3. Op. cit. 44. 
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Substances, and whDt he means by this word. And the explanation, 
' I as tEua.l, can be found in the commentary of Sir David Ross. *'ObO"'-/ Q:..., 
he says, 1 is'a non-committal word meaning the true reality of things 
. whatever ill~~ may be, whether Matter, Form or Compound; and since 
Plato thought reality lay in the Form, the word here means 'form' 
in opposition to matter" - referring to the One. He refers us to 
1028b33-9a4, and this reads:"The word 'substance' is applied, if 
not in more senses, still at least to four main objects; for both 
the Essence and the Universal andthe Genus are thought to be the 
SUbstance of each thing, and fourthly the. SUbstratum. Now the 
SUbstratum is that of Vihich everything else is predicated, while it 
is itself not predicated of anything else. And so we must first 
determine the nature of' this; for that which underlies a thing 
1 primarily is thought to be in the truest sense its Substance. Amd 
in one sense Matter is said to be of the nature of the Substratum, 
in ~mother, shape, and in a third, the compound of these." That is, 
SUbstance means variously, Es.::ence 
Universal 
Genus 
a:tbstratum i) Matter, 
ii) Slape, 
iii} Compound of these. 
Now the words 'that of v:hich everything else is predicated, while 
it is itself not predicated of anything else• reminds us of the 
description of the One on the previous page, 1 The One is a SUbstance 
and not a predicate o.f something else,' 'Unity •••• is not am attri-
bute of something else,, .b:u,,t the SUbstance of existing th:I.ngs,' and 
of the description of the Infinite as 'a principle 1.n the sense of 
a self-subsistent Substance:, and not as a mere attribute of some 
other thing'. Thus, in both cases, Aristotle means by 'rub stance' 
the SUbstratum of things. Let us examine, then, to which of the 
three meanings of .Slbstraturn he refers. 
The key lies in the tvo pa.ssages which elaborate these two 
resemblances to pythagoreanisrn, thus:"Since the Forms were the 
causes of all other things, he thought that their elements were the 
elements of all things. As matter, the Great and snall were princi-
ples; as essential reality, the One; for from the Great and the 
Snall, by partidlpation in the One, come the Numbers, 2 n 987b18-22; 
"For the Forms l:l.re the causes of the essence of all other things, 
and the One is the ca&se of the essence of the Forms; and 1 t is 
evident what the underlying matter is, of which the Forms are 
predicated in the case of sensible things, and the one in the case 
of the Forms, viz. that this is a dyad, the Great and the Snall," 
988al0-14. The more precise det·ermination of the meaning of this 
1. Aristotle's Metaphysics !.171 a.d 987b21. 
2. The variant readings will be discussed below. 
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will be left over for discussion in section iii, when the nature 
of the Great and Snall is dealt with; here we notice only that 
these two passages bear evidence, when taken together, that the 
Forms were the causes of the Essence of sensible things and the 
Lireat and Snall, the analogue of the Infinite referred to o.bove, 
1 is the underlying matter. As Aristotle interprets the Forms and 
the anil.ogue of the Infinite as the elements of All things, the 
cause of the Essence here refers to what is generally known as 
the formal cause or Slape, as he terms it in 1028b33-9a4, as is 
evident from the example there given - not quoted above. As,fol· 
the Pythagoreans, the One &ld the Infinite also were the elements 
especially of Numbers, as has been explained on page 47 above, 2 the 
conclwion is that he calls the one a SUbstance in the sense of the 
SUbstratum as the Slape or formal cause, and the Infinite is a 
SUbstance in the sense of too SUbstratum as Matter. 
The Reading of 987b21-22,: The quotat,ions of 987bl8-22 and 
988a.10-14 above agree, with one exception, that the elements of the 
Forms were the elements of all other things; these elements were, 
in the case of Forms, the One and the Great and Snall, in the case 
of other things, the Forms and the Great and Snall • .Just how this 
Great and Snall is to be underst:ood, whether different for Forms 
and for things, or whether taken twi:ce over, will be discussed in 
section iii, as stated above. What concerns us here is wh~y Aris-
totle says that ,, from the Great and the Snall, by partid:i.pat1on in 
the One, come the NUMBERS' in 987bl8-22, when in 988a.l0-14 it is 
FORMS that are composed of the One and the Great and the small. %N~ 
This eequires an examinat:ion of the manuscript reading and of' 
propEed variants to the text. 
987b21-22: t"S eK£.l,_l{,(,# "/4~ Ktt'"r¢\ rltPI~l~ roii ~"~f ,~ e:'s, 
- J , f}ya.c T0~f a/'«~ 0 ., f .; Zeller accepted this manuscript reading, 
a.nd translated "Forms become Numbers. n This both van der Wielen3 
4 ' I ,9 '-
and Ross reject:l"~Jof Y£ lk0 "'f, having the article, cannot be used 
predicatively. On the other hand, the reading is kept by Cherniss5 
1. van der Wielen, Die Ideegetallen van Plato 98-99, explains tha.t 
by form and matter Aristotle means that by working on the Great 
and Snall that is potentially eny Idea, the One produces the 
actual Ideas, and hence by working on the Great and Sna.ll which 
is s.lso potentially any sensible thing, the Ideas produce the 
actual world of sense. 
2. It is noteworthy that 987al7-19, quoted on page 46 ahd referring 
to the pythagorean One and Infinite, apparently contradicts the 
defi~ition of SUbstratum in 1028b33-9a4. The former calls these 
principles the SUbstance of the thi.ngs "of which they e~re predi-
cated", the latt~r is that "of which everything else is predica-
ted while 1 t is itself not predicated of anything else". To be 
quite consistsn¢'t Aristotle should have said of the former that 
they are the Slbstances of the things ttwhich are predicated of 
them". I con only suppose that Aristotle here bstted nn eye, but 
his meaning is clear enough: ontologically things as units are 
:ijamed after the One, while logically the One is predicated of 
them: each of these units is one. 
3. Op. cit. 53-54. 4. ,Aristotle's Metaphysics I.172. 
5. Aristotle's Criticism of Plato 180 note 104. 
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on the authority of Robin, but he interprets 7ot.S" a;?colfto(J5 not as 
predicative, but as in apposition. His authority for this is that 
of Alexander, who thought the appos11t[on pos~ble, and Mataphysics 
l081a5-7, which uses juBt such an appositton, nAnd the Ideas cannot 
, , , 1 , , , - .. ' u.~~.' be the Numberst' -l(ac )"kf c$tar Oul( t-Ycfc{-clac ~IYcc. ~ov f Cl;?c.,;---f. 
1 ( The manuscript reading, then, of 987b21-22, he translates, "The 
, Ideas arc the Numbers so prlduced. n Personally I consider Chemiss 
is correct, and prefer Alexander end Aristotle - l08la5-7 a.bove/-
1 
( to the authority of Gillespie 
2 tha.t such an apposition is not Greek, 
3 4 
even though he is followed by Ross and van der Wielen. It is, 
however, a stro.bg argument against the manuscript reading that 
Zeller later gave up his interpretation thereof. 5 Nevertheless, no 
suggested emendation is entirely ssti sfactory. 
The emendations are four in number: 1. To avoid the apposition 
' 6 ' referred to above·, Schwegler deletee the 7011f , and so reads 14' 
If I I J r fif'l fcYa' R~~ ~o"f which I suppose was meant to support Zeller's 
''The Ideas become Numbers". But Gillespie 2 cri ti ci se s this in that 
' ' -tf £Kt:JJ?&4#~ tlr'•'- means that the Forms are derived from the dyad 
V\ I II ' 
as their t. "7 , and so a predicati ve ~~c tJI-f«'u r 1 s impossible. 
This seems to me a fair enough objection. 
2. Jackson 7 proposec1 expunging ;o~f J/,Jftouf and inserying these 
words elsewhere, where they would serve to bolster up his theory 
that the One was the formal element of Numbers, not of Ideas, and 
Numbers, not the One, were the formal e lament of Ideas. This gives 
, " r. 
the reading ••••• )"a 'Cccf7 '{eyer,(.. , that is, 11From the dyad Ezm:e. come 
the Ideas". This gives exc~llent sense, but Jackson la.ter8 repented 
' ' ,9-u.. \ of the transposition, and ~tis not admissible to omit.7ovf o/' r-00 S" 
altogether, since in line 24 the words are obviously not used for 
the first time. 9 
10 ~ If ( 7 ~ ( 1 JJ , 3. Jackson's later reading is /It f.t.o? ~rV~c ~ ~f tti''~JLour. I 
have not come aero ss any criticism of this, but it/; seems unlikely 
both because it is a J'~tqf ).fy<'jzyot'for a description of Idea-
( Numbers, and because 
'7 ( objected to by those 
\ text. 
1 t does not avoid tl:J"e awkward apposition 
commentators who call for an emenda,tion of the 
4. Finally, Gillespie2 has shown that Tet z:'cf? might dwell be a 
copyist• s insertion, especially since the offending words occur 
earlier, tn an oblique case, in a similarly disputed reading, and }'{ 
c..l: I I T ' I ll , he reads,~~ f/l.t: tYC4Jv 'lt Y~c )-oc.-r o/tb'f'"o-a..f, "From the dyad came the 
Numbers." He was anticipated in this by Xeller, who had given up 
1. The Riddle of the Ear~y .Academy 8. 
2. Journal of Philology XXXIV.l53. 3. Aristotle's Metaph:ysics I.l71 
4. Die Ideegeta.llen van Plato 53. 5. van der Wielen, op. cit.6. 
6. Journal of Philology XXXIV.l52-3. 
7. J·ournal of Philology X.287-8. 8. Journal of Philology XXXIV.l54 
9. Stenzel, Za.hl und Gestalt 6 note 2. 
10. Texts to Illustrate a CouEEe of Elementary Lectures on the 
History of Greek Philosophy, Macmillan and Co., London, 1914, p. 
69, section 102 ad loc. 
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his eorlier acceptancje of the text, a.s referred to above, and he 
was followed. by Ross1 and van der Wielen2 • Against this, however, 
must be ChernissJ 3 or rather Robin's objection that this deletion 
breaks the train of thought started in 987b18-22. 
Now, as stated above, I am of the opinion that the authority 
of Alexr-mder and l08la5-7 is suff1cien t to accept the manuscript 
4 
reading, and Ross goes so far as to allow the possibility : "If 
the manuscripts are right, Forms ~md Numbers are expressly identi't 
fied". Further, the manuscript reading is clear:).y behind the trans-
ln.tions offered by the following. Milhcmd 5 : "It is by the Great and 
.snell that the Ideas, which partidipate in Unity, are also Numbers". 
Stenzel6 : "From them ( the dyad, Great and Snall) the Ideas are the 
7 Numbers" •. And Cherniss' transle.tion has been given above: "The 
Ideas are the Numbers so produced." Nevertheless, it would be t·ash 
to use this reading to establish that Forms are Numbers, indeed are 
Numbers in virtue of their derivation from the Great and Snall, 
since Gillespie makes out a case against tliis use of the verb r to 
be'. Hence, these two asGertions must be proved by other evidence. 
!!!.Lidenti ty, ,of Forms and Number~. That Aristotle regarded . 
their identity e.s common knowledge is indicated in A.vi by a 
substitution of 'NUmbers' for 'Forms• in two separate places, not 
to mention the passage quoted on pa.ge 82 above, where the translatior 
follows the best emendation, Gillespie's. For here Aristotle names 
the Forms as the CA.uses of things since their elements were those 
of a.ll things; and in nP,ming these elements concludes that from 
them cRme -the Numbers. Besides this passage, we say, there are 
987b27 and 987b30, w~ere NUMBERS are said to have been separated by 
Plato, whereas 1 t isp welh knov.on that he separated IDEAS. Further, 
in 987b24-25 NUMBERS are said to be the causes of the rea.l1 ty of 
other things, whereas in 987bl8-19 it WAS FORMS that played this 
role. By themselves, perhaps, these references do not carry much 
weight, but they show that the same identity which can be demonstra-
ted by a.n imposing array of passages elsewhere refers in A. vi e.lso. 
This imposing array is listed by Ross, 8 f:'!TI.d from his list the 
following examples have been selected. 
~ 
De Anima 404b24-25: After naming Pleto, the passage continues: 
"The Nv..mbers are by him expressly idcntif.ied with the Forms them-
selves or principles, end are formed out of the elements. u 
1. Aristotle'~ Me}app_,».s!_cs 1.162. ~P· Plato's Theory of Ideas 176 
note 2: "!oV~ ~t'~ov(. can ha.raly be either the predc'llcate or in 
apposition to /A ecCf7 ~-· It .is zxx:tx:bd:J: not certain which cf 
the two phrases should be omitted." 2. Die Ideegete.llen van 
Plato 54. 3. Aristotle's Criticism of Plato 180 note 104. 
4. Aristotle's Metaphysics I.l64. 
5. Les Philo sophes GE!om~tres de la Gr~ce 197. 
6. Zahl und Gestalt 6. 7~ Riddle of the Early Academy 8. 
8. Plato's Theory of Ideas 216 note 1. 
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Metaphysics 1080bll-14 : In 8 y{statement closely resembling in its 
t:anets 987bl4-18, we read: nSome say both kinds of Number exist, 
that which has a Before end After being identical with the Ideas, 
and mathematical number being different from the Ideas Pnd from 
sensible things, and both being separable from sensiible things." 
The passage continues by contrasting the views that mathematical 
number alone exists, generally ascribed to Speusippus, that of the 
pythagoreans, that of some unknown Platonist, and that which 
identified mathematical number with the 'Number of the Forms', 
generally ascribed to Xenocratcs. 
l086all-13: t1'1\nd he who first supposed that the Fdrms exist and 
that the Forms are Numbers end that the objects of mathematics exist; 
naturally separated the two. 11 This not only agrees in its tenets 
with the above, but a.lso obviously refers to Plato in t:it~tittD§ to 
'he who first supposed the Forms to exist.' 
J 
Whatever may be thought about Plato's identification of Forms 
with Numbers, this much is clear, indeed is an inl'!scapeble conclu-
sion, that Aristotle believed thnt Plato identified Forms with 
Numbers. It might, however, be ob~iected th8t all the above passages, 
which have been selected on account of their obvious reference to 
Plato- first by·name, the second by its agreement in doctrine with 
A.vi where Plato is named and by its contrasting the v:trew expressed 
with all other schools of that time known to us except that of 
Eudoxus, and the third because of the periphrasis which can only 
mean Plato - all these passages, while ascribing the identity of 
Forms and Numbers to Plato, may perhaps be interpreted as showing 
no more than that for Plato Ideal Numbers were Forms, i.e. Ideas of 
Number, nnd not the converse. To show that not only were Numbers 
identified with Forms, but that Forms were identified with Numbers, 
I cite 3 other passages, where the identification of Forms and 
Numbers is connected not w.ith arithmetic but with Man P..nd Animal -
and these passages are pJ.so from Ross' list • 
. 
99lb9-12: "Again, df the Forms are Numbers, how can they be causes? 
Is it because existing things 0.re other Numbers, e.g. one number is 
man, another is S::>crates, another Callia.s? Why then are the one set 
of numbers causes of the other set? •••• tt 
108la5-13: "Now if all the units a.re aF:socia.ble and without diffe-
rence, we get mathematical number - only one kind of number, and 
the Ideas cannot be the Numbers. For what .sort of number will Man-
himself be or Animal-itself or any other Form? There is one Idea. 
of each thing, e.g. one of Man-himself and another one of Animal-
itself; but the similar and undifferentiated numbers are infinitely 
many, so tha.t any particular 3 is no more Man.-himself than ::my 
other 3. But if· the Ideas are not Numbers, neither can they exist 
at all. For from what principles will the Ideas come?" 
87/ 
l09lb26-)Q: "Again, if tho Forms are Numbers, all the Forms are 
identical \'Vith species of good. But let a man assume Ideas of any-
thing he plee.ses. If these are Ideas only of goods, the Ideas will 
not be SUbstances; but if the Ideas are also Ideas of substances, 
all animals and plants end all individuals that share in Ideas will 
be good. ~1 
These three passages show that the identity of Ideas and 
Numbers does not mean no more than ths,t the Number Three is em Idet:t, 
but that,t the Idea of Man, of AnimAl, were in some sense thought to 
be Numbers, and if these Ideas were not Numbers Aristotle denies 
that they could exj.st at all. Jbttxtm:xl'lk~.:txJORJXER It is j_mplicit in 
'let a man assume Ideas of anything he pleases' that ALI. Ideas were 
identified, at least in Aristotle' s mind, with Numbers, but in wha.t 
sense he thought that Ideas were Numbers is not yet clear·. This is 
the next questton to discuss. 
What Aristotle Understood bl the ~entif1c~2.!l ,of_ Id§i:\.S_!ith_ 
Numbers. We must again remind the readett that it is not the purpose 
of this chapter to discover what Plato thoueht about Ideas snd 
Numbern, but only to asccrt?in what Aristotle understood him to hav ill . --- -- --··· 
meant. Hence, when in the Introduct1oV,1/~e saicC that-~o;~--~r1t1c!>~ 
interpret Numbers as a class of ent&ties dj.ff'erent from and higher 
thatl the Ideas on the evidence of Th1'¥rastus, we were not disc&s-
sing Aristotle's conception of Platonism. The above references have 
ma.de it clear that for Ar~stotle Ideas and Numbers were identified. 
Fmrther, since Aristotle spec16ies among the Ideas identified with 
Numbers Mrm and !.Animal, it. is clear that those critics who limit 
the identif:!ca.tion to Ideas of Number2 - to Twoness and Threeness -
are either incorrect or are referr1ng to whqt they believed Plato 
maintained, not to what Aristotle understood about the matter. 
Hence, the only interpretations of the identity of Ideas and Numbers 
that are relevant to our purpose e.re those which conceived this as 
' 
either a one-one identifi-cation - that Man, for example, is 2 or 3 
and Jmirnsl 43- or that this was meant metf:tphorically. 4 Whether this 
identification was historically correct or notj 5 is, so far as 
concerns our purpose, entirely beside the point. We are concerned 
only with Aristotle's interpretation, irr~spective of whether it 
W13 s correct or not. And a.s 1 t has been shown that he believed that 
Ideas were identified w1 th Numbers in· some sense, and by implication 
thnt all Ideas were idlntified with Numbers - for he goes so far as 
to mention Ideas of Man and of Animal in this connection - it 
remains to determine in what sense this identification was made. 
l.e.g. Brommer, b"tenzel, and Robin, on pages 15-17 above. 
2. e.g. Ritchie and van der Wielen on pages 17-18 above. 
3. c .. g Ross in Aristotle's Metaphysics on pages 18-19 above. Cp. 
Cherniss, Riddle of the Ear~y Academy 37, and apparently W1lpert, 
Classical Review LXV.29. 4. See page 19 above. · 
5. Cp. Cherniss' theory, Riddle of the Early Academy 29 et al. This 
question is dealt witp ~n the Appendix below. 
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As Aristotle's concern with tre arithmetical slde of Idea-
Numbers and his apparent one-one identification of Man with some 
number in 99lb9-12, of Man with 3 nnd Animal with some other Number 
in 108la5-13, quoted above, gives a prima facie case in favour of 
this interpretation, it will be as well to begin by rejecting this 
interpretation, following along the lines which seem to have led 
Ross1 to alter his opinion. The first locuscla.ssicus is l08la5-l3, 
referred to above. But Ross points out that the ~ords, a little 
lower down thaft the quotation above, 'and the Ideas cannot be 
ranked as either prior or posterior to the Numbers', suggest that 
his statement that Plato identif_±ga_e~i th Numbers was based on his 
... 
inference rather than on a plain sta ternan t by Plato. I would go 
ft'll.rther than that. If vve turn for a moment to the ,tsecond locus 
classicus, 1084al2-25, we find, it is true, 'e.g. if 3 is Man-RimE:sl 
himself, what Number will be the Horse-itself? 12 where the Number 
of Man agrees with that given in 108la5-13. But note that Aristotle 
says 'E.G. IF 3 is Man 1 -it is a pupposition only, and that it is 
a supposition for the sake of argument and not a supposition based 
on his belief that Man was 3 in Plato's Tkr&:BJX Theory, is shown by 
his inability to assign to Horse its proper number. Slrely if he 
knew or believe~ ·that Man was 3 he could have said what Number he 
believed HoEse wast But read on f'urther: 3 "If the 4-it.self is an 
Idea of something, E.G. OF HORSE OR OF VlliiTE, Man ~ill be part of 
Horse, IF MAN IS 2. 11 Here Horse is supposed to be 4, whereas previ-
ously Aristotle was unaware of the Number of' Horse. I:ti. fact, that 
he is making random suppositions, wild guesses in fact, is shown by 
his alternative -'or White' - and the fact that ~ower down Man is 
no longer 3 but 2. In a word, ~ristotle does not believe that Plato 
identified Man with 3, but supposes for the sake of argument that 
Man is some Number - any Number, it does not ma.tter which - 2 or 
3. This is no conception of a one-one iden£ification of Ideas with 
Numbers, but the supposition that if Man is a Number in some sense 
1 t is also a Number in a particular sense, that of a one-one 1dent1 .. 
fication with some Dumber. He supposes that, if Man is a Number, 
1 t can be identified with some particular Number, and then points 
out certain absurdities that follow. E.g. if it is 2 and Horse is 
4, Man is~ a Horse. If Uan is 3 or any Number at all, and other 
species o.f .Animal arc other Numbers, since there are only 10 
Numbers according to Plato - if he is referring to Plato ~-the 
Numbers will run short since there are more than 10 species of 
.Animal. This does not mean that Ar.istotle thogght Man was 2 or 3, 
only that he thought the Idea of Man was eN Number in some sense, 
and he is demonstrating that it cannot be in this particular sense. 
The sense in which he really conceived Forms to be Numbers is in 
fact indicated lower down in this same passage, 1081al2-17. 
1. lUa.to' s Theory of Ideas 217-8 with 218 note 1. 
2. 1084al4. 3. l084a23-25. 
89/ 
108la12-17: "If the Ideas are not Numbers, neither can they 
exist at all. For from what principles will the Ideas come? It is 
Number that comes from the One and the Indefinite Dpad, and the 
principles ani elements Are said to be principles and elements of 
Number, and the Ideas cannot be ranked as ei.ther prior f,or posterior 
to the Numbers." Note the •are said'. Because the Platonists said 
so, .Aristotle believes that. the principles and elements of Ideas 
are the principles and elements of Number, nemely, the One and the 
Indefinite Dyad. This is the reason why Ideo.s c.re Numbers - because 
their elements are the elements of Numbers. If, for the sake of 
argument, the Ideas &-re not Numbers, Aristotle crmnot see how the.y 
could exist at all, since there are no other elements from which 
the Ideas could be constituted. 
That this is the correct interpretetion of the identity of 
Ideas and Numbers, in Aristotle's opinion, appears very clearly 
from a comparison of 109lbl9-27 with 109la5-6. l09lbl9-27: "To .say 
that this first principle is good isP~2:i~RiJ correct; but that this 
principle should be t.he One, or, if n-ot ·that, a.t lenst an element, 
and an element of Numbers, is imposr;ible. o o .For on this view, all 
the units become identical with species of good ••• Again, if the 
Forms are Numbers, all the Forms are identicsl with species of 
good." That is, all the Forms will be identical with species of 
good because the One, which is an element of Forms, has been 
identified with the Good. 1 No~ this One is here said to be an 
element of Numbers, and it is assumed thFt the Forms nre Numbers. 
The whole argument hinges on the assumption that Forms are Numbers, 
since otherwise they ~ould not be open to the objection that they 
become species of. good • .And )'lhat characterises these Forms as 
Numbers is not any one-one identification of Forms with Numbers, 
but the fact that their element.is the One- this makes them 
Numbers. So 109la5-6: nNumber according to him (Plato) cannot be 
generated except from the One and an indefinite dyad. n S:> when 
Xenocrates perhaps, or it may be Plato, it mokes no difference, 
generates Magnitudes from. e Number and a Matter, not from One and 
a Matter, Aristotle doubts whether these will be, Ideas - 1090b20-
25: "As for the believers in Ideas, this difficulty misses them; 
for they construct spatial magnitudes out of Matter rmd Number, ••• 
But will these Magnitudes be Ideas ••• u ~ 992bl3-18: "Nor cr:m 1 t 
be explained ••• how the lines and planes and solids •••• exist or can 
exist •••• ; for these can neither be Forms - for they are not 
Numbers ••••• " 
Aristotle belnves that Forms are Numbers because constituted 
from the elements of Number, the One and an indefinite dyad.,. If 
the Forms are not Numbers, they cannot exist since there a.re no 
1. Cp. 988al4-15: 11Furt.her, he has assigned the cause of good and 
that of evil to the elements, one to each of the two." 
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other elements from which they could be campo sed except those of 
Numbers. If they were generated from any other elements, e.g~. from 
Numbers and a Mattert they would no longer be Forms e.t all, but a 
fourth class. This incidentally seems to me to refute Ross' concep-
tion of Ideas as constituted from Numbers and a Matter - at least 
it shows that Ari;:,totle did not understand Plato's Idea-Numbers in 
this way - such composites would be neither Ideas not Numbers. 
Lest it be thought that we are clutching at straws, examine the 
continuation of the second last passage quoted. 1090b32-la6: uAnd 
those,who first posit two kinds of Number, that of the Forms and 
that which is mathematical (Plato), neither have s~id nor can say 
how mathematical number is to exist or of whet it is to consist •••• 
If it consists of the Grert ond Snall, it 'll'lll be the same as the 
other - Ideal Number •••••• Number, .ACCORDING TO H!r!., cannot be 
generated except from the One and an indefinite dyad." Since the 
I dens, a.s we have seen, have as elements the one and the Great and 
Sne.ll - an indefinite dyad - they are by virtue of this derivation, 
.. 
and by this alone, Numbers. 
But the most def¢in1 te statement th:::t these elements, the One 
and the Great and SDall, is what makes Ideas Numbers, is 1089a35-
b2: "surely the Indefinite Dyed or the Gre2t end Snall is not a. 
reason why there should be t\'lo kinds of white or many colours or 
flavours or shapes; FOR THEN THESE ALSO WOULD BE .NUMBERS." 
We have, then, reached this conclusion, that Aristotle sees 
two poi{its of resemblance between Platonism and pythogoreanism, 
firstly, that they agreed in me.king the one a subst~mce as formal 
cause, and secondly that they agreed in making some analogue of the 
Infinite a substance as. Ulierlyi.ng matter. In other wore s, Plato 
agreed with them in compounding his first entities out. of the two 
elements, the One and an Infinite. As Plato, according to lO~Ob32-
la.6, believed the One and the IHfinite were the only clements from 
which Number could be generated, Aristotle understands Platonism to 
imply that whatever was generated from these two elements must be 
Numbers - so l089a35-b2. Hence, as Ideno were derived from these 
elements, they were Numbers. 
It Cflnnot be objected that this identif!ication of Ideo.s and· 
Numbers in respect of their origin w~.s Ar1 stot.le' s deduction from 
his conception of Number - for his conception of Number was quite 
different. In 1088bl4ff Aristotle denies that eternal things ( and 
so Numbers) can consist of elements, and that the argument is based 
on h!is own doctrine of Actuelity and Potentiality shows that this 
is no topical hit, bu:t his conviction. But, it might be objected, 
he did not regard Numbers as eternal entities. At nny rate, for 
,Aristotle, the essential characteristic of Numbers wo..s that they 
consisted of units. SO in M.t vi., when he undertakes to show that 
Numbers cannot exist o.s separable substances, he be.ses a long and 
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involved argum~nt on the assumption that there are three k5nds of 
Numbers, and all these kinds he dj.stinguishes by t_heir units, and 
adds:"These are of necess¢Jty THE ONLY WAYS in which the Numbers can 
exist,n 1080b5-6. 
Owing to this method of argument, it sometimes seems that 
Pleto' s Ideal Nurr.bers also consisted of units. 1 However 1002b12-27 
is evidence that his Numbers were not U4"litary, for there, speaking 
as an AcRdernic.ianQ'Forms which WE posit'), Aristqtle e.rgues that 
Ideal Numberfi w2 s postulated because eo.ch mathemattica.l number is 
.infinite (many 2' s), so that there could be no corresponding unity 
. 
whence they could derive themr existence unless there were Ideas of 
Number - an argument essentially the same as Phaedo lOlC, where 
there can be no 2's except by sharing in the Two. With this take 
1080a30-35: "And so, while mathematical number is counted thus -after 
1, f-(2 (which consists of ~mother 1 besides the former 1) and 3 
(which consists of ~'nether 1 besides these 2) and the other numbers 
similarly; but Ideal Number is counted thus - after 1, a d~stinct 2 
which does not ¢include the first 1, allil.d a 3 which does not include 
the 2, and the rest of the number series similarly." This implies 
that; for Plato, the Ideal Numbers have no units., but are distingu-
2 ished by their setial order, whereas for Aristotle numbers were 
nothing more than aggregates of units. 
Therefore, returning to A.vi, Aristotle uses Forms and Numbers 
indiscriminately because there the Forms are in fact Numbers - what 
ore usually called Idea-Numbers - and by Forms being Numbers he 
means that they are so only in respect of their derivation, namely, 
f'.com the same elements a.s Numbers, the One a.nd the Great and snall. 
Hence, we may say that just as .the pythae;oreans made the One an.d 
the Ir.finite the elements; RS Aristotle expresses it, of Numbers 
end of things, so Plato made the One rmd M analogue of the Infini tt: 
- the Great and Snall - the. elemet1 ts of the Ideas and of things, 
and e.s these were also the elements of Numbers, the Ideas were 
Numbers in respect of their origin. Sb Ideas were derived from the 
One as formal element, from the Great and Snall us material element: 
while sensible things had as. their corresponding elene nts the Ideas 
and the Great and Snell. What relation the Great and snall in Idea.s 
had to the Great and Snall in sensibles will be discussed in 
seetion iii below. 
1. Cpmpare van der Wielen, Die Ideegetallen vr..n Plato 6l:"M.vi-ilx 
is unreliable because 1 t is influenced by his own conception of· 
number.n Also op. cit. 88-89:"ift.ristotle ••• passe.s judgement over 
Plato's theory and sees how fnr it agrees with the truth, and the 
XN truth is his own theory. If Plato's Number,ti was not as 
Aristotle/ conceives Number, it cannot be Number ••••• He argues: 
Idea-Number is number; number is r!. number of units, ••• Idea-Num-
bers are numbers of units. 11 Cp. Cla.st1cal ~mm:r:fc.:e:riJ Review XVII. 
250: 11 Aristotle misses the point. He assumes numbers consist of 
units and gives this as if a statement of Plato's. n Cp. Class1ca.1 
Quarterly XVII.ll3-4:~~ Aristotle has defects as a witness, e.g. 
:I.n mathe~ica.l theory. 
2. Cp. 1082b25-38 and Nicomachean Ethics l096a17-19. 
92/ 
3. Numbers as the Causes. of the Reality of Other Things.!. 
1 • 
We have shown that, for Aristotle, the Forms were Numbers, so that 
when he states as the third resemblance between Plc..to and the Pytha-
goreans that both made Numbers the causes of the reality of other 
things, the prima. facie meaning is that just as the Pythagoreans 
made Numbers the cause of the reality of other things so Plato made 
Idea-Numbers (for that is the usual term for Ideas identified with 
Numbers) i~i ultima,te cause of phenomena. Thus, when he says that 
tt:And in saying that the Numbers are the causes of the reality of 
other things, he agreed with them," 987b24-5, we interpret this in 
the light of 987b18-9 :"Since the Forms were the causes of all other 
things,. he thought thetir elements were the elements of all things," 
and 988al0-14:"For the Forms are the causes of the essence of all 
other things, and the One is the cause of the essence of the Forms •• 
,." In these two passages it is clear that Aristotle understands 
the Forms to be the ca.use of sens1 ble things because they were the 
causes of their essence, that is, they were what Aristotle terms 
the formal cause, and that this was connected with the construction 
of Forms and things from the same uiitimate elemcmts, the One and 
the Great and Snall. Then just as in resemblances 2 and 4 Aristotle 
sees a resemblance between the two philosophies in the construction 
of eternal entities, Pytha.gorean Numbers and Platonic Idea-Numbers, 
from the elements, the One and an a.nalogue of the Infinite, so here 
he sees a resemblance in the construction of phenomenal en~t1ties, 
namely, in their having eternal KH,i:t:t entities as their formal 
causes - in the case of Pythagoreanism, Numbers are the Essence of 
things in accordance v;1th\ their method! of definition, in the case 
of Platonism Idea-Numbers are their formal causes. 
But it is quite possible that by Numbers Aristotle~here means 
something more specific than Idea-Numbers, 1. e. Numbers pure and 
simple. In this case a more fruitful reference would be 1090a4-6 : 
"For him who posits Ideas, Numbers supply the cause of things, if 
each Number is an Idea, for the Idea is the cause of Being for other 
things in some way or other. 11 That is, Plato's causes are Ideas, 
but his Numbers are Ideas %- Ideas of Number - and qu~ Ideas they 
too a.re causes. We have just seen the sense in which the Forms were 
causes: they were the causes of the Essence, and the pythagoreons 
likewise, according to 1Ar1stotle 1 s interpretation, 2 made Numbers 
t.he Essences of things by reason of their method of definition and 
so for them too Uumbers, as )itEssence s, were the ca.use of the rea11 ty 
of other things. 
Hence, overlooking the essential difference in the natures Of 
Plato's Ideal Numbers and Pythagorean phenomenal numbers, he sees 
a resemblnnce between the two inasmuch as both were the causes of 
the essence of other things, which is simply a special case of the 
more general tenet, that prime entities were the formal causes of 
1. Page 8 5 above. · 2. Pages 40-42 above. 
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all things. 
1. Imitation-Participation. 
- • I " )" -..... "'- -Reading of 987b7-14: 987b7 "~',."'f prv ovr/ "7"A. O'- Q u 1 Gl. , t.uY 
8 (J11~JI' l8£4f rt:H7"?'f,J~cCJ ~t.. 1 )-411' cf'._.l~~,~ 7ry4 )'«[;~ ~q.(." 
9 K4~ ~ii]q. ~ {y.,V'"~C. 7tt1Y>-tt· /{oc.:J--ct rrtlcfcr Yo/ eTr«c .,..~ 
10 ~0~~.\ ]'-WV ~f.JY t.UY.:r 'UP ]'-o(f t;;l'dc~cr_ '"r')~ .fc' rT'tJz(cl/ .,..o ;;Pojc4... 
1. ll..t~JioP lic)-~).cp • o'</u~"' Yo/ /7ut9c.yo/c<o<-ft./.ft?1~f..< ~~ [;,.,.~\. 
r:- , r 7- , - , , , /J , '' tJ 6 12 f/40>-lY f.C1'4'- ..,..,Zp rc ~'UY, T! l'q,.'<JV cf~ rc t: t:c.,..,.ou"'"f-·Q_,k~'trt· 
13~A~~y, "t~~ ;:;v'h<. ')'E. jtc'J.t{cy 7' -J.-}v /f7fk.Y ?'1-tf ~~ t;', 
14 i'~Y ~:a~~ J~ec~trl"" J:, KocY't? ( 7 )--c:tY. 
The first sentence, lines 7-10, offers several difficulties, 
which depind lin the first place on the me~ming of ny4 i'~~r~. 
GiJ)espie . tnkes the sentence to mean that Plato called his intelli-
gible entities Ideas, and made sensibles exist apart from them, but 
named after them, since they existed by Participation in the Ideas. 
This requires construing liill/ (1-Urwpu'jtw~'as a. gen:ttive after 
r1Afc..y ' the phrase then being an explanation of Ke:t~ ..,...~ ;,,---. 
~ r'y'C. ~k<... , but since things must participate in Ideas, "'J'-o ;""f 
,, 
ecdf~Pmust be ejected, because otherwise things will be said to 
participate in tre things which have the same name as the Ideas, and 
so in sensible st Then things derive the:lr NAMES from the Ideas 
because they derive their BEING from the Ideas. But Ross2 points out 
tha.t 1iat'~ 1-~ ii ,..et.. eannot mean "apart from the Ideas" as this 
requires the supplying of the word ell"¢' , which could not have 
fallen .out of the text, and therefore ~"''r~ o-tP-4...'- must be taken 
with "Ya )-4v,..ec. as well as with K~t.S 1"4 ~;--~, and the transla~ 
tion, then, is, tt.And he said tha.t sens.ibles were called after these 
and were called what they were called by virtue of their relation 
- ''r to these. n But he agrees that ~' f £ca c ~' v must be excluded. 
As far as the meaning of l7 ~41' _,..,.;; ~~ goes, Ross seems to be 
unassailable, ond can be corroborated by Cherniss, 3 who says that 
)\<i.y~o-tP,.c.. goes with both phrases: things are called after Ideas 
4 ' 
and in accordance with them, and by van der Wielen, who translates 
the phrases, "He said things get the~r names from the Ideas in 
virtue of their relation to these." But Ross later changed his 
5 n 
opinion as to the reading of line 10, keeping ""1-o"'t'r f:c d"t o-c:,.., and 
replacing .,.,:;,, 'o.v•"·"'Y0'-0 Y by o~ ~v v /' 4.... • This changes his 
earlier translation, "For the Many existed by participation in the 
Id.eas that have the same name a.s they" to "For it was in virtue 
of Participation that the Many have the same name a.s the Forms. n 
In other words, Ross' interpretation removes from lines 7-10 all 
1. Journal 
!.161 ad 
101. 
5. Plato• s 
of Philology XXXIV.151. 2. Aristotle's Metaphytics 
987b8. 3. Ar1 stotle 1 s Criticism of Plo to 178 note 
4. Die Ideegetallen van Plato 4. 
Theory ·Of Ideas 154 with note 2. See pa.ge 70 n.l above. 
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mention of things EXIsriNG by participation in the Ideas. Indeed, 
I think Ross has gone ·too far. On the one hand, his reason for 
making this emenda-tion overlooks an important possibility, and on 
the other, the sense of the passage requires an earlier mention of 
the mode of existence of things than line 12. We accepted Ross• 
reading on page 70 above, because the mode of existence of things 
which his reading excises nevertheless came in at the said line 12, 
but a more detailed examination .of the passage is now required. 
The reason Ross. gives1 for changing the text is that-,.4' 77o~~~ 
was meant to signify nthe Manyn and not "the majori tyn, and, Vthile 
..,....w.,a-vY&I\JYJpwt? could be construed with the latter meaning, it 
mo.kos nonsense with the former; hence he replaces _the latter wo·rds 
~ I -by the predicative neuter plural u jA-e-c, Yvftl4... But surely"tw" 00'-~~'-
, ~~~ 2 
WYVfltNY could be construed withf"-' ~ell , as Gillespie· has 
pointed out? Certainly tri~m~ord 1 s followed by a genitive in lines 
... 
21-22 lower down. Nor am I persuaded that a copyist, seeing before 
him the phrase~~ 77o))~, would fail to realise it means nthe Many" 
and would interpret it ttthe majori ty''• Hence, I prefer his earlier 
interpretation. This better follows the reasoning behind the 
passage. Plato calls his intelligible entities Ideas, and asserts 
that sensible things are called after them ( hye{ )'-4u 7'"t:t. 1 in 
virtue of their relation to the Ideas ( /(~~4 -,." c; ]-a.. ) • Now it is, 
in my opinion, weak to follow the later Ross and interpret this 
relation a.s Participation, BY WHICH THE MANY HAVE THE SAM::&; NAME AS 
THE FORMS, without further explanation, since this is a.s much as 
to say that things are named after Forms because they are named 
• • l . 
after the Forms. The plain, sense of the passage leads us to expect 
the argument that things 9:re named after Forms because of the 
Participation BY WHICH THE MANY EXIsr-, i.e. things are NAMED after 
Forms because they derive their BEING from them. This means that 
t7t'a.' in line 9 is an existential verb, not·a copula. This is 
corroborated by the~r,_,4., of line 12, for after saying that 
ft~'Jt~tf , Participation, is a mere verbal variant ofjA-c'f"?g..cf , 
Imitation, Aristotle explains their essential identity by adding 
. ' . 
in explanation ( Y 4 ;o ) that the Pythagorea.ns said things EXI srED 
by Imitation of Numbers, Plato by Participation - which raises 
another variant re~ding,. to be discussed on the next page. 
Hence, I conclude that~~,.£ rrJ.&«<. is to be t8ken with both 
17ty4 .,.,.,;.,..4- and rt__,_.,..._'" ..,...""~ ,..~ , and that -,.i;;p <7-vP~,.:~~~ is 
genitive after nt:t'rA f't'Jtrn-', despite its position, and this of 
' II course requires the excision of7'0c r tc"d€o-cy as a gloss, and that 
T ecr-a,c.. is used existentially. The passage, then, reads:"Th1ngs of 
this other sort, then, he called Ideas, and sensible things, he 
said, were all named after these, and in virtue of a relation to 
these; for the Many existed by Participation in their • s)Ulonyms 1 
(Ideas that have the same name as they). n 
1. Loc. cit. 2. Loc. cit. 
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Up to line 10, then, we accept the manuscript reading, but 
- ''r with the excision ofTo,r 'CretCVc.t' as a gloss. Now o:oo might think 
that .. in line 12,7.ZV'J/ct9f"ZV' is understood after fa-tt~~~~<. , 1 
whereas""r;;,,.'£:$;;1" after f'-''r7~'V' in lines 13-14 is surprising, 
. 2 -
since the pythagoreans held no Ideas. Sl. Jackson transposes ~Y 
f~S,;J' from line 14 to 12. This gives excellent sense, but, as 
GilBspie 3 says, it does not explain hmw the mistake arose in the 
text. He prefers simply to excise]"&;iv£;cf.;;y as a gloss on a par 
• ~ ' 'r with T'"'r ftet t ""'' in line 10 - and we might add with ')--4 Er o7 in 
line 22. 4 Aristotle, he says, is thinking of the Pythagorean. 
Imitation of Numbers and the Platonic Participation m:f in Forms, )S 
but as the Form had 1 ts origin independent of Pythagorean Number, 
..,.;;y c.ls,;;,., can only be connected with Participation in lines 13-
1}4 and so is better omitted. Ross5 explains similarly that "T~Y 
'r- ~~ t«o"VY is not needed with f"l t~r<. in line 12- which is there 
used absolutely - arJd is better excised from line 14, since the 
'leaving it an open question' refers to both 
6 Plato, as the plural verb shows. But in his 
pytha.goreans and 
later work, 7 he 
apparently retains.,..,;,., 'i:&,;y in line 14, as his translation shows: 
accepting it as a piece of carelessness on the part of Aristotle. 
The question does not really affect the meaning, but I again prefer 
Ross' earlier reading to his later, and accept his translation as 
follows:"Only the name 'Part.icipation• was new; for the Pythagorean:· 
say that things exist by 'Imitation• of Numbers, and Plato says 
they exist by participation, changing the name. But what partici-
pation or Imitation could be they left an open question." 
,A.nalzsis of. this Passage.:. iA notable feature about this passage 
is the mixed use of two different constructions: the finite verb to 
denote Aristotle's own comments or inferences, and the accusative 
and infinitive to denote what Plato or the Pythagoreans are roportec• 
to have se,id. These two sets of statements must be kept separate. 
If we do this and make use of the interpretations of the readdngs 
of the whole passage given.above, then, omitting the statement 
about the introduction of Ideas, we have the following statements: 
Plato is said to have held i) that sensibles are namedt{~fter Ideas; 
ii) that sentibles are named in virtue of!: a certain relation to tltee 
Ideas; iii) that this re~ation was Participation in the Ideas, by 
which sensible s exist, i .• e. are what they are. The pythagoreans 
held iv) that sensibles exist by Imitation of Numbers. Aristotle 
asserts as his own judgment v) that neither Plato nor the Pythago-
1. See page 100 below. 2. See Ross, JKetaphysics I.l63-4. 
3 • .Journal of Philology XXXIV.l52. 4.- See pages 84-5 above. 
Naturally it is not necessary to accept Gillespie's excision of 
the words in question in line 22 becapse they have been excised 
·in lines 12 and 14 as a gloss; to excise the words, however, in 
all three places is plausible. 
~ 5. Aristotle's Metaphysics !.163-4 ad 987bl2. 
6. van der Wielen, Die Ideegetallen van Plato 4, to the same effect 
7. Plato's .Theory of Idea.s 154. 
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reans gave any explanation of Participation or Imitation respective-
ly, and vi} that, by implication, Participation was the same as 
Imitation, since only the name was changed, i.e. was different. 
Now· the resemblance in this passage between Platonism and 
Pythagoreanism is confined to one point only: the mode of existence 
of sensible objects. The manner after which sensibles are named, 
point i, and the on~)log1cal basis of this naming, point 11, have no 
corresponding tenet in pythagoreanism, so far as this passage is 
concerned. The resemblance is confthned to iii and iv, as is clear 
' . ~ from the f'C~ , Sf in lines 11-12 - but the difference, the· change of 
name, is not here relevant, and will be discussed in section iii, 
under secondary Differences. Aristotle does not assert that Plato 
thought that his Participation was the same as Pythagorean Imitation 
but this is his own inference. To have been able to make such a 
statement, ;Aristotle must have formed in his own mind some sort of 
conception of each of these terms, and since he states that neither 
Plo..to nor the Pythagorean s gave any clear explanation of them, sucftt 
conception of his must have been in the nature of an inference from 
their use of the words or from his deduction of what the processes 
entailed - in terms of his philosophy, since that is his regula.r · 
practice. Therefore, in order to explain his implied statement that 
Plato' s participation was the same as pythagorean Imi ta.tion, it is 
necessa.ry to ascertain from elsewhere in his works, what sort of 
conception Aristotle had formed of these two tenets - etf~IRifti since 
here no explanation ltha.tever is given of Imitation besides the fact 
that things are said to have existed by Imitation of Numbers, and 
that things existed by Participation in Ideas, as a result of which 
things had the same names as their corresponding Ideas • 
.§ome Difficulties in the Interpretstion o·f the Resemblantll 
!?_etween Part1c112ation and Imitat12n,. Because Plato held separate 
Ideas, and because Aristotle, as has been said, 1 tended to interpret 
Participation, in default of any clear statement by Plato, as the 
Ideas serving as Patterns for· sen·sible things, some critics assume 
that here Aristotle is asserting the virtual identity of the mode 
of the existence of things in Plato - as copies of the Ideas - with 
the mode of existence of things in pythagorean! sm -e- an alleged 
patterning of things after Numbers in the same sense, i.e. that 
the Pythagorean number 2 was a·copy of an Ideal Two. This at least 
2 is how I understand such a statement as, for example, Cornford' s, 
that "One root of the assertion of Forms is Pythagorean Numbers as 
the Being of things. So the resemblance. between Participation and 
Imitation. This makes Forms entities with separate existence in the 
intelligible world, where they replace pythagorean Numbers as the 
reality which appfea.rances represent." In other words, Cornford, if 
1. See pages 76-78 above. 2• Plato' s Theory of Knowledge 9-16. 
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I interpret him aright, virtually adopts Burnet's position, that 
· _Socrates took over a Pythagorean inchoate Theory of Ideas, but 
because he takes the Platonic Socrates as expressing Plato's own 
beliefs, in this respect at least, and not those of the historical 
Socrates, he adopts the same interpretation. but applies it to Plate 
who; .in his earlier dialogues, is said to have taken over a pytha-
gorean Ide_al Theory, but to have extended such Ideas to all CJmERJ11 
concepts, whereas they had limited them to mathematical concepts. 
1 It has, however, been shown that there is no question wha.tever of 
Pythagorean Ideas - their Numbers were phenomenal, not separate 
and intelligible. The error in this and similar interpretation E of 
this resemblance .is twofold: 1 t takes the resemblance to have been 
in Plato's mi11d instead of in Aristotle's, as has been pointed out 
on the previ.ous page, and interpretS:)~ f' Imitation' either by xms:t 
assigning to it a. meaning deduced from the meaning adopted for 
Part1cipation2 or by giving it the meaning which the word natmral-
ly suggests - but the correct procedure is to fix its meaning by 
Aristotle's conception of it, as revealed in A.v. Let us here do so 
What .Aristotle means by Participation, in Plato's Ee.rlier 
Theory of Ideas, has been dealt with above. 3 To adopt the view 
most appropriate to the present passage, it is a metaphor express-
ing the mode of the coming-into-existence of sensibles if they were 
made like their patterns, the Ideas - except that Aristotle denies 
that Plato made any metaphysical use of a.·Pa.tterner, so to speak. 
But he doe~ not conceive Pythagorean Imitation as the mode of 
coming-into-existence of things as copies of Numbers. Although 
4 . 
Ross has sug~ sted that Justice was like 4 - that is, :: , because 
Reciprlcity, the definition of Justice, involves two persons and 
two objects, this is not the impression that Aristotle gives of 
the Pythagorean conception of Justice, much less ·of its resemblance 
to the number 4. As stated c;.bove, 5 Aristotle understands by Imita-
tion that ·Numbers were made the Essences of things in acvordance 
with the pythagorean method of definition. According to this, the 
Essence of the thing, to use Aftistotle's terminology, was th~t 
Number which revealed the same characteristics a.s were embodied in 
that 4efini tion; and as for Aristotle the Substance of a thing, 1 ts 
Essence, determined its shape, he inferred that, in terms of his 
ovm philosophy, the Pythagoreans made things resemble Numbers • 
.Justice was defined as Reciprocity,{; 4, as the fht·st example of 
this, eas the :f:tx Essence of Reciprocity and so of Justice; bmt if 
4, or Number in general, was the Essence of Justice~rthings in 
... 
general, then, as 1Aristotle conceived it, things imitated Numbers. 
1. Pages 4 and 12 above. 
2. Cp. Taylor, Commentary on 
things to Ideas in Timaeus 
word." 
Plato's Tj.ma.eus 33:llThe relation of 
is Mimesis - the standing Pythagorean 
3. Pages 76-8 abobe. 
4. Plato's Theory of Ideas 218. 5. Pages 38-40. 
\ 
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This seems to me to be quite a different matter from saying that 
things were patterned after Numbers by a hypothetical Demiurge. 
Two SUggested Solutions. Now if, taken in the senses in which 
Aristotle has previously been shown to have understood the words, 
there does not seem to be any clear resemblence between Imitation 
of Numbers and Participation in Ideas, there are two possible ways 
out - for Aristotle is so precise here that some exp1onat1on which 
suits the facts must sutely~ be possible. one way is to seek some 
other ex.plsna.tion of Imitation, and the other is to seek some other 
explanation of pe,rticipation .• But we have examined all the evidence 
that could show what .!Aristotle meant by Imitation, so that this 
alternative is out of the question. Is it, then, possllble to find 
some other explanation of Participatio!l? Yes, it is~ In fa.ct,there 
are two possible alternatives. We shall take up the first alterna-
tive here. 
1 
·This is the explanation which/ Field, among others, has given 
to the passage, that the relation between Participation and Imita-
tion was intended to refer to a resemblance between Pythagoreanism 
and Platonism in respect of each having anticipated his own formal 
cause to so:ne extent. That this is true in regard to Imitation has, 
I think, been made clear on the previous page. Number+ere the 
Essences of things, according to Aristotle's conception of pythago-
reanism, and this he e,:..pre.sses in the passage discussed, briefly, 
by saying that "The Pythagoreans say that things exist by Imitation 
of Numbers", sc. because, as their Essences, Numbers were~ a sort 
of formal cause of things, but, we may add, the pythagoreans treated 
the matter too simply. 2 Now if Aristotle also interpreted Plato's 
Ideas as formal causes, so that when he says, "Plato sa.ys they exist 
by Participation, changing the name,n he means that this relation 
of Participation virtually or actually made Forms the formal prin-
ciple of things, then it .is clear what the resemblance is - it is 
that both Plato and the Pytha.goreans had this in common, that both 
anticipated his own formal cause, the Pythagoreans by making things 
im1 tate Numbers, Plato by making things pdlticipate in Ideas. And 
that ·this is, in fe,ct, just hov~ Aristotle understood the Forms in 
the Early Platonism, is clear from one of the arguments against the 
Forms in that part of .Lix which criticises the Early Theory, since 
- 3 it is paralleled in M.v :"Again, it would seem imposs1:tble that the 
substance and that of which it is the substance should exist apart; 
how, therefore, could the Ideas, being the substance of things, 
exist apart? In the Phaedo the case is stated this way •.•• yet the 
things THAT SllARE IN 'IREM do not come into being. n The ca.p1 ta.l!sed 
words show that Aristotle means participa.tion; the reference to the 
Phaedo and the place of the reference in A. ix shows that he means 
the Early Theory of Ideas; 1 substance' indicates that he is referrinE 
l.Classical Quarterly XVII.l-22. 
3. 99lbl-0 = l079b1' -Oa~. 2. Metaphsyics 987a21-22. 
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to the Ideas as Essences or formal causes. And if this passage was 
written as it now stands, i.e. as referring to the Early Theory of 
Ideas- on account of its position - it is difficult to see what 
else !Aristotle could have meant. Iiei ther Plato nor the Pythagoreans 
gave any clear explanation of what they meant, the one by Participa-
tion, the other by Imitation; but, in searching for anticipations 
of his own formal cause, Aristotle affects to see an anticipation, 
albeit expressed too simply, of his formal cause, in the manner in 
which he interprets their method of definition - it amounts to mak-
ing Numbers the Essences of the things defined,i- and Plato's Partici 
pation made Ideas, in which things parlictated, their Elsence or 
formal cause. In this res¢pect both agreed insofar as they anticipa-
ted his formal cause, but Plato spoke not of Imitation so.~ much as 
of Participation, hence his addi t'ii on, "chafnging the neJne. n 
There is, however, another method of interpreting this 
resemblance. In 987b21-22 !Aristotle says that the Numbers in Pla.to-
1 
nism come:[ rom ttthe Great and the Snall by Particil pation in the 
2 One." Now this clearly refers to the Later Theory of Idea-Numbers, 
and when he sums up anticipations of his formal cause, he gagain 
clearly has in mind the later Idea.-Numbers::"The Essence, i.e. the 
subsiant:ta.l reelity, no one has expressed distinctly. It is hinted 
at chiefly by those who believe in the Forms; for t.hey do not 
suppose either that the Forms are the mat tel~ of sensible things, 
<AND THE ONE THE MATTER OF THE FORMS, •••••• but they furnish the Fi!XIrl 
Forms as the Essence of every other thing, and THE ONE AS THE ESSENCll 
~ 3 
OF THE FORMS''. If, then, the sentence 987bl0-14 referred to the 
later Idea-Numbers, we should have fairly well attested evidence 
that Aristotle noted a resemblance between Plato and the pytha.goreans 
in the anticipation of his own formal cause, the latter by m!:);tking 
Numbers the Essence of things, the former in making Ideas,which are 
Numbers in respect of their. origin, the Essence d'f things .. So Ross4 , 
that "Aristotle points out the affinity between the part played by 
Numbers in the Pythagorean theory and the part played by Ideas in 
the Platonic •••• and prob~bly had in mind chiefly tre later Theory 
of Idea-Numbers." :Aga-in~ "The Pythagoreans said Justice was Four-
ness ••• £b Plato did not identify Ideas with Numbers, but assigned 
Numbers· to the Ideas ••••• Thus Plt:lto' s assignment of Numbers to Idea.~: 
is on a par with Pythagorean Justice : 4. '' Further support for this 
interpretation comes from two other aources. Taylor6 takes the 
Participation of everything in the Forms to mean that the elerre nts 
of the Forms are the elements of all other things, and more clearly 7 . 
Brommer ,that Plato thinks Ideas are causAs in the same way a.s the 
1.1(~,-4: f-t{)tSO'· 2. Cp. Journ~.l of Philology x.292. 
3. 988a3 5-bf,. 4. Plato t s Theory of Ideas 161. 
5. Op. cit. 218, 220. 6. Plato the Man and his Work 508. 
7. Mnemosyne XI.iv.268. 
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pythagoreans, i.e. the elements of Numbers ure those of all things, 
but he differs in that the Pytha.goreans took Numbers as causes 
f''f?1(!'-t< , Plato as )-'-~th'(t:-c . 
Could one find an explanation for a reference to Idea-Numbers 
in 987bl0-14, which seems prima facie to conclude the account of 
the Early Theory of Ideas, or to be part of that account, if the 
details about mathematical numbers also belonged to that theory? 
If one cou.ld understand Ti1JY ~;'c~~~~ with J'-rJ/fc(. in line 12, 
and exclude ~" tfcfeV¥ in line 14, then the account of the Early 
'l'heory would definitely end at 987blO, and Aris~otle would be 
passing directly on to Idea-Numbers - "Only the name Participation 
was new; for the pythagoreans sny that things exist by Imitation of 
Numbers, and Plato says the.y exist by Participation ( sc.in Numbers, 
i.e. Idea-Numbers), che.nging the name. But what Participation or 
Imitation could be they left an open question." He then goes on to 
explain Mathernaticals, which would then also belong to the Later 
Theory. Another possibility is that Aristotle first wrote A.vi 
without this sentence, pDssing directly from 987blO - things are 
named after Idea.s by virtue of Participation, by which sensibles 
exist. - to 987bl4ff - the account of Mathematicals. Only at 987b22 
does Aristotle pass from a.n account of Platonism to a list of 
resemblances and differences. Perhaps having reached thie point, or 
perhaps in reading over his work, Aristotle may have realised he· 
could ~add the resemblance alleged between Participation and Imitat100· 
and as he had spoken 8bout Participationt in 987blO, he added as a 
sort of parallthes1.s this. ex,tra point of a.greement without realising 
that he ha.d. cited Participa:tion there in connection with the Early 
Theory, whell'eas his parenthesis referred to Participation in the 
Later Theory. This implies thnt Plato spoke of things existing bY 
Participation in the Forms.in both the Early and the Later Theory, 
and this has, I believe, come out in the discussion above. This was 
the easier for Aristotle to have done since Plato himself gave no 
clear explanation of Participation at all; but Aristotle interpreted 
it, for the sake of his investigation into anticipations of his 
causes, as vtrtually making Ideas the formal causes of things, 
especially in the Later Theory, but perhaps also in the Earlier. 
Hence, ;{.J,ecause he is seeking anticipations of hGs own formal 
cause!Ji :Aristotle affects to see a resemblance between pythagorean 
Imi t'J.t.ion, by which he means that, according to the pythagorean 
. 
method of definition, Numbers as the Essence of things were their 
formal causes, and Platonic Participation, byf, which he means that 
in the Later Theory of Idee-Numbers, just as the One was the formal 
cause of Ideas, so Ideas were the formal causes of things, a.s appears 
from the capitals on the previous page. But it is just possible that 
this passage, as its position suggests, refers only to the Early 
Theory, in which Jdens held the same relation to sens1bles as did 
the Later Idea-Numbers. 
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Section iii. The Secondary Differences. 
The List of Seconda,!:l, Differences. These are interspersed among 
the list of resemblances and d:tff'erences, and to them we add a. 
reference from the Physics. 
1. "Only the name (Participation) was new,« 987bl0-11, and "Chang-
ing the name (Part1Vipat1on instead of Imltation) 11 , 987bl3. 
2. "But positing a. dyad and constructing the Infinite out of the 
Great and the Snall, instead of treating the In:fiini te as one, is 
pec\Uiar to him, '1 987b25-26, and nHis making the other entity 
besides the One a dyad \,as due to the belief that the Numbers, 
except those which were prime, could be neatly produced out of 
the dyad as out of some plastic material, 11 987b33-8al, ihich he 
criticises in 988a2-7. 
3. Physics 203a4-16:"0nly the pythagoreans place the Infinite among 
the objects of sense (they do not regard Number as separable from 
these), and assert that what is outside the heavens is infinite. 
Plato,' on the other hand, holds that there is no body outside (the 
Forms are not outside because they are now~here), yet that the 
Infinite is present not only in the objects of sense but in the 
Forms also. Further, the pythagoreans identify the Infinite with 
the Even •••• But Plato has two Infini tes, the Great and the Snall. 11 
4. 987b29-32:"Uis divergence from the pythagoreans in making the 
Qne.~ •• separate from things ••• was due to his inquiries in the 
region of definitions." 
All four secondary differences centre about one or other of 
Plato 1 s resemblances to pythagorean ism. Thus, the change in name 
deals with Participation which we have shown to have been said by 
Ard!stotle to have' resembled Pythagorean Imitation in some respect. 
Like the Pythagoreans, Plato made the other element than the One an 
' ' ~ 
Infinite, but here he 1s said to have used two Infinites instead 
of one, and while the pythagorean Infinite was both in sensillble 
bodies and outside the heavens, the Platonic was in Ideas as well 
as in things, but not outside the heavens. And the other common 
element, the One, was separate for Plato. We shall deal with these 
differences in the order of shortness of comment. 
· 4. The Separation of~ One. The One is what Aristotle calls 
the formal element of the Forms. But, according to the main primary 
difference, the Forms were separate from tb.ings; therefore, the One 
was separate from things. But Pythagorean Number was phenomenal, 
so that the One, as element of such Numbers, would not be separate. 
This point, then, is a corl'Clla.ry of the original separation 
of Forms, the Pytha.goreans making their primary entities phenomenal, 
Plato making his primary entities separate, sdl that the One, as 
their formal element, was necessarily separate. 
2 1. ~'C,hangin6 the Name." We saw above that, in his account of 
1. I have omitted "and the Numbers". See p.79. 2. Pages 95ff. 
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the resemblBnce between Platonic Participation and pythagorean 
Imitation, Aristotle states as h&s own deduction or observation 
that while these two conceptions were similar - in this respect, 
that each anticipated to some extent his own formal cause - they 
differed in name .• Now we deduced in the snalysis of the passage 
where this statement occurs, that it does not allege that Plato 
borrowed this relatiilonship from the Pythagoreans, but that.Aristotle 
seeing in participation and in Imitation anticipations of his own 
formal cause, pointed out the resemblance between the two concep-
tions in this one respect only. This means that Plato did not 
borrow Imitation as an explanation of the existence of sensibles, 
e.nd then for some rea son or other msde use of a different termino-
logy for it, but both the comparison of Participa.tion with Imi ta}JJ-
tion and the notice of i¥e difference in terminology were Aristotle'~ 
own. Therefore, "changing the neJTJe" means only the.t in feet Plato 
ma.de use of a different name from the pythrg oreans for expressing 
the mode of existence of sensibles, but Aristotle gives no hint as 
to the origin or derivation of this name. As we are here concerned 
only with what Aristotle testifies~ this question must be left over 
for discussion in Part II. 
l!_ The_Senaration of _!he !,nf.!!llli· The passage from the Physic£ 
marks three points of difference in the treatment of the Infinite. 
Firstly, the pythagorean Infinite was in sen!li ble bod:te s )Jecause 
their Numbers- of which the Infinite was an element -·were pheno-
menal, not separate. Plato's. Infinite was similarly an element of 
1 . 
sensibles and of Numbers - Idea-Numbers - but since the latter 
were sepe.rate from sensible s, Plato' s Ifltrini te differed from the 
Pythagorean in being in Forms, which were separate from things, as 
well as in sensibles. This is, then, a cort::iiil.ary of Plato's 
fundament8l separation of FormA. 
Secondly, the Pythagorean Infinite extended beyond the confine~. 
of the Universe, but Plato a.sserted that beyond. the Universe was 
nothing. This is more astronomy than Metaphysics, which is our 
immediate concern, but we might note that as the Pytnagorean 
Universe was constituted from Limit and Unlimited, it was itself 
limited in the sense that :itt was o part of the Whole delimited off 
from the Unlimited which extended everywhere. But for Plato the 
Universe was finite in an absolute sense, and in any case, as we 
shall see presently, he did not actually talk of the Infinite but 
of tits analogue, the Great and Snall. As for Aristotle's statement· 
2 . 
that the Ideas were nowhere, compare Ritter's telling remark that 
the Ideas were everywhere and Oowhere. 
1. We saw on page 82 that while the One was the formal element of 
the Forms and the Forms of the things of sense, the analogue of 
the Infini t.e; the Great and Snall, was common to both, 987bl8-22 
and 988alO-l4. 
2. The Essence of Plato's Phtlosophy 221-222. 
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The third point, that the Pythagoreans identified the Inf'ini te 
with the Even, but Plato identified it with the Great ~nd the Small, 
might be compared with 988a26-7:"Pluto spoke of the Great and the 
Snall, the Italians of the Infinite." This properly belongs to the 
next question, 2, since it means that for the Pythagoreans the 
Infirii te was one thing - the Even,- for Plato two - the Great end 
the Snall. VIe turn, then, to the investigation of v-hat Aristotle 
meant by Ul.l{.ttm: calling this material element two - a dyad - since 
he freauently calls it 'the Great and ,9nall 1 • That is, is this 
element a dyad because the Great is one thing, the Sna.ll another, or 
in some other sense? 
2. Plato's Analogue of the Infinite as a Dyad. 
fllil AJ2parent Contradi~~ion concerning the Infinite as a Dy:ag_. In the 
last reference quoted above, Physics 203a4-16 sub fin., the diffe-
rence between Plato's and the Pythagorean Infinite was said to be 
that the latter was a single entity, equated with the Even ,whereas 
the former was two things, the Grant and the ana.ll. It is one of 
~r1stotle 1 s weaknesses as a witnoss that he sometimes affects to 
take certain tenets 11 terally, anL1 since he ofteh elsewhere -ealls 
Plato's element not the Great and the Snail, but the Great and 
Snall, it is really not tv'JO things but one thing with two character-
istice, ns Ross1 · says, referring us to Physics 206b28-33. For the 
explanation, then, of the two-fold nature of Plato's Infinite we 
must turn to this reference. 
Physics 206b28-33:"Plato made the Infinites two in nwnber 
because it 1 s supposed to be· possible to exceed all limits and to 
proceed ad infinitum in the direction both of increase and of 
reduction. Yet although he makes the Infinite s two, he does not use 
them. For in the Numbers the Ir1fini te in the direction of reduction 
is not present, as the Monad is the emallest; nor is the Infinite 
j_n the direction of increase, for the parts number only up to the 
Deced." This is explicitly given a::: Plato's reason for making the 
Infinites two in number, i.e. as a principle having two character-
istics, and refers especially, if not exclusj_vely, to the role of 
the Inf1ni te in generating Numbers, apparently Ideal Numbers, since 
thet is the natural meaning to sfss1gned to 1 Monad' and, t:IJeca.d'. 
Now I do not wist} further to examine the generation of Numbers,-
this will be dealt with below - but only with the nature of this 
Infinite. And if it can proceed ad infinitum in the directions both 
of increase and of reduction, it would seem to be what can be called 
a two-way continuum; that is, it, is a continuum capable of infinite 
increase- the Great,- and infinite reduction - the Snall. Now let 
us apply these conclusions - that the Infinite was two-fold in the 
seas.e of having the capacity of infinite extension and of 1nfin1 te 
~eduction, end that it was used or rather was supposed to be used -
1. Plato's Theory of Ideas 184. 
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for Aristotle denies that it was in fRet reallyp so used - especial-
ly in the generation of Id.eal Numbers ; let us apply this to the 
source for the Secondary Di~ference here discussed, 987b33-8a7. 
987b33-8a7:"His making the other entity besides the One a dyad 
was due to the belief that the Numbers, except those which were 
prime (tfw lii,aJ "/~rc.vtl ~' could be neatly produced out of the 
H I (ft f 1 dyad as out of some plastic material (tk tcJ~of f~- ~')''f.t 00 ) • Yet what 
happens is the contrary; the theory is net a reasonable one. For 
they make many things out of the matter, and the form generates 
only once, but what:¢ we observe is that one table ·is made from one 
matter, while t.he man who applies the form, though he is one, makes 
many tables. ~nd the relation of the male to the female is similar; 
for the latter is impregnated by one copulation, but the male 
impregnates many .females; yet tl~ se are the analogues of those first 
princj_ples." Now applying whRt we have discovered above, one might 
say that this agrees with Physics 206b28-33 in steting thf1,t the 
Infinite was given a two-fold n~ture in order to generate Ideal 
Numbers -"due to the belief that the NUMBERS could be neatly 
produced out of the dyad tt - am while 1 t does not state in what 
sense the Inf1ni te was a dyad, 1 t we s apparently in the sense of 
Physi_cs 206b28-33 - a~1 a two-way continuum, But a closer examination 
must cast doubt5 on this. How could a pJ.a stic material be rega r.ded 
as a two-way continuum? i;\ristotle before had objected that full use 
was not made of the dual nature of the Inf1n1 te, but here he says 
thatwhat happens in actual fact is the very opposite of what Plato 
alleges; e.nd he goes on to talk, not of Ideel Numbers, but of 
sensible particulG.rs - tables, etc. - and cites analogues which, as 
we shall see, have nothing whatever to do with Ideal Numbers but 
only witb the world of sense. Cherni ss2 indeed is correct - a.t 
least on a. prima facie inspection - that the reason for the Jiffini te 
being a dyad is different here from the reason adduced in the 
Physics. Indeed, the apparent contradiction goes further; for if we 
include the context of each of these references, we shall find, 
according to Cherni ss, 3 that in Physics 203a9-l0 the Great and 
·Snall is an element of things only because things ere caused by the 
Ideas, of which the Greet and Small is nn element - and the same is 
implied by Metaphysics 987bl8-22 - whereas in Metaphysics 988al0-14 
the Great and Snall is used a.s element twice over, once for Ideas 
nnd again forftthings. 4 
1. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas 176 n.3, that the word means a 
plastic material. 2. Aristotle's Criticism of Plato 108 note, 
cp. 110. 3. Op. cit. 108-9. 
4. Similarly Robin, Platen 142 and 144; van der Wielen, Die Ideege-
tallen van P;J.ato 99; and cp. Ross, op. cit.22l:ttAr1stotle sug- . 
gests that t~e matter of sensibles and of Ideas is identical, but 
it is incre/dible that Plato took the same principle twice over". 
!As our concern is 'What Aristotle believed., this is tantamount to 
saying that the matter of Ideas and of sensibles was identical. 
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But I belmeve Cherniss is wrong in All three respects: i) 988a 
l0-14 neither :SJX. says nor implies that the same Great and Snall is 
used twice over. It reads:"The Qnderlying matter ••• of which the Form, 
are predicated in the case of sensible things, rmd the One in the 
case of the Forms, viz ••••• a dyad, the Groat rmd the Snall. n The 
very fact that it is n dyad indicates that we are not here dealing 
with a one single thing, and in any case, if the underlying matter 
of such and such a sphere and such e..nd such a cube ts said to be 
gold, this does not necessarily mean that the same piece of gold is 
a substrs te common to the two figures. But we sha.ll deal with this 
below. ii} 987bl8-22 and $ 203a.9-lO do not necessEfily imply that 
the Grest and Small is an element of sensibles only incidenta.lly. 
-fhe former reads:"Since the Forms were the causes of all other 
things, he thought their elements were the elements of all things. 
;As matter, the Great 8nd the SUall were principles; as essential 
reality, the One; for from the Gret>t and the Snall, by Participation 
in the One, come the Numbers." Aristotle here details only the 
constitution of the Numbers, and states that the elements of these 
were also the elements of sensibles, but if they were so only 
incident«lly, only by virtue of the presence of Forms in them1 , it 
would be rather ridiculous to cite this as the reason for these 
elements being the elements of sensibles: the Great and Snall would 
hardly be called an element if present in things only as part of 
Forms wh1 ch were pre sentt Nor i.S 203a9-lO any better: ttpla.to holds •••• 
that the Infinite is present not only in the objects of sense but 
in the Forms also." Since this is given as a difference from the 
pythagorean Infinite, which W8S only in sensibles, I would rather 
take Ari.stotle to mean a numerically identical Infinite in both Forms 
and things thnn an Infinite immediately present in Forms and in 
things only because Forms are in things. But in actual fact Aristotle 
in both these references and in that quoted in i) has in mind the 
same tenet: that there ~s one Infinite in things, and another in 
Forms. but as both were Infinites he calls them by the same name, 
the Infinite or the Great and Snall, just as the gold in the cube 
and. the gold in the sphere, two separate pieces of gold, are still 
just gold. iii) Hence, I feel that his alleged contradiction is 
miRpls~ced: the account of the reason for making the Infinite two-
fold seems to be different in 206b28-33 and in 987b33-8a7 only 
beca.use in the latter case the renson he gives for Plato's making 
the Inf1n1 te a dyad is a different one from that given in 206b28-33; 
although he talks about the generation of Numbers, these nre diffe-
rent Numbers from those mentiJ}ad in 206b28-33. Can Plato have only 
one rea..son? Did he have only one kind of Number? Naturally if we 
assume that Aristotle :ts dealing with one a.nd the same reason, with 
the very same Ideal Numbers, in both places, not only do the tvio 
1. But Plato's ]~orms, in any case, were not immanent. 
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accounts contradict ea.ch other, but 987b33-81-a7 by itself becomes 
full of inconsistenties, which account for the great variety of 
interpretations given to the meaning of 'the Primes•, 1 to the 
generation of Numbers, nnd to the nAture of the dyE>.d. 
If this p~ssage refers to Ideal Numbers and the dyad as the 
material element of Ideal Numbers, as we showed above that Physics 
2Q6b28-33 does,- and nearly every commentator thus interprets 1 t -
what are we to ma.ke of the 'plastic material'? This occurs in 
T1,meeus 50C not as an illustration of the matter of Ideal Numbers 
but of the Receptacle, which is the •element', as Aristotle would 
t·erm it, of sensible thingsfk How could a plastic material be 
rege.rded as a two-VIay continuum? It 1 s certainly not capable of 
infinite increase. How could Aristotle say, of Ideal Numbers, "they 
make MANY. THINGS QUt of the matter"? Let us not mention male and 
female, much less tables. And yet these analogues are cited a.s 
evidence for the unree.sonableness of the theory: "the theory is 
not a reasonable one. FOR they make many things out of the matter". 
Nor can .Aristotle be changing the subject, for he makes this objec-
tion in connection with his observetion that what hsppens is the 
contrary, ::md ape.rt from the fact thrt for n;Jany lines nothing 
whatever has been said about the gen er."?tion of sensible things, 
these words come immediately after his statement that Numbers could 
be mea.tly produced out of the dyed. as out of some plastic material. 
/Aristotle undoubtedly has his 
\ easy to say he misunderstends 
suggest that it is rather the 
defects a.s a witness, but it is too 
whenever any difficulty/arises. I 
critics who have misunderstood. 1M 
one can. get away from the idee_ that this pa.ssa.ge is concerned with 
Ideal Numbers - is an elaboration of Physics 206b28-33 - the 
meaning be comes perfectly clear and there is no inconsistency. I 
shall¢ explain this passage now, and deal with the difference 
between this pl'!.ssage l':md Physics 20628-33 lnter in this sectton. 
·Apalysis of .2.§_7b33-8~l· This passage has been translated on 
· pnge 104 above, where we gA.ve some ren.son s for doubting that it 
dealt with the genera.tion of Iden.l Numbers. Now if it did in fact 
deal with the gene ration of Idenl Numbers, then the meaning of 
1. Apart from the interpretation to be adopted presently, we may 
distinguish the following: Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of 
Plato 182 note 106, would read:"Except the odd numbers", doubtlest 
following Alexander, cited by Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics I. 
173 ad 987b34. Ross himself na.rroVJs this doV~n to a sub-division 
of odd numbers, in effect 3,5, and 7, op. cit. 175 and Plato's 
Theory o:f Ideas 190, but Ideal Numbers a.re not subject to arith-
metical operations, and the implied generation of Numbers on 
which these interpretations rest is really that o:f Xenocrates, as 
will be shown sub The Gene:ration of Numbers below. More Platonic 
is that the Primes were 1 nnd 2, To.ylor Mind XXXVI. 22, stenzel, 
Zahl und Gestalt 57 and 172, van der Wielen, Die Ideegetallen van 
Plato 130; nor can one object that 1 is not a number (Ross, 
1Aristotle' s Metaphysics !.175, Chernlss, loc. cit.} since Plato 
thought 1 t was: cp. "The Monad is the smallest Numbertt~n2o6b28-
33, and cp. Mnemosyne XI.iv.267 with note 1. 
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"except the Primesn should offer no great difficulty: they would 
be a sub-division of Ideal Numbers which were not easily generated,' 
or perh~ps were not generated at all, and with several interpreta-
tions along these lines we have already dealt, in brief, in the 
footnote to the previous page. But, e.s has been said, the context, 
taken as a whole, does not fit in with the interpretation of this, 
for it passes on, after stating the origin of these Numbers from 
the analogue of the Infinite, to a criticism that Plato should not 
have found the reason for their multiplicity in that material 
principle, but rather in the form. The context, then, suggt!ts that 
what is here dealt with is not Ideal Numbers at all, but a. class 
of entity that 1 s a plurality, sen a; bl e things in fact. The key-
' • t word is D' "'}d'«~i"o' , "the Primes", which can also be ranslated, 
11 The first, sc .Numbers. n 
There are severol passages in the Metaphysics where this use 
of the word occurs. 1080a26-27: n ('The units) in the first 2 are 
associable with one another, and those in the first 3 with one 
another •••• ; but the units in the 2-itself are inassp!ociable with 
those in the 3-itself. 11108lb30-3l:"All this is absurd and fictitiou 
and there cannot be a first 2 and then¢. a. 3-itself." This points 
to the identity of 11 the first 2 and 3" with "the 2- and 3-itself"; 
i.e. the FIRsr NUMBERS are the Ideas of Number. 1080b22: "Another 
thinker says the first kind of number, that of the Forms, alone 
exists. 11 Again, the FIRST NUMBERS are the Ideal Numbers. 108la21-
2 3: "l!'or the first 2 will net proceed iminedie,.tely from one and an 
indefi:ni te dyad ••• 11 This makes the Two FIRST as an Idea-Number in 
respect of its derivation. Finally, 1083a30-35:"And if this is so, 
i 
there must ~lso be a 2 which is the first of 2 1 s •••• plato used to 
say ••• there must be a first 2 and 3, and the Numbers must not be 
.. , 
associable with one another." Tht,t first part of the quotation 
shows that Ideal Numbers are FIRST in oppo si tL on to phenomenal 
numbers, and the secon:i part refers this to Plato, and further 
• 
identifies the FIRSI' NUMBERS as Ideal Numb~_,rs in that they are not 
1 . 
associable. For this rel:> 8on, then, Trendelenburg takes nthe first 
numbers" in 987b33-8e7 to mean Ideal Numbers, and then, if the 
Ideal Numbers are excluded from what Aristotle is talking about 
( "eEcept the first numbers"), what remains is sensible numbers. 
2 Hence, e,n Jackson very rightly puts it, we coul~ paraphrase the 
passage thus:"Pla.to makes the Unlimited a dp.ality because this 
makes it ee:sy to suppose the generation from it of {a plurality of 
pnrticulars) • .Analogies show, however, that plurality must be 
looked for in the for·m, not in the matter. 11 The br(.',.cketed phrase is 
the meaning of'J./,8-fo;,'i {f~Ti:Jv 'o/~1"~1? 1 and this meaning is 
deduced from the classift.ation of numbers in Physics 219b6-8 :1 
"Number, we must note, is used in two senses - both of what is 
1. Cited by Ross, Ari~totle's Metaphysics I.l73 ad 987b34. 
2. Journal of Philology X.290-l. 
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iiW~~i (or the countable) and also that m:f with which we count. 11 
,As the latter is Number par excellence, 1 t is what is mem t by the 
FIRSf NUMBERS, and this being excluded, what rema.ins is the other 
meaning of number given a.d lac. -the countable, that which is count-
ed, which is in fact the senSt.ble particulars which are counted when 
we wish to point to a number of things. But, in fact, 1 in this 
passage it is the Ideas that are THE FIRSI' NUMBERS (inasmuch as they 
are combinations of the One and the dyad), so that when these are 
excluded sensible particulars are what is left. 2 
1'he fact that in rno st of A .• vi preceding the passage here in 
question Arl stotle is undoubtedly referring to Ideas or to Ideal 
Numbers, does not mean that in···987b33-8a.7 he still has these in 
mind; why should he not tersely exclude these by the expression 
"except the First Numbersn? He is undoubtedly referring to sensible 
pnrticulurs when he alludes to the plnstic material, to Male and 
Female, to tables. Nor must he necessarily mean Ideas or Ideal 
Numbers when he states "His mP-king the other ent,ty besides the ONE 
a dyad ••• 11 Plato had only two ultimate elements, the One and the 
dyGd, and while these were the elements directly of Ideas or Ideal 
Numbers, the Great and Snall was also on element in sensible parti-
culars as he says in 988al0-14. For the further confirmation of 
this interpretation it is necessary to examine the analogues to 
which Aristotle.next refers. 
The 1\nalo~ue£lo These analogues are not Aristotle's own similes; 
the reference "These are the analogues pf )f.tho se first pcinciples" 
points to Plato's dialogues. In Timaeus 50:A-C, which has nothing to 
do with Number~~, Gold is equated analog1.cally with the Receptacle, 
which is there a principle of sensible pr-:rticulars, and is called 
I I 
11 some ple stic rna terial" (tK.fttrecotl ) in order to show that the 
Gold is real, but tre various shapes it assumes under the haihds .of 
I 
the goldsmith are transitory and cannot rightly be called 'this' 
or 'th8t 1 but only !'of such a kind'. SO the many sensiblefi forms 
which the Receptacle recUves metaphorically nt the hands of the 
Demiurge are unreal, and only the Receptacle is real. 
In T:f.maeus 50D the foregoing example is interpreted in animi s-
tic terms, the Receptacle becoming the Mother or Female. This is 
cited only to show that as the Male, Female and Offspring are 3, so 
three principles are required in Nature: Forms, Receptacle and 
sensible particulars. The whole point of these analogues is to make 
two points: that Becoming is transitory so that it is necessary to 
posit a third principle be~sides Ideas and things - the Receptacle -
and that this, and not the sebsible pc;rticulers, is reil. 
Now this Receptacle is interpreted by Aristotle - rightly or 
wrongly is not here the question - as "Mattern, and his point is 
1. Jackson, loc. cit. 2. There is no question here of the mathe-
matica~ numbers since we are dealing with the derivation of those 
numbers which are derived from elements, a.nd mathema.tical numbers 
were not so derived, 99lb29-30, 1090b34-35. 
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that it is the cause of the multiplicity of sensible particulf}rst so· 
1 his ttThey make many things out of the matter." But Aristotle m:il:iH:£:k1 
objects that this multiplicity does not arise from the nature of 
the matter, but f~·rom the form. 2 Turning to the Craftsman of Republic 
596B, he says that one act of creation on the part of the Craftsman 
or Demiurge does not result in a plurality of tables, but that from 
one portion of matter only one table can arise; to obtain a plu.ra-
1i.d lity, the form has to be ~ji%H8 several times. Therefore, Aristotl~ 
understands Plato's matter as a principle of multiplicity, one 
application of the Form to the matter giving not one butf{ the 
entire plurality of sensible t.a.bles; but he objects that this 1s 
unreasobable because what happens is the contrary: it is the 
repetition of the Form that gives the multiplicity. He takes Plato 
to mean that the l!'emale, at one copulation, brings forth an innume-
rable litter, but objects that it is the male that is capable of 
unlimited gem~ration. Clearly this has nothing to do with Ideal 
Numbers: it concerns the generation of sensibles as a multiplicity. 
And lest it be thought that we are drawing too much out of the text,l 
other passages are here cited to show that Aristotle believed that 
Plato derived the multiplicity of sensibles from the matter: one 
application of the Form produced in the matter not one table, but 
the whole plurality of sensible tables, the plttrality coming from 
that matter. 
l089a5-7: 3 "They thought .it necessary to prove that that which 
' is not is; for only thus - of that which is and so~ thing else -
t 
could the things that are be composed, IF THEY ARE MANY. u Further J 
on we have 1089al9-22:"What sort of Being and Not-Being, then, by 
their union PLURALISE the things that are? This thinker means by 
the Non-Being, the union of which with Being PLURALISES the things 
I 
that are, the False. n That is, Plato (t
1
his thinker) makes Non-Being 
(the other entity besides the One) the cause why sensibles (the 
things that are) are many, 1 t plural1se,s them; this 1 s apparently 
• 
called the False because sensibles are not really real but only 
apparently so, as appeared from the metaphor of Gold in the Timaeus. 
' Now the Ideal Numbers are not a multiplicity: each is unique, 
and they number probably only 10. If then the dyad is the cause of 
the multiplicity of sensibles, it must be another dyad that is the 
element of Ideas and Ideal Numbers, since these are not many.; HenCE' 
· what Aristotle is saying in 987b33-8a7 is that Plato differed from 
l. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics I.lx11, takes this to refer to 
X~onocra.tes; but there is no indication of any change in referencE 
throughout A.vi in which chapter Plato is named. Instead of inter-
preting this "many" as a multiplicity as Ross does, op. cit.176, 
stenzel, apparently following Alexander, takes it to mean that 
~ the dyad makes everything <b,uble, Zahl und Gestalt 54. 2. Hence Ross is wrong, Plato's Theory of Ideas 201, that "the Form generates only.once" justifies van der Wielen- this is an objec-tion, not a report. 3. This passgge will be further examined in the next chapter. 
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the Pythagoreens, who had only one Infinite - that in sensible s, 
since their numbers were phenomenal - Plato having two Infinites, 
one in sensibles as here explained, and another in Ideas as is 
1 implied. We can, then, paraphrase the whole passage thus: Plato has 
two ultimate principles, the One and a dyad. He differed from the 
Pythagoreans in making this dyad two-fold, one for Ideas and one 
for sensibles. The reason for thus making a different principle 
for sensibles than for Ideas was because he believed that numbered 
th.ings, that is, not the first numbers by which we count but the 
plurality of countable things, could be neatly produced out of a 
different i~~~ than the Ideal Substrate AS A MULTIPLICITY, which 
principle he calls the Receptacle in the Timaeus, using as its 
analogues a ~t~£ftc material and the Female, the Mother. But these 
very analogues show the opposite in Nature and in any case the 
theory is not a reasonable one. In the Republic he makes the lrafts-
man create many tables by one act, but the multiplicity could only 
come{rom the r.epet1 tion of the Form, notfrom the matter. 
But we need to give other evidence for the existence of a 
different matter in Ideas and in sensible s, since many cr1 tics 
believe tha.t 988al0-14 implies that the same material.element is 
used twice over, once for Ideas and once for sensibles. 2 ~his 
cannot be directly attested, but is implied by the line of reason-
ing to which we next turn. 
Two DiSferent Infin1tes. 992all-15: "Line comes from the 
Long and Short (i.e. from a kind of Great and Snall), and the Plane 
from the Broad and Narro~, and Body from the Deep and Siallo.w, ~· 
1085a9-13:" •• the Line,: the Plane and tte Solid. For some construct 
these out of the species of the 1 great and snall' ; e.g. Lines from 
the Long and Slort, Planes from the Broad and Narrow; Masses from 
the Deep ·and Shallow ; which are species of the Great and snall. 11 
. 3 
tAs Plato is characterised by the •unequal', the above references 
can be shown to be Platoni·c by lOOlbl9-25:"But even if one supposes 
( 
the case to be such that; as some say, Number proceeds from Unity-
itself and something els~ which is not One, none the less we must 
I 
· inquire why and how the product will sometimes be a Number and 
/ ~ a Magn1 tude, if the Not-One was Inequali t~, and was the 
I 
~ same principle in either· case, tt 1. e. th~ same by analogy, and not 
numerically the same. So'also 1090b37: 11He makes spatial magnitudes 
out of some other snall and Great." 
1.· Thompson, Journal of Philology XI.l8; Brommer, Mnemosyne XI.iv. 
270; Burnet,· Greek :Philosophy 320; Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics 
I .169, believe that Plato had two Infinite s, one in sensible s 
another in Ideas. 2. See page 104 note 4 above. 3. See below~ 
4. Herace Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato 481-3 and Riddle 
.of the Early Academy 22, is wrong when he denies that species of 
Great and snall were Platonic. He cites 992bl3-18 to pPOVe this, 
but the factylthat Aristotle calls Lines, etc., a fourth class 
may well be his own term~nology, not that of the Academy. 
111/ 
These references sho.w that Plato derived Lines from the Long 
and Short, etc., which ware species of the Great a~d sna.ll; that 
Numbers camerrom some analogous species of Great and Snall 1 perhaps 
the Many and Few, 1 or perhaps from some principles called simply 
the Unequals, but that, since Aristotle more generally states the 
elements to be the Great and Snall simply, the Great and Small was 
the generic term under which these species, as Aristotle calls themj 
(but which must not be pressed too literally) were subsumed. Now it 
is admittedly a. deduction not backed by any. concrete evidence in 
Aristotle, but it seems to me that Plato might also have held 
similar 'species' of the Great and 9nall as the matter of sensibles, 
like the Hot and Cold, the Wet and Dry, to wh:idl Aristotle would also• 
refer simply by the generic term, the Great and Snall; but this 
sensible Great a.nd snall differed from the Ideal Great and Sna.ll, 
from which came Ideal Numbers and Magnitudes, in being a principle 
of rnul tiplici ty, as e:x:ple.ined on pages 109-110 above. 
rt is perhaps to these sensible 'species• of Great and S»a.ll 
that Aristotle refers in l089bl0-15, since he refers to others 
after he has listed all those referred to above as Ideal SUbstrates. 
nThey do not go on to lhnqllire how there are many Unequals besides 
the Unequal. Yet they use them ahd speak of Great and Small, Many 
and Few (from which proceed the Numbers), Long and Short (from 
which proceeds the Line), Broad and Narrow (from which proceeds too 
Plae), Deep and Shallow {from which proceed Solids); AND THEY SPEAK 
OF YET MORE KINDS OF RELATIVE TERMu. 
Hmce, van der Wielen~ and more clearly stenze1, 3e:x:plain the 
Great and Snall as only the simplest expression for the principle 
of the undetermined dyad, conceived in collective dimensions. That 
is, in its numerical 
expression (the Long 
indefinite extension 
aspect-it was a time continuum, in its linear 
and Short) lit was a linear continuum or 
. ' 4 in one dimension, and so in the case of 
Planes and Solids it was indefinite extension in two and three 
dim:ensious! This is the· Great and Snall as Ideal Substrate; as 
material substrate it was SUmilarly various continua running from 
the extreme of Heat to the extreme of Cold, from the extreme of 
Dryness to that of Wetness, and so on, but characterised by its 
reduplicative power: it made sensibles many. This suits 987b33-8a7 
1. For example, Cherniss, !Aristotle's Criticism of Plato 481-2, 
maintains that these species of·Great end Sna.ll were a development 
different from Plato's own and held by those who said the Many 
and Few; so Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics I.lviii (but Plato's din 
Ross, op. cit. 169). Cherniss, op. cit. 484, refers these species 
to speusippus, but he made Number come from One and Plurality, not 
from the Many and Few, and Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas 208, 
cites 1090b37-lal and 1085a31-34 to show that Speusippus did not 
. hold these species. 2. Die Ideegetallen van Plato 154. 
3. Zahl und Gestalt 74 & 88. 4. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas 208. 
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perfectly, but does not suit Physics 206b28-33 quoted on page 103 
above. Let us .return to this, but fl'll.rst, since thet passage deals 
with the generation of Ideal Numbers, investigate how Aristotle 
conceived this. 
The Generation of Ideal Numbers.There is a number of referenc~· 
concerning the generation of Numbers used, but not always in the 
1 2 3 
same way, by Ross, van der Wielen, and Cook Wilson. My starting-
point is those passages among the ones cited nhich make a clear 
reference to Plato. These are: 
108la21-25:"Nor can it be Ideal Number. For 2 will not proceed 
immediately from 1 and the indef4nite dyad, arid be followed by the 
successive Numbers, as they say • 2', • 3', '4' ••••• Units in the Ideal 
2are generated ••• as the first holder of the theory sa~d, from 
Unequals,,t'coming into being when these are equalised." Plato is 
certainly meant by 'the first:, holder of tl-e theory.' 
l09la5-6: "Number according to him cannot be generated except from 
the One (sc. and an indefinite dyad)." {Again; Plato is meant by 
'him' • on these passages I base my interpretation and distinguish 
three points: a) the first number generated was 2, and the other 
numbers followed in serial order. b) The Ideal 2 is generated from 
Ure.quals when these arejJequelised. c) Number can only be genera-
ted from the One and a d}lad. Let us test other references by the 
touchstone of these three points. 
a) The first number generated was 2, and the other numbers 
followed in serial order. This is ~orroborated by a number of other 
passages,. such as l083a30-5:" ••• If the One is the starting-point, 
the truth about the Numbers must rather be what Plato used to say, 
and there must be a first 2 and 3, and the Numbers must not be 
associable wlth one another." Here Plato is named, but tlll refer-
ence does not add emything new;. it suggetts rather than states 
that 2 is the first Number generated, the next being 3. That these 
Numbers are not associable need not imply tfla.tp they do not consist. 
of units,,but it does mean that they are not the objects of arith-
metical operations. 1085al.:"But they deny this; at least they 
generate. the 2 fi.rst .• " This corro~rates that the 2 is the first 
Number generated. 1080a.30-5: 11 ••• Ideal Number is counted thus:after 
1 1 a distinct 2 which does not incLude the first 1, an:i a 3 which 
does not incl. ude the 2, and the rest of the Number series similar-
ly. tt While this refers to counting rEt. her than to the gene ration 
of Numbers, it shows that the Numberstir.&re character! sed by their 
seriAl order, which is in fact explf8cable only on the assumption 
that the Numbers were generated in their natural order. 4Finally, 
1. A:cistotle's Metaphysics I.lix-lxii1; Plato's Theory of Ideas 
188 and 194. 2. Die Ideegetallen van Plato 92 and 118-9. 
3. Classical Review XVIII.254. 4. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphys1cE· 
I.lxiv:"As distinguished by seriality, the Numbers must be 
generated in natural order." 
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there is a reference which connects this type of counting with the 
generation of Numbers, 1082b35-28: "• •• Whether we count and say 
'1,2,3 1 , we count by addition or by separate p11rtions. But we do 
both and it is absurd to reason back from this problam to so 
great a difference in essence.n 
If the Numbers were generated in serial order; and were not 
subject to arithmetical operations, those references which imply 
a generation of Numbers in haphazard order and make use of such 
operations as adding 1 or finding a mean - i.e. addition and 
division - cannot refer to Plato. But we shall deal with these 
references and the interpretations placed on them later. 
b) 'Ihe Ideal 2 is generated from Unequals, when they are 
equalised. One might think that Plato was not the only one to use 
this Equalisation were it not for 1088b28-30:"There are some who 
describe the element which acts with the One as an indeftl.ite dyad, 
and object to the 'Unequal' ••• n Plato held the Unequal, and as 
Speusippus• other element was Plurality, 1 it would seem that it was 
Xenocrates who objected to the term Unequal a.s description of the 
dyad, the Great and the snall. It seems pretty definite, then, that 
all references to the Unequal and Equalisation refer to Plato. But 
it will be noticed that in the heading here we have suppressed the 
mention of the units of the 2. This will be dealt w.ith presently, 
vthen enough information is av~able to show that in this respect 
.Aristotle misrepresents Plato and why. We list, then, the passages 
referring to Equalisation· and ~o Unequals. 
109l'a23-25: "These thinker,'s say there is no generation of the 
odd number, which evidently implies that there is generation of the 
even; and some present the even as' produced first from Une quals -
the Great and the Snall - wh'en these are f5equalised." This passage 
is often used to demonstrate th'at Plato did not generate odd num-
bers, but since Plato is meant by the· ' some' who produce the even 
first from Unequals, and since these • some' are not necessa.r;lily a 
part of 'these thinkers• but may be a different school of thought, 
this passage cannot· be used to demonstrate that Plato did not 
generate odd numbers, only that he generated 2 from Unequals when 
equalised, and that this was the first number generated; for •even' 
here seems to mean no more than the number 2. 1083b23-5:"Does each 
unit come :fi' rom the Great and Snall, equalised, or one from the 
Great, another from the Snall?" Again Aristotle means that 2 is 
genem ted from the Great and Snall by Equalisation; the question 
whether 2 had units will be discussed below. This passage continues 
further on, 1083b30-32:"But if each of the two units consists or· 
both the Gre::1t and the Snall, equalised, how will the 2, which is a 
single thing, consist of the Great and the snall?u These prissages 
1. Compare 1087b4-6 :" ••• Some making the Unequal ••• matter for the e«:e 
One and others making Plurality matter for the One 11 , et alibi. 
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show that it is particularly the 2 which is generated from the 
Great and the Snall, as the Unequal, when this is equalised, and 
not odd numbers alone, as those interpretations of.Plato•s generat18-
J" 
of Numbers assume that derive odd numbers as me~tns between two 
even numbers, as will be shown sub Equalisation below. But that it 
was not only the Two that was so derived, as van der Wielen 1 
asserts, but the other Numbers afell, appears from 1087b7-9: "The 
former (ruferring to note 1 on the previtous page) generate 
Numbers out of the dyad of the Unequal, i.e. of the Great and the 
small, and the other thinker we have referred to generates them 
out of Plurality, while accord!ng to both it is generated by the 
essence of the one.'' This last clause corroborates the next point, 
c) that Number can only be generated from the One and a d)lad. 
This enables us to reject, as un-Platon1c, those references wh~h 
refer to the 4 being generated by the definite 2 and the 8 from 4, 
as in 108lb21-7: n •• They sa.y 4 came ti~!l:tthe first 2 and the imdefi-
nite 2 ••• And similarly 2 will consist of the 1-itself and another 
1; but if this is so, the other element cannot be an indef~inite 2; 
for it gene:m.tes one unit, not, as the :i:Jll!iJitE: indefinite 2 does, a 
definite 2." 1082al3-15:"For the indef"in1te 2, as they say, received 
the definite 2 and made two 21 s; for 1 ts nature was to double what 
is received." 1082a29-32:"For let the 2's in the 4 be simultane-
ous; f,yet these are prior to those in the 8, and as the 2 generated 
them, they generated the 4 •s in the 8-itself. Therefore, if the 
first 2 is an tdea ••••• " 
Now, if these passages do not refer to Plato because not all 
Numbers are, here generated from the One, but 4 is gene rated from 
the definite 2 and 8 from the 4, it is not Plato who described the 
indefinite dyad as what doubles. But the party here referred to 
was not Speustppus, since he· rejected Ideas and the first 2 is 
callep an Idea. Therefore, it was Xenocrates who used the dyad as 
that which doubles what it ·receives, and generated 4 from 2 ani 8 
from 4. Further, the first of these three passages tefers to the 2 
as consisting of two units {that one of these two units would be 
the One-itself seems to be Aristotle's deduction from the statement 
that the definite 2 consisted of two units), which reminds us of 
108la21-25, quoted a.bove on page 112, that the 'units in the Ideal 
2 are generated from Une~quals,' and l083b23-25, quoted on page 113, 
asking whether the units of t,his 2 come/from the Great and the Snall 
together, or one from each of these. I interpret this as showing 
that Aristotle here contaminates Plato's derivation of an Ideal Two, 
not having units but generated by Equalisation, with Xenocrates• 
Ideal Two, which had units, and was gere rated apparently by doubling 
the One. One can explain this contamination in that the passages 
1. Op. cit. 128-9. 
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referred to occur in M.vii and viii, where Aristotle assumes that 
Number can_ exist in no other way than as an aggregate of units. 1 
Further, if Xenocrates conceived Numbers as consisting of un1 ts, it 
would be to him that 1083b28-30 refers:",Aga.in, how is it with the 
units of the 3-itself? one of them is an odd unit. But perhaps it 
is for this reason that they give 1-itself the middle place in odd 
numbers." FinalJ;y, to .Xenocrates refers the conception of the dyad 
as the doubler, such as l09lal0-12:"And the very elements - the 
Great nnd the Snall2- seem to cry out against the violence that is 
done to them; for they cannot in any vm.y generate Numbers other 
than those got by doubling." This would indeed explain why in l09la 
23-25, quoted on page 113 above, Aristotle says that these thinkers 
say there is no generation of odd numbers; it is his O\m ded&ction 
along the lines indicated by l083b36:ttNot from the indefinite dyad, 
for its function is to double." These references to Xenocrates imply 
that his generation of Number was that 2,iJ 4,8 ~ere produced by 
doubling; 3,5,9 were obtained by the addiWon of 1 unit; doubtless 
6 was the 3 doubled and 7 was derived by the addition of a unit to 
this 6. 
It seems to me that it is to this method of generation that 
1084a.2-7 3refers: "Cl.ea.rly 1 t cannot be infinite; for infinite number 
is neither odd nor even, but the generation of nurnbers is always 
the generation either of an odd or of an even number; in one way, 
when 1 operates on an even number, an odd number is produced; in 
another way, when 2 operates, the nu.m.bers got from the One by 
doubling are produced; in another way, when the odd numbers operate, 
the other even numbers are produced." That is, when 2 doubles, we 
get 2,4,8; the addition of 1 to these evens gives the odd numbers 
3,5,9; and when these odd numbers operate, i.e. are doubled in their 
turn, we get 6 and 10, which agrees with the method of generation 
deduced above. 
For these reasons I cannot accept the classical interpretation 
of Plato's generation of Number, 4tha·t the even numbers were derived 
by doubling, and the odd numbers were the means between two evens, 
which is taken, not as the addition of 1 unit, but as xka Equalisa-
"' .. tion. This is ~enocrates' mode of generation not Plato's, and in any 
case either Plato derived all numbers by Equalisation or at least 
the Two, certainly not the odd numbers alone, as we have shown. 
We assert, then, that Plato derived the Two first, followed by 
the other Numbers in serial order; that this was described as 
Equalisation, and all numbers came from the One and a dyad. 
1. van der Wielen, op. cit. 88-89, that because Aristotle conceived 
Number as a number of units, he assumed tha.t this was what Plato 
also must have meant. 
2. We showed on p.113 that Xenocrates held the Great and Snall. 
3. Ross, Aristptle's Metaphysics I.lix, denies the passage is 
Platonic; Cook Wilson, Classical Review XVIII.254, accepts it. 
4. Classical Review XXIII.l98, cp. Mind XXXVI.l9. 
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Eoua1isation. Returning to Physics 206b28-33, quoted on page 
103 above, we saw that this passage attested that for Plato the 
Infinite, with whlch we are now more familiar under the name of 
the Great and Snall, we s a two-way continuum: it had the power of 
proceeding ad infinitum in the direction both of j.ncrease and of 
reduction. This was used for the generation of Number::;, as Aristotle 
says there, and may be rendered in modem terminology as a time 
continuum. Now an example is given of this, but conceived as a 
linear continuum for the sake of clearness, in Physics 2Q6b3-l2 
shortly before:"In a way, the Infinite by addition is the same 
thing as the Infinite by division. In a finite magnitude, the 
Infinite by addit:i!on comes about in a way inverse to that of the 
other. For in propcrnrtion as we see division going on, in the same 
proportion we see addition being made to what is already marked 
off. For if we take a determinate part of a finite magnitude and 
add another part determined by the snme ratio (not taking in the 
same amount of the original whole), and so on, we sholl not 
traverse the given magnitude. But if we increase tl;le ratio¢ of the 
part, so as always to take in the same amount, we shall traverse 
the magnitude, for every finite magnitude is exhausted by maans of 
any determinate quantity however small. n That is, in a finite 
magnitude, if we subdivide a. line in a constant ratio, e.g .• 2:1, 
we can never exhaust the line, which is as much as to say that 1 
is the limiting quantity in the successive addition of the series 
t, t, 1/8 •••••• But if the ratio is not preserved, we shall exhaust 
the line, i.e. the successive addition of any small fraction what-
soever must ultimately exceed 1. 'l'he former is, in a way, divisruon, 
the lutter addition, so that infinite division give£ the opposite 
result to 1j.finite addition - it never reaches 1, the other exceeds 
1. Now the important point, overlooked by van der Wielen, 1 is that 
this is true of a FINITE maenitude, and is cited as an illustration 
by reductio ad absurdum of what an INFINITE magnitude is not. 
Therefore, in an i:fifinite magnitude, we co.n never exhaust the 
whole, Infinity, whether we subdivide ad infinitum or add ad infi-
nitum. SJ in 206b28-33, the Infinite proceeds lin the direetion 
both of increase (addition) and of reduction (division) without 
being exhausted. This example of the Line, then, could not have 
been used by Plato to illustrate his generation ofNumbers, 1 since 
it is finite. Plato's Great and Snall must he.ve been infinitely 
great in order to hold all the Numbers - not just 10 as Aristotle 
objects, but the indefinite repetition of the decad-series as in 
hundreds, thou~ands. etc. 2 . As both the infinite and the finite 
line allow of infinite division., in the sense given above, the 
proceeding in the direction of reduction may have had no special 
significance or it may have been used to include Irrationals in 
1. Die Ideegetallen van Plato 123ff. 2. Zahl u~d Gestalt 43-4. 
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the conception of. Number. 1 Whether for this purpor:H~ Plato made use 
of side and diagonal numbers2 is uncertain, but if so, this does 
not seem to have had any connection with the name, Great and Snall, 
as Taylor3 claims. 
We see, then, that Plato's dyad W:"S a time cc•ntinuum in which 
the Numbers were set out at definite intervals, in serial order, 
and it may well be that by Equalisation Plato referred to the 
equality of the inter~als between the Numbers, which is essential 
to the nature of seriality. Let us examine the relevant evid,ence on 
Unequals and Equalisation in order to establish this. 
We have seen that Plato's elements f4re the One and the Great 
and Bnall, by being composed of which the Ideas ere Numbers. Now 
Aristotle sometimes refers to these elements as the One and the 
Unequal. As examples of his use of the terms One and Unequal we 
have l092bl-2:"Another thinker places the One as the contrary to the 
Unequt:•l, treating the One as Euual ••• 11 That Plato is meant is shown 
by •another thinker' (singular). This Uney~l serves as what 
Aristotle kEXR calls the matter, A.s in l087b4-6:"They make the 
Uneau~l to 
contrary the matter, some opposing the EHHN:~o~.lf!X:XN the One ••• 11 Qther 
references naming the Jmii~!t as opposed to the One are l097b28-29, 
1088b28-30, 1089b4-6, and 1092a28-29, which add nothing to the above 
Now the explanation why Aristotle adds, in the first refer~nce Yiiie 
quoted, • treating the One as Equcd', is that Aristotle's objection 
to these elements is that the Equal and not the One is the contrary 
of the Unequal, a.."ld this perhaps explains why he calls the two 
elements, not .the one and the Unequal, but the Equal and the Unequal: 
in 1055b30-32, 1056a3-12, and l075a32-36. It appears from these 
references, then, that Plato opposed to the One the Unequal as its 
1 matter 1 , to which Aristotle objects that these elerents are not 
true contraries. 
Now iliaR~i~e Aristotle names Plato's Matter the Great and 
snall, and that this and the Unequal were synonymous, at any rate 
in the particular context Aristdltle has mn mind in these references, 
appears from such references as l088al5-16: uThey trent tt;Ie Unequal 
as one thing and the dyad a.s an indefinite compound of Great and 
Snall, 11 and perhaps more clearly ln l087b7-9 :''The Unequal is a dyad 
of Great and Snall •• " Simihtr references are l056a3-12, l091a.26-~, 
l09lb31-33, and the same conclusion is implied in l083b23-2}!I5. 
Now most of the passages cited deal with either the use of 
contraries as elements, in which the use of the term Unequal is 
apposite, but Grea.t and S:nall is not, or with Ideal Nunbers in 
particular, and I believe tha~t Aristotle terms Plato's elements the 
One and the Unequal only in respect of the generation of Ideal 
Numbers - not of Idea-Numbers in genernl, but of Ideas of Number in 
1. Mind XXXV.427; Burnet, Greek Philosophy 320-1. 2. Mind XXXV. 
429-430 and XXXVIII.45-47. 3. Mind XXXV.429-430. 
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particular. The only passagesinconsistent with this conclusion are 
as follows: l089blO-l5: 11 •• Yet they use many Unequals and speak of 
Great and Snal1, Many and Few (from which proceed Numbers), Long 
and Short (from which proceeds the Line), Broad and Narrow (from 
which proceeds the Plane), Deep and Shallow (from which proceed 
S&lids} ••• " One might think from this that it was not only Numbers 
that were genereted from Unequa.ls, but I think not: this gives 
.Aristotle's own reductio ad absurdum - lilf the material element of 
Numbers was an Unequal, and 1 t was a. Great and Snall, why should 
not the other 'species' of' Great and Snall, like Long arid Short, 
etc., also be Unequals? 109lb31-33 and .35 identify the Unequal 
with the Bad as. in 988al4-15. But tif the material principle in 
general was identified with Evil, this would apply equally to that 
of Numbers and to that of other Ideal entities. Therefore, Plato 
opposed the Unequal to the One in the generation of Numbers as a 
special form of the general principle, the Great and the small. We 
turn now to the evidence concerning Equalisation. 
109la23-25:" •• The even comes first from Uneauals -the Great and 
the snall - when they are equalised, lq-4 f7'-li~"1"cuv. • tt 
l08la23-25: 11The units in the first dyad are generated at the. same 
time, as he said who first said from Unequals when they were 
, n • ·" 
equalisea,tO"cc.rrt?"cl")"""r , or otherwise." The 'he' means Platd. 
1083b23-25: 11 Is each unit from the Great and Snall equa1ised,lc;-~v--
• 8-t l"iw~ , or one from the Great, one from the Snall ?n 
One might think from these references that only the Two was thus 
generated, but the first implies that .'all even numbers ~ere so 
derived, the first even being the Two, but by implication the other 
. 
i.~i~s also were derived by equalisation. And yet there are two 
other passages which show that all Numbers were so derived, although 
the word 'equalised' does not occur, but we have the Unequal. So 
lOB7b7~-12: 11Numbers are generated for some out of the dyad of the 
Unequal, the Great and Small, by the essence of the One. For the 
one (i~e. Plato) saying the Unequal and the One are elements and 
the Unequal is a dyad of Great and Snall, treats tho Unequal and 
the Great and Snall as being one' II but they are one"""tin defin1 tion, 
not in number. l092bl-2: 11 Since ••• another thinker places the One as 
contrary to the Unequal, treating the One as Equal, Number must be 
treated as coming from contraries." These show that Plato derived 
not only even, but all numbers, from the One and the Unequal, and 
the natural conclusion is that the passages imply Equalisation. 
What then is meant by Equalisation? The key to this expression 
lies in three points: 'Treating the One as Equal•, generating 
Numbers from the Unequal 'by the essence of the One', and Aristotle's 
definition of the Unequal in l022b34:n:A thing is called unequal 
because it has not equality though it would naturally have it." In 
the series of Ideal Numbers one may distinguish two elements, the 
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one or Equal and the Great and Snall. In this natural· condition, the 
Great and Small has equality because in combination with the One or :lo 
Equal, but when abstracted from Ideas of Number this Great and 
Snall no longer has equality, because separated from the Equal, and 
so by Aristotle's definition is the Unequal. Now both 987b21-22 and 
1087b7-12, quoted above, state that Numbers are generated from the 
Great and snall - the Unequal - by Participation in the One, or by 
the essence of the One. But Aristotle conceives the One as the Equaj 
Hence Numbers are generated from the Une)!fqual by the Equal entering 
into combination with it, and this restores it (in the mind) to its 
natural condition of equality, as we stated above. rurely this is 
Equalisation. In other words, Equalisation is nothing more than a 
way of referring to the action of the Equal, the One, on the Unequa: 
I r !-
Admittedly this is not the normal Greek use of the word(~A~~ 
e.nd for this reason I offer on alternative suggestion by examining 
1 the various passages citec by Liddell and scott to illustrate it. 
Iliad XII. 433-5: ":P.s an hont~t working woman holds the balance 
, 
' tr ' ) and raises the weight and the wool together, balancing (c..~) ovu-
them, that she may win scant wages for her children. tt Here the two 
masses, the weight and the wool, are made equal; but in the genera-
tion of Numbers nothing is weighed, so this meaning is irrelevant. 
Equally irrelevant are those pe.ssages teferring to exchange,th; 
estimation of the exchangeable value of goods \'thich makes trade 
possible. So Nicomachean Ethics 1133a8-192 : "The builder must get 
' from the shoemaker the latterts work and must himself give him in 
return his own. If then there is propationnte equality of goods, 
and then reciprocal action takes place, th~ ~esult we mentioned wil: 
I be effected. If not, the bargain is not equal and.does not hold;for 
there is nothing to· prevent the work of one being better than the.t 
of the other; they must therefore be e quatted,lo-ttt7"8?--'4 '- , ••• n 
A usage that has been seized upon by modern commentators is 
that evidenced by Nicomachean Ethics ll32a6-1o:nTherefore, this 
kind of justice being an inequality, the judge tries to equalise 
, .,. 
( t0'-"4} tul) 1 t; for in the case also in which one has received and 
the other irtflicted a wound, ••••• the suffering and the action have 
been unequally distributed; but the judge tries to equalise things 
(l~4'r'i.tt/ ) by means of the penalty, taking awa.y from the gain« 
the assailant." Now if this were Aristotle's meaning, one would 
expect it to work out thus: a penalty is taken from the overplus 
of the Great so as to make it equal to the Snall. That is, the 
Great is made smaller and the SDall greater W1til their size is 
equal. We should then have two equal W11ts, I suppose~· which is the 
3 
numb13r Two. But despite l09la23-5 and 1083b23-5, we have already 
argued that Plato's Ideal Numbers did not consist of W1its, and in 
1. I am not able to trace all the references given. 
2. Cp. Nicomachean Ethics 1163b28-35. 3. Pages 112-5 above. 
; <.-" 
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rny case how could any other Numbers be produced by such Equalisa-
tion epart from 2? However thet may be, Robin1 uses the procedure 
not of the whole of the Great and the Snall, but makes piecemeal 
restitution by a liberal extension of the meaning. First he derives 
the 2; then, by doubling, the 4; he gets the 3 by splitting the 
difference,assum1ng a ret~rograde movement from the 4 to meet a 
progressive movement from the 2. one might perhRps in fAirness agree 
thnt this splitting the difference is an arithmetical equivalent of 
mulcting, but there are more serious defects. 2 is not here derived 
by Equalisation; 4 1 s derived from 2 in stead of from the One; the 
2 dyad is wrongly interpreted as the Doubler; and the process of 
Eaualisation can here be used only for the generation of odd numbers 
and not at all for evens. Other interpretations along these lines 
are even more faulty, for they make blat~m t use of arithmetical 
operations, Vihich might do very :well for mathema.tical but are out 
of place in the generation of Ideal Numbers. S:J Tn.ylor3 interprets 
. 4 Equalisation as striking an ari thmet.ical mean, and D' Arcy Thompson 
makes it the alternate addition and subtraction of a unit. Hence, 
none of the :interpretations of modern commentators is satisfactory: 
·none e:xpleins how 2 was derived by Equalisation and the other »na.miae 
numbers by the same process, except vnn der Wielen 5 as corrected by 
l:'toss. 6 The former determines a line by the ratio 1:1, whence the .2, 
but he has to fall back on some other prdnciple to derive numbers 
other than 2,4 and 8; the latter shows that just as 1:1 entails 2, 
so 2:1 entails 3, and so on. But in either case Equalisation is 
used only to generate 2 (and 4 and 8 in van der Wielen • s version), 
whereas Aristotle. implies that .ALL NUMBERS were so derived, and we 
have seen2 that Numbers were generated only by the One and not by 
the 2 or any other Number. 
A last reference in Liddell and Scott is Aristotle's Politics 
1265a38-b2:"There is an inconsistency too in equalising (l,..dtov't"-). 
the property and not regulating the number of citizens: the popula-
tion is to remain unlimited, and he thinks it would be sufficiently 
iQ~f:fijii (J.,oftt}.'-fl"8'/o-0ft't''!JI) by a certain number of marriages 
being unfruitful, however many are born to others, be cause he finds 
this to be the case in existing states." Aristotle here criticises 
in Plato's Laws the equalisation of property \'iithout the necessary· 
.. 
steps being taken to equa.li se the populi:l .. tion. What he means is 
more clearly expressed, but without the use of the key word, in 
1265bl3-16: "Phaedo, the Gorin thiap ••.• thought that the families and 
the number of citizens ought to remain the same, though originally 
all 1.~he lots may have been of different sizes: but in the Laws the 
opposite principle is me:5.:n1ained .• " 'That ie, equalisrltion is here 
1. Quo tee by Ross, Plato 1 s Theory of Ideas 191. 2. See pages 112-5. 
3. Plato the Man and his Work 512; Mind XXXVI.l8~19.. . 
4. Mind XXXVIII.52. 5. Die Ideegetallen vari Plato 128-9. 
6. Plato's Theory of Ideas 201-202. 
121/ 
used in the sense that the original 5, 000 lots are all of equal 
size and allotted each to one family. When, then, a number of 
lots of equal size are allotted to that number of persons, the 
property of the· state is s8.1d to be equalised. Apply th&s now to 
the Equalisation of the Great and Snall. The Great and Snall, the 
Unequal, represents the whol~ of the land to be divided up. It is 
divided up, not it is true into lots of equal area, but into time-
divisions of equal size, into equal intervals in fact, and each 
interval is allotted to the successive Numbers. The interval betweeJI 
2 e:nd 3 is the same as that between 3 and 4, and so on. In this 
way the Unequal is equalised and the Numbers generated - as Ideal 
Numbers in a time-continuum, in successive serial order, with 
equal divisions or intervals between each. 
Hence, I believe that Aristotle meant by the generation of 
Ideas of Number from the Unequal, when it is equalised, either 
nothing more than that these Numbers were generated from the Great 
and Snall by the essence of the One, the Equal, or the,t, if the 
Great and Sllall meant, in the sphere of Number, a time-continuum 
capable of indefinite progression and regression, Equalisation was 
the determining of the Right Place, at equal intervals, in this 
continuum, of each of the Numbers, generated in serial order. 1 So 
we have the definition of !deal Number in 1080a33-.. 34:"Ideal Number: 
1,2 without the firstjl, 3 without the dyad ••• v and more to the 
point l08la21-23:*'For then tne first dyad will not be generat.ed 
from the One and the indefinite dyad and the other Numbers in 
succession, i.e. 2,3,4 •• ~~ That this matter of counting was in fact 
the basis of Plato' s gener~~1on of Number appears from ~OOi~~5;g i · 
" •• Whether, when we count ·and say ~, 2, 3, we count by acldi tt: on or 
BY SEPARATE PORTIONs. But we do both; and so 1 t is- absurd to reason 
back from this problem to so great a difference in essence." lris-
totle thinks it absurd that Plato should distinguish Ideal from 
mathematical number simply because we can count in the way stated 
and not by suecessive additions of a unit, since both methods of 
counting are possible. 
We conclude, then, that in the sphere of Number the Great and 
Snall was a time-continuum; in the sphere of Magnitude it was 
Extebsion in 1, 2 and 3 dimensions, called respectively the Long 
and Short, the Broad and Narrow, the Deep and Shallow. These are 
distinguished by Aristotle from the maniiestations of the Great 
and Snall in the realm of sense, where they appear as sensible 
continua such as Hot and Cold, Wet and Dry, and which are characte~ 
ised by the power of pluralising particulars resulting from the 
application to it, so to speak, of the Ideas in any particpla.r case. 
1. Cp. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas 203:ttThe One imparted definite-
ness, which is EqualisD.tion.'1 
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It is the having two such principles, one for Iceas, the other for 
things, that Aristotle notes as distinguishing Plato from the pytha-
goreans in 987b33-8a7, but in Physics 206b28-33 he notices the 
Great and Snall only in its numerical aspect, and observes that thif 
was different from the Pythagorean Even in being a two-waycontinuum. 
Conclusion. In section 1, we showed that Plato's primary 
difference from pythagoreanism lay in the hypostatisation of Forms, 
of which the separateness of Numbers was a special case, am as a 
corfollary of this his third kind of number, ma.thematicals, were 
intermediate between Ideas and things. In section 11, we showed tha1 
his resemblances to pyt.t1agoreanism centred around his Later Theory 
of Idea-Numbers, namely, that he made the One and an analogue of 
the Infinite the elements of Nlliiibers, i.e. of Idea-Numbers, as the 
pythagoreans had made them the elements of Numbers, and that a.s 
their Numbers were the formal cr .. uses of things, according to 
Aristotle's interpretat.ion, so Plato's Numbers likewise, whether 
these were Idea-Numbers or only one class of these, Ideal Numbers. 
It is this common antici".pation of his own formal cause that Aristot;i 
le refers to in saying that participation resembled Imitation. Thus, 
in a word, Plato differed from Pytha.goreanism in his Early lheory, 
in the hypostatisation of Ideas, but resembled them in his Later 
Theory insofar as he made his Idea-Numbers consist of the elements, 
the One and the 'Infinite', and made these Numbers the formal causef 
of things. • 
Now Plato' -s secondary differences arise as differentiations 
of his points of agreement due to the fact that his Later Idea-
Numbers, althouth derived from elements, were. still hypostatised 
Ideas in tr1~m~en se us his Earlier Forms. &:>, although he made the 
A . 
One his formal element, it differed from the Pythagorean in this 
that, as the element of separate Ideas, it was separate from things1 
his Infinite, although the element of sensibles, was also an elemen1 
in Ideas, al01d as the Ideas were separate it was also sepaarate from 
things insofar as it was in Ideas as well as in sensible things; 
but this Infinite wc.s t\"'o-fold in another sense as well,i- because 
Plato's Numbers were not in sensibles as the Pythagorean phenomenal 
numberspere, it was ·not a single principle like the Even, but a 
two-fold continuum; and finally, Plato used a different term from 
the Pythagoref>ns to dBscribe the relation between things and their 
fttrmal element, namely Participatjon - this however is an incidentaJ 
note and not 4 secondary difference in the same sense as the 
previous three differences. 
It remains to determine wbether by the resemblances alleged 
between Platonism t=1nd Pythagoreanism Aristotle meant anything more 
than casual agreement; whether, in fact, Pln to borrowed from or was 
influenced by Pythagorean! sm. To this we next turn. 
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Chapter 3. ~ l(o ~ 0 0 J.,~ G'C~L. • 
In A.vi.l .Aristotle states:ttAfter the systems we have named ca.me 
the philosophy of Plato, which in most respects followed these 
thinkers, but had peculiarities that distinguished it from the 
philosophy of the Italians." The problem before us is two-fold: 
i) to determine the meaning of the word 'followed' I tllt' o>.o .. IJo c; li"'"'-. )I 
and ii) to determine what r~lationship between Plato and the pytha-
goreans Aristotle had in mind when he said that the former follow-
ed the latter. 
i) The Mean1n~f ~I( o~ 0 "' c.Oov~4..: There are three ·interpreta-
tions maintained by mode•n commentators of the meaning of this 
word. Cherniss1 holds that the word could mean% either that Plato 
consciously followed the lead of the Pythagoreans or that his 
philosophy did in fact agree with theirs. Ross2, in his earlier 
work, agrees with this interpretation, saying that it is doubtful 
whether the word me.ans that Plato's system was based on the Pytha-
gorean or merely that it resembled it. Secondly, Field3 holds that 
the word implies a. little more than independent agreement, but does 
not mean that Plato began as a. follower and subsequently diverged. 
But he does not make it clear whether, by the second part of his 
statement he would have accepted the view that Plato began as a 
follower of Socrates and cratylus and subsequently fell under 
Pythagorean influence, and in consequence modified his beliefs. 
Finally, there is Ross' later belief, 4 that~the word probably means 
'resembled' rather than 'originated from' , a.ncf/refers to Bywater' s 
note on ~ristotle's Poetics 1449b9. 5'Here Bywater decides that the 
word does not necessarily mean 1 to folloV'l after• in order of time, 
but may very well mean •to agree with•. This is indeed clear from 
Poetics 1449b9-12, translated by Bywater6 as follows:"Epic poetry 
has been seen to agree with tragedy to th:ls extent, tha.t of being 
an imitation of serious subjects in n grand kind of verse. It 
differs from it, however, in ••• " Clearly epic poetry did not follow 
tragedy in order of time, but rather the contrary, so that epic 
poetry could not have been influenced by tragedy. And the use of 
the word here seems parallel to its ~se in A.vi.l since here it is 
contrasted with 1 1t differs from' just as there it is contrasted 
with 'peculiarities', and 'in most respects' is a limitation 
corresponding to the limitation of •to this extent that ••• '. Hence, 
it seems to me that the...Vrd asserts no more than agreement, but 1 t 
is llnjustifiable to say it means INDEPEND'F.NT agreement, 3 for while 
epic poetry was independent of tragedy, tragedy was to SOME extent 
1. Aristotle's Criticism of Plato 177 note 100. 
2. Aristotle's Metaphysics !.158 ad 987b32. 
3. Classical Quarterly XVII.ll5. 
4. Plato's Theory of Ideas 161 with note 5. 
5. Aristotle on the Art of Poetry. A Revised Text with Critical 
In traduction, Translation and Commentary. Ingram Bywnter, Oxford 
Clarendon Press, 1909, page 145 ad 1·449b9. 6. Op. cit. 
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influenced by epic poetry, if no more than in its choice of charac-
ters and.subjects, so that the agreement asserted in subjects was 
not chance resemblance but the result of direct ihfluence. But of 
cou~rse this has nothing to do with the meaning of the word 
~1(0)..0 vt9cJu()o-A., but with a question of fact. To put it differently 
.Aristotle says no more in A.vi.l than that Platonism in his opinion 
resembled pythagoreanism in certain respects, but·; it; is as mlilch a 
begging of the question to say that this resemblance was coinciden-
tal as to say it was the result of ccmscious borrowing. I feel that 
the commentators c1.ted above ha.ve confused two separate questions, 
the meaning of the word in it.self, And the relationship to which 
it referred. The word means 'resembled' and gives no hint as to thre 
nature of the resemblance - deliberate or coincidental. To determine 
which it is, it is necessary to go further afield. 
ii) The R~lationskulp -Aristotle had :f.n Mind. There is no sure 
indication in A.vi which reveals the natur~ of the relationship 
.~Aristotle had in mind when he sto.ted that Platonism resembled 
pythagoreanism. The resemblances which he notices may have. been due 
to pure fancy on his part, they ma.y have been due to parallel but 
independent development on the part of· the two philosophies concern-
ed, or there may have been various degrees of conscious adaptation 
by Flato of his philos:>phy along the lines of pythagoreanism; there 
is no hint at all. For the alleged resemblance between Participation 
and Imitation, which we have argued1 arose from :Aristotle's arb1te:ft 
rary grouping of the two philosophies together in this respect in 
\ 
order to point to an anticipation o·f his own formal cause, does not 
' touch the heart of the matter, which ·is the construction of Idea-
Numbers from the elements, One and dyad', and of things from these 
Numbers and this dyg,da As ,Aristotle ~as distinguished Plato• s Early 
Theory of Ideas as fundamentally different from pythagoreanism 
' . -'~ 2 for this 'introduction of Ideas' 'flas his main pecul1e.-.~~: ... 1 i and his 
continued separation of Ideas in his Later Theory was the reason 
for the secondary differences from the Italian philo sophy 3 - and as 
the points of resemblance concern his Later Theory of Idea-Numbers 
only, 4 the problem· comes to this: wh~n Plato modified the nature of 
his Ideas by deriving them from elem_ents, whereby they became Idea-
Numbers, was he influenced, in Aristotle's opinion (for in this 
Part I we are concerned only wi tb Aristotle's conceptions}, ·by the 
Pythagorean tenet that the elements of Numbers were the elements of 
all things, 5 or was the resemblance between the two philoro.phies in 
this respect quite fortuitous? 
!:;) The Change in Platoni sm.Now 1 t is not d1f'ficul t to show that 
:Aristotle knew of a change in Platonism and knew further that this 
of 
change concerned a connection J12Xkthe Ideal Theory with the nature ~ 
1. Pages 98ff above. 
4. Pages 83 & 122. 
2. Pages 69 & 122. 
5. Pages 41-43. 
3. Pages 101 & 122. 
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of Numbers. On page 67 above we argued that l078b9-12 bore testimony 
that Aristotle distinguished between a form of the Ideal 'l'heory as 
originally held by Plato and a form which he held subsequehtly, when 
it was connected with the nature of Numbers. On pa.ge 91 we argued 
that by this connection of the Ideal Theory with the nature of 
Numbers, Aris1totle meant the derivation of Ideas from the elements 
of Numbers, the one ani1 the Great and snall, which latter was an 
nnalogue of the Pythagorean Infinite. 
Now it is one thing to say that Plato ageeed with the Pythago-
reans in making the One and an analogue of the Infinite the elements 
of all things, but that he separated the One from things and put an 
Infinite in sensibles as well as, and separate from, the Infinite 
in Idea-Numbers, and quite another thing to sa.y that plato adopted 
the Pythagorean One and Inf1n1 te as the elements of all things, but 
separa.ted them from things because he, unlike them, ~ held separate 
Ideas. Aristotle states only the former and may or may not have 
believed the latter. If he did believe the latter, abe might hope 
for some hint of it in the only place where Aristotle gives an 
historical account of the change in Platonism, of the reasons which 
moti vtated Plato when he modified t,re nature of tre Ideas. This 
passage is 1089al-7, to which we next txuz turn • 
.21 The Reason forthe Change in Platonisn. 
1689al-7: "There, are many causes which led THEM off into these 
explanations,. and especially the fact that they framed the difficul-
ty in an obsolete form. For they tholight that all things that are 
would be one (viz. Being itself) if ohe did not join issue with and 
refute the saying of Parmenid.e s, ·t Foi- never will this be proved, 
I 
that things that are not !ARE.' They thought it necessary to prove 
. \ 
that that which is not IS; for onJy thus - of that which is and 
something else - could tht things th~t are be composed tf they are 
many." 
~s this passage stands in our text 't would seem to refer to 
the immediately preceding paragraph, l088b28-35, and the word 1 THEM' 
would then most naturally take up the parties there mentioned. Mow 
the.relevant part of this paragraph, lines 28-30, reads:"There are 
SUME who deseribe the element which acts w1tth the one as an 
indefir1ite dyad, and object to the Unequal, reasonably enough, 
because of the en suing difficulties.· 11 The iiiiii~ identify this 
•some' probably with Xenocrates, aliicorrectly so, 1 whj.ch implies 
that the 'them' in 1089al-7 refers to Xenocrates. But this para-
graph is out of place for t~o reasons: firstly, there is no mention 
of the ensuing difficulties or even of the Un equa..l in the first 
part of N.1i, to which the paragraph belongs; secondly, the reason 
adduced in l089al-7 does not enlarge on the d1ff1<li.tie s ensuing on 
the use of the Unequal, but on the necessity of proving that 
Not-Being IS. But if we move the paragraph a.bout the Une.}!fqual into 
1._. See_ page 113 above. 
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the previous chapter, where the difficultiLs ensuing on the use of 
the Unequal are discussed, we place the paragraph in a context into 
which it fits, and thereby connect the reference in l089al-7 with 
what precedes the paragraph removed, a discussion of the elements, 
which is .in fact the subject of 1089al-7. We shall make this clear 
by summarising the context of N.i-ii. 
Book N begin~ that all ph1lesophers make the f:ir.:st pr1ne!J:ples 
contraries, 1 but a.ll things which are generated from their 
contraries involve an underlying substrate. 2 But these thinkers, 
instead of positing an umderlying substrate, make one of the 
contraries matter. 3 But in any case they do not describe rightly 
4 
even those principles which they call elements, ~or some oppose 
some sort of dyad to the One, and others oppose to the One somethi~ 
that is not its true contraty. 5 In fact, the One is a measure and 
6 
not a substance. Those who treat the Unequal as one thing, and the 
dyad as an 1ndefin1 te compound of Great and Snall, say wha' 1 s very 
far from being probable or even possible. 7 Four reasons are given 
8 for this, and here should come 1088b28-35:"There are some who 
des:cribe the element which acts with the One as an indefinite dyad 
and object to the Unequal •••• because of the ensuing difficulties." 
This closes the case against the incorrect description of the 
elements, and N.ii opens by stating the case against ~he use of 
elements at all: we must inquir-e generally whether eternal things 
can consist of elements. 9 -Aristotle objects that if t hings have 
elements, then they are as capable of not existing· as of existing, 
\ 
so that no matter how long they have endured, they cannot be said 
to be eterna1.10 Then comes (that is~ if 1088b28-35 be moved ~s 
suggested) 1089al-7:"For they thought that all things would be one_ 
(viz. Being itself), if one did not ... 1 •• refute the saying of Parmeni 
des, •••••• for only thus - of that which is and something else -
' could the things that are be composed-, if they are many.'' The 'for• 
I d~es not explain why things composed of elements cannot be said to 
be eternal, but explains why these thinkers made things, apparently 
eternal things (i.e. Ideas) 1; consist of elements - in order to . 
account for their multiplicity, to avoid all things being one. 
If we move l088b28-35, then, as suggested, we get good sense 
both for that paragraph and for l089al-7, as shown above. The 
• THEM', then, naturally refer·s to the philos phers who saw fit to 
derive the eternal substances, which are their principles, from 
elements. Who, now, are these philosophers? 
Proof that 1089al-7 Ref!!:s to Pla. to .1087a30 might lead one to 
suppose that the philosophers in question are "all philosophers", 
but this cannot be so, for our reference makes it clear that the 
1. l087a3o. 
4. 1087bl3-14. 
7. l088al5-16. 
9. 1088bl4-15. 
2. l037a.36-37. 
5. l087b14-33. 
8. Respectively 
10. 1088bl5-28. 
3. l087b5. 
6. l087b34. 
1088al7fft 2lff, blff, b5ff. 
11. But see p.l2i1below. 
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parties tn question are subsequent to Parmenides, since it was the 
need to refute his saying that led them to make the fir£ principles 
contra.rie s. It 1 s possible that the • them• incLudes all philosophers 
su bseouent to Pa.rmm ides, but there are two ind:l.i. cations that Plato 
is especially meant. Firstly, there is the bvoad lay-out of the 
book. l086a21-31 sets thefi scope of bopk N; it will consider the 
views of those who assert that t.h3 re are other substances besides 
the sensible_; of these some say tha.t the Ideas and the Numbers are 
such substances, and these a.re set down for immediate 1nve stigation, 
while those who posit Numbers only flnd these mathematical {i.e. 
Speuspppus) are left over for later. The inquiry turns immediately 
to the Theory of Ideas as universal substances, and then Aristotle, 
in l086bl6-20, puts a dilemma: such universal substances, if not 
separate, cannot be substances; if separate, how are we to conceive 
their elements? It is this inquiry into the elements, obviously fgt 
Ictea.s (the Later Platonic Ides-Numbers in fact) that forms the 
immediate context of the pessa,ge under consideration, aril when this 
discussion chose s, we go on to the possibility of positing Numbers 
as principles, N .1i.l090a2ff, in which 1 s ind.J.uded Speus:tppus. This 
points to Plato as especially meant by l089al-7. 
Secondly, when (Aristotle comes to discuss that Not-Being, 
which was said to have been thought necessary for the existence of 
the Many, after asking, "What sort of •••• Not-Being .... pluralises the 
things that are?tt1tanswers thus: 2 11 Th1 s thinker means by the Not-
Being, the union of which with Being pluralises the things that are, 
3 the FALSE, nand the editors annotate that this refers to Plato's 
\ ' 
dialogue, S:>phi;Bt 237A,240. Obviously,, Plato is here referred to, 
and as he chronologically preceded all other Academicians and 
J?laton,ists, it is to him and 'to him a~one that the reference is 
made re the necessity of countering parmenides• saying. Further, a 
few lines ielow, 4 ~~ristotle n'ames, in this connection, Pl?-to• s 
characteristic term, the Unequal, thus:n~In seeking the opposite of 
Being and the One, from which with Being ahd the One t.he things 
that are proceed, t~ey posited the relative term, i.e.the Unequal, 
which is neither the contrayynor the contradictory of these." 
Therefore, l089al-7 refers to Plato and gives Aristotle• s 
version why Plato derived all things from elements. We turn now to 
the examination of this passage. 
The Examination of this Passaae. Having establisre d that 1089a 
1-7 refers to Plato, it remains to explain what is there meant by 
the passage, that is, the considerations V¥hich led Plato to make 
the change in question, and the manner in which he effected it. 
1. 1089al9. 2. 1089a20-21. 3. This unusual description 
of one of Plato's elements may be explained in thot here Aristotle 
is referring to the dialogues, the &Jphi st in fact, whereas he 
usually cites the Unwritten Teachings, se-c. part II, ch. 2, sec.i11. 
4. l089,f.b4-6. 
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Now; if we consider the contett of 1089a.l-7, the problem 
arises as to what •these explanations' refers to. There is nothing 
in N.i1, in which this passage occurs, which could be taken up by 
these words, but a somewhat lengthy account is given in N.i of 
vnriou.s sets of contraries used by the Platonists and objections 
are made against all of them. It seems to me that _'these explana-
tions' refers back to these contraries. It is pos~ble that, just 
as l088b28-35 is out of place, so also 1089al-7 is out of place, 
but to move this passage would require a. complete remodelling of 
a good portion of book N; it is more satisfadory, then, to take 
'these explanations' as referring back to N.i, despite the fact 
that it occurs in N.iL I shall attempt to prove this firstly by 
reviewing the context again with this interpretation of the back-
reference in mind, and secondly by reviewing the ita st of N. ii,after 
this passaget to show that the criticism of l089al-7 which follows 
confirms that interpretaition. Having established this, we can thm 
deal with the ij_uestions, what vtere the considerations which led 
.Plato to make the change in question, and what was the manner in 
which he effected this change. 
N.i criticises the standpoint of Aristotle's predecessors 
from his own theory that the things of this world require, for 
their generation, three principles: the form, the absence of the 
form or Privation, and a tertium quid or underlying substrate. The 
former two are contraries, ani as any one quality in this world 
comes' into being as the opposite of its contrary, an underlying 
substrateis required·from w~ich end into which the contraries pass. 
This is the Matter. Now he'criticises his pred~cessors for having 
made the/error of opposing Matter to Form, thus neglecting Privation. 
They used only two principles, Matter and Form in the cn,se of the 
Platonists, and mistakenly co~ceived these principles to be contra-
ries. It is to this that l089~1-7.refers. If there is any one 
sentence in N.i to which it pp.rticularly refers it is l087b4-6:"But 
these thinkers make one of the contraries Matter ..... n This is what 
1s meant by 'these explanatlo~s'. In other words, when .Aristotle 
says in l089al-7,nThere are many causes which led them off into 
these explanations, and especially the fact that they framed the 
dlfficul ty in an obsolete form," he means thet apart from either 
unnamed reasons, these thinkers (and especially Plato, as we have 
shown above) made their principles contraries becau~e they were 
faced by the dilemma. which follows, and which Aristotle considered 
was outmoded. This means, further, that the things which were 
generated from these principles, whatever else they may have been, 
were sensible things, so far as the argument of 1089a1-71s conc~arned1 
since it is about the sensible world that Aristotle had been talking 
in N.1 as far as we have summarised the A-rgument. Let us bear this 
/ 
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in mind, for we shall return to 1 t later: IN l089a.l-7 ARISTOTLE 
MEANS THAT PLA1'0 MADE HIS PRINCIPLES CONTRARIES BECAUSE :&"ACED WITH 
A DILEMMA'Rl AND THAT THESE WERE THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SEN SIBLE WORLD 
PARTICULARLY·. 
To return to the context. ~ristotle next digresses in elabora-
tion of his objection that they mistakenly conceived their princip~ 
les 
the 
but 
as· contraries, 
One but of the 
of the Few. In 
for, he says, the Unequal is not the contrary of 
Equal; Plurality is not the contrary of the One 
general, whatever the P'1nciple other than the 
incorrect, since the One has no contrary a.t ai.l( 
this digression touched upon the elements, nat 
of the sen~ble world so much as of Ideas and Numbers, Aristotle 
opens N.ii by asking whether such eternal entities can have elementJ 
at all. They cannot since whatever is compounded of elements cannot 
be eternal. This is where, if we remove l088b28-35, the passage 
One is termed it is 
Ha.v1ng by virtue of 
here discussed occurs, but it seems incorrect to interpret it as 
referring to the preceding argument. Apart from the fact that too 
little has there been said to warrant the use of the e~pression 
'these explanations', the gist of l089al-7 does not fit. the argu-
ment of N.ii. For to do so, 'these explanations' must mean the 
compounding of eternal entities from elements, and the resultant 
ent1 ties would then be Ideas or Numbers. we shall now· show that :tki:'tl" 
this cannot be the meaning of l089al-7. 
In this passage Aristotle alleges thut the dilemma which 
confronted Plato was how to ,avoid all things being one, i.e.Being, 
unless he refuted Parmenides' saying that \'Vhatever was other than 
Being could not exist. Now if such things were Ideas or Numbers, 
then they would be one either because their formal element aas one,· 
or because, as the only really real entities, they were Being,and 
Being is One - according to the obsolete form in which Plato con-
ceived Being, vi.z. as a unity, following· Parmenides. But Aristotle 
exp11ci tly states that all thing.s were one qu~ Being -• viz .. Being 
itself'. Hence the former possibility does not tally with Aristotleb 
words. But lif the Ideas are one because they are Being, how are wet 
to explain the necessity of refuting Parmenides' saying that what 
is other than Being {namely, sensibles) cannot exist? What meaning 
can there be in an arg&ment which states that in order to avoid 
making the Ideas one, Parmenides must be refuted and some existence 
allowed for sensibles, and how could the Ideas be derived from 
lieing (1~e. the Ideas themselves) and Not-Being (Le.seneibles)? 
Therefore., he does not here refB'r to the derivation of Ideas, nor 1. 
1s he talking about the elements of eternal entities e.t all; he is 
referring to the principles of the sensible world and to the deriva-
tion of sensibles, namely, that sensibles are one because their 
formal element is Being (the Ideas) and according to Parrnenides 
Being is One .. Farmenides must be refuted by proving the existence 
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of a Not-Being from which, with Being (Ideas), sensibles could be 
derived, as will be shown on page 132 below. To demonstrate that 
Aristotle really refers to sensibles here, let us examine the 
criticisms which follow l089al-7. 
Aristotle's criticisms start out from the application of his 
own theory of categories to Plato's solution. 1089alO-ll says: 
"what sort of one ••• are all t~fhngs that are, if Not-Being is to 
be supposed not to be? Is it 
affections and similarly the 
together?" The.t isljl not only 
which belong to the category 
... 
the substances tha.t 
other categories as 
would such things as 
of Substance be one, 
are one, or the 
well, or vll 
men, horses, etc, 
but also colours 
and flavours which belong to the category of Quality. This argument 
is continued further down,1089a32-bl:"The question, evidendily, is 
how Being, in the sense of the ·1 SUbstances', is many; for the thin~ 
that are genera ted are numbers and lines and bodies (~~"'- )'-t:t... ) • 
Novt it is strange to inquire how Being in the sense of the 'what• 
is many, and not how either Qualities or Quantities are many. For 
surely the indefinite dyad or 'the Lfreat and the Snall' is not a 
reason why there should be two kinds of white or many colours or 
flavours or shapes." The examples here seem particularly apposite 
in respect of sensible bodies, but hardly suit Ideas, and the word 
( 
rJ"wftlli.."'rts.. clinches the matter. Aristotle is objecting to the 
one-ness not of Ideas but of sensible things, saying thn.t logic 
requires an expl8..nation not only of the plurality of such things aE 
belong to the category of SUbstance but of those also which belong 
. 
to the category of Quality qr Quantity. 
He next turns to the n~ture of the elements, applying a 
similar argument. 1089al5-20:"0f what sort of Not-Being and Being 
do the things that are consist? F:or Not-Being ..... has many se~ses, 
since Being has •••• What sort of Being and Not-Being, then, by 
their union plural1se the things that are? This thinker/ means by 
the Not-Being, the union of ·which with Being pluralises the things 
that are, the False •• ·" Previously Aristotle had asked whether tre 
unity of things was confined to one category; here he asks whether 
the element. Not-Being, which allows things to be many, is confined 
to only one category. The only explicit reference he can find, 
a.ppa.rently, in Plato 1 s in the Sophist, where 1 t is called the 
False, which he does not seem able to fit into his scheme of cate-
gories. The term, 'pluralises the things that are', suits the 
1 . 
multiplicity of things, and the False seems to indicate the same 
conception for Aristotle, although the Sophist deals chiefly with 
Ideas. S:J Liebrucks2 talces it:"In the Sophist there 1s no longer 
a methexis between two worlds, but the Ideas, as understood in 
l. See page 109 ·above. 2. Platens Entwicklung zur DiBlektik 155-6 
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human terms, are in our midst. The ground of Not-Being is the 
relativity of all determined reality. So Parmenides is refuted.'' 
Also Rob1n1 :"What in the Timaeus is called the Receptacle is in 
the Oral Teaching called Space in such a way that Space is in the 
Ideas although the Ideas are not in Space. This seemed to him 
indi spensible to account for :tl!ls: plurality, f}.nd 1 s called the 
li'alse. n So Cherniss~ 2 although Aristotle's own words confute his 
interpretation of Not-Being in our passage as Absolute Not-Being: 
"That .Aristotle had in mind the Not-Being of the S:>phist is shown 
by 1088b35-9a6 •••• This is the origin of the error. The Platonists 
posit Not-Being to. account for mul t1plic1 ty; the Idea was a. unity, 
therefore, any substrate for plural material existence had to be 
lAb solute Not~Being. •• Tits argument, then, refers to Not-Being as 
the material substrate and to the generation of sensible things. 
The argument is continued smmewhat lower down by attacking the 
actual examples of Not-Being used by Plato,as belonging to the 
category of the Relative, to which Aristotle objects that no account 
is given of the plurality of tre se elemm ts. 1089b8-15:"Theyshould 
have asked this question also, how relative terms are many and not 
one. But as it is, they inquire how there are many units besides 
the first 1, but do not go on to inquire how there are many 
unequa.ls besides the Unequal. Yet they use them and speak of Great 
and small, Many and Few (from wnich proceed Numbers), Long and 
Slort (from which proceeds the Line), Broad and Narrow (from whibh . 
proceeds the Plane), Deep and £hallow (from which proceed Solids); 
and they speak of yet more kinds of relative term .. What is the 
reason, then, why there is a. plural1ty'of these?" While the words 
which appear in brackets are undoubted-ly Ideas, it is not these 
about which Aristotle is speaking, but the elements in each case, 
which are themselves assumed to be many, while they are posited in 
order to account for the multiplicity of sensibles. This is very 
clear from the opening words of the passage. They inquire how there 
are many units, i.e. how sensibles are~ a plurality, besides the 
first 1, i.e. while"the corresponding Idea is single, but do not go 
on to inquire how the.ir material element is multiple, how there are 
other dyads, e.g. the Hot and Cold, the Wet and Dry, besides the 
Unequal, the Great and snall of Numbers. 
Hence, so far Aristotle 1 s dealing only with the principle of 
the multiplicity of sensibles and the derivation of sensibles.Qnly 
at the· end of tbe chapter does he refer explicitly to Idea-Numbers. 
So 109Qa.2-4:"0ne might fix one's attention also on the question, 
regarding the Numbers, what. justifies the belief that they exist." 
But as this does not deal with the question of elements at all, it 
would seem to be a tfiansition to N.iii, where Aristotle passes to 
the consideration of Numb:ers as principles, and not directly 
1. Plato 144. 2. Aristotle's Criticism of Plato 92 & 94. 
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connected with the inqulry centring around 1089al-7 at all. 
Returning now to the examination of 1089al-7 in the light of 
the above discussion, and be a.ring in mind the concluuions arrltved 
at on page 129 above, viz. that Aristotle means that Plato made his· 
principles contraries beaause faced with a dilemma am that tlleeae 
were the principles of the sensible world, we must show what were 
the reasons that led Plato to modify his theory,by explal\ning this 
dilemma and what it entailed • 
. In l089e.l-7 Aristotle gives what he considered was the chief 
reason for Plato having made his principles contraries: namely, th81 
he was faced with the dilemma that sensibles would be a bloc tlmi-
verse unless he refuted Parmenides' division of all things into 
Absolute Being and Absolute Not-Being. P.a.rrnm ides allowed ncflegrees 
of reality: sensibles must be e1 ther Being itself or not exist at 4P,. 
,As sharing in the Ideas, which as the really real were Being, 
other than the Ideas, sen~ bles would 
other than Being according to Parrneni-
sensibles would be Being; as 
be other than Being, and the 
des was Not-Being, which had no existence at all. Not only had Plato 
to r~fute pa.rmenides, but he had to find n metaphysical explanation 
for a position for sens1bles half-way be-m een Being and Not-Being, 
so to speak, which could only be atte.ined by deriving them from 
Being and a. Not-Being which had been shown to have some sort of 
existence. It will be convemient to refer to the latter in modern 
terms as Relative Not-Being. This Relative Not-Being, then, would 
'\ 
distinguish sensibles from Being and at the same time allow them to 
\ 
have that Rela t1 ve Not-Being, in stead of the Absolute Not-Being 
asserted by Parmenides, which VJould be established by refuting the 
\ 
Eleatic bifurcation off a]. things into Absolute :Being and Absolute 
Not-Being. This passage, then, could be paraphrased as follows: 
Plato made his elements contraries for several reasons, the chief 
one being the need to avoid Parmenides• dilemma that sensibles wouJdl 
be either Being itself or non-existent. He had to refu&e thisd~f~~ 
by showing th.at Not-Being did have some sort of existence, and then 
had t6 derive sans1bles from Being and this Relative Not-Being in 
order to account f<iTr their half-way position between Being and 
non-existence. That is about as far as l089al-7,taken by itself, xx: 
. . 
will take us, and clearly thus fa.r there is nothing abopt Pythago-
rean inflluence. To find this a measure of reconstruction is needed • 
. 
c) The Connection with Pythagoreanism. Plato, we have said, 
made his principles contraries to account for the intermediate posi· 
tion of sensibles between Being (Ideas) and nothingness. This has 
been interpreted a.s the attempt to avoid making all things one, and 
to this Aristotle probably refers at the end of the passage when he 
says, "For only thus ••• could the things that are be composed IF THEY 
ARE MANYtt. And yet the logic of the argument leads us to expect 
rether "If they are to exist. 11 Could it be that Aristotle has some-
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thing more in mind than the mere avoidance of making sensibles one 
as Being, is thinking of an active principle making sensibles many? 
It would seem to be the case from two further references which give 
this composition of sens1bles as the reason for their multiplicity: 
"What sort of Being e.nd Not-Being, then, by their union PLURALISE 
:the things that are?"l "This thinker means. by the Not-Being, the 
union of which with Being PLURALISES the things that are, the False~ 
·And that Aristotle does not mean merely the negative of one-ness 
but something more appears from, "The question evidently is, how 
Being, in the sense of 'the substances', is MANY ••• It is strange to 
inquire how Being in the sense of the •what' is MANY, and not how 
either qualities or quantities are many. Fir surely the indefinite 
dyad or 1 the Great Rnd the Sna.ll' is not A REASON WHY THERE SHOULD 
BE 'IWO KINDS OF WHITE OR MANY COLOURS. n 3 It se-ems to me that we 
have here to¢do with that principle of multiplicity to which w~ 
refer~ on page 109 above:"They make MANY things from the matter.n4 
This is doubtless one of the elaborations of the bare derivation of 
sansibles from two elements in order to account for their existence 
at all: it is an elaboration to account for their multt;_plicity and 
may well be referred to in ~~ax~ther unnamed causes which led Plato 
' 
to make his principles contraries in 1089al-7. 
!Another such elaboration was the derivation of Ideas from two 
elements, the One and the Great and Snall. Aristotle must have had 
this also in mind when he wrote 1089al-7 and the sentences following 
it, since, whereas he had referred to the principle of sensibles as 
the contrary of Being, in one of the passages quoted just above 3 it 
is suddenly named the Great and S.Oall, and the continuation of that 
passage brings Plato's derivation of sensibles into connection with 
his derivation of Idea-Nurribers:"For surely •••• the Great and the 
Snall is not a reason why there should be two kinds of white ••• For 
then Tf!ESE ALSO WOULD BE NUMBERS. u 5 This is as much as to say that 
the Great and Snall, an analogue of Not-Being, was used as the reasor: 
for making Ideas Numbers, and was doubtless ~ second of the unnamed 
causes referred to in, "There a.re many causes which led them off into 
6 these explanations." 
But these two points, the principle of multiplicity in sensibles 
and the principle of Numbers making Ideas Numbers, brings us into 
that phase of Plato's thought which was dealt with in thl'.it part of 
A. vi which alleged certain resemblances between Platonism and Pytha-
goreanism - the derivation of Ideas from the elements of Number, the 
One and an ana.logue of the Infinite, and the material element as the 
principle of the multiplicity of sensibles. In both the latter paEtt 
of r.tt.vi and in N.ii, then, we are dealing with the same phase of 
Platonism, the Later derivation of. Ideas and things from elements, 
1. 1089al9. 
4. 988a2-3. 
2. 1089a20-21. 
5. 108 9a3 5-b2. 
3. 1089a32-bl. 
6. 1089al. 
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but from different aspects. Of the several reasons which led Plato 
.to make this change, l089al-7 deals with only one, but the ch!Jlef one, 
the need to refute Parmenides' saying and by deriving sensibles from 
Ideas a.s Being and another element analogous to Relative Not-Being 
to account for their intermediate position between Being and nothti:llig-
ness; the rest of tm chapter, N.11, assumes a. knowledge of Plato's 
1
further use of this element to account for the multiplicity of 
sensibles and the use of the elements, the One and a- dyad, to make 
the Ideas Numbers. The latter two were inspired by the other ·causes 
referred to but not explained in 1089al-7, and as they had been 
dealt with in A.vj, where they were said to have been resem11ances 
to pythagoreani sm or resemblances with certain distinguishing fa-ctorf 
·the conclusion seems to be implicit that such resemblance or f'lear 
resemblance was another of the causes alluded to in 1089al-7. In 
1 
other words, the resemblanee between Platonism and pythagoreanism 
in deriving Idea-Numbers from the elements, the One ani an analogue 
of the Infinite, with the distinction that in sensible s this Infinite 
: was a principle of multiplicity, was not mere independent agreement, 
but a conscious borrowing., since it is to this that Aristotle refers 
in 1089al-7 as some of the "many ca.uses1 which led them off into 
these explanations.•' Further than this we cannot go unless we make 
use of other evidence - the dialogues of Plato -and with these we 
shall deal in the next part, where the historical correctness of 
Aristotle's conceptions of Pythagoreanisrn, Platonism so far as 
it is recounted in A.vi, and the relationship between them, will be 
checked from an examination of the evidence independent of Aristotle. 
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Part II. The Historical Correctness of Aristotle's Conceptions. 
Chapter 1. Pythagoreanism. 
Introductory. 
The Question of Evidence. The nim of this part of my work is to 
- - ~ . 
check the historical correctness of Aristotle's conceptions concern-
ing pythagorean ism in this chapter, and of Platonism end its XHl2'~ 
relation to Pythagoreanism in the other/chapters, by using a.s far as 
possible evidence independent of Aristotle. But for the Early pytha-
goreanism we are at a. disadvantage, for there were no writings left 
by pythagoras or his immedia.te followers, and the oral traditions 
of the school were kept secret until the time of Philolaus, 1 about 
the second half of the v. century B.C. There is some evidence left 
us by contemporaries of the Early Pythagoreans, such as Xenophanes, 
2 Heraclitus, Empedocles and Pherecydes, which does not tell us mmch 
more than that Pythagoras could remember his past lives, cultivated 
( , 
lO"l"IJf''? , and belj.eved in Transmigration. But we are not concern-
ed with the religious side of pythagoreanism, as has been explained 
in the Introduction. 3 Apart from this we are dependent upon 
Aristotle's evidence and that of post-Aristotelian writers, who 
cannot here be used except where corroborated by considerations to 
be dealt with below, since the assumption is that their evidence is 
drawn almost exclusively from :Aristotle's works, 4 whereas our aim 
is to adduce evidence independent of Aristotle. While these post-
Aristotelian writers may have had access to works of Aristotle no 
longer extant, if w~ are to judge by the fragments which remain of 
Aristotle's Life of Pythagoras, such as fragment 191 (Rose), we 
would not be much impressed by such access, since he has incl. uded 
in that Life such marvels as his having a thigh of gold, his appear-
ing on the same day at both Croton and Metapont•um, his killing a 
snake by biting it 11 etc. There is, thus, an initial problem of 
evidence: how can Aristotle be corroborated in respect of Early 
Pythagoreanism when his is almost the only extant evidence apart 
from that of his successors, and they were doubtless almost exclu-
sively dependent on his writings for their knowledge? 
The Method to be Followed. We owe it to Cornford6 that we ijave 
1. See Diels, Die Fragments der Vorsokratiker, Vierte Auflage,Vol.I 
page 27 ad init. s. 4.Pythagoras; and Miss Freeman, the Pre-s:>cra-
tic Philosophers, A Companion to Dials 73-75 .. 
2.Resf':tctively 11B7, 12B40 & 129, 21Bl29, 25B4 in Diels, op. ctlt .. 
3. Page 8 above. 4. Cp. Frank, Plato und die sogenannten pytha-
goreer 72-76, that there was a literary tradition according to 
which writers a.scribed their discoveries to Pythagoras or some 
other famous name, and later writers took this literally. 
5 .. These miracles, however, seem to be taken seriously as evidences 
of Ehamanism by Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, esp.pp.l43-6. 
6. Classical Quarterly XVI.l37, probably suggested by Burnet,Greek 
Philosophy 4 4. Cameron, The Pythagorean Background of the 
Theory of Recollection 64, thinks this crit,_cism caused but 
littl~ change, but he deals with the religious end not with the 
scientific side of Pythagoreanism. 
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at our disposal a method of deducing the leading tenets d'f Early. 
and of Later Pythagoreanism from the Eleatic criticism of Pythago-
rea.nism, if, as will be shown, that critidism was in fact directed 
against Pythagoreanism, by following up two lines of argument: 'fthat 
must it have been before the date of that criticism to have been so · 
criticised, and, if it underwent any cha.."'lges as the result of that 
criticism, along what lines would the reconstruction have proceeded 
in order to obviate that criticism. Hence, the chief features of 
this chapter will be to show that this criticism was directed 
aga..ilmst pythagoreanism, to examine the criticism itself, and to 
deduce the leading tenets of the system so criticised, and.to show 
along what lines that criticism could have been obviated. By these 
means we shall arrive at a basis on which to build up a more 
complete picture of¢pre-Eleatic and post-Eleatic Pythagoreanism by 
taking what evidence there is and assigning it to the former recon-
struction if it substantially agrees with the main lines of t;his, 
and to th~ latter if it agrees VJi th IR~l po st-Eleatic pythagorean-
ism must have been in order to obviate that criticism. In thG:s 
selecting the available evidence there is, however, a. further 
criterion a~ailable) to us. 
The early date of the original Pythagoreanism leads us to 
expect a certain nai"vsty in its outlook on the Univvrse, for not 
only was Pythagoras' era the second half of the VI. century B.C., 
but the first Eleatic criticism, that of Parmenides, can be dated 
about the turn of that century. Thus, we expect to find evidemce of 
a na1•e conception of the Universe in references which refer to the 
early school. For the later school ~e have certain evidence that 
is already assigned to pythagorean philosophers who can be de.ted 
within rea.sot)able limits of certainty, and 5~~~ were all subsequent 
to the later Eleatics. Hence, by using the double criterion of a 
primitive outlook and the sort of tenets which the Eleatics seem to 
have been attacking we can hope .to arrive at a rea sona.ble reconstruc-
tion of Early Pythagorean! sm. Similarly, by using the double cri te~ 
rion of evidence ascribed to la:t;er Pythagoreans by name and the sort 
of beliefs which must have been held if the Eleatic criticism was 
to be obviated, we can recon.struct post-Eleatic Pythagoreanisn. 
There were undoubtedly Pythagorean schools of a. yet later date 
than these two schools assumed by the examination of Elea.tic 
criticism, such as various post-Platonic schools, 1 but these do not 
concern us, since we are dealing with a pythagoreanism which could 
have influenced Plato and so must have been prior to him in date. 
We turn now to tho exemine.tion of the Elea tic criticism referreCl .. 
to, and begin with Zeno, although he was Parmenides' successor, 
since what he was criticising is clearer than what Parmenide s was 
criticising. 
1. See page 65 note 1, a.bove. 
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Section L Pre-Zenonic Pythagoreanism. 
a) zeno' s Cri tic1 sm. Zeno' s Me tho£,. Zeno • s method of' D1alect1c1 
2 has been loesely described by Raven as the drawing out of contra-
dictions from the premisses of his opponents, and in Efimilar terms 
by Taylor, 3 that he employs the premisses of his opponents to reach 
antinomies. I sa.y •loosely', because this description does not give 
a. very clear picture of his method. One must distinguish two stages 
in his procedure. The first is the statement of the pcstula.te which 
he is attacking together with the two contre.dictory conclusilons to 
be deduced therefrom. For example, one of his arguments is that 
'If the Many exist, they are both large and small.' The second stage 
is the deduction of the La.rge.from one set of premisses and of the 
Snall from another set of premisses, for it cannot be ma.intai;ned 
that it is possible to deduce the Large and the Snall equally from 
one and the same postulate, namely, 'If the Many exist.• Now some 
critics appearf,l to have Overlooked this distinction b:j supposing 
that both the Latfge and the Snall are directly deduced from the 
4 postulate, 'If the Many are.[• At least, Burnet says: 11 Zeno took ONE 
of his a .. dversaries• postulates and deduced from it two contradictory 
conclusions 11 , and so apparently Miss Freeman 5 :"Zeno' s method is to 
take ONE of his opponent's postulates and work out from it a p3ir of 
contradictory conclusions. n In these quotations the 'ONE' seems 
quite definitely to point to what I have called the first stage. 
Uiss Freeman an~ Burnet seem to take 'If the Many are' as ONE of the 
opponent's postulates, end t They are Large',' They are Snall' as two 
contradictory conclusions deduced«ifiii!t~ from that postulate. But 
this is not so. In order to establish the two separate conclusfons, 
the Large and the Snall, a different set of intermediate premisses 
is required in each case. This is wha.t I have called s~age two, and 
this is what Lee6 refers to when he says that Zeno startejrrom :tkm:x 
premisses admitt'd by his opponents, and he shows that Dialectics 
was general among the Greeks and was characterised by taking its 
premisses as tY!o/ t%.. • Even cLearer is Cornford, 7 that Zeno' s 
opponents maintained 8l'il:. original confusion of geometrical solid with 
physical body, and so he takes as one half of his argument the 
premiss that magnitude is continuous, and ~s the other half that it 
is ii~.f~ije~ (This of course refers to another antinomy than that 
cited above.) Now the important feeture here is that both of the 
premisses from which conclusions are drawn to contradict the original 
-
postulate are accepted by the opponents, otherltise the e.rgument would 
not achieve its aim. I shall make this clear by comparing it with 
the dilemma. 
1 .. Aristotle, fragment 65 (Rose):"Zeno was the founder of Dia.lectic.n 
2. Pythagoreans and Eleatics 81. 3. A Commentary on Plato's 
T1maeus 180. 4. Early Greek Philosophy 361. 
5. Op. cit. 154. 6. Zeno of Elea 7 & 114-7. 
7. Plato and Parmenides 58-59. 
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The dilemma runs: If A, then either B or not-B. Both B and 
not-B are shown to lead to impossibilities or absurdities, so that 
by the denial of the consequent the antecedent is dehied and is 
accordingly abandoned. But zeno's method is: If A, then A is both 
B and not-B, which is impossible; this denial of the ro.nsequent 
lends to the denial and consequent refutation of the antecedent.The 
difference between these forms is that ig the dilemma, since two 
independent alternatives are followed up separately, there is no 
reason why different standards liB/should not be used in each case, 
but in zeno's dialectic, since A must be shown to be both Band 
not-B together, it must be both on the same grounds, otherwise the 
argument is fallacious. Consequently, then, ivhen ~:ifii alleges that 
• If the Many exist, they are both large and small', and deduces 
their largeness from one set of premisses, their smallness from 
another, the schbol attacked is not touched unless it accepts both 
sets of premisses, or what comes to the se.me thing, unless this 
school made use of both in its philoro phy. So ·Aristotle dismisses 
1 
zeno' s dialectic as childish -lust because he could see no point in 
it a.s he did not accept both sets of premisses. But t:te. antinomies 
were not directed against Aristotle, but, as will be shown, against 
the Pythagoreans, and the implication is that they must have accep-
ted both sets of premisses - that from which A is shown to be B,and 
that from which A is shown to be not-B, since otherwise Zeno was 
indeed ·being childish. Therefore, it is vital for any interpretation 
of Zeno's dialectic to insist that both sets of premisses in any one 
of his paradoxes would have been accepted by his opponents. 
The Party. Criticised,. Noi'9 \~ho were these opponenets? Against 
whom were zeno's paradoxes directed? ~ccording to his extant frag-
ments the only ind:J. cation is that theyyi were directed against "a man 
2 
who says that there is a plurality.tt Dialecticians do not, as a 
rUle, address technical and complicated arguments against the views 
of the 'man in the street', so that the par.::t.concerned was surely 
some philosophical school in existence at the time. According to 
Raven 3 the date of the meeting between Socrates and parmenides 
alleged by Plato in his dialogue, the Parmenides, was 450 B.C.,since 
Socrates was aged about 20, am we know he was born in 469. 4 Since 
Zeno is there represented as 40 years old and is said to have 
written his_ book in his youth¢, his dialectical arguments are taken 
5 6 
to date from about 470 to 465. Ross would seem to agree with these 
conclusions, which I accept, although Cameron 7 takes Zeno•s attack 
a.s .not antedating 449, the pvbable date of the dialogue, and others, 
1. Metaphysics 100lbl4-l5, ()~'~"'",:;,( • 2. Diels 19B2 init., as 
translated by Lee, op. cit. fgt.9 page 19. 
3. Pythagoreans and Eleatics 67. 4. Ritter and Preller, Historia 
Philosophiae Graecae p.l94, § 239; D1ogene s Laertius II. 44. 
5. Cp. Dials 19A1 & 2, which give his floruit as about 465 B.C. 
6. Plato's Theory of Ideas 7. 7. The Pythagorean Background of 
the Theory of Recollection 36 note 3o. 
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Buunet1 and Chern1ss2 , take a wider view cif •youth' by bringing dowr 
the date to before 460 B.C. 'A few years this way or that, however., 
signify little. For at t.hat time there were only two schools of 
philoro·phy (besides the Eleatic) of any ncte - the Ionicn and the 
Pythagorean. The Ionian was p~acticPlly confined to Asian Mltnor 
3 (Miletus and Ephesus), but Pythagoreanism flourished in Tta.ly and 
Zeno was a native of Elea in Italy. 4 Hence, the probability is that 
Zeno W': s opposing· the Pythagoreans for holding the exi stance of 
the Many, since the Ionians, for Aristotle 5 at any rate, wen the 
"" 
type of material monism. 
But a much1 more convincing argument is thct of Lee, 6 that _iri 
' ' SUidas' account of tl;le titles of Zeno' s works, the tit-le -rr~oJ -r-ou f 
4>c}tclo-ofPov( woul~ mean, according to v. century usage, 1 Against 
the Pythago rea.n s, ' an.d there 1 s some rea son to suppose that the 
pythagoreans were the pnrticular object of his attack. In fact, it 
is the general consensus of opinion among modern scholars7 that the 
opponents attacked by zeno in his antinomies were the Pythagoreans. 
An Examination of Zeno' s Paradoxes. H.D.P.Lee, who in his 
'Zeno of Elea• has made a more exhaustive collection of references 
to Zeno than ha.::; HerrnP..nn Diels, has divided them into arguments 
against Plurality, Motion, Place and the Balling Millet Seed. As we 
lack sufficient information about the pythR.gorean conceptions of 
time, place and motion, and in. any case an analysis of the a.rguments 
against Plura.lity will suffice for our purpose, I shall confine my 
investigation to these, which will have the added advantage of 
using evidence, in certain references, drawn directly from Zeno' s 
writings- if we are to p,elieve Simplicius, who quotes them.In this 
examination I shall use Lee's numbering and translation, but I go 
beyond his conclusions, since he has not made it clear what was 
the relation of the 12 passages constituting the arguments against 
.. 
Plurality either to one another (except in one or two more obvious 
cases) or to the several arguments which might be supposed to have 
been actually used by Zeno. 
No·w there are in tlioose arguments against Plurality, as we have 
just said, 12 passages, but the.se are not all of equal value. From 
what has been said above concerning the form of Zeno' s paradoxes, 
1. Early Greek Philosophy 358-9. 2. Aristotle's Crit.icfsm of 
Pre-Socratic Philosophy 388. 3. Diels 4,8 :"Pythagoras at 
the age of 40 moved from S:lmos to Italy"; Dials 4,13 :"When Pytha-
goras had lived a .. t Croton for 20 years he moved to Metapontium. n 
4. Diels 19Al & 2. 5. Meto.physies 987a4-6 :uThe earliest philo-
sophers ••••• regard the first principle as corporeal ••• and 
suppose that theve is one corporeal principle." 
6. Zeno of Elea 8-9. 7. SJ Cornford,Classical Quarterly XVI. 
137, XVII.7, Plato and Parmenides 58; Burnet, Early Greek Philo-
sophy 361, Greek Philosophy 82•3; Cameron, op. cit. 36 note 30; 
Cherniss, op. cit. 398; Milhaud, Les Philosophes Geom§tres de la 
Gr~ce 132; Raven, op. cit. 71-2; Robin, Platon 82 note 1; Ross, 
.Aristotle's Metaphysics !.246; Taylor, Pl<!to the Man and his 
Work 505; Miss Freeman, op. cit. 158. 
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only those fragments which reflect this form will represent what 
Zeno said in the form in which he said it, and other fragments not 
reflecting this form must be excerpts from longer arguments or 
versions of the paradoxes which owe more to their reporter than to 
Zeno himself. This general form is, If A, then A is both B and not-
B, and only 6 of the 12 fragments are couched in this form, viz. 
5,8,9,10,11 and 12. These 6 fragments represent only 5 fundamental 
argumm ts, for 9, as will be shown, equals 10. I shall set out 
these five arguments in brief and then confirm what has been said 
about the general form of zeno' s paradoxes by considering the first 
one with this object in mind. 
These five arguments run as folloV~s:-
i) If there 1s a pl111rality, they must be}1botll like and unlike (12); 
1i) " u , they muft be both fin1 te and infin1 te ( lJ) 
iii) " n , they must be)6 both one and many (8); 
iv) u n , they must be both many and nofu1ing ( 5); 
v) n n , they must be both large and small ( 9 &10). 
11) Like and Unlike. Fragment 12 reads a.s follows: ttif things 
are a pillurali ty, then they must. be both like and unlike, but this 
is impossible. For it is not possible either for the unlike to be 
like or the like to be unlike." This is quoted from Plato's Parme-
nides, ani seems to represent the actual words used by Zeno (doubt-
less in a short statement of the argument, as no premisses are 
adduced to show how the Many is like nor how unlike) in his first 
1 hypothesis of this first argument, as it is here called. Lee shows 
that by • like' and 'unlike', .Zeno would have meant 'like and unlike 
I 
in number•. It is clear that this reference does notgive a cpmplete 
argument, but only a short statement, comparable to those just 
given for the five fundamental arguments above. Nevertheless this 
short statement is valuable because it shows quite clearly the 
' 
form of his paradoxes. Zeno is atta.cking the basic assumption of p_f,_.,..,,. ty 
pluralism, hence the hypothesis, 'If thfngs are a plaie.Mey', and 
this was doubtless the case in all five arguments set out above. 
Further, his method was not to ;J~ftiii a dilemma but to deduce a pair 
of contradictory cond. usions for this hypothesis, which, as the 
end of the quotation shows, was iritended to demolish the hypothesis 
beca91se of the incompatthbility of such conclusions one with the 
other. It is an a.pplicition of the Principle of Contradiction: ''The 
same thing cannot at one and the same time be and not-be or admit 
any othe-r similar pair of opposites. 112 The primary hypothesis, "If 
things are a plurality,• is demolished because it can be shown to 
lead to plurality being at once like and unlike. But the quotation 
omits any indi ca.tion of how plmrali ty was shown to be like, how 
unlike. For an example of such secondary premisses we must look to 
the second example. 
1. Op. cit. 32. 2. Metaphysics l06lb36-2a2. 
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ii) Finite and Infinite. Fragment 11 runs:"If things are a 
plurality, they must be just as many as they are and neither more 
nor less. But if they are as many as they are, they will be finite 
in number. If things a.re a plurality, they will be infinite in 
number. For there will always be others be1w¥ee11 any of them, and 
again b!3tween these yet others. And so :i:f things are infinite in 
number." This Slmplic.ius calls 'the argum¥ents from Dichotomy'. It 
will be observed that these actual words of Zeno, so it is alleged, 
confirm what we have just said about the general form of his para-
doxes: he assumes the existence of the Many and demolishes this by 
showing that it shares in contradictory predicates,but this fragment 
is especially interesting because it preserves the premisses used 
by Zeno for deducing that the Many is finite on the one hand, on the 
other is infinite in number - and we said above, both sets of pram~ 
ses must have been either used b)t or acceptA.ble to the pythagoreans, 
Hence, when we wonder what can be meant by saying in the first set 
that 'they must be just as many as they are' and in the second by 
'there will always be others between any of them•, the solution 
must lie in some doctrine of Pythagoreanism, for it is absurd to 
suppose that Zeno refers to the observations of the •man in the 
street•, according to whom it is true, but childish, to say that 
any number of objects is as many a.s they are, and 1 t is false that 
between any two random objects there are always others. Lee1 has 
explained the latter as referring to the conception of the dichotomy 
of a line, which fits in with Simplic1ust de scription above. That is 
assume any straight line, AB. It can be bisected at c, a.nd CB can be 
\ 
A c D B 
bisected at D, and so on.l So between any two points of the line, say 
C and B, it is always possible to find a third, D, by further 
2 bisection, and so e .. d inf:ilnitum. Thus, the premiss, from which is 
deduced the numerical infinity of the line {remember, the Many are 
1nf1n1 te in NUMBER) as an example of plurality, a.ssumes that the 
line is a continuum since 1nf1•.nitely divisible, and yet the line is 
spoken about as if made up of points, since 'there will always be 
others between any of them 1 • Now it is to these points of the line 
that the first set of premisses refers. They are theoretically 
capable of numeration and so 'just as many as they are'·· Hence, in 
1. Lee, op. cit. 30-1. 2. Taylor overlooks the fact that this 
is only one of two sets of prem1sse.s, the other of which ::t:s wa.s 
equally accepted by the Pythagoreans, when he says that this 
continued bise<;:tion ruined their treatment of geometry as an 
application of arithmetic, Plato the Man and his Work 505, and hif 
saying that Zeno polemised their ignoring surds, Commentary on 
Plato's Timaeus 325, assumes that Zeno knew about surds. Cornfor&i 
Plato and Parmm ides 59, correctly interprets Zeno' s argument as 
ma.k'ing the assumption that ma.gni tude is continuous in one half of 
the argument, and in the other that it is discrete with 1ndivi8blt· 
units. 
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this paradox zeno takes as an example of plurality the Line as a 
succession. of points set out in a continuum -Extension - and first, 
by emphasising the existence of these points a.s capable of numera-
tion, theoretically at least, since actually infinite in humber, he 
. deduces that, being as many a.s they are, they are finite in number, 
and then in the second premiss, by emphasising the continuum, he 
, deduces that, being infinitely divisib}e, the Line is infinite in 
number. Therefore, besides having a fairly complete example of one 
of Zeno's paradoxes, we have here evidence of the Pythagorean 
conception of the Line - a succession of points in a continuum. 
iii) One and ManY,. ¢Ffagment 8 is a rather long passage and 
one part of the argument is of doubtful a"fti.thentic1ty. 1 Since it has 
been shown above that the Zenonic paradox has the characteristic 
form of contradictory predicates deduced from the original assump-
tion, I shall shorten the passage by proceeding straight to the 
point where this procedure is apparent. nae proves the same conclu-
sion also from a consideration of the continuous. For suppose the 
continuous is one; then, since the continuous is alwa:ys divisible, 
it 1 s always possible to divide the products of division into still 
further subdivisions, and if this is so the contlnuous will there-
fore be many. Thus the same thing ?Jill be one and many, which is 
impossible." The first part of the paradox, that the continuous is 
one, is taken to be self-evident, as Philoponus states earlier in 
the passage: "Those who &ntroduce plural! ty, put the.ir confidence in 
its self-e"(idence; for there exist horses and men and a variety ~of 
indiv:filual things •• • ••• This self-evidence Zeno a.ttempted to over-
throw sophtstically ••• " In the second part of the paradox we have 
the same argument from dichotomy as used in 1i) above. Hence, when 
Philoponus .sa~~ the 'continuous' he means the Line in particular. 
Hence, fragment 8 here is based on the same conception of plurality, 
of the Line; as in fragment 11 above. Tl'lis fragment, then, adds 
·.· 
little to out' knowledge: whell'eas fragment ll showed the. t the .Line 
was both finite ano/J!nfinite in number by first showing that the 
points composing the" line are e .. s many as they are, secondly by 
dichotom1s1ng the ll'ne, fragment 8 shows that the line is both one 
and many by usilng for the first part the self-evident observation 
that it is one thing, and the Dichotomy for the second part. 
iv) Many and Nothi~. Fragment 5 runs: "· .. He raised the 
difficulty, it seems, because each particular sensible object is 
called many both ca.tegorica.lly and by division, but the point he 
supposed to be nothing at all. For what does not 4ncrease a. thing 
-when added to it, nor decrease it when subtracted from it, he 
thought had no exittence. 11 Just as .in fragment 8 one premiss 
proceeded from the obvious observation that any particular object 
was a unity, so here- if this 1s the meaning of 'is called many 
categorically' - one premiss proceeds from the accepted observation 
1. Lee, op. c1t~ 28. 
~ 
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that any particular object was many, that is, had a plurality of 
1 
attributes. But as Lea has rejected this line of argument, it will 
be advisable to pass this by, as perhaps an addition on the part of 
Sirnplicius, and look to the alternative suggested, that any obje-ct 
could be shown to be many by 'division'. This must surely refer to 
the ergurnent from dichotomy now familifar to us or to some varllation. 
thereof. As we have aleeady dealt sufficiently with this, showing 
that it emphasises the element of continuity in, for example, a 
line as composed of· a succession of points in Extensi.ion, we may 
now turn to the other side of the paradox, where it is instructive 
to note that what is attacked is just the point - the other element 
in the Line besides Extension. The argument is to the effect that , 
since a point cannot increase the magnitude of a thing ii which it 
is added, nor d.ecrease the magnitude of that from which it is 
taken, it can be nothing, and hence a plurality composed of points 
would be nothing. This presupposes that the constituent points of 
plurality have no magnitude, 2 which will be recalled later. Wl3tat is 
here to be discussed is rather that Zeno demolishes plure .. lity by 
deducing contradictory prediciates of it, for this is the substance 
of fragment 6: 3 nHowever, Alexander thinks that here too Eudemus· 
is referring to Zeno as doing away. with plurality. He says,'fAs 
Eudemus r~cords,Zeno •••• tried to show that it is not possible for 
there to be a plurality because there is no 'one' among existing 
things, ~Hid plurality is a collection of uni ts1 ". That is, the 
point is a nothing,. therefore, Plurality, as a collection of points, 
here called 'unit·s•;· is also nothing; but in virtue of the argument 
from dichotomy, it' is also many. Thus, as sharing in contradictory 
predicates, the Many is demolished. It is notable that here we have 
a more genera.l statement: we are not confined to the Line which· 
was adduced as an example of Plurality, but are on more general 
ground:- Plurality in general, like· the Line in particular, was a 
collection of units or points set out in the continuous, these -p 
points being here in fragment 5 assumed to have no magnitude. 
v) Large and Snall• Fragment 9 rrms: "One of these arguments 
is that, if there 1s a plurality, things are both large and small, 
so large as to be infinite in magnitude, so sm!3.ll as to have no 
magnitude at all. Thus, in this argument he shows that what has 
1. Lee, op. cit. 28. 2. But Ross, Aristotle's Metaphytics I. 
245-6 ad lOOlb7, apparently takes the null-point to be Zeno's 
reductio ad absurdum. So Miss Freeman, op. cit. l58-9,takes only 
the point which has magnitude to be l?ythagorean, while the point 
without magnitude - this null-point - she thinks is a mathemati-
cal concept po s1 ted by those who saw the inadequacy of the 
pythagorean point, But we have shown that both premisses must 
have been acceptable to the Pythagoreans: they must have held 
both types of point, which enables Zeno to draw out tme contra-
d~ct1on~ implicit in their posit&on. 
3. Lee, op. cit. 26, takes fragment 6 as simply Simplicius' 
comment on frag,fment 5, for which reason it ·is dealt with here. 
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neither magnitude nor thickness nor mass does not exist at all. For, 
he argues, if it were added to something else,1t would not increase 
yi~lg­its size; for a null magnitude is incapable, when added, of ¥~,.._«7!: 
ing an increase in magnitude. And thus it follows that what was 
added was nothing. But if, when it is subtracted from another thing, 
that thing is no less; and a~ain when it is added to a..."l.other thing, 
that thing does not increase, it is evident that both what was 
added a.nd what was subtracted were nothing. tt We might pause here to-
note that this part of the argument is essentially that. of the main 
argument in fragment 5 above. The text is then obviously continued 
in fragment 101 :" ••• Having first shown that • if what is has not 
magnitude it would not exist at all', he proceeds/:'But if it is, 
then each one must necessarily have some magnitude and thick¢ness 
and must be at a. certain distance from another. And the same reason-
ing holds good of the one beyond: for it also will have some 
magnitude and there will be a successor to it ••.• So if there is a 
plurality, they must be both large and small: so small as to have 
no magnitude, so large as 1o be 1nfin1 te' "• :Again, the main argument 
here is just that of the infitnite division of the Line, the argument 
2 from Dichotomy. Therefore, here too we have the same conception 
of plura.li ty as a collection of points or units set out in the 
continuous or Extension leading to the deduction of contradictory 
predicates of Plurality, smallness and largeness in magnitude. 3 
Other Fragment}i• Fragment 4 is a sta.tment of the argument 
reducing the pointt;o nothingness which we have already seen :i.n 
fragments 5,, 9 and 10. n ••• For what does not make greater when 
added, nor smaller when subtrac~ed, he denies to have existence a.t 
all, on the grounds·· clearly that whatever exists has spatial 
t ·, .. 
magnitude." Fragments 1 and 7 are doublets, referring to the 
argument from dichotomy. The former rea.ds:"For, runs the argument, 
if it were diVIded, 'it would not be one i~ the strict sense because 
of the infinite iili:itBiilt~i of bodies", and the latter:"Alexander 
says that the second argument, that from dichotomy, it Zeno's who 
says that, if what is had magnitude and were divided, then what is 
. . 
would be a. plurality_ and no longer one ••• u These three, then, are 
only parts of Zeno' s pa.ra.doxes,. either parts of those already 
quoted above, or ,parts of some lost paradoxes along similar lines. 
1. Lee, op. cit. 29, says that fragment 9 refers forward to the 
first part of the ·argum,ent in 10, which is proved 1n 9 by way of 
anticipation. 2. Incidentally, this paradox seems to be identi-
cal with 5 : both use as premisses the reduction of the poirt to 
nothingness a.hd the argument from dichotomy, and the conclusion 
of 5, that pllllra11ty is both many and nothing,may be simply. 
Sirnplicius• report of the conclusion of' 9 and 10, that plurality 
is both infinitely large and small to nothingness. 
3. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy 362, misses the point when he 
summarises the paradox thus: "If the units have no magnitude, the 
thing will have none; if it has, the thing will be infinite." 
This is not a dilemma; the Pythagorean units were both with end 
w.i thout magnitude, but of course in different settings. 
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Finally, we are left with fragments 21 and 3,. These are not, 
in their present form, Zenonic paradoxes at all but dilemmas, in 
which I believe Sirnplicius (in fragment 2) was following Philoponus 
(in fragment 3). Both give al terna.ti ve explanations, apparently of 
the role assigned to Zeno in Plt.to's Parmenidos of supporting his 
master by showing that what is, is necessarily one. Thus, these 
dilemmas, or rather this dilemma - for both 2 and 3 refer to the 
same argument - a11e made up from some argument of Zeno' s, which we 
must reconstruct as a paradox. The fragments read, abbreviated - 2: 
"If the One were div1si¢'ble ••••• i) either ••• the whole will be made 
up of minima, but from an in.fini te number of them; ii) or else 1 t 
will. • • • be made up of parts that are no thing. 11 3: ttEa.ch unit, 
then, is either •••• indivisible, or itself div~ ible into a plurali-
ty. Therefore, 1) if each unit is ••••• indivisible, the whole is 
built up of indivisible magnitudes; 11) but if the units are them-
s£lves divrisible, we shall again ask the same quest.ion about each 
of these units that are so divisible, and so ad infinitum •••• 11 That 
the same argument is used in each case is obvious, the only 
difference being one of terminology .• Thus, i) the 1 indiv:·isible 
magnitudes' of 3 are called •minime' .in 2; ii) the infinite diiVision 
of the whole in 3 is reported in 2 by saying that the wh~le is made 
up of parts that are nothing, for if the 1 ultimate•units are 
themselves 1nfini tely divided 1 t could be said trn t they are reduced 
to nothing. By taking· these two premisses, i) and 11), to form a 
1 both ••• nnd 1 instead of an •either •••• or', the original paradox 
can be reconstructed thus: i) if, the whole is divided ad infinitum, 
1 t will be seen to be composed o.f fln iU,defini te number of minimal 
indivisible magnitudes; ii) if the whole is divided ad infinitum, 
c.there can be no end to the subdi.vision, so that its •uitima.te' parts 
: 
are nothings, null magnitudes. Therefore, if there is a. plurality, 
they must be both 1) infinite, and ii) nothing. Fragment 5 made 
Plurality many and nothing, which is similar, but is it the same? 
This made out that Plurality was many by the argument from dicho-
tomy, which is as much as to. say that Plurality is infinite, but in 
fragments 2 and 3 both premisses i and 11 proceed by i11finite 
subdiw1sion, the difference between the results of i and 11 depend-
ing on the theoretical end-results of the sub-division - minimal 
units in the one ca.se, still further divisi¢'ble points in the other. 
The arguments then are different. Fragment 2 is Simplicius' restate-
ment of 3, which is Philoponus 1 version. of a paradox, which can be 
labelled vi) Th!3 Man;y: is bot!} InfiXli te and Nothing,, but which he 
cast into the form of a dilemma. But it clearly presupposes that the 
ultimate constituents of things arep un.i t-po1nts of a. twofold nature; 
1. Lee, op. cit. 31 ad fragment ll:"Simplic1us argues that fragment 
2 is not Pa.rmenides• as Porphyry says, but Zen&• s, nwherefore Lee 
includes it a.mong Zeno t,s fragments. 
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as mathematical points they are, like any other magnitude, infini~ 
tely divisible - ii) ; but yet they were conceived in a non-mathe-
matical way a.s minimal or indivisible magnitudes beyond which the 
sub-division of things could not be carried -i). This agrees with 
the¢ composition of the Many revealed in the other paradoxes - a 
tine, for example, composed of a succession of points in Extension 
was, qu~ Extension, infinitely divisible, but que" a succession of 
points, sc. indiviSble minimal 'magnitudes', was divisrble only so 
far and no further .• .rust what sort of points these could be tha.t 
were indivisible minima must now be considered. 
Deduction of thew.§Ystem Implied b¥ his Criticism. We must 
fir st analyse each paradox above, and for this purpo:se it is neces-
sary to classify the premisses used to draw the various pairs of 
contradictory conclusions. If we exclude for the moment the premiss 
of the self-evidence of the Wlity of any object, as in fragment 8 
on page 142 above, all the premisses used fall into one of two 
classes: 1. those emphasising the Continuous as an element of the 
Many, and 2. those emphasising the constituent points. We can 
further subdiv ide 1 into premisses assuming infinite divisibility, 
either as merely asserted or as pressed to its logical conclusion, 
thus: a) that the Continuous is infinitely divisible, and b) that 
the process of infinite divisibility can never be cpmpleted, but 
leads logically to 'ultimate' nothings. We can subdivide .2 into 
premisses merely i~~i~i~g that Plurality is made up of points and 
those making two distinctions, thus: c) -that Plurality is made up 
of points, milt d) that tharse points can have no real existenc~since 
they neither increase nor diminish tha.t to \lhich they are added or 
subtracted, and e) that continued sub-division must lead to these 
points as ui.timate minima .• To this scheme can be added the premiss 
provisionally excluded above, thus: f) that any particular object 
is obviously a unity. 
Row paradox 1 lacks its constituent premisses, but ii is 
made up of a and c: PlurBlity is unlimited in nlilmber because it 
can be infinitely divided, end limited in number because made up of 
points that are as many as they ore - that is, that are countable, 
theoretica~ly at least. 
Paradox iii is composed of premisses a and f: any plurality is many 
because divisible into many (infinite) parts, but one because self-
evidently a unity. 
Paradoxes 1v and v are both deduced from a and d: iv, Plurality is 
many ~cause divisible into many {infinite) parts, and yet nothing 
because its parts, points,. have no real existence; v, Plural! ty is 
large to infinity because continued sub-division of a continuum 
implies always some part between any part a.lready sub-divided, and 
yet small to nothingness because its constituent parts, pointst can 
have no real existence, and so no magnitude. 
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Finally, paradox vi is deduced from b and e: Plurrality is nothing 
because infinite division leads logically to ultimate nothingness, 
and infinite because infinite division must lead actuallj: to 
minimal parts, points, which are infinite in number, since the 
division is infinite. 
Hence, with the exception of f, all the paradoxes are based in 
the last resort ·on two fa~damental assumptions, one of which is 
used for one side of the paradox, the other for the other side. Thus 
a and b, which form one part of paradoxes 11, iii, iv, v, and vi, 
are sub-types of 1- that Plurality is infinitely divisible; and 
c, d, and e, which form the other part of paradoxes ii, ivt v, and 
vi, are sub-types of 2 - that Plurality is discrete, co~posed of 
an a.ggregate of points. This is very clear if we set out tre 
paradoxes schematically as follows:-
11 
a c 
iii 
a. f 
1v 
a d 
v 
a d 
Vi 
b 6 
This means 'that Zeno gets his contradictory conclusions by pressing 
alternately the infinite di vis ihD..i ty of the Pythagorean Many, and 
the constituent points within this continuum. Therefore, we conclude 
that the Pythagorean Plurality was composed of an aggregate of 
points set out in a. continuum. This is clearly a confusion of 
geometry with pbyl:f;cs • Ma.thematica:; solids are infinitely divisible 
but physical bodies are not, but are divisible only down to minimal 
constituentl bodies, as is acknowledged by premiss e·- the whOle, 
~hen sub-divided, leads umtimately to minima. But such minima are 
not geometrical in nature, as they apparently were taken to be in 
frAmrlent ' premiss cj as used in :tnXXMm:~x ll on pages 141-2 above. There the 
Line was composed of a succession of points set out in Extension. 1 
' Hence, both bodies and magnitudes were conceived by the PythagoreanE-
2 
as aggregates of points set out in Extension. Whether such a systen: 
could be called Number-Atomism3 is doubtful, since Atomism was 
rather an answer to .Zeno' s critidisms of Pythaf,orean1sm 4 and there 
could hardly have been that quantitative c~mception of reality at 
so early a date which is implicit in any form of Atomism where 
~ual1ty becomes subjective appearance. 5 But there is more in this 
Pythagorean! sm than ;Just that parallel construction of magnitudes 
and things with a tendency to conceive the ultimate minima of bodies 
as geometrical points, and this more is 1n fact the explanation of 
this peculiar tendency. 
1. The conftilsion betv1een minimal psrt1.cles and geometrical points 
is even more obvious j_n fragment 3 11 on pa.ge 145 above, vvhere 
these points are assumed to be themselves divisible. 
2. So Burnet, Greek Philos~phy 82-3, that Zeno criticises Pytha.go-
rean things asJI-""4S14Y rN)tJor end .Raven, Pythagoreans and Eleat1cs 
71-2, that Zeno' s criticism implies plurality as a sum of monads. 
3. So Cornford, Classical Quarterly XVI.l37 and XVII. 7, and Plato 
and Parmenides 57-60. 4. Raven, op. cit. 76-77. 
5. Frank, Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer 71-2 w1 th 220. 
~ 
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The whole key to Pythe.goreanism lies in a considera.tion of 
premisses d and e above. That points are the ultimate minima of 
Plurali t.y is fundamental to the w.nception of things as aggregnte s 
. 
of points set out in Extension, but even if these points seem to be 
conceived now as 'atoms' now as geometrical magnitudes, this does 
not explain how in d they can be said neither to increase that to 
I which they are added, nor to decrea.se that from which they are sub-
d .ti d subtraction tracted. In fact, the whole ope1·ation of a d1 on an ED:t:rEE:t%~.JX 
smacks of arithmetic rather than of geometry. So in fragment ll,where 
these points were the points of a Line, they were nevertheless 
countable. This is soluble only if theEe pointsfowere further 
conceived as arithmeticaii: units. That is, while Plurality was in 
one aspect composed of the Continuous, which lent a geometrical air 
to its constituent points, in cmother aspect these points, while 
properly physical and yet tending to be conceived geometrically, 
were further concl-1 ved ari thmetif(.cally, the ar.i thmetieal unit being 
confused with the existing confusion between geometrical point and 
physical 'a.tom'. a;, Zeno was able to treat the constituent points of 
Plurality, in one and the same paradox, notably in fragment 3, as 
infinitely divisible like geo~etrical points (solids), and yet as 
. indivisible and countable like arithmetical units. This is not so 
extraorjdinary as it sounds if we remember the genernl Greek 
1 . 2 
conception of numbers, probably pythe.gorean in or:ig~in, as a.ggre-
ge.tes of units set ou_t geometrically in Space - the so-called 
figurate numbers, such as :: and ::: etc. 3 If, then, guided by this 
I ••• 
method of conceiving numbers, tho pythagoreans regarded the units 
,of numbers as having spatial po ~1 tion, 4 we can see that it was a 
I I 
1
1
small step to identifying the un,i ts or points or 'atoms' or whatever 
!they w e.re called, which constituted physical bodies as well as 
igeometrica.l magnitudes like the Line, with numerip{ca.l units, which 
oould be counted in theory at lesst, but which strictly speaking 
could increase only the numbe~ btit not the magnitude of that to 
which they were added. It was this conception of the ultimate 
constituents of bod:bes as numerical units that explains the Pythago-
rean tenet that things a.re Numbers. 
To sum up, then, Pythagoreani sm before Zeno held that the 
' general construction of Plu:ral1 ty was by points set out in the 
Continuous: bodies were made up of • atoms' in Extension, magnitudes 
otl points in the Continuous, Numbers of units in some sort of place, 
but these •atoms' were confused with points on the one hand and with 
units on the other, things being Numbers inasmuch as their ultimate 
1. See Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics II.211 ad 1039al2; Taylor, 
Plato the Man and his Work 507; van der Wielen, Die Ideegetallen 
van Pln.to 14. 2. See Cherniss, Aristotle's Critidism of' 
Pre-Socratic Philoro phy 387. 3. See Robin, Pleton 82 note 1; 
Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy 338 with note. 
(. See Lee, op. cit. 32-4; Miss Freeman, op. cit. 158. 
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particles were unit-points. This,· according to Cherniss, 1 is summed 
up in .the two tenets that All is Number, and that Bodies are composed 
of points, and the same tenets are allowed by Frank2 in respect of 
the early Pytha.gorean religious fraternity, and is in fact just that 
conception of Numl!lers as composed of units having magnitude and 
things as assemblages of such units as is witnessed by Aristotle, 
and which has been set forth a.bove on pages 56-57. 
b) Parmenide~ Criticism. 
As;ai!JlSt Whom was Pa~llis' Criticism Directed? Perhaps the clear-
est; indication given by Parrnenides of the identity of tee parties 
against whom his criticism was directed 1s to be found in fragment 
63 :"1 ... I hold thee back from this first way of inquiry and from 
this also, upon which morta.ls knowing naught wander two-faced, ••••• 
borne along stupefied like men deaf and blind. Undi seeming crowds 
in whose eyes it is and i.s not the-same and not-the-same, ani all 
things travel in opposite directions." Who are these mortals? :the 
word in itself might seem to indicate what we would call •the man 
in the street• whose outlook is that any object is both like one 
thing and¢ unlike another. Inde~ 'men stupefied, deaf and blind' J 
tallies with Heraclitus' description of the Average Man in his 
fragment,S 4: 4 nEyes and ears are bad witnesses to men if they have 
souls that understand not their language. It But there are very clear 
indications5 that Parmenides included Heraclitus himself in the 
number of these mortals. For Heraclitus was two-faced, believing 
that things travel in opposite directions, tna.smuch as his peculiar 
view of the world was cha.ractet'ised by the Upwa.rd~/nnd Downwards/ 
/ / 
Paths, Ftilre condelll!6ing to Water, and Water to Earth, a. rrl again Earth 
rarefying into wa.ter and Fire. 6 In this connection it is notable :tiloc~ 
that the same word which Parmenides uses fort hings travelling in 
OPPOSITE ( 774'Ait~'f,Poi/DS ) directions occurs in the fragments of 
Heracl1tus7 in connection with a mystical' utterance summing up his 
whole philosophy of Harmony. Further, Heraclitus could be aptly 
dubbed the 'knowing naught' since it was one of his tenets that "We 
must follow the Common, for if we live thinking that we have an 
individual source of knowledge, we shall err.n8 Heraclitus claimed 
to have no know.l~dge of his oVvn - he knew naught - but all knowledge 
came from the Logos or Common. FinallY, that 'it is and is not the-
wame and not-the-same' 1 s almost certainly tl hit at such sayings as 
that we cannot enter the sPme river twice, 9 and that we both are 
and are not, enter and do not enter the same rivers. 10 
1. Aristotle's Criticism of Pre~Sbcratic PhiloEophy 389-?390. 
2. Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer 135. 
3. see Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy 198 : Diels 18B6. 
4. Burnet, op. cit .• 147. 5. Raven, however, in pythagoreans and 
Eleatics 25, discusses and dismisses this possibility, preferring 
to take the same allusions to be Pythagorean. 
6. Diels 12B60, cp. 12B50 & &i 62. 7. Dials 12B51; also; read as 
1/a),~rovos. 8. Diels 12B2. 9, Diels 12A6 4: 12B91. 
10. Diels 12B49a. 
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1 Hence, Burnet concluded that PArmenides' poem attacked Heraclitus 
. 2 
and the •man in the street• together. But I feel, with Jaeger, that 
"the mortals who combine Being and Not-Being are not all mortals, 
for mankind has never asserted its naf!le conception of reality as 
a combination of Being and Not-Being." Who, then, are incl~.uded among 
the 1und1scerning crowds' besides Heraclitus? 
Cherniss3 takes the reference not only to Heraclitus but to 
all theories a.ssuming change, but we can be more explicit, in 
respect of one or two passages at least. Thus, "Thou cancfr not cut 
off What Is from holding fast to What Is, neither scattering itself 
abroad in order, nor coming toe¢her (C1"-Uvc(l""!"dfit"'ov }", 4 and "Nor 
is it divisible since it is all alike, and there is no more of it 
in one place than in another to hinder it from h!Dlding together,nor 
less of it, but everything is full of What Is~ 5 IJ!ight very well be 
aimed at Rarefaction and Condensation since the 'scattering itself' 
abl!1oad and coming together' seem to mean just that, and as a result 
of Rarefaction a.nd Cond~Cnsation there would be 'more of it in one 
place than in. another and less of itt elsewhere. This teaching was 
origina.ted by 'Anaximenes. On the other hand it was adopted by 
Hern.clitus, and it is just possible that here too PArmm ides criti-
cises Heraclitus, since one of the words he /ruses for Condensation, 
namely C>-UY''~'J"",;f'CrYoY , appears also in a fragment of Hera.cli tus. 6 
To be of any use, however, for the present investigation, the 
criticism of Parmenides must have been nimed at the Pythagoreans as 
well as At Heraclitus and Anaximene s; but unfortunately this cannot 
be demonstrated without assuming in adv<:mce a knowledge of what tee 
Pythagoree.ns held. We should then be in danger of arguing in a 
circle if we alleged that one could reconstruct Pythagoree.nism from 
an examination of Parmenidcs' cri tic1sm,. and yet had to assume a 
prior kno•ledge of Pythagoreanism in order to demonstrate that those 
criticisms were in fact directed ngainst l'ytho.goreanism. We are, 
in fact, reduced to the position where we have to say, with Raven, 7 
that "Parmenides was particularly concerned with the Pythagoreans, 
FOR WE KNOW OF NO OTHER PHILOOOPHY of that time which maintained 
the existence of Void, and this is what is criticised in fragment 8r 
However, this line of argument bears some confirmation from the 
8 9 support it receives from both Cherniss and Cornford, but with the 
addition on the part of the latter'of an 4lleged attack on the 
emergence of the manifold world from an original unity, which Raven 
does not support. 
1. Op .. ,cit. 210, cp. Greek Philosophy 64 and Robin, Greek Thought 88 
2. The Theology of Early Greek Ph1loEophy 101. 3. Op. cit. 383. 
4. Diels 18B2 translated by Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy 197. 
5. Dials 18B8 lines 22-4 in Burnet, op. cit. 199-200, with which 
compare his remarks on p.2o4. 6. Diogenes Laertius IX.9.iniit. 
7. pythagoreans and Eleetics 34, see also 27-8, where Raven• s 
reasons are given in full. 8. Op. cit. 95 note 401. 
9. Plato and Parmenide s 28 & 40. 
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It is possible, however, to reach a tentative view of what 
pythagoras might have held by examining the teachings of Anaximenes 
and :Anax1mander, and by confirming this by ?pplying tothis view the 
criticisms of Parmenides. But before ottemptir1g this1 it will be as 
well, for the sake of completeness, to mention the interpretations 
• 
of his way of ~es6ming as held by moderm commentators. It is, I 
think, a safe gen,{ralisation to say that those commentators who 
cannot or do not see any special reference to Pythagoreanism in 
the way of Truth take the way of Seeming to be an exposition of the 
1 2 3 
erroneous pythagorean cosmology - so Burnet, Robin, and Ross. 
The strongest evidence supporting this is the evidence that Parme-
nides was originally a pythagorean or at least was associated with 
one. 4 But this is equally applicable to the view that Parmen ides 
criticised pythagoreaniEm in his Way of Truth and expounded his 
own belief.s in the Way of Seeming as plausible but not true. 5 
. Deduction of What Plthagort?s_.~!,6ht have_J!eld. Pythagora.s, 
before he migrated to Croton about or before 540 B.C., lived in 
s;mos. 6 Nov• S3.mos is not far from Miletus, so that Pythagorcs would 
·have learnt hi z philosophy from .Anaximande r and Anaximene s, the 
. . 7 
representatives of the Mile~ school in pythagoras' day. Indeed, 
there i's evidence that he was a disciple of Anaxim~:mder8f and 
Jaeger9th1nks that pythagoras carried Ionian ideas to Italy. These 
ideas were as follows. 
The main characteristic of :Anaximander's philosophy was the 
,, 
Unlimited ("1lC'~Or ). In what respect was it unlimited? It 
seems impossible to answer this' with any certainty. Qualitatively 
it was unlimited in the sense that it was indeterminate in quality, 
but this cannot have meant that it was undifferentiated Matter as 
ttnot· any of the four elements but some iH;~erent kind of "1-' substance, 
as Miss Freeman in 10 11 is certainly quite says one place. Cherniss 
correct when he says that "If quality as distinct from matter was 
a concept not earlier than Socrates, then undifferentiated matter. 
could not have been early and Anaximander' s Unlimited was not such. n 
12 In pre-Sbcratic times the 1 hot 1 meant a hot thing, he continues, 
ond so ~Anaxad.mander' s Unlimited would be not a qualiteti velJl und1ffe-
1. Early Greek Philoso.phy 211 a.nd Greek Philosophy 66. 
2. Greek Thought 88-9. 3. Aristotle's Metaphysics !.133-4. 
4. See Ear~y Greek Philosophy 193-4. 5. Cornford, Classical 
'Quarterly XXVII.ll0-111 and Plato and Parmenides 49-51. 
6. D1els 4,2: S:tlmoxis was o. slave of Pythagoras in Samos, and 4,8 : 
at the age of 40 pythagoras moved from S;tmo s to Italy, doubtless 
after the conquest of Ionia by Harpagus in 540, since 4,10 gives 
his floruit as 540. 7. Floruits respectively 570 and 550, 
according to J·ackson, Texts to Illustrate a Course of Elementary 
Lectures on the History of Greek Philosophy from Thales to 
Aristotle, Macmillan 1914, page xii. 8. Burnet, Greek Ph11.39. 
9. The Theology of Early Greek Philosophy 38. 
10. The Pre-Socratl.cPli"l'losophers. A Companion to Diels 56. 
11. IDp. cit. 367. 12. Qp. cit. 369 and 375-379. 
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rentiated body but a mixture f,f s.ll quality-things which existed 
as such throughout all eternity, passing into and out of the 
Unlimited. Thus there was really no quali tati v·e change. On the other 
h?.nd., iff it was unlimited in a quantitative sense1; as an inexhaus-
tible reservoir, from which Becoming draws its nourishment, 1 it 
2 
was not necessarily so, since, as Miss Freeman points out, all 
i~ as their source. ~ b things return to X]IRXXX:EMMXEK However tha.v mrq e, we can 
distinguish the following cha.ru.cteristic pattern in Anaximander' s 
philosophy. There is only one ultimate principle, the Unlimited, 
which,as we stated above, is a mixture in which the Opposites are 
3 held together in neutralisation. From this, ~airs of Opposites 
separate out to form the Cosmos, of which Hot and Cold are the 
primary pair, and return again to their source acctflrdtlng to the 
principle of Justice. That is, the emergence of ind~viduals is a 
having too much and must be atoned for by ceding 'to; others what they; 
now enjoy, 4 Heat for exa.mple drinking up Water but giving it. back 
as Rain. 5 In particule.r we can instance the separation of the 
original pair, Hot and Cold, the Hot embrn,cing the Cold in a ring; 
but this Cold is itself composite, consisting of a. lp,yer o~ air 
with the earth within. Th~ earth is wet, but the Hot dries it out 
6 
except for the seas. In this Sl'fi3 tern we note the following: 
Anamimandert s cosmology, while po s1 ting the Unlimited as th~ ul tima11 
principle, actually makes use of :tw~ ppimary pair~ a.s principles, 
the Hot and the Cold,. The further separation of. the pair,t Wet f'11ld 
Dry is effected by the action of the Hot on the Ea.rth, the emergence 
of which is not expla.ined but ·simply assumed. Let us leave the 
• 
matter here for a while Rnd turn to Anaximenes. 
,fmaximene s' principle was definitely unlimited in quantity, but 
not in quality since it was identified with Air. 7 All things came 
from this underlying substrate, bp rarefe.ction and condensation, 8or 
rather there was no subsisting substrAte sinee Fire, water and Earth 
were the same substance more tigh~ly or more loosely packed. Hence, 
we tm .. ve here an ex];5bnation of Becoming in terms of mechanical 
change, the difference in defonsity being a quantitative difference~ 9 
Now this principle was identified with Air, prmbably because the 
connection between rarefaction and increase of temperature and of 
condensation with decrease of temperature, discovered by Anaximenes, 
was illustrated by him by breathing out with the lips slack or 
contracted re spect:i.v~rly, 10 and this (Air or Bree.th11 was itself 
12 identified with Ebul, and encompassed the Cosmos. A last point 
1. Jaeger, op. cit. 24. 2. Op. cit. 57. 3. Op. cit. 58-9. 
4 •. Jaeger, op. cit. 34-5. 5. Robin, Greek Thought 43. 
6. Miss Freeman, op. cit. 58-9, cp. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy 
66, based on Diels 2,10 and 2,11. 7. Diels 3Al & 5. 
8. Diels 3.A5-9. 9. Cherniss, op. cit. 379-380, snd Miss Free-
man, op. cit. 65-66. 10. Miss Freeman, op. cit. 67-8. 
11. Air or Breath said synonymously, Dials 3B2. 12. Burnet, 
Early Greek Philosophy 77; and references in notes 9 and 10 above. 
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wotth noticing is that since condensations were cold and rarefac-
tions were hot, 1 he preserv·ed :.Anaximander• s Opposites, at least in 
thi.s case, but Mif's Freemnn 2 notes thr:t Hot is absolute hot ~nd 
Cold 1 s absolute cold, so thRt these do not form e continuum eny 
. 3 
more than /IJ1aximander' s contraries do. Here we note the following: 
In .Anai:imene st system the Unlimited tBke s on a definite quc.li ta ti vo 
charactet:tstic - it is Air or Breath - and from it the sensible 
world is formed by meP.ns of tvvo generative principles, Ra.refaction 
and Condensation, which replace the Hot andthe Cold while yet 
preserving their connection therewith. As this Air is J said to 
encompo.ss the Cosmos as the soul encompaEses the body, it is 
possible thst here too the Cosmos t:as assumed from the beginning, 
but the evidence is silent on this point. 
Now there are certain features common to both tha;;e systems. 
Neither givahany indication of the generation of the Earth, but .its 
exi~tenco is apparently assumed by l\IHlXimnndcr, and thiA is surroun-
dod or encompassed by the Unlimited or by Air. From the lo. tter, two 
principles, the Hot and the Cold, separate out, albeit in different 
way;.;, andlSfrom them arises the plurttl.ty of things. Tha:re is no 
explanation in Jmuximander of the mechanism whereby things separate 
out from and return· to the Unlimited, except that this is called 
.rustice, which seems to indicate some sort of divine control, but 
it may ~ell have been similar in essonce to Ancx1menes' Air having 
in i.tstelf the power of movement, of rarefying end of condeR:Sing, 2 
and so being conceived along animistic lines, just :::;s Anax1menes• 
Cosmos seems to have breathed in the Un11mi ted Air. 
Corroboration of Part of Jl.ri stotle' s Evidence for EarlL,.Pl:tha-
S:2.rean1sm. Nor. on pn.ge 56 r; bove \"1!:3 summ':!ri sed the following tenets 
di sting.uishing E~n·ly Pythagorean ism according to the evidence of 
Aristotle: i) an animistic view of Nature; 11) the One conceived_ as 
E.aed; iii) this brer;.thos in the Void; iv} Void is confused with Air 
v) Void is equate(, nith the Unlimitec'; vi) tho Unlimited is con-
strained ond 1imi ted by the Limit ..;. the other tenets are not here 
relevant .. To this we can add Stobfleus, 4 thnt in his book Concerning 
the Pytho~oreuns, Aristotle said thot the Universe is one and draws 
in from the Unlimited Time and Breath and Voj.d., which determines 
thegrounds of each thing, which corrobrntes 111. Lat us examine 
each tenet in turn. 
i} Tne Hylozoism of the Milesians - the use of Justice 1n 
Anuximandor and the equation of Air with &>ul in Anaxiroene s -argue E: 
an animistic conception of Mature as in pythogoreanism. 
11) There is no evidence at all thRt either of the Milesians 
conceived the One ns Seed, but the aui~henticity of this tenet seemr 
to be guaranteed by its consistency with an animistic view of 
1. D1e1s 3Bl. 2. Op .. cit .• 66. 3. This may explain the differ-
ence in Plato• s f:Ubstrnte as being a two-w0y continuum. 
4. Diels 45Bt30. 
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Nature and by its agreement Vfj_"~.;,n the Mile sians j_n this,. that they 
do not seem to have given a-r,y satisfactory accou.."lt of the origin of 
the Earth, which is what the Pythagoreans seem to have meant by the 
one1 - or at least a proto-earth - ::md :lf the Q:,:le was Seed it could 
hardly ha.ve hed any more satisfactory e.ccount than that 1 t Wf-lS laid 
by a god or goddess in the Unlimited. 
iii) and i v), if taken together, (and the confusion of Void and Air 
was natural in the days before Empedocles2 ) agree with the identifi-
cation of Air with Breath by Anaximenes. With this can be taken v}, 
that the Void was equated with the Unlimited, since the .Air of 
:P,naximenes too wr:.s unlimited in extent. 
vi) cannot be parP~lleled, but it assumes two generative principles, 
Limit and Unlimited, and while the former na.me is lscking in the 
MilesiAn systems, both made uce of two generative principles. 
Aristotle's conceptions, then, in respect of these six poants 
seem to be fair enough, since they a.gree with wha.t ~.s common to 
.Anaximander and Anaximene s, the argument being thht if Pythagoras 
was a disciple of the Milesians in his days at samos, any system 
that he himself thought out would be likely to have resembled theirs. 
And this is confirmed by this, that Parmenides' cr1t.icisms can be 
shown to have been aimed at just tre se tenets, namely, that a.) the 
One had a mysterious, unexplained origin; b) that the other principle 
be sides the One was the Void., and this w n s unlimited; c) there were 
two e laments, the Limit and the Unlimited, be,tsides the One; d) the 
exist:ance of Time, witnessed by Stobaeus. For we hav-e seen in respect 
of a) that neither pythcogorenns nor Milesians gave a sat1sfa.ctory 
account of the existence of tm One, the proto-earth, but in 
:Anaximander.it was simply there, surrounded by a layer or ring of 
uir, together constituting the Cold; in :Anaximenes the ultimate 
principle, Air, is said to have encompassed the Cosmos; and in 
pythagoreanism ii) the One as Seed could only have h~1,d some mytholo-
gical origin. In respect of b), we have just seen that both Milesians 
conceived the Earth, the One, as surrounded by air, which was Bxprxsc 
expressly identified vr1 th 1\naximander' s Unlj.mi ted; end in Pythago-
reanism iv) end v) the Void, confused with Air, vras equated with tm 
Unlimited. As for c), the Milesions had two generatives, Hot and Cold 
or Rarefaction and Condensation, besides the Unlimited; Pythagorean-
ism had two elements, vi) Limit and Unlimited, but it still remains 
to determine whether or not' these were apart from the One or whether 
the One was ectually the former. I shall argue here in favour of the 
former alternative, before turning to the examine tion of Parmenide s• 
.criticisms. 
Of modern cornmentatbrs, R8ven 3 might be instanced as one who 
1. Cherniss, op. cit. 39, that in Metaphysics 1091al3-22 the One 
is the Universe. 2. [)3e page 55 above. 
3. pythagoreans and Eleatics 43-44. 
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does not accept two senses in ?Jthagoreanism of the One, for he 
believes tha.t pa.rmenides attacks, not Plurality derived from Unity, 
but two ultimate principles, Unity being one of them, so that for 
him the One is the Limit and nothing else. On the other hMd, 
Burnet1 says that the One had two senses, the whole of reality and 
the point as spatial unit, but assigns this to the mid V century 
B.C., leaving it uncertain whether this applied also to Early 
pythagorean ism. As Raven's work was written primarily as a. correc-
tion of Cornford' s, 2 it might not seem to be very impressive that 
the latter cites the evidence of Eudorus and comments thereon that 
there was a confusion be tween two senses of the one, either a.s the 
good principle in conflict with the Unlimj_ted, or the un1 t beginning 
the number-series. Guthrie) does not mention a second sense, but if 
~ s he says the pythagorean Primal Monad was anaiiogous to the Orphic 
Egg, it would seem that it hRd e. second sense as the unit of Number, 
which is in feet the Limit. 
However that may be, and papart from any consideration that 
may be drawn from the Milesian philosophers - for their One was 
obviously quite different from their two generative principles, 
although these principles did not arise from the one, as I believe 
was the case in Pythagoreanism, but from the Unlimited - Aristotle, 
if analysed, names the Limit separately from the one, thus imply-
ing their difference •. &:> l09lal5-18: "They say plainly that when the 
One hnd been constructed, whether of Seed •••••• , immediately the 
nearest part of the IIJnlimited began to be constrained and limited 
by the Limit." This shows,to my way of thinking, that the One wa.s 
not the Limit, and since Aristotle has been shown to heve been 
correct in most of the sa.lient .features of E~rly Pythagoreanism, 
why should he not be correct here too? Now while it is not clear 
from this evidence whether the One was a primal Monad, a.. sort of 
Orphic Egg whence emerged the Limit and Unlimited, or whether it 
wcs itself a product of these principles, or whether there were 
originally these three principles, no one has maintained trn last 
possibility, and the middle one is out of court since Parmenides, 
as will be shown presently, criticises the lack of derivation of the 
One. Hence, I believe the Pythagorean One wa.s original, am from it 
emerged the Limit end Unlimited, but, using the commentators• views 
cited above, the One was also, in a secondary sensei, identical 
with the Lim! t - namely, as the unit of Number. We shall ·see that 
this view exactly fits the criticisms of Pl.'lrmenides, end to this we 
now turn. 
An Exarnine.tion of PB.rmeni.de s' Cri ticli sm s. Following the 
numeration used on page 154 above, the points v;hich P?.rmenides made 
agaio:s.t Pythagoreanism are as folloygs:-
1. Early Greek Philosophy 377-8. 2. Plato and Parmenides 4-5. 
3. Orpheus and Greek Religion. A study of Greek Heligion 219. 
'\ v 
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a) ,Against the unexplained origin of the One:- We surmised 
above that the one as seed arose in some unexplained way. This 
seems to be criticised by parmenides in 11Fo{what kind of origin 
for 1 t wilt thou look? ••••••• I cannot let you say it came from 
What .Is Not; for it can neither be thought nor uttered ths.t any-
thing is not. If it came from nothing, what need could have made 
it arise later rather than sooner: thefefore, it must either be 
a.ltogether or not at all. Nor will the force of truth suffer aught 
to arise besides itself from that Which Is Not. 111 That is, the One 
as Being could not have arisen from sorre thing else - the Unl1m1 ted 
as Not-Being - and if it IS 1 t could not have arisen from nothing. 
Therefa\·e, it could not have been generated at all. 
b) ~ainst the Void as a principle, add against its conception 
as Unlimited:- But if such a one did exist, Farmenides argued that 
there could be nothing else, ~HD since this something else was 
conceived as the Void, it is probable that he refers to this 
2 
conception of the Void/ as Something besides the One in "For this 
shall never)6 be proved, that the tthings That Are Not are; and do thoUI 
restrain thy thought from this way of enquiry. u3 Further, this Void 
was conceived as infinite - as Unlimited - hence, "It is the same 
and it rests in the same place, ab1Ctling in itself ••••• Wherefore it 
is not permitted to What Is to be infinite; for it is in need of 
nothing; while if it were infinite, it would stand in need of 
everything.tt 4 Parmenides, thus, criticises the infinity of the Void, 
its wandering nature (for like Anax1m ene s' ;Air it wandered), and 
its existence as something other than the One. 
I . 5 
c) Against the derivation of the ~imit from the One:- Cornford, 
who '6 is followed by Tredennick, believes that Parmenides criticises 
the evolution of two forms, Limit and Unlimited, from the One, but 
7 \ 
Raven disagrees and takes these two forms as ultimate, identifying 
the One with the Limit. 'Aristotle's Table of Contraries8 would seem 
to favour Raven, but net, neces~ar1ly so flf we accept the evidence 
cited on page 155 above, since we showed there that "the One" had 
two senses: it was both the Pr~mal Monad from Vt~hich emerged the 
L1m1 t and the Unlimited, and 1 t was also the un1 ts which constttuted 
the Limit. Now I ~~ii:~iiB that the criticism which follows is dif'fie 
cult unless it be allowed that the Limit was derived from the One 
either by its multiplication or by its division into a number of 
units. For e Seed grows, and s'o the One as Seed also grows, and this 
is referred to when Parmenide s i~~:i, "How and whence could it have 
drawn its 1ncrease?"9 That thi,s does not mean that the one grew by 
1. Diels 18BB, liues¢ 6-13. 2. Cp. Chern1ss, op. cit. 95 note 
401, that Parmenides showed as against the Pythagoreans that 
Being was one and there was no Void. 
3. Diels 18B7; cp .• Burnet's remarks 1n Ea.rly Greek Philosophy 207. 
4. D1els 18B8 lines 29-33. 5. Plato and Parmenides 28. 
6. Aristotle's Metaphysics (LOeb) xvii. 7. Fythae;;oreans and 
Elea\-tics 43-4. 8. Met. 986a22-6. 9. D1els 18138 line 7. 
- . 
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inflation like a balloon but that its growth wa.s rather a reduplica-
tion is shown by, "It is complete and immovable, neither is it 
incomplete. 1 Nor was it ever, nor will it be; for now it is, all 
at once, one, continuous. n 2 For te make i.t grow by reduplication is 
to deny its.completeness: when it was a unity it Was, and when it 
reduplicates.to become many it Will Be; and its state as an aggre-
gate of units, when it has been reduplicated, makes it discrete, so 
that ParmEnides can deny this by insisting on its continuity. 
Parmenides, then, criticises the reduplication of the One, and it 
is this One reduplicated, this resultant aggregate of units, that I 
take to be the Limit. We have stated that such a Limit is discrete, 
and this seems to be criticised in, "Nor is it divisible, s6tnce it 
is all a.like ••••• Wherefore it is whol Jly continuous; for What Is 
is in contact with What Is. "3 The lacuna refers to Rarefaction and 
Condens0tion, but the insi,tstence that Being .is in cont<',.ct with 
Being hardly suits this: it implies that the view criticised makes 
things discrete, as we have saidt: things are units (the Limit as 
the One reduplicated) set out in Void (the Unlimited as the other 
than the one) • 
d) iAgainst the concept of Time:- We saw from Stobaeus that 
with the pythagoreans Time was drawn in from the Unlimited along 
with the Void, and to this concepti.on of Time Parmenides refers in, 
11 How can What Is be going to be in the f'utuf)re? or how could it 
come into l?eing? If it came 1nt;o })eing, it Is Not; nor IS it if it 
is going to be.n4 The further criticism of Generation and Destruc-
tion as unrea1 5 could apply to a,ny school exce:pt the Eleatic 1 tself. 
This exhausts all the relevant evidemce. 
t 
P~:.rmenides, theh, cr1 ticises the sudden and unexplained origin 
\' 
of the One as Seed, indeed,its having any o~igin at all; he c~iti-
cises the emergence of they.1two elements from it - the Unlimited as 
the other than the One .he cri t.ic:il se s because what is other than 
Whc.t Is cannot €)Xist at all, l1nd the Limit as the One reduplicated 
he criticises because t~e One: is one and cannot be so incomplete as 
to require reduplication; and he further criticises the resultant 
discreteness of things constructed from Limit and Unlimited as from 
' 
units in Void on the grounds 'that Being 1 s continuous, and finally 
the reality of· Time, Generation and Destruction. New.~ this di aerate-
ness of things, this compositj)on of things from units and Void, is 
perfectly consi~tent with that constitution of things which Zeno 
criticised, and it is to the relation between the pre-Parmenidea.n 
and the pre-Z.enonic schools that we now turn. 
, l' ' 1. Readingou<J with Brandis. 2. Dials 18B8 lines 4-6. 
3. Diels 18B8 lines 22-5, compare Burnet• s comments, op. c1 t. 204. 
4. Diels 18B8 lines 19-20, compare Raven, op.cit. 27-28. 
5. Dials l8B8 lines 40 and 10-11. 
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_gj one pre-zenonic pythagorean School. If the Limit was 
der1 ved by reduplcation of the One and so was an aggregate of uni tsl 
and if the Unl1m1 ted was con strained and lim1 ted thereby, then 
things would be constituted as units in a Void, and this is the 
very construction of Plurality that zeno criticised; For we said 
on pages 148-9 above that the system which Zeno attacked conceived 
bodies to have been made up of •atoms' in Extension, magnitudes of 
points in the Continuous, and Numbers of units in some sort of 
Place, 'atoms'', , poiri ts and ut)i ts being confused so that things 
were rega.rded as Numbers. The pythagoreanism, then, which was 
attacked by Permenides wa.s substantially the same as that attacked 
. 1 
by Zeno, and there was only one pre-Zenonic Pythagorean scho·ol. 
a:> Raven2 point.s o11&t that it wa.s the same school that saicl that the 
One draws in the Unlimited e.nd tha.t things w ere Numbers having 
3 Ma .. gni tude, as against the two schools of Cornford, the first being 
a monistic tl~ii~~i~iiillln with a due.listic system of Nature, which 
Pa.rmenides attacked, and a.fterParmenides a Number-Atomism which 
Zeno attacked •. 
One might ask, then, what effect the criticism of Parmenides 
had on pytha.goreanism. The ans?ler to this is indicated by Plato in 
hils parmenides 128CD: 4 tt.These writings (of Zeno' s) are really a 
support to parmenides' work against those trying to mock him that 
if there is a One, many ridiculous and contradictory condlusions 
follow •. But his book opposes these Plutralists, returning their 
1. Modern interpretations of this Early pythagoreanism which agree 
on the whole with the a.bove conclusions, but which give much 
prominence to the)sf"eligious side of Pythagoreanism - which we 
have altogether neglected as irrelevant to this thesis - are 
as follows: BURNET, Early Greek Philoro.Jphy l00-121 and Greek 
Philosophy 42-56, that this school held transmigration, the three 
lives, a wa.y of life by following which man is released from the 
Cycle of Birth, boundless breath breathed in to separate the ut:tf 
units of things and Numbers, ·Numbers e.rramged by dots in patterns, 
square and oblong numbers, the three means and the harmonic 
ratios, health-patterns formed by a ba.lance among the opposites 
found in the bodily constitution, a harmony of the spheres formed 
by arranging ~e.x1mander' s three wheels at the intervals of the 
fourth, fifth a.nd octave. CAMERON, The Pythagorean Background of 
the Theory of Recollection 16-36, emphasises the· religious side: 
transm1g~ation, immortality,· kinship of all Nature, ~ei:ease from 
the C~cle of Birth being achieved by the recovery of the omni- . 
science of the divine soul by observation of the physical embodi-
ments of Number. LEE, Zeno of Elea 32-4, confines himself to ,that 
phase of pythagoreanism attacked by Zeno: the One as an element 
of Plurality had the properties of the geometrical point, yet 
w1 th certain characteristics of the numerical unit; perhaps 
equalled the unit spatialised. Other interpretations with only 
minor deviations ure those of Rl\VEN, Pythagoreans and Eleatics 
-esp. 27-8, 34, 43-5; MISS FREEMAN, The Pre-Socratic PhiloS> phers, 
:A Companion to Diels 82; and ROBIN, Greek Thought 62-3, whose 
·View is vitiated in my opinion by conceiving :tkx a 'Central Fire• 
as the agent of the inspiration of unlimited Breath, and the 
formation of particular things by Rarefaction and Condensation. 
2. Pythagoreans and Elea.tics 45, cp.54-55. 3. See page 147 above. 
4. Pointed out by Cherniss, op. citt 398. 
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ridicule with interest by showing that their asFumption of Plurali t~ 
.leads 
~~~ to even greater absurdities tham the assumption of Minism, if 
it be properly examined." This is evidence that the pythagoreans 
replied to Parmenides' criticism by applying dialectics to his 
hypothesis 'lf the One is' and showed to their satisfaction that 
it led to absurdities. But Zeno countered this ridicule by utterly 
1 
refuting their Pluralism,~d Raven , who has followed this line of 
evidence in detail, points out that Melissus completes the circle 
by rausting Eleaticism so as to avoid that pythagorean criticism, 
whi.ch he reconstructs from an examination of Mel&ssus• ii§~~ijt 
thus: the pythagoreans argued i) that the one was two not one, 
C) baca,use if the One is~nite, then there must be SPrm thing 9utsidt: 
/' it, to wit, the Void, because finiteness implies an outer limiting i 
entity, and so Being becomes/! two instead of one. ii) If the ·One is 
finite, ·it must have beginning, middle and end, 2and so be three not 
one. iii) If the One is corporeal~ it must have parts and so be 
many. The hypotheses 'If the One is finite•, 'IF the One is corpo-
real' 1 a~te drawn from pe,rmenides' own concluslons as to the nature 
of the One. Mel~ssus. unable to cow1ter these arguments, made the 
One 1nfinite, 3 which preserved its unity since there could now no 
longer be anything outside it, nor could it have beginning, middle 
and end; and he also denied 1 ts corporea.l.i ty (but wi i:h out thereby 
a.ss!Wting that it was incoprporeal) so as to avoid its having parts. 
Early Pythegoreanism, then, was umeffected by Parmenide s• 
criticism, since 1 t answered this by counter-:attlcking the Eleatic 
thesis so effectively that Elea.ticism hA.d to be modified; but:. what 
action did they take as the result of Zeno 1 s criticism, which made 
their thesis even more absurd than they had made Parmenides'? 
'· Nearly all modern critics a.gree that it underwent some change in 
order to avoid this criticism;· but they largely differ as to the 
nature of this change. I shall summarise the features of this 
pre-zenonic school and thert turn to this question in section ii. 
1. Op. cit. 79-86. 
2. This argument .1s made use of by Plato in his first hypothesis 
in the Parmenides and is based on such extant evidence as De 
CRelo 268alO:"For, a .. s the J?ythagoreans say, the world and all 
that is in it is determined by the number 3, since beginning, 
middle and end give the number of en 'all', and the number they 
give is the Triad." S> :Aristoxenus, Diels 45B2, that nthe pytha-
goreans ••••• made the Monad the beginning of Number, and Number 
and aggregate of units •••• and odd number having beginning, middle 
and end." 
3. Dials 20B3. 
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SUmmarl• We have seen that Early Pythagoreanism1 resembled the 
systems of ~Anaximander and ·Anaximenes in certain respects and was 
chara.ctarised by an animistic view of Nature. The one was a Seed, E::rn 
and when it came into existence the other than the One was distin-
guished as the Void, act1ually confused w1 th ·Air. This was inhaled 
by the One, which thereupon reduplicated itself into units, and 
both Numbers, figured geometrically as points set on a. background, 
and things, composed of points set out in Extension, were con sti tu-
ted by this Void separating the units derived by the reduplication 
of the One. By virtue of its na.ture the Void was called the 
Unlimited and the units were called the Limit by virtue of their 
distinguishing the nature of things. This construction of things 
out of the units of Number- for these units had spatial position -
is what was meant by things being Numbers, ahd resulted in the 
discreteness of Matter. J\ristotle• s evidence, so far as it deals 
with the above points, is thus fully corroborated, both in respect 
of the One breathing in the Void and in respect of the units of 
Number.having magnitude. Parmenides criticised the origin of tho 
one and the derivation from it of the Void and of the Limit, and 
touched on the resultant discreteness of sensible things. The 
pythagoreans countered this by drawing out the absurditi&s in the 
One: if finite, it must have bounds, which makes it 2 not 1; it 
must have beginning, middle and end, whicb makes it 3; if it is 
corpoeeal, it must have parts and so be many. For these reasons 
Melissus made the One lnf1nite and denied its corporeality. But 
zeno more effectively came to the support of his master by showing 
that the pythagorean Many was yet more absurd than the Eleatic 
one had been shown to be. !A.ccording to their postulates, the Many 
as limited is small to nothingness, since the arithmetical units 
constituting its L1m1_t have no magnitude; but the Many is large 
to infinity, since in respect of its other element, the Unlimited, 
each part is infinitely divisible. parmenides criticised the 
principles of Pythagoreanism, Zeno the structure of their Many, 
and it rema.ins to examine what action was taken a~s the result of 
his criticism. 
1. We must remind the reader that we have neglected the religious 
side of Pythagoreanism as irrelevant to this dissertation. Sbme 
of the leading tenets belonging to this side of pythagoreanism 
are mentioned in note 1 on page 158 above. 
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Section ii. Post-zenonic Pythagoreanism. 
a) students. The Tradition of a Spllt in Pythagoreanism. Iamblichus 
has recorded a tradition that there was a. split in pythagoreanism, 
and while not all modern critics believe that there was more than 
one pythagorean school, 1 I think that I am correct in saying that 
all critics who cite this tradition are agreed that it is to be 
accepted, although they d1ffer as to its interpretation. I shall 
begin by stating this tradition, then I shall recount tm various 
divergent interpretations of it, and finally I shall exami~ these 
interpretations and give mp own reconstruction. 
Diels 8,2: n •••• Two types of pythagorean philosophy and two 
I 
kinds of philosophers, theql(ovC'-}'47"'Ao'- and the f«cctP?ftt:t"'icKtJ<. • 
Of these the f~tJ?/A""' 4o~ were admitted to be pythagorean by the 
• ~ ll ... 
others, but the qi(OVVj---~~~ I'IC 0 ' were not,nor to have derived their 
2 doctrine from pythagoras, but from llippasus." 
\ 
Diels 8,11: Hippasus is called nthe dKtHI(JIO-ftct.. rLK 0 f of the 
• ~h ' pythagoreans", and again we have "the~o"""r4 ,.cKo' around H11lppasus." 
Dials 8,15:"Pythagoras and the~t:tl7f'Gt'l'cl(•,' around him" who called 
' , one ·Of the three means t; ft""-v,.' ~ , but this was called the 
harmonic mean by those around Archytas and Hippa.sus." 
These references agree 3 in naming the two schools respectively the 
f417ftA14-I{o't and the d/(ocJtrf"t:t'1"ciCa( , and in associating the 
former with pythago~as, the latter with Hippasus.Tha.t the followers 
of H1ppasus were what might be called heretics appears not only 
denied from the fact that the othlers RB~XJ.Ui them the title of genuine 
pythagoreans, but also from the tradition that Hippasus was expelled 
from the brotherhood, so to speak, since he put into writing the 
mystical ).oyor in order to caiumniate the pythagoreans, 4 and 
perished in the sea fo~ his impiety, that is, either for revealing 
the 111scription of the dodecahedron in a sphere or for revealing 
1 ts construction. 5 
Now all critics with whose works I am acquainted agree on an 
interpretation of this evidence in a way contrary to what i o/stated 
by it, with the exception of Miss Fpeeman whom I follow and whose 
view will be dealt with separately. Influenced no doubt by the 
collection of pythagorean catch-words and cant sayings under the 
, ' p ' title ofa.l(ovo-ftDt.,..c:~c. and a secondary meaning forjte:e 7fta.TcKof 
as 'mathamat1c1an', or perhaps more generally as 'belonging to the 
1. sea page 9 above, especially Cherniss, cited itl note 12. 
2. Compare Porphyry loc. cit. :"For there was a double form of his 
teaching, and of those resorting to him some were called ft4~r4..­
'l'" £I( o l . , others dl( t>VIT ftr< lc. ~ o ~ , and the ftec."7f!"' rc Kot. 
learnt the more accane tenets and the s1gn1:fii cance of his teach-
ing worked out in detail, whereas the J,.l(,vtTftct 7-t.Ko~ heard only 
summaries without more exact explanation." This suggests some-
thing quite different from what Iamblichus records and will be 
discussed later. 
3. But Cameron, The Pythggorean 
lection 24 note 15, says that 
!orde~. 4. Dials 8,3. 
Background of the Theory of Recol-
Iambl1chus elsewhere reverses the 
5. Diels 8,4. 
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sciences', Cornford1 a,ppliesdK.out'f'-"'r'Jto: to the original, the 
religious s1do of pythagoreanism, and, in termsj of his own inter-
pretation of the history of the sect, he applies the term ftai'JfLa' 
TtKOc to the scientific wing, the Number-Atomists. Following him, 
although rejecting his Number-Atomism and disagreeing in cert&in 
2 
other respects, Raven agrees that two strands of Pythagorea.nisn 
fell apart, religious instruction persisting among thetl.I!Pu~f4-A1'1Col , 
and scientific investigation being undertaken by the f-ttl1fL¢7"c.K.ol.. • 
Jl.long similar lines Robin 3 accepts a schism at the end of the v. 
contury, and calls the A.IC.ov,. ftl:c.IC..I(pc' the devout believers, the 
- 4 f"~~~.A,ft-ea.Tt..KPl the men of science. Fi~ally, Frank ~ames those 
preserving the true pythagoreanism the aKf?utl"jA~J& T«..koc , and calls 
the f'"l7 f'4-,.,1Cot heretics, "a>-called pythagoreans'', whose 
tradition went back not to Pythagoras but to Hippasus. These all 
agree in two respects, which are at variance with the evidence x.i:t:e® 
cited: Firstly, Cornford gives 490 B.C. as the date of Number-
Atomism; Raven makes his men of science posterior to Zeno, which is 
even later; Robin talks of the end of the v. centlllry and ·the second 
gene. ration of pythagoreans; and Frank dates his "S:>-called pytha.go-
reansn at about the time of Democritus, which is later still - but 
~the evidence quoted, at least that of Porphyry and Diels 8,15 
,...~1 implies that this divi s1on iell within the life-time of pythagoras, 
]..AI~ and he must have been very old to have been alive a.t the turn of 
Jr-'~ the century, not to mention the end of the V. century. But since we 
do not know the date of his death, and Hippssus is such a shadowy 
figure that we cannot argue from any assumed date for his life-
' 5 
time - indeed, Frank has pointed out that there were probably 
several persons bearing this name - tlUs objection is not conclu-
. / 
sive. However, the secqnd objection is that it is pythagoras who 
is associated in the evlidence cf,ted with thef'"''7f'4.,..,Ko/- these 
are said to have been the acknowledged pythagoreans - whereas it 
I ' ' is the QJ(ovrft"' l'"_clf "' who were the followers of Hippasus 
and not generally recor{~1sed as genuine pythagoreans. The above 
'· 
critics, then, cannot be correct in their interpretation of the 
meaning of the words. For this rea~on I prefer jhe· explanation 
given by Miss Freeman, which also better suits the facts. 
6 Following Porphyry, Miss Freeman says that pythagoras taught 
his most advanced doctrines to a select group only,ft:uP?fe-4 1tKoc.' , 
which according to the meaning of the root verb jtt::t~"'8tt'J/w she 
translates students, while there was an outer circle who were 
allowed to hear only rough outlines or heads of the teachings 
1. Classical Quarterly XVI.l39. 2. Fythagoreans and Eleatics 2. 
3. Greek Thought 55-6. 4. Plato und d!ie sogenannten Pythagoreer 
note 174 & page 69. 5. Op. cit. 261-2: he appears as the 
grEPldfather of Pythagoras (D1og.VIII .. l), as successor of Pythago-
ras (Dials 7:Al & 3; 8,la,3,4,5,13), as contemporary of Democritus 
(Diels 8,12; 55~1), and as founder of a mathematical school (Diel~ 
8,2,4,15). 6. Op. cit. 74. 
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• ~Lt. ~ It:. ' which 
without exact expihanatioss, ttKO" o---r -• ' oc.. , WfHi again she 
. , 
translates according to the meaning of the root verb ciCtH.It..J as 
1 Auditors. The two later branches of Pythagoreans cannot be traced 
d1eectly to these two grades, but when Hippasus founded a branch of 
2 
the school, which did not derive from pythagoras at a.ll, (here she 
deals t;ith the evidence of Iamblichlb.s), they were called dllou~-
I 
.,-c.l(o c. , because they were thought to be the successors of the 
pythagorean outer ring of pupils who were not initiated into the 
advanced doctrines. 
The matter.is really of little importance¢, but Miss Freeman's 
interpretation keeps closest to the evidence, and if we re,B.toin her 
titles for the two grades within the ciccle of pythagoras for the 
two groups of la.ter pythag oreana, then we have the Students as the 
true followers of pythagoras, i.e. the religious wing who retained 
the iHit~~tuJoctrines of pythagoras, and the Auditors, i.e. the 
scientific wling who believed something dttfferent from the original 
teachings of the Pythagoreans and whose claim to be called Pythago-
rean was challenged by their rivals. This, then, s1t.pports and 
explains Arist otle' s use of the restrict! ve 1(-.).tJ,:~cvo< ( so-vallee1) 
they called themselves Pythagoreeus, but he hints at the Maim doubt-
fulness o.f their claim by me2n s of this epithet. But I Yli sh,.tto deal 
here only with the Students, the true successors of pythagoras, and 
for this purpose another trad!tion must be examined. 
Cylon. Iamblicbus4 records a tradition that Pythag oras was 
driven out of Croton by Cylon, and aLl his followers were slain 
except Archippus and Lysis; Archippus w.ant back to his native town, 
Tarentum, and Lysis went to Greece, first to Achaea, then tolttebes, 
. 5 
where Epaminondas heaitil him. Other Pythag oreans (apparently from a 
different district .of Italy)' reso~ted to Rhegium, but tre political 
' 
situation growing worse, all except Archippus left Italt. The most 
zealous were Phanton, Echecra.te s, Polymnastor, Diocle s and Xenophilm-
who kept their original customs and ~iR~ies. SUch is the substance 
of Iambl1chus' report, but it obviously telescopes ~veral genera-
tions, since, if Lysis taught Epaminonda.s he could not have been a 
contemporarry of Pythagoras, a.s the account implies, and the most 
. 6 
zealous pythagoreans here named are stated by Diogenes Laert1us to 
have belonged to the 9th or lOth generation of Pythagoreaas, to have 
been the last of the pythag oreans, to have been known by Ari sto-
·xenus, 1\'ho lived in the IV century B.C. 
Now Plutarch 7 has m mething similar: When the brotherhoods of 
the Pythag oreans., overcome by faction, were driven out of tae 
various cities, the followers of Cylon fired a house in Metapontium 
wh'ere the Pytht:g orea.ns who were still banded together had gathered 
l.Op. cit. 76. 2. Qp. cit. 75 & 85. 3. 1»3e pages 30-1 above. 
4. D1els 4,16. 5. But Frank, op. cit. 294 n.l thinks this last 
point is a fiction. 6. Diels 4,10. 
7. Diels 32A4a .. 
...-'• 
164/ 
for a meeting, "nd all were des1troyed there except ¥~fit~~tl~ and 
tysis, both being young men., who broke through the flames and 
escaped. This Diels dismisses ad lac. as a fiction (Romanhaft ), 
appnrently referring to the substitution of Philo¢:laus' name for 
that of Archippus, since he refers back to the account of Iambli-
ch'lils. 
Now the interpretationrof this tra.dition by modern critf:ics 
fall into three groups, those de,ting the commotion of Cylon within 
thefifetime of pythagoras, those d8t:ing it by using Plutarch, and 
those concentf.rating on the common element in the two accounts, 
namely, Lysis. Robin1 thinks Cylon set fire to the house :~ilit~e 
seems to place in Croton about 470 B.C., only Archippus and LYsis 
escoping, and pythagoras removing to Metapontium. 2 But Pythagoras 
was 40 years old when he left Sarnos in the time of the tyeant 
Polycrates, 54q, for Croton in Italy, 3 which would ma~e him 110 
. . 4 
years old tiln 470. Hence, as Miss Freeman says, this event could 
not have taken place in his lifetime. Raven 5 dates the event 
bet we en 4 4 0 and 4 30 as rno st consistent with Philo lau s being a. 
young man and escaping to Thebes, which he is known to hnve left 
before 399,(? But Miss Freeman 7 .agrees w1 th Diels thrlt it is unlike-
ly that Philola.us was a refugee from Croton, and indeed Burnet8 
cites evidence that the school at Rheg1um broke up when Philo¢laus 
went to Thebes, pointing to a different persecution of the 
Pythagoresns. Thirdly, in ~MX)' Pauly Wissowa' s encyclopedia 9cylon 
is said to have been a young nobleman who was annoyed by PythagoraE 
and with his dependants set fite to the house of Milo in Metapon-
th.e. tltum, where .t'Ythagorean.s had gathered, and only two escaped, one 
being Lysis: The rfkp continued until the last days of the pytha-
goreans. The persecution is dated between 410 and 395 B.C., but 
Cylon surely couJd nothave still been alive at so late a date. 
. 10 However that may be, Lysis as an old man. was Eparninondas• teacher. 
Lysis was born according to Zeller not before 420, but the author 
of the monograph prefers Rohde's date, 440. Lysis must have died 
before 379, when the persecthtion of the Pythagoreans speead from 
Italy to ·rhebes. Epaminondas wns born ::~ccording to Pomtow in 418, 
but in 430 or 427 according to Unger. If we add that the teacher 
of Philolaus also was this LY si s11 we shall have exhausted the 
relevant evidence. 
As it stands,· Irnablichus' record cannot be accepted for the 
reasons ment.ioned above. But 1 t ca.n be regarded as a. cornpre ssed 
1. Greek Thought 51-52. · 2. Diels 4,13 :"When Pythagoras had 
lived at Croton for 20 years he removed to Metapontium." 
3. Diels 4,8. 4o Op. cit. 78 note 1. 5. Op. cit. 95. 
6. Phaedo 61DE. 7. Op. cit. 220. 8. Early Greek Philo-
sophy 319. 9. Paulys Realencyclopfidie der Cla.ssischen Wissen-
schaft XI.2461 s. KJ"i\~.VY 2 .. 
10. Op. cit. Vo 2675 s. 'Epaminondas. 11. rnss Freeman, op.cit.220 
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1 
statement of four different time periods, thus: i) Pythagoras was 
driven out of Croton by Cylon. Since Pytht=g ovas came to Croton at 
the age of 40 in the year 540 and removed to Metapontium 20 years 
leter, it is quite possible that he was driven out of Croton by 
Cylon in 520 and then settled in Metapontium, where he died some 
years la.ter. The sea.t of the school V~~ould then have been Metapon-
tium,. ii) All pythagoras• followers were slain except Archippus 
and Lysis, Lysis procee.ding to Theb~s, where Epaminonda.s heard him. 
Iamblichus does not f:!B.Y that. Pythagorus was f'live, nor that Cylon 
wes alive. It is possible that Plutarch is referring to this when 
he gives the more circumstantial nccount of the followers of Cylon 
setting fire to a house in Metapont.ium, only Plllilolaus and Lysis 
escaping, but he seems to have induded Philolaus mistakenly, and f 
for this reason the young a.ge that he attributes to these men may 
also be erroneous. Now if this event took place in 410 and Rohde's 
date for Lysis• birth -440 - is correct (olthough I personally 
would have preferred a much earlier date), Lysis would have been 
30 years of age and so old enough to have taught Philolaus, perhaps 
10 years his junior. However that mzy- be, Lysis escaped to Thebest 
and if Epaminohdas was born in 418 (Pomtow}, then, in 410, a.l though 
LYsis could not be said to have,f been an old man (which is why I 
should prefer a date for his birth about 20 years earlier than 
Rohde' s), Epaminond:> s would have¢' been a youth, wh1 ch would s1uare 
with Cornelius Nepos 2 that this youth preferred the society of the 
unsmiling )'tlld man above that of his fellows, and by 'youth' (adules-
cens) he clearly meens an age aboU,t 16 ·or 17 since he cont1nues3 
that "after he h<>d become an ephebus ••.• ", which rean'S the age 
between 18 and 20 years. Further, in 362, when Epaminondas died in 
battle, this dnte of birth would make him 56, which is not too old 
for an active life. iii) Other Pythc.gorean s resorted to Rhegium, 
but the pdlitical situation growing worse, all except Archippus 
left Italy. It is reasoheJble to follow Burnet here and include 
Philolaus among these exiles from Rhegium. This event may have taken 
place at any time between the i~~~lr at Met·apontium in 410 and 
Philolaus• return from Thebes to Italy before 399. iv) The most 
zealous of the Pythagoreans, Pha.nton, etc., belong to a later 
genere tion, the. last of the Pythagorean school nccording to Aristo-
xenus. If the Echecrotes of this list is the same as the Echecrates 
of the Phaedo, he would seem to belong to th{next generation after 
Philolaus, which egrees with his hrJ.Ving been the puj>il ofPhilolaus! 
The Rel151oue Wing. This tr8dition is not in 1ts~lf of any 
importance, but 1 t is a pointer tbnt the Pythegoreans involved in 
these civil disturbances were more lil(ely to have been the Students, 
the genuine followers of the politico-religious school founded by 
1. Here I largely follow Miss Freeman, op. cit. 77-8 & 220-1. 
2, XV. Epeminondas 11.2. 3. Op~ cit. ii.4. 4. Diels 32A4. 
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pytha.goras, than the Auditors who made a doubtful claim to be 
pythagorean e.nd were rr ther a mathematical and scientific school. 
Further, Iamblichus' account coneihudes, ro ftn' as it was quoted 
above, w1 th the words, "Who kept their original customs and studie s" 
which confirms the surmise that the Pythagoresns here discussed 
were the genuine followers of pytha.goras. To this Diel s1 adds that 
they introduced into Greece the notion that the soul is immortal 
and undergoes transmigration - they wereff then, a religious rather 
than a scientific school. In the next place, this cnnnot be a. 
complete list of all Pythegoreans, for we know that Archytas was 
2 
in Tarentum at the time of Plato's first visit to Magna Graecia, 
Eurytus, Philolaus and Hippo sus were roughly his contemporcr ie s, 
and there were other pyth:agoreans who seem.to have lived at about 
the same time, but, except th••t Philolaus is mentioned, none of these 
others n~0named in this tradition, although it implies that 
those who are cited were well-b1own. I suggest that this omission 
is due to the tradition dealing only with the Students, wb.ereas 
Archytos, Eurytus and the rest were not gaiillne Pythagoreans at all, 
but Auditors, and so had no place in Iamblichus' list here. 
This list, then, deals with the Students, but unfortunately 
1 t affords no evidence concerning their beliefs apart from their 
introduction into Gre8ce of tra.nsmigrat ion, and the suggestion in 
the vague expression, "they kept their original cudt>ms and studies", 
that they pre served Pythagoras' Way of Life \Vi th 1 ts food t~boo s 
and practised c9fw~c' t:t • doubtless. the observation of nnalogie s of . 
Number in the Universe. 3we co.n add~ yo this the picture of Philolaus4 
. ~· 5 
as given by Plato in his Phaedo and~~perhaps the Gorgias, where he 
;" 
appears purely as a religious te~cher, concerned chie;l:fly with the 
soul and its relstion to the gods end the Underworld. But the 
question of PhilolBus' teaching is one of great uncertainty and. 
' will be left over for discussion below. This much, however, is 
clear: that history knew of a religious wing in pythagoreanism, 
th:Jt these were the Students as distinguished from the Auditors, 
and they pre served the original Pythagorean customs and teachings, 
among whiCh Transmigration c2n be named. This squares exactly with 
what Aristotle a.ttributes to the Theologians of Metaphy s1 cs 109la34-
b3, c.nd so corroborates his evidence 6 in this respect, and further 
1. Given as 4,8a in Diels Vol. I. page xx-xxi. 
2. For thic, see chapter 3 below. 3. Cp. Camerq:rn, The Pythagorean 
Background of the Theory of Recollection 51 :"To both Philolaus 
and the Pythagorean s the world 1 s revealed a.s the physical 
embodi,Jment of Number." 4. Field, Plato and his Contemporaries 
179 : 11 Philolaus appea rsf/ only e.s a moral Pnd religious tea c her", 
Frank, Plato und die sogenannten Pytheg oreer 68 :}V11 Wha.t Plato 
indicates for Philolaus is throughout Orphic - no trace of any 
concern with mathematics or science. u , 
5. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy 321 note, takes the K.of-·+6( oft 
Gorgias 483AB to represent Philolaus, although this is denied by 
Frank, op. cit. 298-301. 6. Se~ pages 60-64 above. 
./-
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corroborates by implication his knowledge of another school, not 
genuinely Pythagorean by.t only so-called, who must hm-e been the 
Auditors. And to these we now turn. 
b) Auditor§• Now, concerning the tradition of a split in 
pythagoreanismj into students end Auditors declt with Flbove, it 
might be argued that there is no real evidence in the tradition 
that this entailed a chm•ge in respect of their met2.physics, and, 
even if this could be taken as implied, the evidence does no't state 
th~t this change was effected subsequent to the time of Zeno, much 
less that it was effected in order to obviate his crit1c1sms,which 
is the theme of this chapter, and finally no in~ cation whatsoever 
is given of the nature of the assumed change, or, what comes to. 
much the same thing, of the tenets held by the Auditors. I shall 
however attempt to obviate these objections by showing what changes 
in pythagorean! sm would hazve¢ been ne _ce ssary in order to avoid 
Zeno' s paradoxes and by detailing the systems, if they can be so 
Y~~igt of the tradit~onal founder of the sect of Aud4tors, namely 
Hippasus, and of those philosophers associAted with him. If it can 
then be shown that the views of these philosophers form a coherent 
doctrine, and that this doctrine conforms to the reouirements laid 
down for a system that is to avoid the criticism of Zeno, and 
incidentolly of Parrnenides too, then the line of my argument will 
be that since this doctrine is thot of Hippasus Bnd his asseic1ates, 
it is the system of the Auditors; since it squares with the deduc-
tion of what j_s required to obviate' Zeno' s critidism, it is post-
Zenonic, and because the system represents a change from the 
original teachings of Pytho.gort' s, 1 t avoids Zeno' s critic ism 
t 
because it was an answer thereto. Since we hGve al~eady shown what 
1tere the pre-Zenoni c tene t.s of Pytha(ltoraani sm, and since the 
doctrines of the Auditors which will be set forth presently will 
clearly represent fundamental differences therefrom, it will have 
been demonstrated thA.t there was a chrmge in Pytha goreanism, and 
this ch2pter will conclude by Showing thnt Aristotle's conceptions 
;-;/ 
of the philosophy of the Italians - that of the fludi tors -:/ way 
histori cally correct. · 
~LDeduction gf tho post-Zononic pythagoreanis~. It will be 
recalled that the Early Fythagoree>nism derived its two principles, 
the Limit nnd the Unlimited, from the Primal Monad, the lP.tter as 
the other than the One, the former as the One re<'luplicated. Further 
Parmenides criticised firstly the unexpla:dtned origin of the One or 
Primal Monad; secondly the der1V€'tion of the Unlimited on the 
grounds tha.t, since the One IS, wh0t is other thr'n the One (that is, 
what is other than Be5.ng) is Not-Being, is nothing; thirdly, the 
derivation of the Limit on the grounds tha.t if the One is one it 
cannot become many, cannot be reduplicl3ted, and also that the One 
must be continuous and not discrete, qs it would be if reduplicated 
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into an aggregate of un1 ts. To show how it was pot1ible to avoid 
these three criticisms, it will be comvenpiant to leave the first 
until last. Now the objection. that the Unlimited must be Not-Being 
will always hold true as long as the One is the first principle, 
for if Being is one whatever is other than the One, sc. the'Unlimi-
ted, ll')Ust needs bp Not-Being • .H.ence, the first task of the Pythago-
reans was to start from¢' a different conception of the Monad. 1 
Cornfo r d2 is correct that the le,ter pythagoreanism had to drop the 
evolution of the Opposites, J .. imi t and Unlimited, from the One, and 
this meant that inster-d of the One the Opposites, Limit and Unlimi-
ted, were ultimate. Being is thus assumed to be many and PluraliSID 
becomes possible. •rhe Unlimited is no longer wh0t is other than the 
Qne, but is origina.l; the Limit is no longer the One reduplicated, 
but :i .. s original. Being in at least two, am both the Limit and the 
Unlimited e.re Being. Thus, by assuming two ultimate principles, 
pytha.goreE~nism could escape the objection<ttboth of' Parmenides' 
A 
criticisms, thct the Unlimited as Not-Being was nothing and that the 
Limit could not be the One reduplicr:.ted since the One could nnly 
be one. There remained the first objection, how could the One be 
explained.: Raven3 has pointed out that the One. could now be derived 
as the first product of the Limit and the Unlimj.ted .. Another ~RXlxmv 
innovntion would have to be the distinction between the Void or 
Unlimited and Air, since Empedocles4 had disc41vered aborL 455 B.C. 
that these were two separate conceptions. Hence, all that was 
necessary to avoid Pormenides• crit:Io..;isms was to give up the deriva-
tion of the Limit end Unlimited from the One and to postulate these 
as primary, making the One their first product; and if this change 
was effected sub_sequent to thefime o.f Zeno, we expect tha.t the 
further change YJa s made of' distinguishing the Unlimited from Air. 
As for the objection that generation was impossible, this could no 
longer be held since, the One being derived, all other things also 
could be derived in their turn. 
Pnrmenides• criticism of the discreteness of the Limit if it 
was constit'lted by an aggregate of units was worked out in detail by 
zeno, and his objections, being nearly all ultimately based dn the 
argument that Plurality could n<llt be composed of e continuous 
Unlimited and a discrete Limit, had to be met. Plura.lity could be 
either continuous or discrete, but not both together. This confusion 
in Pythagoresnism rested on their fundamental conception of things 
as Numbers, that is, that their constituent parts were numerical 
units separated by geometrical, i.e. infinitely divliible, space. 
Make these constituent units themsail:ves geometrical in nature, t·hat 
is, conceive them no longer as indi vis 11 ble megni tudes but a,s truly 
1. Cp. Cornford, Ct:Jmbrilflge Anc1.ent History IV.vi1.551 : 11 The two 
schools part company in the early v,. century, starting from a 
.different conception of tho M0 nad.'i 2. Pluto and P<>rmenides 59. 
3. Op. cit. 118 & 124. 4. DielA 21BlOO. 
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geometrical pointE, and Plurality becomes altogether continuous• 
and 'L.eno/' s paradoxes lose their effect, and Parmenides' criticism 
of the discreteness of the one as well. Hence, to r>v:oid Zeno' s 
criticisms, Pyth&gorecni sm had to abandon its equation of things 
1 . 
with Numbers, and redefihe the point. Now Euclid is generally 
accepted, in certa1n p·~rts of his vvork, to represent pythagorean 
arithmetic and geometry, and while he regards Number as an aggre-
gate of units, the point is defined as pure positlion with no 
magnitude. Thus, the Line becomes, not a. succession of points, sc. 
with magnitude, but Extension bounded by points, sc. without magni-
2 
tude. Logic reouires thst, if the Line is Extension 'ounded by 
points, 3 then the Plane is Extension bounded by lines, and the 
Solid is Extension bounded by pl&nes. f:O the connection between 
Prithmetic rnd geometry or physics is severed. For things are no 
longer constituted from numerical units, but by Extension bounded 
by surfaces and only ultimately bounded by points, but not at all 
built up of points. Zeno is met: the Line is continuous and not at 
. cannot 
all d1screte, and body EiH oe at once both infinitely large and 
infinitesimally small because no longer constituted out of un1 ts 
either with or without magnitude, but it is pure Extension. 
Thus, we deduce for post-Zenonic J?ythagoreenism., that it 
postulated two elements as primary, the Limit andthe Unlimited,of 
which the Limit constituted the bounds in the case of any entity, 
whether Number, Line, Plane, or St)lid, and the Unlimited we s in all 
cases Extension. Ihe first product of these two elements wa.s the 
One, Numbers were constituted. by limiting a background ( )<'~;?ec..} f 
by means of. units, Lines by Extension bounded by geometrical¢po1nts, 
Planes by Extension bounded by lines, and Solids by Extension 
bounded by planes. Since bodies are no¢longer composed of .numerical 
units, things are no longer Numbers; since the bounds of things 
were geometrical points, the point wo.s no longer a unit having 
. 
position. We have here, then, a completely different system from 
tha.t of Early J?ytha goreani sm, and one, further, which met the 
critic~sm both of Parrnenides and of Zeno. 
!)Hippa sus end the Aud.i tors. Now the Auditors were dist,~gu-
1. Taylor, Plato the Man and his Work 505 :"Zeno' s criflticism could 
be met by severing the ari thmeticel connection.·" Haven, op. cit. 
55 :"Zeno's etta.ck resulted in the separation of ::-rithmetic and 
geometry." Cp. 76-77. Also cp. Cornford, Pll'lto and Parmenides 60: 
nAs a result of Zeno, arithmetic was separated from geometry: 
arithmetic remained discretef geometry continuous." B~t I do not 
agree that this means that the point flowed into the line (p.l2), 
whatever that may mean. Raven, op. cit.108-9, takes this last as 
contemporary V'ilth the Platonists. 
2. Raven, Classical Quarterly N.S.l.l4S:ttin deference to Zeno later 
Pythcgoreans admitted two points in contact could not constitute 
a line, and kept the line=2 by rnEking points without magnitude 
the limits of a line in e continuum of infinitely divisible 
space." 3. In E.ll cases Extension is the Unlimited, as its 
name implies, and the limit or bound is each case is the Limit. 
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ished as the followers not of pythagorPs but of Hippasus, and one 
would expect to derive some conception of the beliefs of this school 
from an examina.tlon of thefer>.ets attributed to Hippasus and those 
philosophers who are associated with his name. I shall first detail 
the tenets of each of these in turn, then show that the bel.iefs of 
these philoro phers are substantially the same, constituting in fact 
what may be called a school or sect, and finallY I shall show that 
this system squares with the tenets deduced above as a possible 
answer to the criticisms of Parmenide s and Zeno - that in short the 
Auditors were a school that not merely came after Zeno but held a 
form of Pythagorean.ism modified in order to meet Eleatic crit.iltsrn. 
In the following account of the beliefs· of these philo oo pher s, 
however, I shall largely confin4myself to what seems relevant to 
the main course of the argument. 
1 2 Hippasus. Hippasus v;::: s of Metapontium or Croton. He wrote a. 
book celumniating the Pythagoreans, 3 a.pparently on account of his 
disgrace as the result of his revealing one of thei. r ~~~iiii! the 
4 inscription of the dodecahedron in a sphere. Of greet importance 
is the fact that he dettoted himself to mathematics, instructinp~ 
5 IJ:hoodorus and Hippocrates. The branch: of mathematics in which he 
seems to have specialised was t.he mechanics of sound, for he made 
four bronze discs of equal size in diarpeter but differing in 
thic~ess in the ratios of 4:3, 3:2, and 2:1, which when struck 
6 
sounded a conoord, and he demonstr{~ted thjs concord (the octave) 
by filling vessels with eater according to these ratios and :xtriRk1nE 
striking the vessels. 7 His followers a.dvanceq this study of 
harmonics by relating the speed and the slowness of the musical notes 
8 . 
to these ratios. Finally, one of his tenets was that Number was 
9 
the first e:xGmple of Co snogony, which implies the.t the generation 
of Number was at the same time the generation of the Cosmos. 10 
How this VJas applied will be discussed under Philolaus below. 
Arch~ta.§_. One of the teachers of Archytas was Hippasus, so 
that it is to be expected that the teechings of Archytas resembled 
ll those of Hippasus. He vvas F.J. Taren tins, the cantempors.ry of Plato. 
He seems to have constructed all things from two elements, since 
he 1 s coupled with Plato in respect of the Grea. t ana an all, which in 
1. Dials 8,1. 2. Dials 8,2. 
4. Dials 8,4 bis.. 5. Diels 8,4. 
7. D1els 8,13, with similar evidence 
8. Dials 8,13. 9. Diels 8,11. 
3. Dials 8, 3. 
6. Diels 8 1 12. 
from Nicomachus in 8,14. 
10. Cp., but in different connections, Cornf'ord, Plato nnd ParmenideE 
18 rmd Hoven, pythagoreens '1nd Eleot ics 148 .. 
11. Dials 35Al. 
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1 Archyta.s was represented by Not-Being. Further, the One 1 s both 
Odd and Even, 2 and the Decad embraces all Number. 3 But most of the 
evidence 1 s concerned with his· studi e s in mathematics, 4 vthich 
concerns his finding the means between two given lines as a step 
5 in the process of doubling the cube; in ha.rlJionics, showing the 
ratios between the notes in the scale and between three types of 
:the 
scales, the enharmonic, the diatonic, and:ti~ chromatic, and the 
connection between the rate of vibration of a string and the height 
6 
or depth of the note; and in a.stronomy, chiefly concerned with 
the speed of the stars and their risings and settings. We might 
notice that mathematics is connected with harmonics by determining 
7 the intervals between the notes e.ccording to ratios, and harmonics 
8 
with astronomy apparently by comparing tre speeds of the stars 
with those of vibrating strings in re~ation to their distance from 
the centre of the universe and the length of the string respectj.ve-
ly. There is, it is true, no trace of this in the references quoted, 
but these are so interpreted by Ross9 and by Frank. 10 one last 
re1eve.nt fact is that Aristotle seems to have found a connection 
between the philo cophy of Archyto s and that expounded by Plato in 
11 the 1'1me.eus, for according to Hesychius he wrote a volume about 
this, where 1 Timaeus• meo.n s not a. Lo crian philo m pher but Plato's 
dialogue, as appears from the preamble to section XXXI in Rose's 
Fragments of Aristotle. 12 • 
Philolaus. Besides Hippasus, another teacher of Archytas was 
13 -Philolaus. The evidence in his case is particularly puzzling. 
on the one hand, as we hnve stated above, 14 he seems to have been 
little more than a religious teacher, apparently belonging to the 
sect of the students, wl::t.o are called by Aristotle the Theologians; 
on the other hand, his fragments and the evidence of post-Aristote-
lian writers show him to ho~vefbeen a 'scientist• with beliefs 
similar to those of Hippasus and Archytas dealt with above. Miss 
Freeman15 stetes that modern opinion ranges from acceptance to 
1. Diels 35A23 :"Plato cells the Great and &'mall, Not-Being, the 
Irregular, and all .things which through these incline to the same 
place, Motion. But it seems absurd to call this very thing Motion. 
For when Motion is present, that which is in it appears to move, 
but though the Unequal or Irregular exists, to insist that it 
moves is ridiculous. For it is better to call these things cnuses, 
e.s does Archytas." That is, Archytas calls Not-Being and the 
Irregular, causes, but Plato calls· them Motion, because wha.tever 
is in them appear to move,Thus Archytas held Not-Being as a cause. 
2. Diels 35A21. 3. Diels 35B5. I+ ... Diels 35Al4, 15, 19 and 
Horace :tm I.xxviii.l-2 in 35A3: 11ma.r1s et terrae ••• mensorem.tr 
5. Diels 35Al6, 17, 19a ond 35Bl. 6. Horae~, op. cit. 5-6; 
11 aer1as tentasse domos animoque rotundum Percurrisse polum. ·" 
7. Diels 35B2. 8. In D.1els 35Bl these studies are said to be 
sisters. 9. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphyd cs I.145 ad 986a.2. 
10. Plt-1to und die sogenannten pythagoreer 30-35. 11. Diels 35A13. 
12. Page 168 - so also Diels ad 36,2, that in D1ogenes' and 
Hesychius' catalogues of Aristotle's works the 'Excerpts from the 
Timaeus and Archyta.s 1 refers to an epitome of Plato 1 s diaogue. 
13. Diels 32A3. 14. See page,S 166. 15. Op. cit. 221. 
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rejection of his fragments as a. whole, but one of the most recent 
wr1 ters, Ra.ven, 1 points out that most of his fragments are spurious 
and other evidence is la t.e snd unreliable, and most modern writers 
whose works I have read2 and who deal with the subject a.re unani-
mous that his fra.gmen ts are forgeries. Indeed, Raven3 precludes the 
possible a.rgumeht of no smoke without fire by showing that certn1n 
key fragments are in fact forgeries draWn from Aristotle's account 
of the Italian philosophy - but not quite consistently, for he 
assumes4 that Philolaus would hav~eld a. Pythagoreanism which had 
suffered modifications as the result of zeno• s crit1c1t;;m, and 
supposes that he held ma.tter to be continuous because this was the 
view of Eurytus. But if his fragments and the other evidence adduced 
by Diels are unreliable, it seems better to assume that the picture 
o" Philolaus given by Plato 5 18 more correct than one which rests 
on undernonstrable surmises. Nevertheless, there is this much truth 
in Raven's procadure, that such evidence would have been known by 
the Ancients to have refle.cted the views of some Pythagorean school 
or other, whether it': was that of Philoalus or not, and with this in 
mind 1 t may not be amiss to include here a. review of what wc..s 
attributed to th1 s 'Philolaus.' 
He came' from Croton 6 or perhaps Tarentum, 7 and passed over to 
Thebes, Vihere Cebes ;b~~iitthim,8 returning before the death of 
.Socrates, and possibly. being with Eurytus in Italy when Plato sailed 
thither from Cyrene, if this tradition is true. 9His ultimate Hi:emm 
elements were the Limit and Unlimited, 10 and. the first compound of 
11 these was the One, which in one aspect is the Even-Odd because 
derived from both Odd and Even m1xed.together, 12 and in another 
- 13 
aspect is the Hearth, of the Whole or Universe, a central fire 
eround whic hj1! the 10 heavenly bodies move, one of which is the 
Counter-ea.rth. 14 This so-called Philolaic system explains the tenet 
. 15 
that Number was the first example of Cosmogony. For the Central 
. 16 
Fire was One, the Earth 2, and the Sun 7, etc., so that the genera-
tion of each Number wa.s the generation of the heaven~· bocB:ies. 
17 ' Further, this One is the beginning of all things, and in geometry 
1. Pythagoreans and Eleatics,93. 
2. Frank, Plato und cUe. sogenannten Pythagoreer 139; Raven, loc. cit.; 
Ross, Plato's Theory of Idee.s 161; Bywater, Journal of Philology 
I. 53; Cherniss, Aristotme' s Criticism of Pre-Socratic Philosophy 
386; but Miss Freeman, The Pre-Socratic Philorophers, A Compan41in 
to Diels 229, seems to accept some at least of these fragments, 
and Taylor, Plato the Man and his Work. 436, ditto.· 
3. Op. cit. 98-lOO. 4. mp .. tcit. 101-3. 5. See page 166 above 
6. Diels 32Al. 7. Diels 32A4.& 6. 8. Diels 32Ala. 
9. Diels i2xt 32A5. 10. Diels 32A9; 32Bl & 2. 11. Diels. 32B7. 
12. Diels 32B5. 13. Diels 32B7. 14. Diels 32A16 & 17. 
15. See page 170 above. 16. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics II.484; 
but Robin, Greek Thought 64, has Counter-earth = 1, Earth = 2, SUn= 
= 7; and Raven, op. cit. 169-172, makes the first generated the 
Central Fire, then the Coun.ter-earth, Earth, Moon, SUn (so = 5), 
five ple.nats, and Fixed ~"tars, in that order. 17. Diels 32B8. 
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the Line 1s bounded by 2 points, the SUrface (triangle) by 3, and 
the Solid (teftrahedron) by 4 points, and 1,2,3, and 4, make lO,the 
. l 2 
perfect Number. This 1s the Tetractys. The five regular solids 
are associated with the four cosmic elements, Fire, Earth, Air, and 
Water, and the &lip of the Universe. 3 
~rytu.s. Another of Philolaus• pupils besides Archytas was 
Eurytus. He came from either Croton, Metapontium or Tarentum,accord-
4 ing to different accounts. He would seem to have been younger than 
Philola.us, since he vw. s his pupil, and also be cause he 1 s said to 
have been ·told of a miraculous voice from the tomb of Philolaus 
who had been dead for many years. 5 He was possibly older than 
6 Archytas, since the latter reported a certain procedure of his. 
Thi~was to nimitate the figures of living things with pebbles, as 
some people bring Numbers into the forms of triangle and square", 
and so, by regarding nnumbers as the causes of substance and of' 
Being .... ~as boundaries, as points are of spatial magnitudes, n he 
worked out what the numre rs were of man, horse, plant, etc. 7 The 
Pseudo-Alexander sa!ls Rd loc. that he would take green, black, red, 
and other coloured stones; outline the figure of a man or other 
living creature in lime on a .wa.ll, and fill in the face, hands and 
other parts with these pebble s; and by counting the pebble s used 
he would thus determine the number of man. Raven8 explains that the 
surfaces characterising au object were dllineated in colours to 
bring out the perspective, and the pebbles were. used to determine 
the bounds of these· surfaces. 9 A count ge.ve the number of the 
object, e.g. 250 for man, 360 for plant. It is surfaces, then, that 
act as limits in Eurytus' sy;stem· to give the sensible body, and 
these surfaces were themselves l!mited by points. Thus, it is no 
great stept to deduce that for him body was constituted out of 
Extehsion del,imi ted by bounds, first surfaces, finally points. 
f 
Other~. Of other Pythegoreans of this generation we know very 
little. Hice.tas of Syracuse held the doctrine. of the Count er-e arth10 
which we have seen· was ascribed· to 'Philola.us• .Timaeus of Locri is 
a very shadowy figure, being mentioBed only by Plr,to in his Timaeu~1 
. 12 
a!ld Procihus' commentary thereon_. Other references to T1maeus seem 
to refer to Plato's dialogue rether than to a, living person, and 1:t 
may well be that he was a fiB:IJlent of Plato's 1magfi4at1on, for the 
writings a.scribed to him are now rejected as forgeries, 13 and of 
12 Occelus, a predecessor of T1maellls ) we knowliYJm: eve.n less. 
1. Die1s 32A13. ' 2. D1e1s 32All. 3. Dfels 32Al3 & 32B12. 
4. Diels iimx 33,1. 5. Dfels 33,1. .6. Dials 33, 2. 
7. Meta.phya cs 1092b9-14 = D1els 33, 3. · 8. Op. cit. 103-4, cp~. 
Classical Quarterly N. S.l.l47-9. 9. Cp. D~els 45B42, that ' 
surface or colour 1s either the Limit or in the Lim1 t, and the 
pythagoreans CAll surface 'colour'; cp. Metaphysics 109la15-l8: 
"When the One ha.d been const:1tuted, whether out of planes of' of 
surface ••• " 10. Dials 37,2. 11. D.1els 36,1. 
12. Diels 36,3. 13. Diels 36,4. Cp. Miss Freeman, op. cit. 240. 
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'f. These Auditors are the Pos!;-:Zenonic Pythaeore~. On page 161 
we quoted Diels 8, 11, "the ai(OcJ ~ft0 1"'1-<~~ around Hippa susn 1 which 
indii ca tee.$ that Hippasus was the founder, so to speak, of the sect 
called the Auditors, and Diels 8,15 implies that one of these 
Audt\tors besides Hippasus was Archyte.s. We have seen that Archytas 
was in fac,t a pupil of Hippasus and also of Philol8.us, andl that 
another.pupil of the latter was Eurytus. These four, then, were 
closely connected. Both Hippasus Dnd Archytas were distinguished 
as mathematic~ans, set out the concordant notes of the seale as 
ratios, and connected-the length of the string with its rate o:f 
vibration. Now 'Philolaus' and Hicetas believed that there were ten 
heavenly bodies, one being the Counter-earth, and that these 
revolved about a Central Fire. S1nce 'Philolaus• and Archytas held 
the doctrine that 10 embraces the whole nature of Number, this 
doctrine of the Tetractys seems to have been connected by them with 
the i~~ii of the heavenly bodies, 10, and this again implied, as 
we saw in the case of Hippasus, that the generation of Numbers, 
that is from 1 to 10, was that of the Cosmos, the 10 heavenly 
bodies. This wos connected with harmonics by Archytas by comparing 
the speeds of the stars with those of vibreting strings in relation 
to their distance from the centre of the Universe and the length 
of the string respectively, so that all the above tenets formed one 
doctrine. Since, then, both • Philolaus' and Archytas made use of 
two elements, the Limit end Unlimited, from which they derived the 
One as their first product, and since also 1 Philolaus' and Eurytus 
both connected magnitudes with the Tetractys, it seems·thc.t a 
further feature of the beli.efs of this school was that M~gn1 tudes 
were composed of the Continuous bounded by limits, solids for 
e:xnmple being bounded bypplanes, theee d.oubtle ss by lines, and the 
last by points. We have here,. then, one doctrine common to these 
Auditot:s -.although the evidence is lacking to show th<?t each .of 
these philosophers held every one of the tenets in question - and 
we can tabulate these tenets for reference as follows:-
1. The school was characterised by specialisRtion in mathematics; 
? • Its studies in harmonics centred around the discovery of the 
concordances of the octave, Pnd the connection of the length of 
the string with its rate of vibration; 
3. This we. s applied to astronomy by seeing an analogy between the 
distance of the heavenly body from the centre and the length of a 
musical string, between its speed of .revolution and the s~eed of 
vifbration of a string sounding a note; 
4. Its astronomy was characterised by 10 heavenly bodies, a. Coun~er-
earth, and a Central Fire; 
5. The generation of the 10 Numbers was thr, t of the £!lrME~ Cosmos; 
6. 10 was the perfect Number; 
7. There were two elements, Limit and Unlimited, from which the 
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One was derived as their first product; 
8. The Line was bounded by two points, and a body was bounded by 
its surfaces, these again ultimately by. points; 
9. We can add as a last feature the conception of the four Commie 
Elements or Roots as regular solids, Fire as the Pyramid, Eerth 
ns the Cube, etc., although attested only for 'Philolaus'. 
1 This set of doctrines is substantially what Raven deduces as 
those of the Post-Zenonic pythngorean school, end while most of 
these tenets cannot be deduced from the nature of the Eleatic 
criticism, we have shown on pages 168-9 above that in order to 
obviate that criticism Pythagoreanism had to assume two elements, 
the Limit and the Unlimited, as ultimate and derive the One from 
them as their first product, and so to compose magnitudes from the 
Continuous end geometrical bounds, the solid being limited by 
surfaces, surfaces by lines, and the lines by two points. These 
agree perfectly with points 7 and 8 nbove, rnd betVteen them were 
held by Archytas, • PtUlolatis' and Eurytus. The conclusion, then, 
seems inevitable, th!_ t these philoephers., together with the ottrers 
nemed above, belonged to one school, that of/the Auditors, and that 
these were posterior to Zeno in time and modified the original 
doctrines of Early Pll'thagoreanism in certain respects in order to 
obviate the criticisms of Parmenides and of Zeno. 
yl Corroboration of Aristotle's Conce~tion of Pythasorean!_§!!!_: 
Now ne<Jrly every one of the above nine points is found in the 
reconstruction 2 from Aristo~le' s evidence of the Philosophy of the 
Italians. 1. They were THE mathematicians of. their day; 3. they 
seem to have connected the heavenly bodies with the numerical 
expression of the notes of the scale; 4. they held 10 heavenly 
bodies, one being the Counter-earth; 5. the generation of this 
Cosmos was the. generation of. Number; 6. the Number 10 was the 
Perfect Number; 7. their elements of Number were the Odd and Even, 
analogues of the Limit and Unlimited, and while it cannot be shown 
that they derived the One therefrom, the One was composed of Odd 
and Even 1n this sense at least, that it partook of the nature of 
·both, making odd numbers even and even numbers odd; 8. ·magnitudes 
were composed of the Continuous, limited by points to give lines, 
by lines to give planes, and by planes to give solids; 9. and pB:rk 
perhap_s they idmtified the four Roots with four of the regular 
solids. All these tenets are attested or at the least implied by 
Aristotle' s evidence concerning the Philosophy of the Italians, 
B.nd to these we can add the fact that Hippo sus, Archytas, Ph114tlaus 
and Eurytus were Italians, 3 and Hicetas a S1c11ian, nnd that 
1. See Classical Quarterly N.S.l.l47-8, compare his Pythagore0ns 
and Eleat1cs 150-166. 2. See SUmmary on pages 53-4 above. 
3. According to the Catalogue of Iamblichus (Diels 45A) the ~ 
Tarentines were Philolaus, Eurytus, Archytas and some others. 
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Aristotle calls the Italian ph11o~hers the '.s>-called Pythagoreans 
which agrees very well with their having been Auditors and not 
Students, followers of HippasU.s rather than of Pythrg oras. Finally, 
we have seen that Aristotle places Plato in some relation to the 
philaEtphy of the Italians, and it is notable that Archytas is 
named in connection with :Plato by the independent evidence1 and in 
respect of one of the tenets specifiied by Arist otle at that - his 
element as analogous to the Gre8.t and Sna.ll. 
We see, then, that in respect of Pythagoreanism and its various 
schools, 2 Aristotle's conceptions were historically correct, if one 
makes due allowance for his practice of not clearly distinguishing 
one school from another. But an analysis of his evidence reveals 
his knowledge of at 1e ast three Pythagorean schools before Plato, 
EarlY Pythagoreanism characterised by the One inhaling Infinite 
Breath and both things and Numbers constituted by units having 
J!r&:ixi. position in the Void; the Theologians who, ns their name 
implies, were a religious sect arrl WhoV{ preserved the teachings of 
the Master, especially the equntion of/things with Numbers, except 
that they made the Good come later i~ •evolution' instead of 
identif'~ing 1 t with the One; Gnd the 'so-called Pythagoreans•, the 
, I.talian Philosophers, who were predominantly m8thematicians and 
concerned themsOtlves with harmonics and astronomy.a~nd radically 
al tared the orig1ne.l PythBgoreanism by a different conception of' 
the One, by making matter continuous instead of discrete,and by 
incorporating Empedocles• four Roots. These thre6 schools are 
attested by independent evidence. 1he Ee.rly pytha.goreo.ni sm was 
shown to have been correctl~ conceived by an analysis of' the 
teachings of Anaximander anq Anaximenes and the implications of the 
criticisms of Parmenides and of Zeno; tradition implies the exist-
ence of o religious wing of Pythqgoreanism - the Students - who 
. 
preserved the original teach.ings and customs, and is perhaps 
reflected in Plato's references to Philolaus; the Auditors have 
been shown to have met the objections of the Eleatic criticism and 
their teachings are preserved in. a fr8gmentary condition in the 
evidence concerning Hlppa sus, Altehytas, • Philolaus', Eurytus, and 
Hicetas. Finally, we have certain p2 ssage s in Plato's dialogues 
which seem to refer to these Auditors or Italian philoophers, Vthich 
corroborate the concltl.S1ons reached above, but 1 t will be conveniert 
to leave these over for a later part of this work when the evidence 
of Plato's dialogues is discussed. 
1. See page 171 not.e 1 obove. 
2. For more detail refer back to pages 153-4 w1 th 149 (top) for 
Early Pythagoreanism, and 166 (sub fin.) for Students. 
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Chapter 2. Platonism. 
Introductory. 
The aim of this chapter is to check Aristotle's conceptions of 
Platonism point by point, by examining evidence independent of his. 
We are concerned not with Platonism in general, not even with the 
interpretetion of his 1'heory of Ideas in particular, but only with 
thoee tenets cited by Aristotle in Metaphysics A.vi and commented 
upon in Part 1, Chapter 2 above, te@ther with as much other 
material as is required to elucidate or elaborate them. Of such 
independent evidence we have two broad groups: the writings of 
Plato, and the screps of information preserved by various ancient 
commentators. The examination of these two groups of evidence will 
be undertaken in separate sections below, and our introductor~ 
remarks here will be confined to the former - Plato's writings. 
The Date and Order of the Diologues~ Now if Plato had expound-
dad his beliefs in e treatise or series of treatises, the problem 
of the use o~ his evidence would have been much simplified, but as 
it 1 s he p·referred to cast his writings into the form of dinlogue s, 
and dialogues 1n which the chief speaker was, for the most part, 
some historical personage, so that it is not s.t all obvious whether 
the utterances of such speakers are to be regarded as representing 
the thoughts of those personages or of Plato himself. This funda-
ments. I problem of what might be termed the significance of the 
dialogue form will b>e the subject of the first section below. The 
immediate task is to place the dialogues in the order of' compo si-
tion, since this ord~r becomes vital if there is any possibility 
that there was some development or ch-::mge in Plato's thought, which 
indeed is highly probable in view of the fact thnt his writimgs 
were spread over a.pproxima.tely half a century. Accordingly I sha.ll 
give a brief summary of Plato 1 s life, into the framework of which 
I shall assign the: relevant dialogues, foll;wing Ross for the~r 
order of composition. 
Since Plato was.~ 28 at the ttime of Socrates' deAth in p399, 1 
l 2 
at}.d barely 40 when he went to Sicily in 388, he was born in the 
yenr of Diot1mus, 3 428-7 B.c~ 4 As his teachers we hear only of 
Cratylus and Socrates. 5 There is af{tradition that he went to Megara 
6 
after the death of S::>crates, end thence to Cyrene where he met 
7 . 8 
Theodorus. If he served in the Corinthian War, he would doubtless 
have returned to Athens before 395. In 388 he travelled to Italy 
1. D1ogene s ta.ertius III. 6. 2. Epistle Vii. 324A. 
3. List of archons in Pauly Wissowa II.586-8. 
4. Diogenes Laertius III.2 - Apollodorus gives 01.88, i.e. 429-5; 
Diogene s Laertius III. 3 - in the same year thn t Pericles died. 
5. Metal_lhysics 987a32, cp. Ritter ond Preller p.234, § 307a:"Ex 
iis quae de Platonis educations puerili singula tradunt"ur, vix 
quidquam fide dignum." 6. Diogenes Lnertius 1!.106 & III.6. 
7. Cp. Theaetetus l43D. 8. Cambridge Ancient History VI.3ll; cp. 
Shoreyt Whot Plato S"31d 6. 
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and Sicily to see the volc8no1 and to acouaint himself with the 
2 pythagorean discoveries. He returned home the next year and found-
' 3 1 ed the Academy. In 367 Dionysius It whom Pleto had met in Sici y, 
died, and Plato was summoned by Dion to c>ttempt the education of 
his stmcessor olong the lines l~id down in the Republic, and. to 
4 
re-e?<stablish the Syracusen State. In this yenr Aristotle, a lad 
of 17, entered the Academy, preswne.bly during Plato's absence. A 
third trip to Sicily, pertly to get D1on reinstated, partly in a. 
last desperate attempt to educate the tyrant, followed in 361-0, 
but in vain. 5 He died in 348-7 B.C. in his 8lst yeor. 6 
Nov1 Ross7 gives this scheme of the dielogues which are rele-
vant to the Theory of Id.eos: 
399-389: Chsrmides, L':?.ches, Euthyphro, flj_ppia.s Major, Meno. 
388-367: ?Cratylus, Symposium ( 38 5f-), Phr edo, Republic, Phaedrus, 
P8rmmn¢'1des, Theaetetus ( 369~). 
366-361: Sophist, Politicus. 
360-348/7: Time.etbs, Cri tia s, Philebus, Ep1 stle vii ( 353-2), Laws. 
He is undecided. about the position of the Cratyil.us, and I shell take 
the liberty of placing it somewhat earlier. Further, I disagree 
with .Ross concerning the genuineness of Hippias Major. He accepts it 
8 
on the strength of Grube's defence thereof, but seems to have missed 
9 10 Miss Tarrant's reply to Grube's article. As other commentators 
have decided against this dialogue, I feel it is safer not to make 
any use of it. In one other point Ross' list require~supp1ementation 
·rn Phaedrus 278E-9A Socrates prophesimspthat the young Isocra* 
11 tes will go far for there is philosophy in him. This prophecy is 
12 
referred t~ 3by Cicero, that while 'Socrates• refers to the young Isocr~tes . 
u:crll'rXE:Ex' Plt>to he.s in mind !socrates as an old man (de seniors). 
As !socrates was 6 or 7 years Pleto 1 s senior, 14 and as •senex' 
implies an age of 60 or more, the terminus a quo for the Phaedrus 
must be set down as 374 B.C. Further,.How1and15 takes Phaedrus 
16 267AB as referring back to !Socrates• claims in the Panegyricus, 
which was published in 380 B.C., so that the Phaedrus is posterior 
1. Diogenes Laertius III.l8. 2. Cicero, De Republica !.16. 
3. Diogene s Laertius III. 7. . 4. Diogene s Laertius III. 21; Epistle 
vii. 332E; Plutnrch, Dion x1.1 & 2. 5. D1ogenes L'=>ertius II!.23; 
Plutarch, Dion xvi11.2-3; Epistle v1i.339A, 345D. 
6. Hermippus in Oiogenes Laert1us III.2, the year of Theophilus, cp. 
V.9. 7. Plato's Theory of Ideas 10. 
8. Class1cnl Quarterly XX.134-141, cited by Ross, op. cit. 3-4. 
9. Classical Quarterly XX!.82-85 •. 10. Field, Plato and his Con-
temporDrie s 49; Robin, Platon 30; Rogers, The .SOcr~i tic Problem 
188. 11. Howland, Classical Qu~rterly XXXI.151-9, however, 
takes the pro~hecy to be a condemnation with faint praise. 
12. ·Orator xi11.42. 13. Zeller, .Plato §.nd t.he Early Academy 132, 
takes the prophecy as Plato's own, thus taking the Phaedrus very 
early; but his or~ dering of the dialogues is quite erroneous. 
14. D1ogenes LAertius 11!.3. 15. Loc. tit. 
16. I prefer this to the view that in Panegyricus 8 Isocrates takes 
the sarcasm on the rhetor::1cal powers of Gorgias and Tisias in 
Phaedrus 267AB as a belligerent claim for himself. 
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to this date, which of course adds nothing to the above conclusion. 
'<:;, 
But a more precise date is given in this,that the Phaedrus is later 
than Ad Nicoclen, probably published in 372, and earlier than the 
N6cocle s, written in 368. Therefore, I date the Phaedrus betVJ·een 
373 and 368. Now the Phaedrus is said by Diogenes Laertius III.3 
to have been Plato's first work, which is manifestly absurd, but 
the tradition can be saved if we interpret this in the sense that 
it was the first work of his later period, a view which is thr:.t of 
some of the best of modern commentators, 1 and is corroborated by 
two indications: it is the first work in which Dialectics, alluded 
to in Phaedrus 265E-6B., has the new meaning of Division, 2and where 
the soul filr'st appears as the Self-mover, cp. Phaedrus 245C-E. 
Th1 s gives the following scheme: 
Plato bGrn 428-7. 
Death of Sbcrates 399. 
Plato's First Voyage 388. 
Plato founds the Academy 387. 
Charmide s, Laches, Euthyphro, 
Cratylus, Meno. 
Symposium ( 38 5t), Phaedo, Republic, 
Phaedrus (373-368), Parmenides, 
Theaetetus (369t)• 
Plato 1 s Second Voyage 367. 
Aristotle enters the Academy 367. 
Plato's Third Voyage 361. 
Plato's desth 347. 
Sophist, Poli ticus. 
Timaeus, Critias, Philebus, Epistle v11 
Laws. 
1. Lewis Campbell, Clnssic3l Review X.42; Stenzel, Paulys Realen-
cycloptidie II.iii.860; Robin, Greek Thought 203; Ross, Plato's 
'l'heory of Ideas 81; compare Jaeger, Aristotle 15: "Plato• s 
abstract and methodological period began about 369." 
2~ Cp. Robinson, Plato 1 s'Earlier Dialectic 73-4: flThe account of 
'Dialectics in the Phaedrus, Sophist, Politi cus, Philebus, is not 
t~e sPme as in the Phaedo and Republic~ It is Division in the· 
former, the method of hypothesis in the latter." Ross, Plato's 
·Theory of Ideas 81: 11 In the description of Dialectics in Phaedrus 
we nave not the method of the Republic but of Sophist and Politi-
. cus 11 ; also 118 :nThe conception of Dialectics in Phatrdrus, Sophist 
·and Politicus is quite different from that of the Republic." We 
must then disregard S'lorey, Whnt Plato SU.id 554 ad Phaedrus 265B: 
ttThe feigned introduction of the word, Dialectics, as new proves 
nothing. n 
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Section i. The Significance of the Dialogue Form. 
The Problem of the Platonic Socra~. Plato wrote no metaphysical 
treatises but only a. series of dialogues in the majority of which 
Sbcr~tes is represented as the chief speaker. The question is 
whether it is Socrates• or Plato• s views that a.re expounded - ,the 
views of the other chara.cterts than the_ protagonist. need not detain 
us: as Field1 says, the at~ r characters simply represent the views 
of the t plain man'. If the representation of t~ chief character in 
the dialogues WH s intended to be strictly hi st.oritcal, then we can-
not expect to discover very much of the views of Plato from the 
dialiogue s, but only of Socrates, far example. SUch 1 s the view of 
2 . ' 3 4 Burnet and Taylor • With this we·have dealt above. Perhaps the 
stron~st ergument a.gaia&t it is that according to the ancient 
commentators, and accord:ing to Plato himself if Epistle vi.322D is 
5 genuine, the Theory of Ideas which is put into Socrr'ltes' mouth in 
the dialogues was not s:>crat.ic et all but Plato's own discovery. 
Further, consistency reqJ.dres us io take the picture of Parmenides 
in the dialogue of that name as hi s:toJ£i cttlly true if the picture of 
s:>crates is taken to be historical; but Parmenides can hardly have 
held all the opinions th erefe.scribed to hlilm, and least of ell his 
6 
critic ism of the Theory of Ideas t Indeed, so many objections have 
been raised against the strict historicity of the dialogues, some 
4 
of which ha.ve been mentioned above, that it is no longer necessa.Fy 
to argue against this vi~w. 7 
If, then, the dialogues were ·not llleQt to be strictly hi ztr;ori-
cal representations of the teachings of Socrates, does it imply 
that '&:>crates' is only o la'j;-flguret;7and the vie~s expressed are 
entirely and unreservedly Platon:i.c? For example, there are certain 
noteble passages in the diologue s where &:>crates doubts, chiefly 
but not :Rax exclusively in connection with Reminiscence a.nd mmmor-
tali ty. According to the biographical interpretation of the dialogu~ 
. . 9 
this doubt is easily explained as Socratic irony. But if the 
contrary theory is accepted, that tte thoughts are essentially 
Plato 1 s own, then Pleto must also doubt where t Secretes' doubts, and 
the doctrines of Reminiscence abd Immortality, v;hich are those 
most affected, must-. be myths. 10 Eb in fact. ~~~fijtll explic 1 tly 
states that Anamnesis was not seriously meant; it is myth not dogme. 
So Slorey~ 2that Recollection is PLAINLY mythological symbolism. 13 
1. Plato and his Contemporaries 188-9. 2. Greek Philo~ID phy 212-4; 
Plato• s PhaedC xi1 et passim, cp. Classical Review XXVI.l61 .. 
3.A Commen1tary on Plato's Timaeus 28 & 32;Classical Review XXV.251. 
4. Pages 4-5. 5. Field, Plato and his Contemporaries 57. 
6. See Hackforth, 'The Composition of Plato\• s Apology 171-2; Fleld, 
op. cit. i:al 191; Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas 7. 
7. Cp. Ross, Op. cit. 157. 8. Shorey, What Plato Said 21-22. 
9. Cp. Burnet, Plato• s Phaedo 26 ad 63C. 
10. Stenzel, Plato's Method of Dialectic 4-9. 
11. The Myths of Plr-•to 344-5. 12. Op •. cit. 513 ad Meno 81DE • 
13. The capitals ;;,re mine. 
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This is, of course, a possible interpretation of Platonism and 
would require a detailed exAminatio.n of Plato's Earlier Theory and 
its implications in order to refute it, but such a~nterpretat1on 
seems to me to founder on i t.s failure to explain why Plato cl1io se 
Socrates, whose philosoph:t.cel views must have been more or less 
well known to his ccn~empor~·ies, as his chief speaker, if the views 
he put into Socrates' mouth were not those of Socrates at all, but 
his ownt o t;horey, for example, would n<tt deny that the trial .of 
&crates actually took place and that the Apology was intended to 
be some sort of represei!ta,tion of what happened at that trial. But 
thio h!-3rdly suits his view thPt the Pl<4tonic Secretes was purely a 
lry figure. If the &>crates of the Apology was the historical 
Socrotes, then the Platonic Socrates could hardly hav,e been"Pla.to' s 
. own creation," as he terms 1 t. The key to the signi::tUcnn.ce of the 
Platonic Socrates, indeed, can to a le.rge extent be discovered from 
an examination of his position in this very dialogue, run to this 
question I now turn. 
In the Earliest Dialogues Plat2 Pre serves a Picture of Socrates 
We do not know that the Apology was the. first of Plato' s extant 
dialgogues to have been written; indeed, Hackforth1fairly conclusiv~ 
ly shows that it We s not composed before 394 and may have been 
written at any time down to 387 B.C. But it is logi!cally the f:irst 
of the dialogues on the assumption that Plato began to write these 
.compositions only after the death of Socrates. since tha.t event 
must have impre ssec him strongly, and I base my interpretation of 
Plato's intention in dzoosing Socrates as his protagonist on the 
assumption that the Apology was the first of his extant works. Now, 
•. 
on this assumption, if Plnto intended merely to preserve a.n accurate 
record of the trial, and in general to write a sort of memoirs of 
s:>cra.tes in dramatic for.·m, one wouJd expect that this, the ft-rst 
and most serious, most tr~gic, of tre series, should be as far as 
possible a literal. transcript of the trial. Indeed that is what it 
is on the face of it. But a closer examination reveals a deeper 
motive. We cannot go into this here in any great detail, but one 
instc:.nce should .su.ff'ice. In Xenophon' s Defence, Socrates replies to 
the charge (Jf di sbeli.eving in tl'e gods, th..: t he often sa.cri:f11 ced 
openly at the public altars. But Plato makes no mention of So crate s• 
sacrificing at all, but represents Socrates as answering the charge 
by a piece of sophistry.- He extends the charge of disbelief in the 
State gods to cover outright atheism, and evasively argues that as 
I he was known to have believed in a Src.,cfo~"'"~ - his well-known 
Divine Voice or· Sit:on - he must have believed in Jt~A.)'ov~ ('" , the 
offspring of the gods, and so by 1mplica.tion must have believed in 
the gods themselves, their progenitors. Hence, in the Apology, Plata 
was not reproducing Socrates' actual speech in his own defence,but 
1. The Gomp,sit:ton of Plnto' s Apology 44-46. 
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1 two 
was reconstructing it. S1mila.rly in the EltlllB dialogue s most close-
2 
associated with the Apology. According to Schrempf, whom I here 
follow, the purpose of the Euthyphro is primarily to give a picture 
of religious feelings at Athens: Plato ~haws_ ~p the Athenians that, 
\\hile_ not toking religion seriously, they are nevertheless ready 
to make use of 1 t as £~b'c.•Jio'>..o Y - as a pretext to liquidate an 
opponent hated on other grounds. The Crito was written chiefly for 
the purpose of exonerating S:>crates' friends from blame for his not 
h!'i ving escaped from gaol, and the hi star 1ictty df the picture of 
Socrates is t~p~re_d_ with by Plato basing his conduct, not on 
-~--
obedience to an Unwritten 1.0 Divine Law as we should expect from a 
study of Xenophon's Memorabilia, but on the implications of the 
dictum that we must not return evil for evil, so that Plato could 
there correct the impression made by his Apology thGt SbCEates~as 
disloyal to the State. 3 
By writing these dialogues i~~iring around the circumstances 
of &>crates• trial., the cond. usion is that Plato began his works 
from a desire not so much of preserving a. picture of his master's 
last daps as of defending his good naJlle. 4 Socrates• manner of 
sacrificing and his obedience to Un'Fitten Divine Laws were dicta 
of a controversial nature: belieiis on which his indictment was in 
fact based as something alien to the Athen1sn religious outlook. 
Plato suppresses these dicta, substitutes something harmless, and 
represents him as arraigned not for 'heresy' but on a pretext, the 
real motive being pure :_;nd simpl-e hatred not of his religious 
innovations but of his embarrassing questions which showed up the 
wise as really ignorant. Whrt, we hAve, then, in the r/f.:~J'ture of the_ 
.Plutonic Socrates is a Socrates ideelisef., a Socrates purified from 
even the suspicion of •heresy', a Socrates whose sayings were 
essentially if not. literally preserved in situations where there 
was no possibility of offence, but \"/hose words were replaced by 
Ple.to' s own interpretation wfi1ere controver.sial issues were raised. 
And just the same treatment is evident in the next set of dialogues, 
whicll belong together in subj~ct an, d tveatj!ment if not in date of 
coqJpo si tion. 
Characteristic of Socrates is his search for the definition, 
especially in ethical matters, and we have pictures of his search 
for the defini t.ion of four of the cardinnl virtues in four of Plato'; 
earliest dia.l')gues: of piety in the Euthyphro, of courage in the 
Laches, of tempearance in the Charmides, of justice in Republic I. 5 
1. Cp. Lewis¢ Campbell, Encyclopedia Britannica XXI.813; Ritchie, 
Fleta 54; Hackforth, op. cit. 87-8, 101-2, et ali~i. 
2. Sokrates 81-85. 3. Schrempft, Sokrntes 93. 
4. See Field, Plato and his Contemporaries 51-2; The Philo m> phy ol 
Plato 16; and Classical Review XXIX.219. 
5. Book I originally an early and sepsrB.te die.logue: Classical 
Review III.29; Field, 'he Philosophy of Pfato 67. Denied by Taylor: 
Plato the Man and his Work 264; cp. Classical Review .X.82; and 
Classical Review XXIX.220. 
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But just as even in the Apology Plato took the liberty of somewhat 
modifying the words that Socrates uttered in public nt his trial, 
in pri vate)1in the Cri to, so here too Plato allows himself some 
freedom., not so much. by glozing over controversial dicta as by 
giving his own interpretation of E:ocr?tes' beliefs. For example, in 
the Lysis, wb.ereas socrates would have said thr.:t the condition for 
his fGmous Pregnancy .of fuul wrs the friendship of two youths, 1 
Plato brings this friendship into connection not with Pregnancy of 
Soul but \'ti th the Good, which even Burnet allows t,o have been 
Plf'.tonic, by postulating, in terms reminiscent of the Idea of the 
Good which he later expounded in the central books of the Republic, 
- I 2 
a Fi r st Principle of Ftitind ship, the o/uroy t( Ao;t , which is 
shown to be the Good inasmuch as 1 t is that "on account of which 
things are.n3 But here the Good is not explicit but only hinted at -
its elaboration is left over for treatment in the sYmposium. 
Hence, thus fRr Plato seems to have left us a fa.irly faithful 
(·, \ 
depiction of Sbcrates, but with two exception~he tones down 
controversial or objectionable dicta in order to ideAlise the 
picture of his m?ster, and he feels nt liberty to interpret some 
/of S:>cra.tes' te3chings along the lines thf\t his later die~Jgues 
I --- -~
show his mind 1\IB.s working. Socretes spoke of friendship and went no 
·--further - unless we are to t8ke his flronical references to Preg-
nancy of the Soul more literally th-:.m most comment~tors are willing 
to do - but Plato feels the need for a more ultimate source of 
\ 
Friendship or Love, and mekes Socrates mention this First Principle, 
which we know from his lr,ter works to hft.ve been the Idea of Good -
.Plato then tends to interpret a~ong h~s own lines Slcrates' 
apparently vain search for the defin:it:!ion, as well as to idea.lise 
4 his tenchings. 
J.n his Middl~ial ogues PlGto Foth~s his Philosophy on S>crates. 
The log:lical outcome of the tendency just noted hes beem adm:irably 
expressed by F:ield: 5"As Plato went on writing he put more and more 
of his own idens into his work until heY,h::1d gone beyond anything 
that SocrPtes hod thought of." But Plato would not feel that his 
Ebcrotes wns purely a lny figure; his thought was "on enlargement 
true 6 
of the original and fONrR S:>crdtticism;" since "If nnd when he 
realised he had gone beyond Secretes, he would still feel he was 
developing a hint dropped by S:>crates or drawing out some view 
1. Cp. Sfmposium 209BC. 2. Lysis 219CD. 3. Lysis 219DE. 
4. Cp. Field, The Philosophy of Pl~to 16: "The purpose of the 
earlier dialogues was to carry on the work of a> crates by 
stimulating thought through the medium of discuss:ion that he had 
used, and "t the some time to defend. his memory Dnd justtify his 
services to the world •••• From the very beginning it is Plato• s 
thought whiclill is presented, even if it runs very much on the 
lines suggested to him by s:>crP...tes. It would be bery natural 
therefore that as Pl~to went on writing he should put more and 
more of the ideas that he had arrived at for himself into his 
work, until he h::,d gone much beyond anything that Socrates ever 
thought of. 11 5. Op. cit. 16. 6. Robin, Platon 27. 
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1 
expressed by him." According to these commentators, then, Plato, 
who had begun writing dialogues in order to preserve the Socratic 
spirit and :'lt the same time to defend his memory, but having by 
reason of hi G initi.al depa.rture from the strict letter of histori-
cal truth in order to present ,S,crc.tes' teachings, if not his mar 
charfl.cter, in the most favourable light, and in order to interpret 
certain of his tenets in a¢.way more satisfying to his own point of 
.view, as sat out above, Plato then carried the tendency of ideali-
sing and reinterpreting SJcrates to its logt;cal conclusio~, viz. 
that in time he came to ascribe to his figure of &>crates not so 
much the true &> crati c teachings n s his own development from and 
construction upon S:lcrate s• teachings; he drew out the implications 
of Socrates• beliefs, As they seemed to him; in fact he fa:thered 
his own philoro phy on SJcrates. This/was the easier fir.·stly because 
his philosophy was really a development of &!crates• and secondly 
because his dialogues were not intendec to be metaphysical treRtise~ 
were not addressed to sp e cia lists in philosophy, but werefi;sem1-
2 popular works, were addressed to the ortd1nary educated public to 
stimulate thought. 3 Plato aimed ot mol{ing his pa.rticuler point in 
8ny one dialogue rather than crt reducing his various utterances to 
consistency • 4 so that it was the easier for him to bring in his own 
contribution to any particular problem discussed in a SOcratic 
dialogue casually and by wBy of the customary question and answer 
without CflUsing a feeling of startling incongruity. These conside-
rn tions by themselves perhaps mieht be ay{ sufficient explanation of 
his ac~eptance of tre- drairiatic propriety of ascribing to Socrates 
views which Socrates never· held, but wli.:'i.ch in P:bato' s mind were tm 
logical outcome, the development of the Socratic tenets from whic.h 
they were elaborated by Plato. But this explanation has been, at 
leest to my mind, firmly establisbd by Frank' s 5 demonstration that 
at about the time Plato wrote there was a literary tradition a.ccor-
ding to which writers of that time gave modern thoughts the app&ar-
6 
ance of ancient wisdom by ascribing them to some great name. Field 
too notes this tendency in respect of the ascription of discoveries 
to Pythagoras in order to claim his a.uthori ty, and stenzel has made 
use oft his line of thought with an innovation of his own. 
stenzel' s the sis is that Plato ascribed the lleading ideas of 
his own philosophy to Socrates indeed, but preserved the semblance 
of dramatic verisimilitude by demarcating such non-Socratic tltter-
ances which he put into Socrates' mou~h by means of certain literary 
devices,"whereby PlPto wr1s c:ble to expound his views within his 
7 
conception of the frJ.mework· provided by the personality of s:>cratest' 
1. Field, Plato and his contemporaries 53. 2'/;. Tredennick in the 
Loeb edition of Aristotle's Meta'phyFics xxi. 
3. Field, op. cit. 59, and Milhaud, Les Philosophes Gt'fom~tres de la 
Gr~ce 192. 4. Dickenson, .Journal of Philology XX.l32. 
5. Plato und die .sogenonnten Pythagoreer 72, examples in 73-4 & 138. 
6. Plato and his Contemporaries 177. 7, Pla.to' sAMethod of Dialectic 
4· J 
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stenzel lists such artistic devices as Sot!rntes appealing to a 
higher authority, such as thot of Diotima. in the Symposium, the 
1 2 priests in Meno, or the well-known Soc.ratic doubt. In another work 
Stenzel works this out in greater dete.il, most of the references 
being to the non-.s:>craf.ic nature of the doctrines of Reminiscence , 
the Good, and tre fastening down of opinions by thea:;.cof ~o"f,g./'~. 
devices . . Sbme of these mEXXE~ have been recognised by other authorities, 
3 I I 
among whom we migh 't instance Adam, that the 77o).}..tetf aK?J( Dtk..( of 
Republic 505A make s 1 t clear that the Good was already recognise:d 
as a tenet of the Pla.tonic school, and Robin, 4 thst the ascription 
of the doctrine of Love in the Symposium to Diotima is only a 
rounde.bout way of saying that it was an apaptation of Socraticism. 
Not so much against this view in general as age.inst the inter-
prepation of some of these artistic devices in pEJrticular are such 
5 
counter-interpretations as the following .• As said above, Burnet 
takes the doubt expressed by &>crates in such passages as Pha.edo 
63C as the well-known Socratic irony, and Ehorey6 explains the 
familiar belief of Gri to 46B that "Plato is at liberty to refer to 
his permanent belief's o.s familiar doctrine". SJ again ~izx..;eno 86B! 
that ''SOCRATES' expression of doubt is a hint that the argument 
is not to be taken too literally - PLATO limits his dogmat.ic 
8 
affirmc.tions to a minimum." Like Burnet, T:::yltir regPrds the unknow-
ability of the Good in Republic 509A as meoning no more than that 
£berates cannot give an account of it. But if we ex0mine this 
statement, since Taylor admits that the philoro.>pher-kings are 
expected to know it,. VJe are drawn iTo the concliP\S ion that this 
corroborates stenzel' s vie~, since how could Socrates tell as much 
as he does about the Good if he .knew nothing of 1 t. burely if the 
philofO_,pher-klngs knew it, so did Plato, and hence the ignorance 
of S>crates about that which he nevertheless expounds is precisely 
a device to distinguiEb what Plato knew but what Socrates did not. 
But the strength of the inter pretation that I have here adopted 
lies not in isolated instances, but in the coincidence between 
what are generally accepted to be Platonic doctrines and some such 
literary devices as those mentioned above being used to demarcate 
these doct.rines as non-S>cratic. To a closer examination of t·his 
we now turn. 
Plato, the{), in his middle g>roup of daatogile s retained Socrates 
as the protngonist a.l though he now departed so much from the canon 
of dramatic ver.i similitude as to put into S:>crate s' mouth his own 
teachings, be cause he rightly felt that his philosophy was a 
1. loc. cit. 
3. 'l'he Republic 
5. Page 180~ . 
7. Op. cit. 515 
· 2. Paulys Realencyclop!!die II.iii.866-880. 
of Plcto Vol.II.50 ad 505A. 4. Greek Thought 186. 
6. WhRt Pl' to SJ.id 468 note nd Cri to 46B. 
note a.d Meno 86B. 8. The P9..rmenides of Pla.to 156. 
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construction on Socrates'. But these too blatr:intly non-Socratic 
tea.chings are demarcated as non-Socratic by some artistic device 
showing that here we have not Socrates• but Plato's own thoughts. 
It is not my intention here to give 8 full list of such devices or 
a complete inventory of the tenets· so demarcated, but for tre sake 
of making the point, I shall give some of the most not:keable of 
such instances. It will be noticed that in all these cases the 
doctrines which Socrates dreams about, that he prophesies, which 
he cannot tell, which he doubts, that he offers a.s a charm'l' that he 
accepts simply as an hp.pothesis, or that is stated as the doctrine 
of others, or even what he is said to be always talking about, all 
these are generally: accepted as Platonic and rarely regarded as 
s:>cratic tenets by modern commentators. This coincidence is surely 
too close to be taken merely as due to too ptvturesquene ss of 
,Socrates' iwa.y of speaking, to be due to what is somtime s termed 
the Socratic irony. And wh.ile it might be a.rgued, by the ppposite 
·school of thought, that it is Plato who doubts when Socrates doubts, 
it can hardly be maintained that Plato also dreams tre se doctrine s1 
a) The Good. We have already cited Lysis 219CD as anticipAting 
Plato's own Idea of the Good under the g&ise of the First Principle 
of Fr1endship. 1 Now the point of departure for this tenet is that 
nWhat is neither good nor evil is the friend of the Good," and 
2 this is put forward by ~:berates as a PROPHECY, and referred back 
to as a DREAM. 3 Tbis, we said, was an ent1cipa.t1on of the Good, 
worked out in the qymposium~ There this doc trine is put into the 
, mouth of Dim~IMA; where the~ Good is pre sen ted as the object of 4 . . 
Love, and the more develop~d const.ruction of this Love into the 
Ascent to Beauty is given as a Higher Mystery which Diot.ima DOUBTS 
: WHETHER SOCRATES IS CAPABLE, OF FOLLOWING. 5 This is further elabo-
rated and brought into connection with a more general principle of 
Divine Madness, whicb is expounded in &>crates' 'Palinode' which 
he attributes to the INsPIRATION OF SI'ESICHORUS, 6 and to which he 
refers back as a product of· • enthusiasm'· attributable to the 
ACHELOAN NYMPHS AND TO PAN. 7 Even in the Republic,where we have a 
more prosaic account of the· Idea of the Good, a> crates confesses 
his IGNORANCE of 1 ts nature, 8 and aliso, rather inoonsi stently, 
. . I . . 9 
re.f e r s to it as one of his FAMILIAR BELIEFs. 
b) The Ideas. The demonstration of the he cesrsary existence of 
objects of knowledge as entities out of Flux is given in the 
lo Cra.tylus as what &>crates has DREAMED, and afterwards he DOUBTs 
11 the valid1 ty of his pr;oof. The Ideas are next mentioned in the 
Phaedo as what Sbcrates is ALWAYS REPEATING, 12 and later13 are 
1. Page 183. 2. Lysis 216D. 3. 
4. ~posium 205E-6A. 5. t$Tmposium 
6. Phaedrus 244A. 7. Phaedrus 263D. 
9. Republic 505A. 10. Cratylus 439C. 
12. Phaedo 76D. 13. Phaedo lOOB. 
Lysis 218C. 
209E-2lOA. 
8. Republic ~ 5o6c. 
11. Cratylus 440D. 
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assumec as an HYPOTHESIS. 
c) Rerniniscnnce.Where it is first mentioned, the doctrine of 
Remin,ii scence is it}troduced ~ts that OF MEN AND WOMEN wise in religi-
1 
ous lore, as well as that OF PINDAR and other 1 INSPIRED' poets, and 
is referred back to as what Socrates REFUSES TO BE DOMGAIUC ABOUT. 2 
In the Phaedo, Reminiscence is what Socrates is accustomed FREQUENTLY 
3 TO EXPOUND, although the Platonic &:>crates has exp&unded it be:fore 
only in the Meno when Cebe s, the speaker ad loc., was not even 
present\ The cor9llary, that learning is Reminiscence, is what 
4 Socrates CANNOT TELL, for it would be contradictoey, he asserts, 
for him to do so. 
d) Immortality. The whole exposition of this doctrine in the 
Phaedo is called by Socrates5 his SVia.n-mng, rejoicing at the 
approach of death in PROPHETIC vein. NOR WILL HE ABSOLUTELY ASb~RT 
that he will meet goof men in Hades, as he would if the m ul we~e 
6 
assuredly immortal. As for the proofs offered of the soul's 
immortality, Socra.tes urges Slmmia.s to a.ccept them only as the 
LIMIT TO WHICH MAN'S REASON CAN ATTAIN, 7 end more specifically, the 
proof of immortality arrived at by combining Antipodiasis with 
Reminiscence is regarded only as a CHARM against the fear of death, 
and wb.en Socrates is dead his followers must seek among themselves 
. 8 
to supply other such charms. 
One last point that has become clear, and which indeed follows 
from the general. interpre~tion of the significance of the figure of 
Socrates a;:> protagonist in the13e dialogues, is that the amount of 
Platonism increase!? and that of .strict verisl. mil,tude to the picture 
of Socrates decreases roughJ,lin proportion as the date of composi-
tion of the dialogues 1 s removed in: time from the life of their 
coo.tra.l figure. So; except for the first book which we said was 
·doubtless of earlier date than the rest of the wo rl<:,)t one of the 
latest dialogues of this group, the Republic, is 'virtually an expo-
sition of Plato• s own politics,· system of education, Idea of the 
I Good, and proof of Immor.ta.lity,, with his own grounds for the necessi-
ty of leading the life of virtue, with little indeed of JJBe:X%J purely 
Socratic traits. 9 
·Now it is· noteworthy that many of t:OO se doctrines are introduced 
by the way. This is especially noticeable in the case of the Ideas 
and Reminiscence. Thus, the Phaedo, in which we obtain perhaps the 
clearest statement of Plato's Theory of Knowladge as the Reminiscence 
of Ideas, was not written to pre sent this ·theory but to give an 
otherwise faithful and vivid picture of Socrates' death in prison: 
1. Meno 81AB. 2. Meno 86BC. 3. Phaedo 72E. 4. Meno 81E-2~, 
5. Phaedo 84E-5B. 6. Phaedo 63C. 7. Phaedo 107B. 8. Phaedo 78A. 
9. Cp. Field, Classical Review XLVIII.lS: nrr there was a change 
from a more Socratic to a more Platonic point of view, such a 
change would be gradual and cont:f.nuous. Therefor e, any line 
would have· to be drawn chronologically." 
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The philosophy comes in only incidentally to the leading motif: the 
demonstration of the immortality of the soul, which wcs a fitting 
subject for dfscussi'on, although not necessarily that actually 
discussed, at the deathpf this great religious teacher, for it is 
given as his 'swan-song•. & the Meno is for the most part a 
typically Socratic investigation into the nature of virtue. In the 
course of the 1nvettigation the question arises, How is learning 
possible? This question, which is ostensibly a digression, becom'eS 
the most signiftcant conttibution of Plato's to the work- a 
digression of epistemology in the midst of a{l ethical discussion -
for it is answered by a doctrine quite foreign to Socrates, Plato's 
doctrine of Reminiscence. Again in tm Cratylus the main subject is 
an invea'tigation into what might be called etymology, which ra.ises 
as a side issue the question wbether Heraeli tean Flux or Elea.tic 
Rest is the correct interpreta.tion of things. It is almost as a· 
digression that a proof is given1 of the necessity of the fixity of 
the object of knowledge in a world of Flux, if knowledge is to be 
possible. Hence, we may say, the dialogues are first and foremost 
druatic representat.ions .of the method and teachings of &>crates, 
but in the course of the annversations Plato introduces, ofteh as 
digressions, fragmants of his own philosophy put into the mouth of 
Slcrates, but demsrcated by artistic devices, because he regarded 
such tenets as developments of Socratic beliefs or sayings, and as 
such they could be inserted; especially with the safegua.rds afore-
mentioned, without too violently violating the canon of dramatic 
verisimilitude. But such Platonic 1 a. side s• were· not amant to be 
expositions, much less syst,ematic exposit:1ons of his philosophy;they 
can ne'tertheless be used as, elltidence for his beliefs. So we have the 
. . . . . 2 
evidence of Diogenes Laertius III.52 that Plato expressed his own 
Views through S:>crates, Tima.eus, and the Eleatic and Athenian.strange\1 
Plato• s Later Dialogue s_i Phaedrus 276D, etc. Burnet 3 cites · 
Epistle ii. 314C, that we sgal'l find no writings of· Plato but only 
of a rejuvenated Socrates, t,o· support his interpretation of the 
Socrates of the dialogues as a: faithful rendering of the historical 
s:>crates, and 'corroborates this by pointing to Phaedrus 275Dff, 
wh1~1-1s rather long to quote here but we can quote the most tellinf 
passage, '276D: "In the ga.rden of letters he will sow and plant., but 
only for the sake of recreation and amusement; he . will write them 
dpwn as memorials to be treasured again-st the forgetfulness o.f old 
age, by himself, or by any other old man who is treading the same 
4 J;>ath ••• tt Slorey rejects as wrong Burnet's interpretation of the 
passage that no Platonic truth could be put into writing. Taken as 
they stand, the words seem to mean that Socrates regards written 
1. Cra.tylus 439E-440B. 2. Quoted by Field, Classical Quarterly 
XIX.l2. 3. Greek Philosophy 212-214. 
4 .. What Plato &tid 5.54 ad Phaedrus 275Dff. 
.. 
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compositions only es a pastime with value only as a mnemonic, 
something to stimulate the memory of what bad been learnt by oral 
teaching. But the passage as a whole is so critical of the written 
word, and is for us so reminiscent of Plato's Epistle vii.341C-E, 
which denies that Plato would ever have put any serious metaphysi-
cal truths into writing, that it is usual for modern commentators 
to take the sentiments as Plato's own. In this case, they would 
refer to his dialogues, and the i~Jpression given is that Plato 
di smi sse s them as of no serious value as a source of his _philo s:t phy • 
S:>me critits take this to apply only to dialogues already written. 
Thus, Stenzel1 takes these remarks a.s showing that Plato felt at 
the time of wr1 t1ng that he was then 1 eaving behind the problems 
of the :S>cra.tic dia-logues and so had lost the motive for Mimesis, 
and may have felt that be would give up writing a.nd devote himself 
to teaching in the Academy. Other critics interpret the remarks as 
applying to Plato's dialogues subsequent to the Phaedrus. Thus, 
Robin2 , that when Plato writes in tte future it will simply be to 
pre serve the true researches and debates of the school, or to pique 
the curiosity of the public, not to satisfy it about his teachings. 
But Field 3 po-ints out that although Plato may have ta.ken his· 
writings less seriously thari we do and allowed himself the latitude 
of tentatively putting for¢ward ideas to which he would not have 
wished to be finally committed, his discussions nevertheless imply 
a general philosophical position from which tl'e va.rious questions 
. 4 
are apptzfroached, Indeed, as Black says, we are not left with parerga 
even if Plato says so: there are ;in fact special rea,sons in each 
' 
case for Plato's unoo mplimentary remerks about writing. He explains 
Epistle vii that Plato is ther.e d1'sowning an abridgement of his 
. 
philosophy written by Dionysius, ,.Plato denying, with particular 
reference to this; that his philosophy could be expressed in a 
5 . ' .. 
written wo.rk. Ross po.ints out that Epistle 11 is spurdlous and is 
' 
obviously an imitation of the releyant passage in Epistle vii, a_nd 
in any case refers to Plato• s not writing a prose treatise on his 
Theory of Ideas, which does not necessarily mean that he would h.sve 
denied the value of his dialogues, so far as they went. We might 
. 6 
notice further a.n interesting suggestion made by Post. !socrates 
in Ant&dosis 79-83 had belittled the activity of the compiler of 
laws, presumably referring to Plato's Laws; Epistle vii.344C, that 
no written work, whether .in the form of laws or any other form, can 
be the most serious work of a serious man, simply makes light of 
!Eocrates' thrust, and is not to be taken too seriously. It seems 
to me, then, that these pa.,ssages which decry writing do not mean 
that Plato denied the value of his dialogues a.s evidence for his 
1. Plato's Method of Dialectic 16 & 20-1. 2. Platon 13. 
}. The Philosophy of Plato 13. 4. Classical Review N • .E.l.87-8. 
5. Plato's Theory of Ideas 157-9. 6. Classical Quarterly XXIV.115. 
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beliefs, and even if they did, this would not mean that they were 
in fact of no value. 
Limitations of t~e Dialosue ~· Nevertheless it must be 
fo~ . · b 
accep'ted that, as a oource m:x Platonism, the dialogues, y reason 
of their very form, suffer from certain noteworthy limi ta.tions. The 
dialogues are conversations not metaphysical treatises, and as such 
were addressed to the general public rather than to specialists, so 
to speak,. His doctrines, at least in the dialogues so far discussed, 
a .. re chiefly in evidence in digressions marked usually by some 
literary device, but there is no systematic or even consecutive 
exposition of Platonic doctrines. He e,pproaches each problem afresh, 
and the dramatic elem e nt is there a.nd has to be allowed for in the 
detailed interpretation of particular passages. 1 Hence¢, we must 
not expect to find in any dialogue Plato's last word, for the .final-
ity of any doctrine mentioned is limited for us by the uncertainty 
how far Plato felt himself restricted by the limits of such drama-
tic propriety as chronological considerations and compat1bil1 ty with 
the character of the person in whose rn9uth it is put. For example, 
in l?haedo 105DE we encounter what might be taken to be Ideas of 
Injustice as well as of Justice. S::>crates did not hold Idea.s a'S all: 
these are Platonic, but does that mean that Plato held such negative 
Idea.s? Not necessarily so; for s:>crates made definitions o:f both 
Justice and Injustice, and when'Plato made the objects of these 
defin1t1.ons Ideas, and put Ideas into the mouth of Socrates, iflt is in 
deference to this., no d<0ubt, that P~a.to makes Socrates talk of Ideas 
of Injustice as well as of Justice ..:. Socrates spoke of definitions 
. ' 
not of Ideas, but h1s.defin1tiions were equally of Justice and_of 
Injustice. SUch ea.ses must be treat~d each on its own merits, n.nd 
' ' 
this su~ject will come up for d1setussion later~ Here we shall say 
simply that so fa.r ·as the dia.logue s ar·e concemed which have already 
been discussed, chiefly whe.t ha.s been ca.lled the Middle Group, we may 
expect to find Plato's own thoughts, especially where demarcated as 
non-fbcratic by various artistic devices, but any such case is open 
to the possibility of distortion in order to fit in with the 
character of the speaker a,nd the chronological setting of the 
conversation in question. 
2 So far as concerns the later dialogues, I follow Field , that 
as Plato retained the form of the dialogue he could not have 
entirely~hanged ~is intention in tle use of dialogue at any 
pa.rticular point; but, where he did change the form as in Timaeus 
and J .. aws, 1 t was be cause he felt the subject inappropriate to the 
S>cratic method. Here the choice of another chief character was due 
to his feeling that on the quest.ions there discussed his thought 
had been especially influenced from sone other direction them that 
1. Field, The Philosophy of Plato 11. · 2. Plato and his Contempora-
ri e s 51. 3 • Op. c 1 t • 53 • 
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of ;S>cr.ates. The primary problem in tte se ln..ter dialogues is to 
h Of his Chief Sh~ta_.~ter, and determine Plato 1 s r.easons for the c oice - .... :m: ...... x..,. .... 
to allow for the amount and direction of the dramatic distortion of 
his views by these characters, as touched on above. I shall discuss 
the later dialogues in turn, beginning with those which retain 
S:Jcrates as the protagonist, and dealing again with the Phaedrus, 
but more particwlarly with those passages which belong to his 
later period, as pAinted out on page 179 above. 
Phaedrus. The Phaedrus is chiefly concernee with tlme doctrir..e 
-
of Divine Madn~ ss, being an elaboration of the ideas set forth in 
the Symposium~ but extended in their application to include an 
interpretation of the meaning of life in terms of Transmigration, 
with the possibility of release from t~e cycle of rebirth for the 
philosopher. It constitutes, then, the culmination of the earlier 
Platonism, and as such it has been suffic;iently dealt with above. 
Naturally enough SJ crates appears as the leading speaker, but in 
view of the transcendance of the philosophy here expounded he 
speaks not in his own name but a.s one inspired,i, just a.s in the 
dis-· ;~mpo sium the analogous doc trine of Love ea.s related as the llxE:euuu: 
course of Diotima.. But there are two passage s1 where quite differen~ 
doc trines are presented from those of this earlier Platonism, of 
which Socrates is the natural exponent.. In thst larlier philo ro phy 
Dialectics was for Plato the Method of Hypothesis of Republic 510B, 
5l1B. But in Phaedrus 265E-6B we ~i~i.a quite different pro.cess, 
given as the complement o~ the normal 'Socratic' process of 265D of 
comptehending sca.ttered particularb in one Idea. This is the new 
method of D1a-eresi s or Division, whi.ch plays so great a part in the 
S:>phist .and Politicus: "The se.cond principle is that of division 
into species accordi~g to tre natural formati~n, where the joint 
is, not breaking any part as a bad .carver might •••• I am myself 
a grea_t lover of ·these processes of Division and Genera.lisation; 
they help me to speak and to think. And if I find any man whtll is 
able to see a 'One and Many' in Nature, I follow him and nwalk in 
his footsteps as 5f he were a god". And those who have this art, 1 
have hitherto been in the habit of calling DIALECTICIANS; but GOD 
KNOWS WHETHER THE NAME IS RIGHT om NOT". The words}capitalised show 
that this is not the sort of sentiment that is rightly to be 
ascribed to a>cra.tes. This is the transition to the later method of 
Division and is thus demarated as non-a>cratic. And as stated 
before, this process, ~tlthough called Dialectics, is something 
quite different from the Dialectics of the earlier dial'Jgues. Here, 
then, is the bridge between the earlier and the later Platonic 
periods. Further, the passage quoted is part of a digression into 
rhetoric, and the novelty of this subject in the mouth of Socrates 
is marked ot the beginning of the digression by the literary device 
1. Cp. page 179 above. 
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of atf:tibuting the whole digression to the INSPIRATION of the grass: 
hoppers:"This piece of good fortune I attribute to the local li:tm::tim::i 
deities; and perhaps the/Prophets of the Muses who are singing over 
our heads ma.y have imparted their inspiration to me. For I do not · 
1 imegine\that I have any rhetorical art of my own •• , 
The se4ond novelty is a new conception of the soul as the self-
mover, which occurB again in the Politicus and is elaborated into a 
whole system in Laws X. We need not go in any detai.l into this, 
since the doctrine of the soul lies aside f'rom our course. The soul 
as self-mover, however, occurs in a. passage which offers a proof of 
the souPs immortality, 2 ?nd introduces the de scription of the 
Supracelestial Plain and the Procession of the Gods, which is 
necessary in order to understand not merely the doctrine of Divine 
Madness, but the entire interpretation of existence as bound up with 
the Vision· of the Ideas r·nd the Winged Soul. This entire 'PBJinode' 
3 is attributed by S:>crates to Sl'ESICHORUS, in fun no doubt, and 
referred back to as due to the INSPIRATION of the N~phs of ¢ 
Achelous and Pan, the son of Hermes. 4 
'J.'heaetetu.s. One can easily understand that it was fitting for 
&>crates to be the chiedr speaker in the Pha.edrus, since al thougn 
the new ideas of ilJ}j~gn and of the stlf-mover which belong to 
Plato's later period appear there, the leading ideas of the dialogue 
were still in the trajdi tion of the earlier. Pla.toni sm, which had 
been developed from S:Jcraticism And h8d been put into the mouth of 
S:lcrates in all the dialogues so far trea.ted. But now that Plato 
leaves the earlier Theory of Ideas behind, one might well wonder 
why S:>crates is made the chief speaker in the Thea.etetus. The 
answer must be that this dialogue does not at all mention the Ideas; 
at least ~ot explicitly, but is ostensibly an attempt to define 
knowledge along the usual a:>cratic lines. It is in parts curiously 
like the more Platonic parts of the Cratylus, wlr'llere the nece ssv{ity 
for Ideas is deduced from the need for having fixed objects of 
knowlEdge in a world of Flux, whereas in the Thea.etetus knowledge 
is shown not to lie 1ln the SBDses since all things flow. Thus, it 
would seem that here Plato is reconsidering his doctrine <l!f Ideas 5 . 
as a theory of knowledge preliminary to working out his later 
theory. As he has not abandoned the Socrat1.c universal as the 
object of knowledge, SOcrates retains hi~ old seat of honour. And 
yet, while SJcrates throughout displays no¢1mowledge of the Ideas, 
expounds l~~i*iE*iit is glaringly non-Sbcratic, 6 the whole subject 
1. Phaedrus 262D. 2. Phaedrus 245C-E. 3. Phaedrus 244A. 
4. Phaedrus 263D. 5. This is the interpretation adopted by 
Jackson, Journal of Philology XIII. 266; Cornford, Plato's Theory 
of Knowledge 28; Ross, Plato 1 s Theory of Idee .. s 101. 
6. Except for the theory of 'Letters end syllable s 1 ., and this is 
what &>crates DREAMS, 1heaetetus 201D, 202C. 
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is hardly a Scrcratic one; and yet Pl&to probably keeps S:>ci:ates as. 
the protagonist because of the analogous position occupied by 
this dialogue to the relevant part of the Cratylus, as just stated. 
Nevertheless, Plato still draws the line: because here s:>crates has 
played out the part of master and has become one of many predeces-
1 sors, Plato puts the dialogue in a. setting 30 years after f't>crates' 
death (the immediate occasion being an In Memoriam for Thea.etetus) 
~d for these last 30 years Terpsion has been Ire aning to ask 
Eucl1cies, who had written down the conversation at the time from 
memory, about this meeting between a>crates and Thea.etetus., but had 
2 
missed his chanco until nowl Further, a large place is given to 
1 3 
, S:>cra.tes' Mid&ifery \vhich, apparently unconnected with the rest of 
(
. the dial,gue, has yet this signif::li.cance: "But d~ you not see that 
in wx:rx reality none of these theori es comejrrom me; they all come 
from him who talks with me.n4 
£!!,!lebusl. A third later dialogue in which £:berates keeps his 
seat of honour is the Philebus, which was probably written by Plato 
as his contribution to the Academic controversy with Eudoxus. 5 As 
the whole subject of this dialogue is ethical - the nature of the 
Good Life, whether Pleasure or Knowledge is its chief constitutent -
Plato evidently feels it appropriate to return Socrates to tre chair 
so to speak, after his eclipse in the ParmenJides, Sophist and 
6 Politicus. But as our. concern lies with metaphySics and not with 
ethics, the only relevance this dialogue has for us will be found 
in the two passages on the Limit and Unlimited, and the Fourfold 
Classification of Being. Now it is noteworthy that this discusaron, 
for the two passages are closely related, is introduced a.s A GIFT 
FROM: :PROMETHEUS, which· shows that the whole doctrine is P1sto• s and 
not .SJ crate s• • 
Now it is important for the interpretation of the Parmm1ides 
to form a. conc.lusion concerning S:>crates• role in this later period. 
In the three dialogues last d1 scussed, there is no essential change 
in the position of S:>crates a:3 chief speaker: except for a pass1ing 
reference to the m w Method of D1 vision, which is tlere called 
Dialectics as if it were that same Dialectics expounded by S:>crate s 
in the Republic and hin~ted at in Fhaedo lOlDE, and the soul ~EX 
self-mover, what £berates. expounds in the Phaedrus is the fearller 
Platonic Theery of Ideas, the earlier Tripartite nnd Transmdgratory 
.S:ml, not essentially different from the Phaedo, Republic and 
1. Schrempf, s:>krate s 164. 2. Theetetetus 142C-3A. 
3. Theaetetus 148E-151C. 4. Theaetetus 161B. 
5 .• See Burnet, Greek Philosophy 324; Cornford, Cambridge Ancient 
H1sttory VI.ix.IV.331; Field, Plato and his Contemporaries 40; 
Frank, Plato.und die sogena.nnten Pythagoreer 130 with note 379; 
Jaeger, Arist,otle 16-17; Hobin, Platon 43; Taylor, Plato the Man 
and his Work 409-410. 6. Sb stenzel, Plato's Method of 
Dialectic 15. 
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qymposium, but more developed; in the Theaetetus Sbcrates does not 
explicitly mention Ideas at all, but discusses the same sort of 
problem as in parts of the Cra.tylus; and in the Philebus we have 
S::>crates in his own proper r$le of e'fhical teacher. Hence, in these 
later dialogues, &>crates does not appear in a role essentially 
different from that of the eailier dialogues, where he was the 
mouthpiece of Plato's Earlier Theory of Ideas. 
Parmenides. But in the P'armm,ides $:>crates appears as the :ci:sm 
deuteragonist. As that role is virtually confined to giving an expo-
sition of the Ideas as they appfeared in the Phaedo, etc., ED crates' 
position a.s deuteragoni st 1 s obviously in keeping with his earlier 
role as protagonist and does not mate·rially depart from his position 
in the three later dialogues dealt with above. Previously he wa.s 
the mouthpiece for the expression of Plato's Earlier Theory ofidea.s; 
he still expresses that same Theory, but now it is under criticiSDwl 
a,nd Socrates must play second fiddle. Not only does this interpreta-
tion seem to be the most simple and natural, but it fits in with 
the significance of the dialogue form for Plato as dealt with above, 
and must of necess1 ty rebut such interpretations of a> crates' role 
here as that of stewart, 1 that ::berates here represents the typical 
young student of the Academy who misunderstood Plato's doctrin.e in 
exa~ctly the same way as, so he alleges, Aristtotle dftl afterwards. 
If Plato's choice here of &>crates as deuteragonist has :?.ny meaning 
a.t a.ll, that meaning can only be that he is used to expound that 
Earlier Theory of Ideas. which he had previously expounded in the 
Phaedo and Rep)6ublic. Whether the criticisn is Plato• s own or 
someone else's, whether, Plato means the criticism .or not - this 
question will be discu~sed later- it is Plato's own Earlier 
• Theory of Ideas that is criticised, as witness the posititon~rr!tes. 
But why is Parmenides the protagonist? Parmen1des plays a two-
'fold r~le in this dialogue: he is the ostensible author of the 
criticism of the Ideas2just referred fo,, and is the exponent of' the 
2 . 
'dialectica.l exercise' which follows that·criticism. Any interpreta-
tion of his role must tDke both these facts into consideration, and 
interpret him in the same way in both roles. This raises a. very 
difficult problem, and before turJt1ng to it we note the literary 
device by which Plato marks the unh1st.orical nature o.f the meeting 
between Parmenlides ::md Socrates. 3 The dialogue is given at fourth 
hand. Cephalus hs.s coJre to Athens to he1:1r from Antiphon, Plato's 
half-brother, an account of a. meeting between S:>crates and Parmen1-
des which he had got in his youth from Fythodorus, who in turn had 
apparently 1 earnt the details .from Zeno. So Parmenide s 126BC. 
1. Plato's Doctrine of Ideas 70-72. 
2. Th1 s will be referred to as P~menide s I and II re spect1 ve ly. 
3. Cornford., Pl8to and Parmenides 64, Plato's Theory of Knowledge 
1; cp. Lewis Campbell, Classicnl Review X..l35; Jackson, Journal 
of Philology XV.300-l; and Robin, Greek Thogght 84. 
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To return to the question of the significance of Parmen1des 
as protagonist, it will be useful to review the chief interpreta-
tions of the Parmenides a.long general lines given by modern commen-
tators. Slch views fall into several well-def'inec groups. 
1. The Transcendental View. Plotinus1 claimed to find his own 
One, Nous or One-Many, and Soul or One and Many, in the firstj and 
second hypotheses and the Appendix to the second respectively. But 
he was wrong in separating this .Appendix (155Eff) from the second 
hypothesis, 2 since both arguments refer to the same One. 3 Perhaps 
for this reason Proclus took the first hypothesis to refer to the 
Good and the second to the unity of the object of science or 
opinion. 4 To this school of thought belongs Dodds, 5 who sees in 
hypothesis i a "lucid exposition of the fnmous negative theology, 
and a d.eri vat ion of the universe from the marriage of unity and 
existence in hypotheses ii and iv." But I feel-that this view is 
quite erroneous since 142A makes it clear that the first hypothesis 
1 s a reductio ad absurdum and so quite unacceptable, nnd since the 
6 d' 7 other hypotheses fail to fit in with this explanation. Har ie 
finds much to be said for the view, but an examination of' his 
arguments reveals no real support for the VE w that the above-
menti<fed hypotheses expound a negative and a positive metaphysucs, 
A 
but only tha.t Plato identified the Good with the One a.nd that this 
highest reality was beyond adequate expression, which is a very 
different matter. In fact, he does not really prove the ineffabi-
lity of the One at all, for his_ references are either to q;>urious 
Epistles - Epistle i·i. 312E nnd vi. 323D ·- or to Timaeus 28C, which 
refers to the ·ineffL'bili ty of the Creator• not of the One. I 
conclude, then, that any inter pretation oftha Par~menide s must 
explain all the hypotheses ond not merely two or three of them,, and 
must accept the first as a reductio ad absurdum. 
2'• The Logical. Exercise Vi~w:.A second group of interpretationF 
meets the criteria referred to by considering the whole of ei~ht 
hypotheses as a logicel exercise in view of Parmenl.ides' sta.temernts 
in 135CD and l36A-C to this effect. Three commenta.tors have a4opted 
this interpretation: Grote, Ehorey, and Ross. According to Ehorey, 8 
the Trope of the Parrnenide s 1 s a conscious exercise in logic, 
exhibiting the f'allacies aris11ng from the confusion of the copillla. 
with the existential verb 'to be'. The resUltant antinomies are 
not seriously meant - 1 t is just a laborious game. Further, to 
support the lack of serious purpose in thi·s Trope, S'lorey dismisses 
the criti.ciSJJ of the fir·st part of the dialogue by saying that the 
1. 'QUoted 11nd criticised by TBYlor, The Pa.rmenide s of Plato 146-58. 
2. Hardie, A study in Plato 129. 3. Taylor, op. cit. 157. 
4. Hardie, op. cit. 113-4. 5. Classical Quarterly XXII.l33-4. 
6. Hardie, opl cit. 115; Taylor, op .. cit. 152-8; Ross, Plato's 
'llleory of Ideas 96-8. 7. Op. cit. 117-130. 
8. What plato Said 289-291. 
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introduction to the Philebus shows that Plato was not disturbed by 
the objections to his theory, so that he rejects the preva.iling 
view that the :Parmenides marks a~crisi s in Plato's thought. But the 
Philebus was written something like ten or fifteen years after the 
Parmenides and so is no evidence th8t AT THE TIME OF WRITING THE 
PARMENIDES Plato was not disturbed by these objections. Ross1 !pUst 
command our respect in any view which he supports, a11d he has said 
:t.h effect that 11 As Plato did not answer Parmenides' arguments againtt 
the ~~ii8 and continued to hold them, he plainly did not think them 
fatal. As Plato did not indicate that he preferred the ind!scrim1-
nate assertion of such hypotheses as the second to the indiscrimi-
nate denial of the first, the inculcation of doctrine was not the 
main. purpose of the Parmenides. It is a logical exercise,concerned 
not so much with the Ideas as with Parmenides' One, and it is a 
mistake to trace gra.ins of positive teaching in the wilderness of 
paradox." But I think Ross fails to draw a dist~nction. Plato may 
have continued to hold the Ideas, indeed, and yet have made modifi-
cations in their conception. I cannot understand how Ross can say 
that Plato here maintains a position of impartiality between the 
arguments. since, as mentioned above, he plainly· states at 142A that 
the indiscriminate denial of hypothesis i is absurd - surely, then, 
he must accept the indiscriminate assertion of hypoth e sis ii \ This 
point can be demonstrated by quoti:ing Plato ad loc.;l42.A: "The One 
can neither be named nor spoken nor opined nor known nor can any 
of its madifestations be perceived ••• Is it possibl~for the matter 
to be in such wise concerning the.one?-It doo s not seem so.to me.« 
With this, contrast the. cpnelmaion of the second hypothesis, 155D,: 
ttThere would be. something, for the One and of it, and it wa.s and is 
and will be, •••• And there would be knowledge of it and opinion and 
perception if we acted so in respect of it." It is my opinion, then, 
that Plato must have had_. and indicated, some ~r to .Parmenides• 
cri ti·cis ms in the first part of t,}1je dia.logue, end that in the Trope 
the positive h~;ptheses must receive preferential treatment ove~the 
negative .. These two criteria have been put forward in differertt xm:x 
words by Bury2 and Chen. 3 The former says against. this Exercise 
Theory that it is unlikely that Plato would produce a work thn.t had 
no serious purpose - in other words, some attitude must be supposed 
on Platots part towards the criticism of the first pa.rt of the 
Parmenide s, and this attitude must be reflected in the Trope, the 
second part. The latter says that this view overlooks the factual 
content of the hypotheses - that hypotheses 1,1v,vi and viii, for 
example, agree in indiscrimina.te denial, whidh 142A rejects, and 
that i1,i1i,v and vii agree in indiscriminate assertion, which is 
consistent with knowledge, opinion and perception. 
1. Plato's Theory of Ideas 99-101. 2 •. Journal of Philology XXIII. 
178. 3. Classical Quarterly XXXVI!I.lOl .. 
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3. The Eristic View. Attempts have been made to meet these 
-
requirements in part, that is, by taking the Trope in close connec-
tion with parmenides• criticism - this is called the vtErist;ic View. 
Thus. P.pelt1 takes the criticism of Parmenides I e.s Magarian and 
Parmenides II as a parody of Magarian arguments. !b also Burnet
2 
that since the Third Man argumemt in parmenide s I was introduced by 
Polyxenus, a pupil of Bryson the Magarian, the criticisms of the 
Ideas are Magarian, nnd po.rmenides II was intended to disprove the 
Megftri?n philosophy; making use of certain sophisms deliberately 
because the Mega~iens were eristics. Much to the same effect is 
Taylor3 and Robin. 4 But Taylor in an eerlier work5 anticipated the 
very criticism urged in later da.ys against this interpretation by 
6 7 Cornford and Ross in soying thct nA tu quoque would be lame since 
to discredit ithe Magarian One is not to rehabilitate the Ideas,and 
how can•.(parmenides' criticise Pleto from the .Magarian point of 
view in Parmenides I and then criticise the Megarians themste1ves in 
Parmenides II?" In other words, this interpretation fails· to explain 
the significance of parmenides as the protagonist. 
I include several other versions here, although not eristic in 
the strict sense of the word, because they too turn on the interpre-
tation of Parmenide s II as a tu quoque of some sort of Parman ides 
8 I. Eb StewPrt.; who takes the doctrine criticised as Plato's own as 
it was misunderstood by others, so that 1 Secretes• represents a 
pupil of the Academy who took the Idoas exactly as Aristotle did 
afterwards, as he alleges. The founda.tion of these Ideas was 
Eleatic Being, and after giving his objections to the misconception 
of the Id~as by the Acad¢e:my,.Plato in the Trope proceeds to 
criticise the Eleatic setting up of the One. This has two defects: 
it a.scigns to socrates a role imcompatible with h&s usual position 
9 in the dialogues, and 1 t does not malfe it. clear how en attack on 
the Eleatic Being affects a misconception of the Ideas. For if the 
Academy wrongly interpt:eted the Ideas, surely it was irrelevant to 
a correction of that misconcepti-on whether the Being with wt.lch they 
were wrongly identified was 1tse1f incorrectly or correctly EMM&Etlre(l 
conceived. Bury10 sees ib the Parmenide s a reassert ion of the Ideal 
Theory in the face of the young Aristotle• s criticism , apparently 
on the grounds that many of the criticisms reappear in his Meta-
physics. But on the one hend, .Arist,otle was sutrely too young to 
11 have been thus honoured, if indeed he. had already entered the 
Academy, which is doubtful, and on~ the other, Aristotle might well 
have made use of the criticisms in the Parmenides12 without 
1. Cla.ssical Review VI.321 and Journal of Philology .XXIII.l68. 
2. Greek Philosophy 254 & 263. 13. Plato the aan and his Work 
350 & 361. 4. Plnton 127-9. 5. Mind V.317-8. 
6. Plato and Parmenides 106-7. 7. Pla.to•s Theory of Ideas 95-6. 
8. Plato• s Doctrine of Ideas 70-72. 9. See page 194 above. 
10. Journal of Philology XXIII.l91 & 176. Cp.Ritchie, Plato 119-122. 
11. Jaeger, Aristotle 16. 12. &> Ross, Aristotle• s Met.II.212. 
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1 
ackntowledgement - why not? Cherniss seems to belong to this type 
of interpretation when he says that the "Parmenides criticises the 
immanence of the Ideas in sens.i. ble s held by Eudoxus," J!but this I 
dp not understand, since whether. or not the participation ·Of sen-
Bibles in Ideas there crit i<cised can be taken to denote immanence, 
it is obvious that 'Socrates' defines the Ideas as separate; that 
the relation of patterning there criticised requires transcendent 
Ideas, and that the arguments conce rn~ng the lack of relationship 
between Ideas and things, and the unknowability of the Ideas, rest 
on the assumption of two worlds. 
A good transition to the point of view that alone of all we 
have revi e wed takes proper cognisance of the relation between parts 
2 
I and II and of Parmenides• role, is afforded by Hardie's crit ici.i sm 
of the Eristic view: The introduction to the Parmenides, he says, 
namely 136B-7A, and the back-reference in Theaetetus 183E to 
Parmenides' "noble depilh 0 , show that the Trope is meart to be meta-
physically significant. The c~iticism of the Ideas impliesft a defec1 
in 1 Socrates' not in the alleged cr1 tics {Megarians )1 a.nd Socrates' I· 
helplessness before the attack means not that the difficulties are 
fallacies, but that .&>crates could escape them if he was more 
dialectical. The length of the first two hypotheses shows that they 
are meant to elucidate the problem. In other words, the c~rrect~ine 
of interpretation .is to forget Bryson and the provenance of the 
criticisms of Parmenides I, and to concentrate on the possibility 
that Parmehides here acts·as Plato's mouthpiece for a revised Ideal 
Theory as s:>crates acted for the original Theory • 
.i· The Idealist Inter12retat1on.The general line taken by those 
critics who subscribe to the varieties of ·the Idealist Interpretat4l 
tlon is well put by Taylor: 3 As S>crates in Parmenides I is reduGed 
to hopeless perplexity, the problam is to find in Parmenides II the 
solution of the difficulties. Taylor4 had first held this view 
blended in with a,l form of the Eristic, but he subsequently abandoned 
it. He said, however, that the Socratic Theory in Parmenidu s 129 
was Magarian and thought it singularly apposite that Parmenides the 
Eleatic should refute the Megarianism represented by socrates. We 
have, I think, sufficiently argued that it is incompatible with the 
role of S:>crates as Plato's mouthpiece to expound anything else t'h8ll 
Plato's Earlier Theory of' Ideas, but Taylor is correct when he adds 
that hypotheses i and iv show that the Magarian principle is 
untenable, and the solution to the difficulties raised in Parmenide{ 
I are solved by hypotheses 11, iii, v and Mii. 
This solution given by Taylor 1 s found alc..o in Tocco' s5 inter-
preta.tion: multiplicity is introduced by these hypotheses into 
the Ideal .Sphere from which it VIaS at" first excluded, and this is 
1. The Riddle of the Early :Aca.demy 79. 2. A study in Plato 99-101. 
3. Mind v.3ol. 4. Mind VI.36~8. 5. Journal of Philology XXIII.l6£ 
_ ... , 
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developed analytically in the Sophfst, indirectly demonstrated in 
.hypotheses 1 and i v of the Parmenide s by redllctio ad absurdum., and 
applied to Ethics in the Philebus. Objections hove been. raised to 
l 
this line of interpretation by Hardie and Ross. Ross objects that 
the refutation of Monism in the Trope does not suit Parmenides as 
the speaker., but Ross himself supplies the retort to this objection, 
as will be shown presentlY.t. Further, the indiscriminate assertion 
of hypothesis 11 is no more satiPfactory than the indiscriminate 
negation of 1. I have already dealt with this objection on page 196 
above. Finally, the conclusion, 166C, treats all arguments as 
2 t"-: forming a single argument. Cornford has given a;t explanation of 
the appfea~rance of fallacy here by pointing out that Plato delibe-
rately couched the argument in the form of Eleatic dialectic, no 
doubt. to preserve some sort of dramatic verisimilitude! in th~h~Jti!:c 
of Parmenides as protagonist. These objections Ross has borrowed 
from Hsrdie, 3 who had posed the crucial question, ttHow can an at tack 
on Eleaticism be put into the mouth of Parmenide s?" This seems to me 
to be the only serious difficulty, and the solution has been offer~ 
ed by Ross himself: 4 "Whlile Parrnen: ides is a,!Donist, he is not here 
treated as such, but is chosen as the mouthpiece of Plato's 
reflections because they were too far removed from S;)crates• way of 
thinking to be put into his mouth, and because he ~represented the 
objective wisdom of age. He says that the theory is funde,mental.ly 
true but has been proclaimed without rega.rd to prec1 sion of thought. 
Parmenides II affords an example of such preci:s:ilon." This J6v1ew has 
5 been to some extent anti.clpated by Bury, who sa.id: n I conclude that 
this (t~e Trope) is a polemic against Megarian Monism, put into the 
mouth of Parmenide s as an ad hominem, and indica.ting that true 
Eleaticism is inconsistent wtflth Absolute Monism." I would rather 
say, however, that this is a polemic against Eleatic Monism, indica-
, ting that Plato's version of what he felt to be the true Eleat1c1sm 
l is inconsistent with the aboolute Monism maintained by the histori-
cal Parmenides. This I shall elaborate presently , but first it will 
be as well to conclude this review by mentioning two others;ialong 
these lines, but '&n1que in their interpretation of Platonif':.m. 
Wild6 takes parmenides II as Plato's correction of the over-
simple ontologp expounded by Socrates in Parmenides %1 I, whiCh 
represented h~s own earlier view. "It is inconceivable," s~ys Wild, 
"that the very man who saw and stated these objections so clea.rly 
could have gone on holding the very misconceptions he had so 
destructively criticised. u The new ontology is that there are four 
grades of reality: the Forms must exist imperfectly in th1Dgs 
t'] 
(hypotheses ii ond iii), le'ss perfectly in the marginal content of 
-
1. Plato• s Theory of Ideas 95. .2. Plato end Parmenides 114. 
3. A Study in Pla.to 109. 4. Op. cit. 91. 5. Journal of 
Philology XXIII.l81. 6. Plato's Theory of Man 209 & 217-9. 
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sense experzilence (hypo the sis vii)., purely and insubstontially as 
objects of the Understanding (hypothesis v), and have their source 
in the unique unity of Being·itself (hypothesis 1). Wild makes out 
a. very interesting onto logy, and one which might be squared with 
Plato's thought in the Simile of Light of the Republic and parts 
of the S:>phist, but it is doubtful whether the hypotheses cited 
reallY reflect such an interpretation, and certainly 1 t is d1ff1 cult 
to accept the reductio ad absurdum of hypothesis i as expressing 
the highest grade of reality. Nevertheless, Wild correctly inter-
prets the rSle of Parmenides:"It shows the master, Farmen ides, 
leani.1ng to see in the dark instend of dismissing what 1 s not 
peE'fectly real as delusion. 11 If Plato could put his own philo co phy 
into the mouth of Socrates becnuse, although Socrates never held 
such doctrines as Reminiscence, Ideas, Transmigration, he felt that 
this philosophy was a development of the Socratic, as we argued 
above, surely it is quite consistent with thia point of view that 
he should ascribe to Parmenide s views which Parmen ides indeed never 
held,1 but which Plato felt were the logical development of his 
position •. Plato shows l?armenides learning to see in the dark, as 
Wild so be au tifully expresses it .• 
A last interpretation is that of Liebrucks, 2 whose error lies 
in his pla~ing the Parmenide s subsequent to the Sophist. He inter-
prets the Sophist as expounding a new ontology in which sen£1bles , 
Not-Being, are as real as the Ideas, Bei~g, so that his earlier 
theory of two worlds collapses. That earlier dualism is expounded 
by Socra.tes in the Parmenides, criticise~ by Parmenides, who then 
proceeds to develop the new ontology of Rela.ti'kuity in t~he Trope. 
From an examination of the above review I have reached this 
conclusion, that the Parmenides represents a crisis in Plato 1 s 
thoug@t.Wha.tever the source of the criti.cism in Parmen:ldes I, this 
criticism was meant to demolish the Theo-ry of Ideas put forward by 
$)crates. 3 This means that Plato realised that his Theory was still 
immature, 4 and we expect in J?armenides an indication towards 
reconstruction. 5 Parmenides is chosen as the author both of the 
criticism and of the foundations of this reconstruction because 
Plato wished to emphasise the part played by Eleatic influence in 
the transformation· of his doctrine. 6 I believe this to be the true 
interpretation of the choice of Pa.rmenides as protagonist both 
because 1t is in line with Plato• s earlie·r choice of Socrates as 
his mouthpiece and because this interpretation of the·ro~le of 
1. Cp. Field, Plato and his Contempora.ries 19l:npa.rmenides ca.n 
hardly have held all the opinions ascribed to him in the dialoguen 
2. Platens Entwicklung zur Dialektik 156-9 & 168-172. 
3. Classical Quarterly XXXI. 71"-73. 4. Campbell, The Thea.etetus of 
Plato xxv. Ep. Mind V.316; Cambridge Ancient History VI.ix.rv. 
326; Liebrucks, op. cit. 183. 5. Classical Review XX.273; cp. 
Classical Review LVo77; Jout:nal of Philology XI.301; Robin, 
Platen 126-7. 6. Robin, Greek Thought 84, cp. Ritchie, o.c.124. 
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Parmenides is the obvious explanation of his later choice of the 
Eleatic stranger a.s his chief speaker. We sh~.dl elaborate this last 
point now. 
Sophist and Pcili tic~. We have se,en that the Phaedrus introduces 
a new meaning of the word Dialectics - the new Platonic Method of 
Division. This method is made much use of in the Sophist and the 
Pol1t1cus, which are thus demonstrably works exhibiting or illustra-
ting .Pl~to' s new method. Now· 1f in the p.armenide s Plato had la.id the 
foundation for his amended Theory of Ideas, it 1 s reasonable to 
~i~iimto find his new construction in these two dialogues, and one 
might even expect that Parmenides had been used as his mouthpiece 
for the foundation of this reconstruct.ion, the reconstructed Theory 
itself, so far as it might appear in these later dialogues, would 
also be expounded by Parmm1des. So &>crates wns the exponf'ent of 
the Earlier Theory, now Parmenides is expected to be the exponent 
of the Later Theory. But instead of Parmenide s we find a.n Eleatic 
stra8ger. True, he is an Eleatic like Parman ides, but why not the 
Master himself? For one thing, of course, Paremnides belonged to an 
auterior age: it is all very well for Plato to suppose that Socrates 
met pa.rmenides in his youth, but it would ®rely be monotonous for 
two other dialogues to follow the same pattern. Ross1 as llsual has 
sup~ed us with the answer: Plato feels that he is now the HEIR 
in some sense to the philosophy of Parmenide s, but, repelled by his 
extreme Mon1 sm, he takes as his mouthpiece not Pa..rmenide s but tpe 
. 2 Stranger a.s the type of an ENLIGHI'ENED Elea.tic. So Robin, that by 
the substitution of Socrates by the Elea.tic stranger Plato sug!§ests 
that he is giving the world a ~NEW Eleat,Cicism. And again Burnet, 3 
that his use of the Eleatic stranger shows tha.t Plato conl11dered¢: 
himself and not the Megarions as the TRUE DISCIPLE of Parmenide s. 
Hence, because the stranger expounds the Method of Division, he 
represents Plato himself; he is an Elea.tic because Plato regarded 
\ 
himself as the true Elea.tic - Parmenides' Elea.ticism was too 
monistic, so 'to speak; Plato corrects the error and claims· to hold 
a. purer Eleatic1sm than Parmenides him self. But this interpretation 
can only be fully justified by an examination of the doctrines 
expounded in the above-menticred dialogues, which stil~lies ahead of jt; 
us. 
Timaeu~ One la.st dialogue remains to ~e considered - for the 
Cr1 tia.s is a fragment and the Laws deals with subjects irrelevant 
to this the sis. In the Timaeus the protagonist 1 s an alleged Pytha-
gorean, Timaeus of Locri. We ca.nnot be pure that such a person ever 
. 4 
existed at all, but what here matters is not his historicity but 
his being the representative of some Pythagorean school or other. 
Now the .S;>phi st and Po11 ticus dea.l largely with 1og:1 cal questions, 
1. Plato's Theory of Ideas 104. 
213. 3. Greek Philosophy 237. 
2. P1a.ton 138-9, cp.Greek Thought 
4. See' above, page 173. 
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but the Timaeus is more especially concerned with the world of 
sense, and the generation of the vigjble universe. Hence, it seemtlp 
to follow that whereas Plato derived the logical side of his new 
Theory from a. reformed Eleatic:tsm, the details of the sense world 
and its generation were influenced by some Pythagorean school. For 
if Timaeus of Lo cri was not an hi~oliical person, did not in fact 
exist except 
pythagorean, 
1 philosophy. 
in Plato's imagination., since he i€ presented as a. 
Plato must thereby be acknowledging his debt to that 
It is, however, 
identity of some person then 
But this question can rather 
portion of this work. 
a possibility that Timaeus cloaks the 
2 living, whom custom forbade his naming. 
ent§.red be Bftlli1' into more deeply in a. later 
~ut by saying that Plato, by choosing a. Pythagorean as his 
mouthpiece, acknowledges pythagorean influence, I do not mean that 
Plato is here reproducing pythagorean science any more than the 
choice of &>crates in earlier dia.logue s meant that the Theory of 
Ideas there. expounded was held by &>crates, only that. Plato 1 s s:> uree 
. . 3 
was Socratic. ~ylor takes the science in the Timaeus to be a sort 
of rescript of pythagorean beliefs held by pythagoreans living in 
,S:>crates' lieftime, since S:>crates is present in the dialogue, at 
the same time contaminated with certain of his own views. 4 But it' 
is suffi·cient reftil.tation of this, unless ohe be a follower of the 
Burnet-Taylor tiiiiili~' that such an interpretation leads to the 
5 deduction, as .Taylor sees, that the absolute Ideas which appear in 
' 
the Timaeus were Pythagorean and not Platonic. This has been pointed 
out by CCTrnford, 6 but is really quite obvious, and fb.orey7 has gone 
so far a.s to sta.te that the hypothesis that 1~ the Timaeus Plato is 
REPRODUCING pythagorean science of the V. century 1 s fanciful. 
One other question rema.ins to be discussed concerning the 
Timaeus, and that is the significance of its doctrines being tenJjed 
a mi~kx !!!Yth, a likely tale,f';;8or~:x~~ .• This reservation o~~urs in 
several places of which the most impor;tant is 28B-D:ttAbout what is 
I 
fixed and clear to the mind our accoun.t must be fixed and incontra-
' . , 
vertible, but the account of what is only ,an image ( flKOYo~ ) of 
I ' the former can only be probable (tcl(o TttS . )- what Being is to 
Becoming, ro is Truth to Belief. cb do not wonder if we are unable 
to render a wholly consistent nnd exact account. Yet if we give an 
account no l.e ss probable than that of other philosophers, it should 
be welcomed, considering that I the speaker and you the listeners 
1. Ritchie, Plato 52:"The Timaeus gives Pythagorean doctrines, 
modified by Plato's own." Also op. cit •. 127 and Ritter, The 
Essence of Plato's Philosophy .258. 2. Cp. Field, Platofand his 
Contemporaries 75-6 that Plato would not refer to a liv1 ng person 
by name, but.he admits Cebes, mentioned in Phaedo,was still alive. 
3. Plato the .Man and his Work 436 and A Commentary on Plato's 
Timaeus 31-3. 4. S.ee stocks' criticism, Classical Review 
XLIII.219-220. 5. A CommenJtary on Plato's Timaeus 335 ad 51B. 
6. Plato's Cosmology 28 with note 1. ·7., What Plato Slid 612 note. 
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are only mortal, so that it behoves us to accept this likely tale 
or myth (T~"' tb(o7~ f:Vc9otl ) concerning these things, and not look 
1 I ~ 
beyond it." S<:emp . is probably correct in connecting UK'-"/ S w1 tb 
t11(~ , and so in giving it the meaning of something more than 
' - ' 'probable•. :tike thett~4c;o-,u(oV of s:>phist 234Cff and 266D, which 
give_s the true proportions of the original, it is a form o£. science 
2 
.fb Ross, while allowing that the expression means that we cannot 
look for certainty, interprets 1 t to be an attempt at what Plato 
thought mo.st likely true. Gornford3 and Vlastos4 have pointed out 
that the element of fa.l,tdity lies not in the exposition but in the 
object described, and yet this does not mean that it is fanciful. 
As examples of the irreducible element of 'myth' Field 5points to 
the account of' Crea.tion: this does not mean tha.t Plato regalfud Cre-
ation as an event in time because it is so presented - Pla.to has 
simply chosen this form of expos1 t1.on in order to present the result 
of analysis in a form. in ~hich we can most easily grasp it. This 
doubtless is what Xenocrates meant by saying thnt Plato chose this 
form of expos11:1i.on&"ufcer¥A),•q~ )f.·~~~. 4 This is well expressed by 
6 . 
De Lacy: ·"As the generation of S>ul and the Irregular Motions of 
the Prec~smos took place before the creation of Time, this form of 
the account may be only a device for fi~tlf1ng certain features of 
reality." I conclude, therefore, that the Timaeus gives us an 
account of what Plato believed., but in a form which was not D!leant 
to be pressed literally but was employed as the most convenient for 
expounding difficult truths which Plato had thought out as the 
. ' 
result of his analysis of·real1ty. Plato does.not claim that this 
account is Truth in the same certain wa.y in which knowledge of the 
Ideas was Truth,, but so far as it went it gf:1 Ve wh::J.t Plato really 
believed. 
Sln:lmau. We·have seen~ then, that Plato adopted the dialogue 
form for his,writings as that most appropriate to his original 
purpose, that 9f portraying a. living picture of Socrates. But as 
from the outset·t Plato took the liberty of suppressing certain 
unpalatable a>cratic dicta and of reinterpreting others that he had 
thought out for himself, Plato, as he became the more removed in 
time from the death of a> crates,. put more and more of his own 
thoughts into the mouth of his master. In accordance with the 
literary convention of his day, Pla.to, from about tm time of the 
Meno, begaa .to use his figure of Socrates not merely to present an 
idealised picture of 8bcrates but to use him as the exponent of his 
own philosophical beliefs,. generally however demarcating these as 
1. Plato's Theory of Motion 67. 2. Plato's Theory of Ideas 126-8. 
3. Cambrid_ge Ancient History VI.ix.IV.330, and Plato's Cosmology 
.29 :nMo»or does not mean that it is only provisional and must 
be constantly revised, only that physics does not yteld exact 
truth." 4 .• Classical Quarterly XXXIII.73. 
5. The Philosophy of Plato 127. 6 •. Classical Philology XXXIV.112. 
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non-Socratic and marking them off as out of character by means of 
certain ertidic devices sucb as making Socrates dreain, pmphesy, 
or doubt the~. This he felt the more justified in doing as he 
believed .that his own philooophy wos the development, the logical 
outcome of Socratic! sm, and as these dialogues were directed not 
to specialists but to the general edlicated public of his day. Hence, 
in these earlier dialogues the particular doctrines expounded are 
not to be taken as literal expressions of ·Plato• s beliefs, but it 
is rather the general philo so. phi cal po si t:1on from which they are 
a.pproached that is of value .~ for us. 
In the dialogues written subsequent to the Phaedrus we notice 
a change in approach. This <change lies in two lim! directions. In 
the first, socrates as the Master recedes to be replaced by Socrates 
as jiia~i~a~~r - and there is a later tendency to replace Socrates b 
b_y other cb.ara.cters a.s chief speaker. This tendency must be inter-
preted in the same way as the earlier practice of using Socrates as 
prota.goni st. That is, just as Pla. to had felt entitled to use Slcra-
tes as his mouthpiece because in this way he could acknowledge his 
debt to him - his philosophy was a development of the Ebcra.tic - se 
the choice of an Eleatic or a Pythagorean speaker is to be regarded 
a.s an acknowledgement that in the dialogue in question the doctrine 
was a development of or had been i.{jfluencad by the Eleatic or the 
Pythagorean philosophy respectively. In the second place, there is 
a change in the audience, so to speak. As Field1 so excellently 
expresses it.: "The later dialogues are directed lass to the general 
public and more to. those specially: 1ntera sted 1n philosophical 
questions. n Hence, we can expect· to find a. more detailed exposi-
tion of certein .tenets of his phil'? sophy if' less of his brttad 
philosophical position. But there is an important corollary to 
this change in public and the .consequently more specialised approach 
nemely, "The later dialogues only give what Plato saw fit to give 
the public 1n order to define his attitude to other schools of 
2 3 philosophy." Or to keep to Field's expression of the matter: 
"PLato is. not giving a systematic account of his philosophy, but 
discussing controversies on particular points that had arisen in 
connection with it." fb we shall find no complete manue.l of Plato-
nism, but only discussions of particular points. 
Now if Plato had written monographs on these particular points 
we should have been able to obtain exact if not complete knowledge 
of his doctrines; but as they 8re presented in the form of dialogues 
one must expect to find a distortion of the doctrines presented 
to suit the mise en sc~ne, apart from the limitation of the tenets 
expounded to strict relevance to the particular question d1 scussed, 
as has already been mentioned. Thus, when 'Parmenides• expounds 
1. The Philosophy of Plato 108, cp. 12. 
2. Burnet, Greek Philosophy 214. 3. Op. cit. 109. 
I 
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Plato's beliefs, we must expect those beliefs to be given a form 
resembling what Parmenides might heve said: for example., he would 
speak of the One rather than of the Idea.There is also the question 
of avoiding too ~agrant anachronisms: if S:>crates is ma.de to 
expound some belief of Plato's concerning the constitution of thing& 
from elements, we must expect 'S:>crates' to name these elements in 
a way known to the v. century rather than to the IV, and to ca.ll 
them Limit and Unlimited rather than One and Great and Snall. But 
the interpretation of such particular instances is better left 
over for treatment a.s they arise. 
In conclusion., we may use the dialogues as evidence for Plato's 
own beliefs, but with certain reservations. We must not ·expect to 
find any systematic exposition of Platonism, but only more or less 
isolated tenets determined by the paeticular question dealt with by 
the dialogue in which they appear. While these tenets can be 
regarded as Platonic constructions based on the philosophy of the 
person or school represented by}l;the mouthpiece used by Plato in any 
particular case, they have for that very reason been modified to an 
uncertain extent to accord with the character, thoughts en:i time of 
the speaker, and are probably not e.xpressed by Plato with the 
precision one might expect from a metaphysician, but are merely 
expressions of Plato's general underlying philosophical position 
modified according to the requirements of the mise en sc~ne and 
expressed with varying loeseness of definition as suits the genius 
of a dramatist. The more precise determination of the signiflicance 
of any particular tenets must be detided in any particular case on 
the strength of the factors which might be considered to have 
. ' .· 
influenced its expression. And with this 1n )Onind we now turn to 
the,t examination of those doctrines relevant to our aim of 
establishing the h1stod1cal· correctness or otherwise of Aristotle'~ 
conceptions of those features of Platonism dealt with in the 
. second chapter of' Part I above. As 1 s natural, we shall begin with 
those tenets which seem to belong to Plato's Earlier Theory of 
Ideas, that is, with the peculiaJr:!tties of Plato's philosophy, or 
its differences from Pythagoreanisn, as alleged by Aristotle in 
Metaphysics A.vi. 
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Section 11. The Evidence of Plato's Dialogues. 
a) Plato's Earlier Theory ·of Ideas ... 
The purpose of this section is not to give a complete ~~~i~i~igR 
of Platonism, for that lies outside the scope of this work, but 
merely to corroborate from Pla.tots dialogues those tenets of Plato-
nism which Aristotle adduces, especially but not exclusively in 
Metaphysics A.vi, in connection with his resemblances to and_d!iffer-
ences from pythagoreanism. Here we shall confine ou.rselves to the 
question of the Primary Differences or Peculiarities as set forth 
in Part I, Chapter 2, Section i above, which nreans in effect the 
Theory of Ideas as it appfears in the earlier dialogues. These 
prima,ry diffe;-ences can be summa .. rised as follows:-
1. Numbers, i.e. Ideas of Number, exist separately from sensible 
things. 
2. The objects of mathematics are intermediate between Forms, i.e. 
numerical or mathematica.l Forms, a~d sensible things - 1. e. the 
numbers and shapes of the things of this world - being like the 
former in that they are eternal and unchangeable, like the latter 
in being many. 
3. The introduction of Forms was due to two influences with Plato's 
own conclusions drawn from these: i) Plato accepted that sensible 
things were in a sta.te of Flux and there was no knowledge about 
them (which he continued to hold even in later years) - this he ha.d 
from Cra.tylus; 11) Plato accepted Socrates' definitions as the 
objects of knowledge; iii) but he held that these were not sensible 
things but entities of anotper kind, because definitions could not 
be stns1ble things as those were a.lwa.y s changing. To these points 
can be a.dded 1v) that Plat.o called these entities Ideas. which were 
characte:tised by being universal and yet individual - i.e. they 
were universa.ls separate as substances from par~iculars; and 
v) that sensible things were named after the corresponding Idea 
inasmuch as they existed by· Par.ticipation in that Idea. This 
relation of Participation Aristotle was unable to define from his 
knowled~ of Plato's teachings, but seems to have conceived lflt 
indif_ferently as \!;sharing in' or as the thing being modelled on the 
Idea, which served as a.n archetype. We shall start from point 3, 
lea.ving 1 and 2 for later discussion. 
3.i) Flu;!• The Heraclitean doctrine of Flux is mentioned in 
several of Plato• s dia.l0gues, ea.rly as well as late, but one could 
not gather that Plato learnt it espec,eily from· Crstylus, for 
altbo.ugh in the dialogue of that name this theory forms one of the 
theses on which names are founded - for Socrates takes his stand 
between the extremes that the Name-giver was an exponent of Flux 
on the one hand, anlll of Parmenidean Rest on the other - 1 t is 
.Socrates who first mentions this theoryt an.d at that sugl§ests it 
to Hermogenes not to Cratylus:"Heraclitus said that ··all things are 
•• 
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in flux and nothing rests•n, 1 and the corollary that ttNa:turally it 
is said that there could not be knowledge elf all things chBnge and 
nothing is stablen2 is put forward by &>crates for the approval of 
Cratylus. On.e mie)lt deduce from the fact that these tenets are put 
into the mouth of &>crates rather than in that of Cra.tylus, 3 that 
4 this doctrine represents Plato's own belief. At any rate, the 
recurrence of this theme in other dia.logues is an indication that 
this was in fact Plato1s own belie~. For in the Theaetetus 5 it is 
sa.id to be the belief of all philoso.phers ~1 th the exception of 
p·a.rmenide s that "there 1 s no signgle thing or quality, but out of 
motion and change and admixture all things are Becoming rela.tively 
to one another •••• for nothing ever is,but all things are becoming." 
6 Again the corollary is stated, " ••• Since whiteness itself is a 
flux or chenge which. is passing into another colour, 6ixii; never 
to be caught standing still., can the name of any colour be rightly 
used at a.ll? •••• And what would you say of perceptions? ••• Is there 
any stopping in the act of seeing and hearing? - Certainly not, if 
all things are in motion. - ••• Yet perception is knowledge? ••• " 
several other passages where Flux is given, apparently as Plato•s 
own belief, are cited by Ross3 and Cherniss, 4 so that we are in a· 
position to conclude that Plato accepted the Heraclitean doctrine 
tha.t P.J.ll things were in a state of Flux and 1 ts corollary that there 
was no knowledge about them. And that he continued to hold this 
doctrine even .in later years 1 s apparent from the Timaeus: 7 "Water, 
when split up by fire or by air, settles down into one body of fire 
and two of air; particles of a.ir, wl';licb have been dissolved from 
one portion would become two bodies of )'fire .And again, when fire 
is compressed by air, water or some eartho •• fighting its v..ay out 
but being c.onquered and shattered, two bodies of fire are. put 
together to make one figure of air, or if it is a.ir that is over-
come and broken up, one whole of water will be compacted from two 
and a half portions of air." Here is the notion of Flux, but with 
a new principle of geometrical figures built up of triangles 
replacing and indeed making more scient1fifc the conventional 
interpretation in terms of Rarefaction and Condensation. Aristotle, 
then, is born.e out at all po.ints, except that no evidence can be 
found from the dialogues that Cratylus was his teacher. 8 
,!i) Definitions.:., Five dialogues are almost exclusively concern-
ed with ){the discovery, in the &lcra.tic manner, of the definitions 
of various ethical concepts or universals: the Euthyphro with 
l.Cratylus 402A. 2. Cratylus 440A. 3. Ross, Plato's Theory 
of Ideas 156: ttin the Cra.tylus, Cratylus appears a.s a conv:i.nead 
Hera.cl1tean, 440DE."- rather late in tha d1aloguet 
4. Admitted even by Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato 211. 
5. Theaetetus 152DE. 6. Theaetetus 182DE. 7. T1maeus 56DE. 
8.Diogenes Laertius III.6 init, states that Plato's teachers were 
Cratylus and Hermogenes, which looks like a deduction from the 
dialogue, Cratylus; 
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piety, the Laches with courage ( elabora.ted in the Protegoras}, the 
Charmides with temperance, the first book of the Republic with 
justice, and t.he Meno with virtue in genena.l • .As examples of 
Socrates' distinction between the loose examples of a virtue then 
currently mistaken iii a defin1 t1on and the true definition., the 
essence itself, we may cite the following passages, which are also 
of value because they illustrate the germ of the !deal Theory taking 
f,root 1n Jlato' s mind, the object of the definiti:ton being whe,t later 
was termed the Idea.: "Remember that ! did not ask you to give me 
two or three examples of piety, but to explain the general idea 
( ccl>~o )o t Uo~ ) which makes all pious things to be pious. 111 
"I wish to find. out !from you not only what men are brave as infan-1; 
try but e.lso as cavalry and in all phases of warfare, and not only 'If 
in warfare but also brave in encountering dangers by sea., and those 
who are brave in the face of sickness and penury, or in tpe politi-
cal arena, al}d further who are again not merely brave in Slilffering 
and ai'frights, but also boldy oppose their desires :-.nd pleasures, 
both. in encountering end abstaining from them - for there are 
perhaps some., 0 Lac!l)ls, who are brave even in such matters as these~" 
'Slch is the S>cratic search for the definition, the common factor 
in a number of instances, the essence. In Plato's hands this becomes 
"the very Being with which true knowledge is concerned; the colour-
less, formless, intahgible essence, vis:i.ible only to the mtind, the 
pilot of the soul, n3 in a word, the Idea, which Plato¢ places in the 
a.tpracele stial Sphere: 4 . "In the .revolution she (i.e. the soul) 
beholds Justice, end ·Temperance, .and ·Knowledge Absolute., not in the 
form of generation or of relation, which men call existence, but 
Knowledge Absolute in, existence absolute. n Again AriStotle is 
corroborated : Plato's Ideas are d.erived from the a>cratic 
definitions as the true objects of knowledge. 
iii) The Deduction of Idea~. What we have seen in i and ii 
above are Heraclitus' Flux and S:>crates• definitions or universals. 
That Plato accepted these tenets is shown by their beingeiM~iiiiid 
in several places in the dialogues, but better by their being used 
as the foundation on which Plato erects the nucleus of his Theory 
of Ideas. This nucleus, the existence of Ideas as eternal, unchange-
able objects of knowledge separate from sensible things, is implicit 
wherever Plato mentions the existence of Ideas, the reality of 
knowledge and the distinction between knowledge and opinion, but is. 
expli(cit in the Cra.tylus, where the statement of the assertion of 
the existemce nnd manner of existence of such entities closely 
correspon4s to Aristotle• s aceojunt in the Metaphysics- so close 
indeed that it is tempt1Ag to suppose that Aristotle drew his 
1. Euthyphro 6D. 2. Laches l91DE. Ross, Platoi s Theory of Ideas 
11, sees here the seeds of the Ideal !heory. 
3. Phe.edrus 247C. 4. Phr:edrus 247DE. 
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account directly from this dialogue. 
However that mey be, the demonstration of the existence of the 
1 Ider4s is given in the Cratylus as follows:"Let us then consider 
this, ••• ~whether in reality those who laid down names thought that 
all things were constantly moving and in flux ••••• For consider, 
my dear Cratylus, what I have often dreamed. S'lall we say that there 
is an Absolute Beauty Bnd Good and each such thing or not? ••• And 
consider this, not whether some face or suchlike is beautiful ahd 
all these things which are in flux, but, let/us say, &i~~li 
Beauty, is not this always such as it is? ••• And could we rightly 
say this very thing, 1f 1 t constantly flowed away., first that it 1s, 
then that it is such, or would it not necessarily immedia.tely become 
different even while we were speaking, give ground and never be so? 
•••• But if it is always so and rema.ins the same, how could it 
change or move? ••• Nor could one rightly say there wa.s knowledge, 0 
Cratylus, if all things changed a.nd nothing was st~tble •••• For if 
that very form of knowledge were to change, at that same time it 
would '.change to another form than knowledge and there would be no 
longer knowledge." 
That this theory is Plato• s ovvn and not Socrates', by whom it 
2 is enunciated, is shown by SJcrntes' dreaming 1.t, and also by much 
the same resultant position being put forward by the Eleatic 
Stranger, who,. as we said above, represents Plato himse:t.f: "¢If 
Justice and Wisdom· and other Virtues and their opposites exist, and 
further if S>ul exists in t"lhich these are manifested, shall they 
say that· any one of these is visible and tangible, or that a.ll are 
1nv.isible? ••• For if they are willing to admit that even one small 
pe.rt of reality is imm,-,teria.l, it will silffice.n3 This is the 
eonclus:ion drawn from the thesis and antithesis that all things are 
sensible and in motion, and.that all things are immobile, respective-
ly, and this conclU\tion shows that sensible things are indeed .in 
motion, but~that such' immaterial entities as quoted also exist. 
The argument, then, holds good not only for Flato's.Ea.rl.ier but 
also for his Le..ter Theory of Ideas, of which, as will appear, the 
. . 4 Sophist gives an expos! tion. 
!v} .Sepsration. Slcb entities, then; Are objects of knowledge 
or what Aristotle calls Universals, inasmuch as they are the objects 
of the Slcratic definition, and because they are not in Flux they 
are separate from the world of sense. If 1 t can be shown from the 
dialogues that the Ideas were separate, transcendent, Aristotle willt 
have been corroborated in this point also, for this is the fact 
underlying h1 s interpretation of the Ideas both as un.i v e rsal and ae 
1. Cra,ttilus 439C-440B. 2. Cratjlus 439C in the quotation cited. 
3. SOphist 247 B &: D. 4. This, I. think, disposes of Liebrucks' 
finding the origin of Ideas in Plato's politics, Platons Entwick-
lung zur DiAlekt1k 24, and of Field's alleged origin in pythago-
rean mathema.t1cs., The Philosophy of Plato 36-43. 
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individual. No one denies that Aristotle had the habit of couching 
the doctrines of his predecessors in his own term:!.nology nor that 
he drew out the implications which any doctrine under discussion 
might have· according to his own system, and. the Idea as both nni ver. 
indilidual 1 
sal and ~a:rx :euxs:r is an example of this; but certain critics 
allege that for Plato the Idea was not separate from things, but 
this was a. misunderstanding by Aristotle of the nature of the Idea. 
It is perhaps true that the dial:gues written before the Pha.edo 
treat the Idea a.s immanent, 2 ~vhich may have been due to Plato's 
desire to keep as close as possible to s:>cra.tes, 3 but at any rate 
in the Phaedo and in the Parmenides the Idea is frnnkly transcen-
dental, and while the SUpracelestial Sphere of Pha.edrus 247C-E need 
not be taken lite rally it does stand for extreme separation. 4 
Uinfortunately there is some dispute about the interpretation of 
these dialogues. Concerning the phaedo, where Imnr.ortali ty is proved 
both by the kinshl.ip of the soul with the Ideas and by Recollection 
5 
of the Ideas implying the pre-existence of the soul, Cornford Xzks 
takes his stand on the obvious fact that Rernini seance, Immortal! ty, 
6 
and the separateness of the Forms, stand or fall together, and Rose 
argues that Anamnesis involves the sepnration of the Ideas recellec-
ted since particulars only sugg9 st the Forms and this presupposes 
tpe prior knowledge of them. On the other hand¢, stewart 7points out 
that Anamnesis is presented in the Meno as an Orphic belief, not aS 
Platonic dogma; Ritter,8 making a¢distinction between the results 
attained by scientific 1nve stigation and those of myth r.nd poetry, 
can see no more iri the doctrine of Immortality than the fact that 
there is •a .. priori' knowledge in the soul; F1eld 9 points to the 
Socratic doubt in the Meno that he 1 s not prep8red to insist on the 
doctrine in the form presented. On the strength of these and other 
kindred arguments the Idea. is reduced to a point of view. hnving 
the perrna.:mence of Laws of Nature indeed, but being in no sense 
separate entit1es. 10But all these points turn on the inteirpretation 
of wha.t have been termed above artistic devices, and I believe that 
the truth lies with stenze111 when he SAYS we must regard Reminis-
cence snd Immortality as myths unless we ac.cept the hypo the sis of 
such artistic devices: so Reminiscence is used t.o prove Immortal~t' 
but Socrates compares 1 t to a swant-song; in Phaedo lOOA the Ideas 
are hypotheses, but this hypothesis is used to prove Immortal:f.ty, 
which again Socrates later doubts. These doubts are not meant by 
1. E.g. Ritter, The Essence of Plato's Philosophy 111 & 113 with 
·note 1; stewart, Plato's Doctrine of Ideas 3-4. 
2. Ross, Plato's Theory of Idea.s 21. 3. Cp. Classica.l Quarterly XX .. 
76-7. 4. Ross, op. cit. 81. 5. Plato and Parrnenides 75; 
Plato's Theory of Knowiedge 6; cp. Liebrucks, Platons Entwick-
lung zur Dia.lektik 31-2. 6. Op. cit. 35, cp. 25. 
7. The Myths of Plato 344-5; cp. .shorey, What Plato said 513 ad 
Meno¢ 81DE. 8. The Essence of Plato's Philosophy 104. 
9. The :Philosophy of Plato 65. 10. stewart, Plato's Doctrine 
of R~Drim:EXtll: Idet' s 6. 11. Plato's Method of Dialectic 5-9. 
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Plato to signify that he believed the doctrines to be myths, but 
to Bhow that while these doctrines are uttered by Socrates they are 
non-Socratic. are Plato• s own thoughts. The Idea. is never perfectly 
represented by particulars, but these only approximate to the nteas. 
This ' ::hortfall1 makes our knowledge of the Ideas inconceivable 
unless they were already known to us in a pre-existent state of the 
soul· and now are Recollected. And if the soul had a previous state 
of exist e nee and the Ideas are immaterial nnd yet really real, it 
can be proved, according to the Phaedo, that the soul is immortal. 
That is Plato's belief,fand unless the Ideas were separate, neither 
;Slortfa.ll, Remin1 scenqe nor Immortality could be demonstrated, nor 
even assumed. 
But separation is explicit in the Parmenides, where, as we 
have seen, ,a, crates is the expmnent of this Theory of Ideas. There 
we hr-ve: "There are certain Ideas SEPARATE (X'V',;0/5) from their 
participants, a.nd Likene ssfii t self is separate from the likeness 
which we have."1 Further, there is n~m Ideaclone by itself of Jus-
' tice ...... and an .Idea of Man APART FROM ( ..Vt.v'~( f ) us men and all who 2 .... , . 
are .like us, an Absolute Idea of Me.n. n Indeed, the very cri t~ i\Cisms 
of •pa.rmenides' turn on the consequences of def·ining the Ideas as 
3 
alone by themselves, with the result thnt none of the Ideas can be 
4 in us or even related to our world; so absolute, indeed, is the 
gulti between our world and the Ideas that they are logically 
Unknowrble llp us 5o.. which is why Reminiscence wa.s an essential part 
of Plato• s Theory of Knowil:edge in this Earlier Period. 
!l Parll,_s1pation. That sentible particulars are named after 
the Ideas which have the same name as they, and that this is due to 
Participation, is ste.ted in Phaedo 102B:6 "After they had agreed 
that Ideas ex1 st. and that other things participate in them and 
DERIVE THEIR NAMES FROM THEM, &>crates, if I remember rightly, said •• 
• • • " 8J also Parmenides 130E: 7 "Are there certain Ideas in which 
other things participate and DERIVE THEIR NAMES?'' 
As for Porticipation itself, .&>crates asserts it as the manner 
in which things have their characteristics: ·"And you would loudly 
asseverate that you know of no \"lay in which anything comes into 
existence except by PARTICIPATION in its own proper essence, and 
consequently, as .far as you know, the only cause offowo is the 
PARTICIPATION in Duality .n8 Now there 1 s a stfartling resemblance 
, between part~ of this dialogue, the Phaedo, and that port of the 
, Parmenides in which s:>crates enunciates his Theory of Idea.s • .short-
ly before the passage just quoted vJe have, 11By Greatness only, great 
. ' bj[ 
things become great and greater gre.a.ter, and" mallness the less 
become less. n 9 substitute the pairs LHce and Unlike for Great and 
snall, and we have, "And some things, PA.RTICIPATING in Likeness, 
1. Parmenides. 130B. 2. Parmenides 130BC. 
4. Pa.rmenide s 133C-E. 5. P'a~rmenides 134BG. 
1. Cp. Parmenides 133D· 8. Pha.edo 1010. 
3. Pa.rmenides 133A. 
6. Cp. Phaedo 103B. 
9, Pha.edo lOOE. 
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b:ecome like accordigg to their degree of PARTICIPATION, and the 
unlike by the Unlike .. n1 A further striking resemblance is found in 
the contrast between things which snare in opposite chAracteristics 
and the Ideas which never do. 'Thus, Phaedo 74BC states that these 
pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal and at another 
time unequal, but real equals and the Idea of Equality are never utt· 
equal .• In Parmenides l29DE, we have not merely the thought but also 
part of the turn of phease:"If one tries to make out that stones 
and pieces of wood and suchlike ere both one end many, we shall say 
that such thing is indeed many and one, but not that the one 1 s 
many or the Many one ••••• But if, as I said just now, one di stingu-
ishe s Ideas apart from themselves, like Likeness and Unlikeness, ••• 
• ,and states that they are capable of mingling among themselves and 
interm~xing, I should be aghast." Indeed, there seems to be little 
doubt thet it is one and the same theory expounded in both the 
Phaedo and the Parmenides. 
r~ow there is a curious ~8!Rll in bdth these dialogues concer-
ning tho interpretation of Participation. In the Phaedo, on the one 
hand, participation is almost synonymous with Presence, as ·in lOOD: 
nr hold omd am ossurec in my own mind that nothing makes a thing 
beautiful bpt the PRESENCE and Participation of Beauty in whatever 
way or manner obto.inedo" On the other hand, in Phaedo 74D and 
elsewhere we h:;.ve such phrases a.s this: 11They fall short of this 
perfect Equality in a measure." This seome to imply that the 
sensible is an impexfect copy of the Ides, its Model, a notion 
which is explicit in Cratylus 389B:"Slould the shuttle break, would 
he who is making it make another by looking towards the br,oken one 
or to that form according to vvhid'n he made also the broken one? •••• 
S> 1 t would be most right to coll that the S'lutfle Which Is. n And in 
Republic ¢X. 596B: 11 Are we not accustomed to say that the craftsman 
of each artefact makes the tables and beds which we use by looking 
towards the Idea, and other things likewise?" SimilPrly in the 
earlier pert of the Timaeus, which seems to pre sent a nafve form of 
the Theory of Ideas, the Craftsman in excelsis, the Dem1urge, when 
creating the Cosmos, uses the Intellie,ible World as his Model:"When 
the Demiurge, ronstantly looking towards the Self-subsistent, using 
it as a sort of Model, creates its shape and strength, all must 
necessarily be finished beautifully.n 2 Again, in Phaedrus 250B we 
meet w1 th the "E?.rthly copies of Justice and Tempfernnce," and in 
250D with the "visible counterparts of Beauty. tt W1 th this we may 
compsre SVmpo sium .212A: "Beholding Beauty w1 th the eye of the mind, 
he will be able to bring forth not IMAGES of Beauty but realities." 
There is a similar dual interpretation of the relation of 
things to Ideas in the Parmenides. For the f:ir st compare Parmenidel 
129AB:«There are two opposite Ideas, Likeness rnd U~likeness, end 
1. Parmenides 129A. 2. Timaeus 28A, 
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1n these you and I and indeed all the Ma.ny SHARE. Those things that 
·SHARE ~i.n Li~eness become l.ike insofar a.s they SHARE therein, and 
unlike by Unlikeness, and both like and unlike by both of theme. 
And after all, what wor1der is it if things are both like ahd unlike 
on account of parti~ipat ing in both these Ideas." 'l'he alternative 
version appears in Panne11ides 13-2D: "The Participation of things in 
Ideas is nothing but RESEMBLING them." 
The so lutiotJ of this anomaly seems to be given in Phaedo 100 
D, where after the sentence quoted above1 Socrates adds,"As to the 
manner (of Participation) I am uncertain. n Stricyly interpreted, 
the separation of the Ideas is incompatible with Participation and 
requires Imitation to explain the existence of sensible s; and yet, 
that Plato, when he spoke of thefrelation between things and Ideas, 
had in mind something else that the external resemblance implied 
by the notion of Imitation• is apparent in t9o passages, where the 
grossly material interpretation of Partici pa.t.ion must ha:v e had J(some 
basis whether that interpretation was Plato's or ·not - for some 
think it was a misinterpretation by Antisthenes, 2 others of certain 
studex1ts in the Academy. 3 I refer firstly to Euthydemus 300E-1A: 
I 
"And if a.n ox is present near you, he said, are you an ox, and 
because I am nov' near you, are you Dionysodorus?n True, this is 
buffoonery, but the difficulty was serious: ''And have you, Socrates, 
ever seen a beautiful thing? - Yes, I sadld, and many too, Dionyso-
dorus. - Are such things, he said, different. from Beauty or the 
same with Beauty,? - And I was completely at a loss, and thought that 
I was justly suffering because I had complained, ue:vertheless I 
said that they were dif~ferent from Beauty Itself ;F'OP THERE IS +IND 
OF BEAUTY IN EACH Oli THEM. 11The same ma.terial interpretation is 
adopted by 'Parmenides' in his criticli sm of Participatlon, 131A-C: 
nsuch participation can only be in the \vhole species or in any part 
of it. The whole species in any individua,l, then, is one. But being 
one in maavdEjjt~~~ii·i8 things, it is at the same time whole and SO 
separate i tse.d' from itself ••• Then these species are divisible, and 
that which participates in them partict. pates in a part only. There-
fore, you must assert that one species is divided and still one." 
Dickenson4 believes that the Parrnenides critict·ses not Methexis per 
se, but a materialistic interpretation of it, but I feel that 
Hardie 5 is more correct, that the criti~sm shows that Methexis is 
~n empty metaphor by develjioping the consequences of td<: ing 1 t 
literally. Indeed, the last word seems to be Ross• , 6that Plato was 
not quite satisfied VIi th either expression, Participation or 
Imitetion, and savv no way of getting nearer the truth than by using 
both., for the relation was unique and indefinable. 
1. Page 212. 2. Zeller, Plato sn.d the Older Academy 126 note 80. 
3. Page 197 above. 4. Journal of Philology XX.l2 5. 
5. A .study in Plato 87. 6. PlAto• s Theory of Ideas p 231. 
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In conc-lusion, then,Plato was unable to.fgive any final 
expressi.on of the relation between tllte particular and the tidea, but 
used both the relation between the copy and its original and that 
1 between the attribute and the substra.te to express the relation. 
!md in these respects Aristotle's evidence is borne out, that both 
Imitation ar.d Participation were unsetisfa ctory metaphors for 
expressing the relation between the thing and the Idea, but there 
was no other more satisfactory mnnner of expressing it known to or 
expounded b.y Plato. 
1. Ideas of 1;wnber..:.. As Ideas, Idea.s of Number would be separa.te 
and are found in the dialogues in severs.l places, of which the 
. ,, 
clearest mention is Phaedo lOlBC:f In like manner one ~ould be 
but one 
afraid to say that 10 exceeded 8 by, and by reason of, 2; H~X:c!1MK 
would say by, and by reason of, number •••• Again, would you not be 
cautious of affiirming tho.t the addition of 1 to.l, or the division 
of 1, is the cause of p2? And you would loudly asseverate that you 
know of no way in v1hich anything comes into existence except by 
participation in its own proper essence, and consequently, as far 
as you kno'~ll, the only cause of 2 is the participation in Duality -
this is the wa.y to make 2, an.d the partid patton ln One is the way 
to i.~~ 1. ,, On the streng-th of this, Ideas of !\umber are recognised 
as belonging to the Earlier Th~ry by Cook Wilson, 2 Cherniss: Ross~ 
and van d~r \Yielen, 5 and Bo Aristotle is corroborated. These Ideas 
of Number do not seem to be mentioned in the later dialogues, but 
are implicit in the Theory, si~ce there is no reason for supposing 
that Plato. abandoned this class of Ideas. There is, however, one 
passage where such entities seem to be alluded to, Timaeus 53.13: 
"When the work of setting in order this universe was being under-
taken, fmrnt He ga.ve shapes to Fira, and Water, and Earth, and Air, 
which bore some traces of their own ne .. ture, yet were altogether in 
such a condition as was natural in the absence of God, and inasmuch 
as this was then their natural condition He shaped these things by 
means of Forms and NUMBERBtt. 
g. Objec~of Mathematics. The-re is much contention whether 
the Mathcma,ticals appear at all in Plato's dialogues, s.nd even more 
so whether they are to be found in the dia,lce_ues prior to the 
Phaedrus, 1 .• e. in his earlier period. As every possible reference 
has been challenged as v1ell as accepted, it. may be useful to recount 
the various interpretet1ons of such passages by modern critics. 
In the Republic, the Simile of the Line 6deals with four mental 
faculties, of which the third is Dianoia and the fourth Nol!.s1s. It 
is reGsonable to suppose, in view of the divisiod of the Line in a 
proportion corresponding to the alleged relation between a copy 
1. So Baldry, Classical Qua.rter::ly XXXI.l45. 
§. Classical Rebiew XVIII. 249. 3. Fiddle of 'the Early Academ¢'y 34 
4. Aristotle's Metaphysics I. i11!:1 ; Plato's Theory of Ideas 178. 
5. Die Ideegetallen van Plato 31-33. 6. Republic VI.509D-510B. 
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and its original, that the objt'lct~:; of Dla.noia ate the ima.ges of the 
objects of No«sio, the Ideas. But as the objects of t,he second :nti:rtl 
division are sensibles, the objects of Dia-noia w:i.ll be intermediate 
between sensibles and Ideas, and so refihect Aristotle's evidence 
regarding the Objects of Mathematics, intermediate between Ideas 
nncJ things. Following this line of reasoning many critics assert 
that these Mathema.ticels are t.o be found in the objects of Dianoia, 
Plato making no explicit mentiont~~f~gf because there was no 
l · · h b te d b M h 2 occasion to do so. This last argument e. s een coun . J re y urp y, 
. 3 
and Heckforth, that if Plato had tmesc Mathematicals in mind he 
ld h id 'ki h. • 1 .e. a ..... f'ew '~~<.1ords10~lSlR~, wou . a.ve sa so, rna ng ~s rnean1ng c ear wn x ..... .., ... ~
of giving the long and involved explanation of the distinction of 
reality within the sphere of Ideas that he did. In this long paren-
thesis the references to mat hem at ica.l processes are intended only 
by way of explanation of this distinction, not to ind:l cate the 
4 proper objects of Dianoie. In actual fact, as several critics 
point out, the difference between th0se two subdiv isiohs of the 
Line dls one of method alone, the objects of both being the same -
Ideas. If there is any d"l fference at a.ll bet ween these objects it 
is that Noesis studies Ideas in the light of the Good, whereas the 
objects of Di&1noia are Ideas imperfectly knova1, v.ithout the Idea. 
of the Good. 5rndeed, in the one place where Plato is specific, the 
- I 
o bje ct2 of mathematics, l. e. of Dianoia, are saio to be70" 'NT;'tr1"'""tJ1 
' - s u' '.... 6 
«\)7"Dv and 'IJI.r-tT/'0 .,- all1"1( , Republic 510D, which most cr1t1o 
tal<:e as being obviously Ideas, al thouf,h van der Wielen 7 is not sure 
8 The whole matter has been: well summed up by Cook Wilson, that 
Dianoia is concerned 11dth the objects of mathematics and is between 
l'!ous and Doxa, so that its objects SE:R:M to be the Intermediates of 
Aristotle's evidence, but this is not so. Its objects are Ideas, 
and these differ from the objects of No&sis in that they are not 
connected with the Good. Any Idee, v.hether mathemati.cal or not, 
before its connection with the Good would be the object of Diano1a. 
And to the commentat~rs who, besides those already cited, reject 
the doctrine of Intermediates in the Line, we add Stocks, 9FergusoA~ 
11 12 13 Jackson, Cornford, and Grube. 
1. Hardie, A Study in Plato 53-55, cp. P.obin, Greek Thought 193; 
Fat.on, Proceedings of the Aristotihlian Society X.XII.?0-74; Adam, 
The Republic of Plato 1!.159; Frank, Plato ·und die sogenennten 
pythagoreer 116; Robin, Greek Thought/ §11, and Ple.ton 110. 
2. Classical Quarterly XXVI.lOO. 3. Clr.;ssical Quarterly XXXVJ.i. 
4. Brommer, Mnemosyn.e XI.1v.267-8; Fobinson, Plato's Earlier 
Dialectic 207-8; Poss, Plato's Theory of Idea.s 47-8 and 63. 
5. Classj.cal Quarterly XXXVI.l-2; Stenzel, plato's I\llethod of 
Dialectic xii; Cla.ssical Quartarly XXVIII.20l. 
6. Journal of Philology II.lo2-3; Ross, Aristotle ' s Metaphysics I. 
168; Plato's Theorlt of Ideas 59-60; Classical Querterly XXXVI. 
3. 7. Die Ideegetallen van Plato 49. 8. Classica.l Review 
XVIII.257-9. 9. Classical Q.uarttrly V.83. 10. Class3ical 
Qua:rte.rly XV.lS0-1. 11 • .Jout·nal of Philology X.l33-6. 
12. Mind XLI.38. 13. Ple.to's Thought 301-2. 
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As examples of the recognition of Mathe rna ticals in other place Eo 
1 2 in the Republic, Adam cites 525E, van der Wielen 522E-6E, wbere 
conceptual numbers are distinguished from physical numbers,bpt thi~ 
may mean no¢ more than mathematical numbers3as abstractions,rather 
tha.n as separate entities. As Ross 4 says, such entities are impli-
cit, but not actually made clear, and we must conclude that there 
is no good evidence in Platof-~rl~!~.logue s for his belief in Objects 
A 
of Ma.thematics distinct from and intermediate between Ideas and 
sensibles. 
In the later dialogues there are three passages which seem to 
recognise Mat.hema.ticals. Most explicit is Philebus 56C, cited by 
1 2 5 Adam, and van der Wielen, but again Ross points out that the 
identical units there mentioned are on a par with those of Republic 
526A and add nothing to the question. Ha.ckforth6dra.ws a distinction 
f f ,,~ 
between 7ff/trr and71f,i'q'" t'1for1"-ct. in the description of the Limit in 
the Philebus, affecting to see there the doctrine of Mathematicals 
as the ground for the distinction, but this seems rctther fs:ncifu,l. 
7 8 9 I I ~ Finally Field , Adam , and Stenzel, interpret the t. t(/"toVr' of 
Timaeus 50C as Obje c ts of Mathematics, intermodia. te between things 
and Forms, and Ross10 was inclined to agree in his earlier work, 
but in his later11 he came to the conclusion that these "t/fJ"tov..,...~ 
were not eterna.l and not necessarily mathematical figures., but were 
sensible qualities. Indeed, since Epistle vii.342A-C makes no 
mention at a.ll of anything inte:rmediate between the Idea. and its 
t>mage, and the seine position is reflected in Laws 895D, Poss12 
thinks that)15 thisf doctrine of Intermediates can only have been 
formulated very riea.r the end of Plato's life. 
But I think that in this case silence is no argument, and it 
is quite possible that if?lato held the doc trine without hawing had 
any occasion of mentioning it in his dialcg&es. 
1. The Republic of Plato II. 111 ad 525E. 2. Op. ci 1. 21-23. 
3 .. Op. cit. 50 note 67. 4. Plato's Theor)l of Ideas 60-61. 
5. Plato's Theory of Ideas 61. 6. Classical Quarterly XXXIII.27. 
7. The Philosophy of Plato 141-2. 8. The Republic of Plato II.l61. 
9. Zahl und Gestalt 4. 10. Aristotle• s Metaphysics 1.168. 
11. Plato's Theory of Ideas 61 and 224. 12. Op. cit. 62 a.nd 141. 
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b) Plato's Later Theory of Ideas. 
The points listed by Aristotle in v.hich Platonism resembled Pythago-
. . 1 
reanism are as follows.: l.Participation was much the same .;hing lUll 
as pythagorean Im1tat ion. We concluded/ that, if this v1as to be 
referred to Plato's Later 'Iheory, it meant that, just as Aristotle 
interpreted the relation between things and Numbers in pythagorea~t­
lsm as an anticipation of his own formal cause, so he understood 
plato's Ideas a.s the forma.l causes of things. 
2. Both p~ilo ro phie s regarded the One as substance, which we have 
interpreted to mean tha.t, for Plato, the One was; to use Ar~stotle' s 
terminology, the formal cause of the Idea-Numbers .. · 
3. Numbersw ere the causes of the reality of other things. It seems 
most likely that this meant, for Aristotle, that Plato's Idea.-
Numbers were the formal causes of sensible things, and although a 
more restricted interpretation is possible, viz. that Aristotle ha.d 
in mind no more than Ideas of Number, I sha.ll adopt the former 
interpreta.tion here, as more in keeping with the other l_5points of . 
resemblance. 
4. The other element than the One was an Infinite. We hav::e seen that 
these two elements, the One and xi~ Infinite, were the elements of 
Numbers, e.ud since plato is alleged to have derived Ideas from these 
same two elements, the Ideas were Numbers in respect of their origin 
Hen •. ce, these four points of resernbla.nce rea~ly amount to two braad 
features of the Later Fla. tonism: tl. and 4 taken together a.llege that 
Ideas ,were composed. of· ;~he One· and an Inf1nl te as their. elena nts, 
Vihereby the Idea-s were .Numbers, ~nd points 1 and 3 ta.ken together 
add the t these Idea-NumbvlfJS were the fo·::rmal causes of sensible 
things. 
NoVv the Secondary Differences, discussed in Part I, Chapter 2, 
Sec-tion iii, centre around the above-mentioned points of resemblance 
and should be discussed here along with the9. These differences are 
as follows: 1. While there was a resemblance between Plato's and 
' 
the pythagorean relation between things and Ideas or Numbers respec-
tively, the term Plato psed was different, namely Participation. As 
this relation has been discussed above and the provenance of the 
. 2 
term participa·ttiontAhas been touched upon, it does not seem necessa-
ry to deal wi t.h this difference iU nomenclature again, and. accord-
, 
ingly I shall omit further reference to this point. 
i. Plato's Infinite differed.from the Pythagorean irfbeing a dyad. 
We concluded that this might have two meanings, first-., that Ple.to 
used two Infinites, one for Idea-Numbers and another for sensibles, 
secondly, that the Infinite used for the generation of the Ideas of 
Number was a two-way continuum. Tllis latter ra.is ed the question of 
the gere ration of Ideal Numbers and the meaning of the term Equali-
sation. Unfortunately there is no indication Vihat soever in 'the 
1. See Part I, Chapter 1, SecM.o:ill¢" .ii. 2. Page 214 above. 
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dialogues concerning the meaning of this Equalisation or of its 
1 
mode of operation, and a solitary reference to the generat·ion 
of Numbers, which, since it makes use of mul tipl:l.cation in this 
genere,tion, is generally 2 taken to refer not to Ideal Numbers but 
1 . b 1 irrelevant. ·i'f;l.. th i t to ma them a ti ca. num e rs, s :fxx:mxarwx:x .r:ue o er po n · s are 
duplica:ted in the next difference. 
3. Plato• s Infinite differs from the pythagorean in being both in 
sensibles a.nd in Ideas separately, so that he used two Infinites. 
we have seen tha.t Aristotle interpreted Plato's material substrate 
as a principle of multiplicity and as different in species but not 
in genus from his intelligible substrate. This, taken with the 
previous point a.nd in co rpora.t ed with the two broad features in the 
later platonisn deduced in point 4 on the previous page, gi ve5 the 
following s Cherne:-
The Ideas we re composed of the One and an Infinite a.s their 
elements, whereby the Ideas were Numbers. This Infinite, the intel-
ligible substrate, was a two-way continuum and specifically diffe¥¢P' 
rent from the material substrate. Sensible things were composed of 
the material substrate with Idea-Numbers as their fo nnal causes. 
This material substm te was a principle of multiplicity, that is 
one application to it of the Idea-Number¢ gave rise to the multipli-
city of sensible ·par:ticulars. 
4. A last point of difference from Pytheg oreanism was that 
Plato• s One was separate from things. rhis is a corollary of' the 
separation o:fl' Ideas, of1 which it was the formal cause.a.nd recp.ires 
no especial discussion. 
'· 
Finally, in Part I, Chapter 3, we reviewed the evidence for a. 
change in Platonism, a.nd saw that Aristotle gave as the reason for 
this change the necessity of proving that Not-Being could exist if 
the multiplicity of sensi bles wa.s to be explained; for sensible 
particulars would then be derived from Being,. that is the Ideas, x:No 
and this Not-Being whicn·had some sort of existence. 
Hence 1 in order to check the historical truth of Ar1 st otle 1 s 
conceptions of that phase of Platonism underlying the points of. 
agreement that he lists between Platonism and pythag~reanism 
together with the deviations from Pythag.oreanism in these points of 
a.greement, we have to invetstigate the evidence of the dla logues in 
respect of the following points:-
1. Pa.rmenides 143A-4A. · 
2. So Foss, Aristotle's Metaphysics !.174; and in Plato's 1heory of 
Ideas 187-8 he denies that this account bea.rs any resemblance 
to Aristotle's account. On the other hand, Brommer, Mnemosyne 
XI.iv.266 and 273-4, interprets the generation as that of Ideal 
Numbers from the Odd and Even~ the usa of mul W.plicat1on being 
only appea.t-ance. But even granting this, Brommer still fails to 
explain hoV<~ a generation from Odd and Even squares with Aristot-
le's account or where Equalisa.tion comes in. 
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oc) Corresponding to the subject-rna tter o-f Part I, Chapter 3, pages 
127-132, Vie must ascertain from Plato's dialogues whether there :1s 
evidence for e .. change in his Ideal Theory,whether the motivation 
for this c .. hange we.s the need to find an ontological ground for the 
mul tiplivi ty of sens1 ble particulars, and ~hether this ground was 
a Not-Being which had some sort of existence. 
~) Corresponding to the subject-matter of Pa.rt I, Chapter 2, 
sections 11 and iii, we must ascertain what evidence there is in 
the dialogues for the derivation of things and Ideas from elemnts, 
1 
namely,. ·Ideas from the One and the Infinite or Great and Small, 
which ~as A two-way continuutn, 2 things from Ideas and aB Infinite3 
different in kind from the Ideal Infinite, 4 since it was rather a 
prin~iple of mult1plicity. 5 
These two questions cover the main points in Aristotle's 
evidence dealt with in the pla.ces cited in the footnotes to this 
page, and so cover most of the points of resemblance a.nd difference 
mentioned above, but there are some tenets}vhich cannot be corrobo-
rated from the dialogues and which have accordingly been omitted 
from this scheme. We cannot, for example, shoVJ from the die..logues 
either that the One and the Great and Small were the elements of 
Numbers or that by reason of their der1vl.t ion from these same 
6 
elements the Ideas were Numbers. But silence is no argument since, 
as we have seen, the dialogues were not intended to give a complete: 
picture of Plato's beliefs, but dealt ·only v;ith certain specific 
questions. Hence, if .·Ar!st otle is corroborated in the points 
detailed above, oJ. and j2.·, or most of them, it seems only reasonable 
to gj.ve him the EB:f:m~eU~it:t of the ·doubt where the dii!Uogues a.re 
silent. For, as has peen said in the Introduction, 7 there are 
commenta1tors who have a;rtogether denied that there was any cha.nge 
whatsoever in the Ideal~ Theory a~~t Arist otle1 s entire evidence 
concerning Iaea-Nsunbers' a.nd the derivation of ·Ideas f:r.·om elene nt t-:.._~ 
is e1 ther a misundersta.nding or a .. mist:epresentation. ·If, then, 
despite the -occasional hature of the dialogues and their consequent 
.silence on certain points attested by Aristotle, it can be shown 
that they do testify ton a change in Platonism along the lines 
suggested by Aristotle and to a d6r1vation of Ideas and things 
\ 
from elements and similar in effect to what Aristotle says, then 1 t 
will be sufficient I think to serve as corroboration of Aristotle's 
evidence. 
1. See pages 81-2~ above. 2. Pages 103, 116 and 122. 
3. Pages 92 and 97. 4. Pages 110-lll. 5. Pages 106-9. 
6. It is a. subterfuge to cito in this connection Philebus l5AB, 
which refers to Ideas as Monads or Hena,ds, cp. Ross, Plato's 
Theory of Ideas 150. 7. See pages 13-14. 
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ot ) The Crisis in platonism. 
An Interpretat,ion of the Pail'ffie.E,ides. In deat.ing with Metaphym cs 
l089al-7 on pages 12.5ff above, we saw that Aristotle connected a.n 
. oe ~deas 
alleged modification of Plato's Theory ei:tR with a difficulty 
that Plato encountered because of Parmen1des• saying, ttFor never JJ:tll 
will this be proved that things that are-not are." This line is 
quoted in Sophist 237A, and that Aristotle actually has this iH 
dialogue in mind is. further indicat. ed by hi.s reference 1n l089a2o-l 
to Plato's identification of Not-Being with the False as in Sophist 
240. And yet Plato refers us back, at the beginning of this d 1a.logue 11 
to the Parmmides, for Socrates asks, ftl7C., whether the Stranger 
prefers to expound his opinion in a .}.ong speech ornJ.by means of 
questions, ets once in my youth I seconded Parmen1des, who at that 
time was already a.n old m::n1, and vvh.o gave voice to most noble 
thoughts." I feel, then, that it is to the Parmenides t.ha.t we must 
turn in the first instance for same inclication of thispl~i~ge in 
Platonism referred to by Ari'ttt(P,tle, though a more mature statem'tnt 
o.f the new position might be expected in the Sophist. 'Ihis is 
confirmed by the position of the Parmenide s as set out on page 179 
above, for we have seen that the Phaedrus, while representing the 
culmination of the Earlier PlatonisD'Il, is the f:ir·st dialogue to 
mention the new Method of Division, and the Pa:rmmidos following 
soon after might well be expected to Ja. y the foundation of the Later 
Platonism, of which Division was an important feature. I hope, then, 
to show from an· e xarnination of the Parmenides that this dialogue 
states a.s clearly a~ can ge ~expected from a,Lwork which is more a. 
dramatic than--a- t~~h~Ica.l composition that there was a change in 
Plato's Theory of Ideas, what the motivation was for thiscllange, 
em.o along what lin'es the change was to have been effected. 
That the Parmenides bears witness to a change in Platonism 
can be demonstrated from two lines of thought, first, from~a consi-
deration of the roles of Socrates and Parmenides, and second, from 
an examination of certain de:vices used by Plato to make his ID3 aning 
clea.r. We have argued iU the f'1r.st section of.this chapter that 
the choice of Plato's chief speakers wes determined by certain con-
siderations, and that because Socrates was Plato's mouthpiece in 
the earlier dialogues, where this r""ole wes chosen for him becau.se 
Plato felt his philosophy wets a development of Socrates', in the 
Parmen1des too his role .must be interpreted in the same way - that 
is, Socr-ates here expounds Plato's Early Theory of' Ideas. Now the 
Theory expounded by Socrates is subjected to a. devastating cri t1tfism 
and irrespective of the provenance of this criticism, the fact 
that Plato's own Theory of Ideas is here criticised can only man 
that Plato is making trial of his own philosophy. '!'here may be weak 
points in detail in one or two of the criticisms - for example, 
Plato may ha.ve denied tha.t he understood Participation in the 
121/ 
grossly material sense in which it is there presented - but taken 
as a whole the criticisms are undoubtedly devastating. In this case, 
, the question arises whether ( if the critici.sms l'iere for example 
Magarian criticisms levelled against the Idea.s) Plato thought that 
these criticisms could be rebutted, or whether (if the criticisms 
were his own], or if he accepted them as valid) he thought that his 
Theory could be remoda.i.led so as to escape the objections made. 
For, since he undoubtedly continued to maintain the existence of 
Ideas - the Theaetetus means as mucn1 - he would not have thought 
that the Ideas would hav-e to be abandoned as the result of these 
criticisms. That the correct alternative is the latter follows from 
the role @f Parmenides, who is made to level these criticisms 
2 
against the Ideas. We have argued a.bove that~ he represents Plato 
himself in his maturer period just as Socrates represented his x:rm:i:t 
earlier car~er. Parmenides is plato's mouthpiece here because Plato 
felt that now (at the time of writing the Parmenides) he was being 
influenced by Eleaticism rather than by Socrates' definitions in 
approaching certain problems in his philCSJphy. What other explana-
tion is consistent with his choice of protagonist? Parmenides 
replaces Socrates; Socrates was the spokesman of the Earlier Ideal 
Th6C1J'7; :Pa.menides must then be the spokesman of the Le .. ter Theory, 
or at any rate of Plato's period of crisis. lf then Parmenides t 
represents Plato himself, the criticisms put into his mouth, wbatevet 
their ultimate provenance, must have been accepted as valid by Plato 
and the conclusion is inesca,pa.ble that here his Eatr-l.ier Idea.s are 
shown up as defective. But Plato would not have publicly exposed his 
~ Ideas as unsatisfactory unl~ss he }thad something to put in their 
place,· or ha.d at least en .inkling of how to modifi his theor; so· as 
to avoid the objections made, so that it is a ·priori probable that 
the ans\fer to the criticisms is to be found in the second part of 
the Pa,rmenides, the so*called Trope. 
If this deduction be thought to be too fanciful, conSlider what 
Plato himself says by means of certain devices referred to above. To 
J 
make this clear I first give an outline of the relevant parts of the 
1 dialogue. Feferring to the fm:st hypothesis of Zeno• s first book, 3 
Socrates asks him why he thinks it 1s impossible that if things are 
many, they should be both like and unlike, why their having contrm-y 
attributes is :.tl!lxi'J:e taken as a refutation of their existence. 4zeno, 
he says, doubtless accepts that there is an Idea of Likeness and 
one of' Unlikeness, in which all things participate, being 'like 
insofar as they participate in Likeness, and unlike 1nro far as they 
partictpate in Unlikeness. There is, then, nothing remarka.ble in that 
i things should be both like and unlike by partid.tpation in both Idea~. 
What would be a marvel is if Likeness were unlike or Unlikeness were 
1. See page 192 above. 2. Page 200, cp. 201. 
3. Parmenides 127D. 4. Parmen1des 127E. 5. Parmenides 129A. 
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like. 1 Socrates makes a point of this by repeating his challenge 
w1 th the One and the Many: A man is many in that he has parts, right 
and left, before and after, up and down, and is yet one. This is no 
m·arvel. But if the One should be many or the Many one, then he would 
be amazed. 2 Aga.in, if stones or logs were both many and one 1 all 
V1ould agree; but if we distinguished. separate Ideas like Likeness 
qnd Unlikeness, One and Many, Rest a.nd Motion, etc., and showed them 
capable of intermingling, he \"'Oul d be aghast. Be would be astounded 
if Zeno' s contraries were demonstrated· to hold good of the Ideas. 3 
J?armenide s takes up the investigation of these Ideas :=tfter 
defining their nature as separate, but things pa.rtici pa.te in them. 
socrs.tes agrees that there are such Ideas as Justice, but doubts 
such as Fire and Water, a.nd rejects those of .ffair, Mud and Dirt, to 
which Parmenides replies that Socrates is still young and so is 
guided by the opinions of the many instead of by logic<. 4 
Pa.rmenides next takes up the question of Participation, showing 
that %it can be neither by part nor by whole, 5 and refutes in turn 
6 
various alternative interpreta.tions put forward by Socrates. In the 
course of his refutation of Pa.rticipation, he shows that the 
divisi¢bil1ty of the Ideas entailed by Participation by part leads 
to Greatness being both great and. small, the Equal being both. ¢ 
equal and small, and, if the sentence is not spurious, to smallness 
being both small and g'Te·!3,t. 7 such a.re the difficulties into. which 
ol'le is led who maintains Absolute
8 
Idea.~, but 1 says Parmenides ,the 
rea.l diff1cul ty is still to come. If Ideas are absolute, there a.re 
~ 
two :SJI!ll.'JX:tsc sepa.rate -worlds, th.a.t of Iqeas and tha.t of the senses., 
Ideas ·are then 
. . 9 
and there can be no rela-tion between them, and the 
unknowable by us, 10 but wo'rse, the god~, while they can know the 
11 ' 
Ideas,. cannot know us. \ 
Parmenides hints that there are al;so manp. other difficulties 
which might well non-plus an inexperilenced lad like Socrates, but 
even a man skilled in dialectics would 1be puzzled; and yet if there 
are not such Ideas as Socrates ma~ntains, 
and the power of dialectics would utterly 
ll tought would be imposttble, 
,.. 12 
perish. He advises 
Socrates to exercise his mind while he is still young, or he will 
find that Truth will esca:pe him. 13 He explains that the method of 
exerc.iting the mind is to take one's stand on such Ideas, and ask 
what are the consequences for each Idea. both if one maintains their 
exist e nee and if one denies 1 t, 14 the detail of the explanation 
suggesting a process reproduced in respect of the One in the rest 
of the dialogue. Age.in this method is stated to be the means :wsm::r:em7 
1. Parmenides l29B. 2. Parmenides 129BC. 3. Parmenides 129DE. 
4. Parmenides 130B-E. 5. Pa.rmenides 131A-E. 6. Parmenides 132A-3A •. 
7. Farmenides 131CD. 8. Parmenides 133AB. 9. Parmenides 133C-E. 
1o. Parmenides 134AB. 11. Parmenides 134CD .. 12. Parmen ides 135A-C. 
13. Parmenides 135D .. 14. Parmenides 135E-6A with 136A-C. 
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1 
of a.tta1ning the truth, and when Zeno joins forces with Socrates 
to entreat Pe.rmen1des to give en example, he urges the smallness of 
the audience, .~*1for ~he ma.ny are ignorant the"t without exercise it 
is impossible to arrive at the Truth. n 2 pa.rmenides agrees to give 
an example of this method "by te.king as subject his own hypothesis, 
3 
'If the One is, and again if the One is not, what follows?' 
Now briefly the argument is that Socrates cba.ll e nge s Zeno' s 
disproof of the Many inasmuch as they are contradictory, by showing , 
on the asSUII.ption of the Theory of Ideas that a perfectly feasible 
explanation of these contradictions is possible. But Pa.rmenides 
answers this by showing that the Theory of Ideas, as maintained by 
Socrates, is fa.ulty. This leaves a,!threefold task to be performed. 
Firstly, the objections raised against the Theory of Ideas must be 
answered either by refuting them or by mod:JL.ying the Theory. 
Secorldly,the contradictions which belo8g to the world of sense must, 
in answer to Socrates• challenge to this effect, be shown to a.pply 
also to the world of Ideas, but without thereby rendering the Ideas 
self-contradictory a.nd so untenable - and it is reasonable to 
suppose that, since sucb contrai ictions were impossible under the 
Early Theory 1 it is to a modified Theory that these contradictions 
can be shown to apply - in other words, these two points stand 
together. Thirdly, since the Early Theory, by which Socrates had 
explained the contradictions of sense, is tacitly a.bal!doned as the 
result of Parmenides' cri tivisms, the task still remains df showing 
how the world of sense can combine contradictory attribut.es and yet 
be real. This threefold task is; ip effect, undertaken by ParmmideE 
. 
since 1t is he who monopolises .the rest of the dialogue, and so we 
_. ~ ·.. . 
aslC - I:f/ Parmenides both criticises the ·Idea.s and tacitly undertake£ 
th~ of reconstructing them, or at least of pointing the way 
thereto, what is the relation between these two divisions of the 
dialogue? Clea.rly Parmenides must represent Plato himself in his 
maturer thought just as Socrates represents Plato's own earlier 
thought. Parmenldes, i.e. Plato, now sees the inadequacy of his 
Early Ideal Theory, which 1 s criticised a.ccordingly, and points the 
way to a reconstruction that will at once obvia.te those crltici· sms, 
allow for the One and the Many in the Ideal Sphere, and explain the 
One and the Many in the world of sense. 4 That this is indeed the 
correct interpretation is indicated by certain nota. ben~- that 
--
Plato has inserted in the course of the con9ersation. 
'These nota. bene's are the ~iifii~ion in three different pla.ces 
of certain thougb;.ts, which must inditcate Plato's intention: 
5 i) In Socrates' explanation of the contradictions of sense, he 
l. Parmenldes 136C. 1. Pannen1des 136E. 3. Pannenides 136E. 
4. Of course, this does not mean that Plato• s rea.l rea.son for 
modifying the Theory of Idea.s was to explain these contradictions 
of sense; this is only the dramatic reason. 5.Parmenides 129A-E 
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takes a ~hole page to expound a very simple conception, and repeats 
himself twice with similar effect. There. is nothing remarkable, he 
says., inf1lhese contradictions of sense, but, quoting his final state-
ment, 1tif on.e first distinguishes Ideas apart by themselves, like 
Likeness and Unlikeness,· One and Many, Rest and Motion, etc., and 
then asserts the.t they are capable of mingling and intermixing among 
1 themselves, I should be aghast." He makes tm challenge, the n, 
which on a.ccount of its emphatic repetition we expect to be taken 
f I 1 
up, that "the same ~ilOf''" as Zeno demonstrated of the sense wor d 
2 be proved of the Ideas themselves." 
ii) Parmenides keeps\harping on Socrates' you~h, inexperience. When 
he has perplexed him concerning the extent of the world of Ideas,he 
says, nyou are still young, Socrates, and philosophy has not yet goi: 
a hold on you, as in time it will, when you will despise none of 
these things; but now you consider men's opinions, on account of 
your youth.u 3 While not so explicit, the same {)ot1on of Socrates• 
youth is implied in 133B:"The inexperienced would be forced to 
accept the argument that knowledge of the Ideas is impossible; and 
again that "there a-re many other d1fficul ties that one oo uld adduce 
aga.inst Ideas SUCH AS YOU MAINTAIN, so that you, hearing them, woul<l· 
be at a loss and doubt whether they exist, and if so, whether they 
a.re knowable to man. u 4 And finally, 11Get .a hold on yourself and 
exercise your mind because of your 1ne:x:perience, •••• while you are 
still young; otherwise 'l'ruth will escape you. n 5 I have capitalised 
'such as you maintain• because I believe that this is tpe point at 
issue. ·We saw onP"~xi~&x~~~~I~lg~~x~~iBj!¥~~iilx~bH}~t;~~~~ext,that 
Pa.rmenides did not •laim that his criticism absolutely .demolished 
the ·Ideas, made them quite· untenable - Socrates, on account of his 
youth, his inexperience, was non-plussed, but a man of very great 
natural gifts might be expected to find some way of obviating the 
difficulties. If these difficulties hold good only of Ideas a.s 
maintained by Socrates, the solution would be to postulate Ideas of 
a. different na.ture or of different composition. Hence this ha.rping 
on Socrates• youth is as much a.s to say that the Ideas are untena.ble 
in the form in which. Plato had hitherto held them; but nou that he 
had reached maturity he would be able to obviate these difficulties 
by concei v1ng, formulating the Ideas differently;. 
iii) The nature of the dialectical exercise thus suggested is 
explained with unduly elaborate care, especi&Jil¥ considering that an 
example follows, running from 135E,£to 136C, adlmost a page, making 
f1r,·st a perfectly clear,tsta.tement of the method, then giving an 
example in greater detail in respect of the One and the Many, then, 
taking up Likeness, and mentioning for similar treatment Unlikeness, 
Motion, Rest, Gem ration and Destruction, Being and Not-Being, and 
l. Pa.rmenides 129DE. 
4. Parmenides l35A. 
2. Parmenides 129E-130A. 3. Parmenides 130E. 
5. Parmenides 135D. 
... 
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concluding with a general statement of what has been thus detailed 
with so many reserva'ltions as to be very nea:ly tln'lntelligible. 
What does this all amount to? Note the connection between the 
passages thus emphasised: i) Socrates challenges the removal of the 
d 710;? / tJI4. from the sensible to the Ideal world; 1i }So era tes md:mtar 
maintains incompdsi te Ideas - for only thus is it intelligible how 
their intercommunication should so utterly astound Socrates - and 
Parmenides replies that he is still young and should prosecute his 
studies further if he would reach the Truth; and iii) Parmenides 
specifies a.s an exrupple of such studies a dia .. lectical exercise 
such as is set out in· the rest of the book. This, then, is the 
interpretation of the relation between the criticism of the Ideas 
and the dialectical exercise following: it fulfils Socrates' 
challenge to show that the Ideas are intercommunicable and so la.ys 
the foundation for a new, or at any rate a modified Theory of Ideas. 
That the dialectical exercise was indeed inten_ded by Plato to 
answer Socrates' challenge by sho;;,ing that not only the sense world 
but also the Ideal share tn contrm. ictions, is shovm by the 
1 
conclusion of the whole work: nLet this then be said, tha.t the One, 
whether it is or is not, both itself and the others are and are not 
in respect both of themselves and of one another, all things in 
all ways, and seem so and do not seem so. 112 Zeno' s contraries are 
thus but a. pretext for introducing the Ideas, and these Ideas are 
introduced in order to expoand the implications of the One; the 
13 
representative of the Ideas in general. That this exposition is 
meant .as a correction of the nature of the Ideas is shown l:;)y i1), 
that it is specifically given e.s an exercise v1hereby Socrates, who 
maintains Ideas such as he does on account of his youth and inex-
perience, might attain the Truth. 
The Parmenides, then, represents a. crisis in Plato's thought. 
He realises that the Ideas, as heretofore constituted, are open to 
many objections, but he 1s able to obviate these objections by 
modifying the nature of the Ideas .Aristotle, then,is corroborated 
in this, that there was a change in Platonism, and that this change 
wa.s concerned w1 th the implications of Elea.tic thought - for 1 t is 
parmenides who is·made to crit1cjse the Ideas. But what the reason 
was for this modification and in what way the Ideas were modified, 
remain to be seen. 
1. I prefert to interpret the conclusion in the above way. For 
although'~ Cornford, Plato and Parmenides 107, believes that Plato 
was here producing a misleading appearance consciously to make 
us think the matter out for ourselves, Robinson, Plato's Earlier 
Dialectic 34, shows that Plato thought the contradictions were 
directly deduced from the pre11fisses. 
2. Parmenides 166C .• 
3. I.e. broadly speaking; for a more precise interpretation see 
page 227 et Mix±Kr~ alibi. 
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The Dia.lectioal Ex~~ We have arrived a.t this position: 
socrates maint~ins incompo s1 te Ideas and in effect challenges 
Parmenides to show that they :?.re capa.ble of intermingling. Parmeni4e 
des replies ths.t Socrates' conception of the Ideas is llncorrect 
because he is still too youngo To arr1 ve at their correct formula-
tion he should undertake a dialectical exercise which he volunteers 
to exemplify by taking his own One as hypothesis. Thust in the 
following dialect,ical exercise we expect firstly to have an exposi-
tion of the implications of the Eleatic one, and secondly a basis 
for a modified conception o_f the Ideas which allows them to inter-
mingle. 
No11 this dialectical exercise can. be set out schematically as 
follows:1 
A. If the One ge supposed to exist, 
1) if it exists abstractedlY.; it is nothing, 137C-142A, 
ii) if it exists united to Being, it is everything, 142B-157B; 
iii) the Others are all things, l57B-159A, 
iv) the Others are not}).ing, 159B-160B. 
B. If the Not-One is supposed to exist, 
v) if understood in a relative sense it is by itself everything, 
160B-l63B, 
vi) if it exists abstractedly, :'it~ is by itsel f1' nothing, 1·63B-164B; 
vii) the Others, as being freed from one-ness, ere everything, 
164B-165D, 
viii) the Others are nothing, 165E-166B. 
Now this seems to be twice as long asPii&fi¥iii 5 hed promised. 
For he had laid down, 137B,thet one must consider the consequences 
both .if the One is and if it is not, a .. nd the relevant part of 136A 
sta.tes that a. deduction of the One must include what it is in :row 
respect botb of itself and of the· MBillY, ·this implying not 8 but 
the following 4 inve·stigat'ions: A. If the One is, how is it in res-
pect a) of 1 tself., and b) o'f the Many; ;a. if it does riot exist, how 
is it in respect c) of itself, and d) of the Many. This scheme is 
discernible in the dialectical exercise, for a) is covered by i) and 
ii), b) by iii) and iv), c) by v) a.nd vi), d) by vii) and viii),but 
each group contains two deductions instead of one, ana/from the above 
scheme 1 t is/clear that each of these deductions differs in the 
2 
sense in which the One is understood, whether abstractedly or 
united to Being. Now since in 137B3 Parmen1des says that he will 
1. Based on stallbaum•s summery as given by Burges in his translatior: 
2. So J'ackson, Journal of' Philology XI.306-7,that no two hypotheses 
have the same first eleaant, therefore there is an inquiry into the 
relations of the One and the Many according to different concep-
tions. This is commended by Bury, Journal of Philology XXIII.l85, 
and followed by Cornford, Plato and Parmenides 109. 
3. "Let me begin from my own hypothesis, pos1 ting a.bout the one 
itself, whether it exists or whether it does not exist, what must 
follow." · 
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take his oan One t:.s the example, ancl t.he Eleati c One is most close~. 
represented in hypothesis i, this I take to be the deduction of tre 
Eleat1c One;and with this is associated iv in the case of the Many, 
and vi and viii in the case of the non-existence of the One in 
respect of itself and the Ot811:10'"S respectively. Consequently, accord-
ing to what we said at the top of previous page, it is in the other 
hypotheses, ii, iii, v, and vii, that we expect to find Plato's 
basis for a modification of the Ideas such as would allow them to 
intermingle. 
In discussing the s~pa.rate hypotheses I shall not keep to the 
order in which they appear, but shall group them a.s seems most 
conducive to a clear exposition, but I shall sta.rt with the first. 
H;tp2,the sis • .J • .:.. From what ha.s been said above the presumption is 
that the One of this hypothesis is the Eleatic One, that is the 
Universe, and the Others of hypothesis iv will then be the parts of 
l 
the Universe. I prefer to say, however, that the One is the 
Universe as revealed by Truth, the Others are the World of See¢ming, 
thus following Parmenides• own division of his poem, for it will 
2 
appear that the Others are not parts of the One, indeed the dne is 
deflimed as excluding parts. The One, then, is the Universe as 
conceived by Pure Reason, and the Others are its Appear·ance. It is 
in this sense that I interpret hypotheses i and iv. Further, it will 
be shown that many of Plato's deductions in respect of the one, in 
hypothesis i agree with parrnenides!3 deduction in the Way of Truth, 
but yet there are notable exceptions. These I explain that Plato 
considered that in these. respects Parmel1ides erred in his deduction,. 
and he took it upon himself to correct Parmenides. 3 This is the 
explanation why he gave Parmenides tho role of chief speaker: Plato 
considers his deductj_on of the One to be the correct one, a correc-
tion in fact of the Elea.tic master~'¢, and so assumes the role of 
the true interpreter of Eleaticisrn, expounding this truth as if it 
were that of a. Parmenides brought back to life. The hypothesis runs 
as follcws:-
"If there is One, the One would not be many, nor would there 
be a part of it nor even a whole, for it must. not be many but one. 
Therefore, it will not be a whole nor have parts, if the One is to 
be one.n 4 This agrees, so far as it goes, wiith the definition of 
the Eleatic One as given in Sophist 245A:ttThe truly one must be 
defined a.s without parts according to co r:rect reasoning." 
"Since it has no parts, it can have no beginning~ middle nor 
1. So apparently Oornford, Plato and Parmen ides 208. 2. Page 230. 
3. So Jackson, Journel of Philology XI.311 note l:Uin hypothesis 1 
the Eleatic dogma is interpreted with a strictness which Parmeni-
des did not a.ttain. 11 Wild, Plato's Theery of Man 229:ttHypothesis 1J 
i is a purif'f:e.d Eleatic theology warning us aga.inst Pantheism." 
4. Parmenides l37CD. 
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end, since these are parts, and so must be infinite and formless .••• 
Nor is the One anywhere, neither in itself nor J.n another, which 
denies both motion and rest of 1 t. n1 This deviates considerably 
' 
from Parmen1ide s• poem, and yet gives what seems to be a deduction 
of the One which meets the flythagorean crit1c1sm2 that the One wa.s 
ridi£ulous since it was many: for if it wa.s finite, it would have 
beginning, middle and end, and so be three not one. Plato here shows 
that the truly one does not have beginning, middle 'nor end, since 
it has no parts, and so it must. be infinite, and not finite, as 
indeed Meli.ssus had allov1ed. But if infinite and formless, the One 
3 
could not be a motionless sphere. This is interesting, since 
Plato's words here agree with those quoted in the Sophist, except 
that the conclusion is the contrary. For here, Parmenides 137E, the 
sphere is defined a.s •1haiiing 1 ts extremes ON ALL SIDES EQUIDISTANT 
from the centre n 1 and in Sophist 24 4E, Parmeni de s 1 Whole is thus 
desrtibed:noN ALL SIDES it is like the ma.ss of a well-rounded sphere 
EQUIDISTANT on all sides from the middle.fi" We have here, then, a. 
corrected deduction of the One, which meets the Pythagorear{cr1t1 ciinll 
"Since it is One, it cannot have any a.ttributes,for this would 
imply others, so that it cannot be the same either with another or 
with 1 tself, nor again different either from 1 tself or from another. 
Nor can it have the varieties of same and Different, viz. likeness 
and unlikeness. " 4 Not only can it hav·e no predicate of qua.li ty, but 
not even of quantity, for Sameness implies fequali ty, Difference 
inequality, and since the former of each pair has been dehied of the 
One, it ca.nnot be equal or unequa.l either to itself or to another. 5 
Nor ere the predicates of change posiSible for it, for extending the 
concepts of equality and inequality to time,the One cannot be older 
or younger than,ti tself., nor· even of the same age with l. tself, nor · 
\~ith another, and so must be out of u~E altogether. 6But under such 
conditions the One could not exist, and so could not be an object 
of knowledge, ppinion or sensation at all. Such· a state of affairs 
is manifestly impost;ible. 7 Now while there are one or t·wo points 
here which resemble Pnrmenides' own deduction oi' the One, such as 
its not being dtfferent either from itself or from others, and 1 ts· 
inability to be older or younger than ltself, which is as much as 
to say that it was not nor will be, most of Pla~o's deductions in 
this passage are quite the contrary of J?armenides', especially that 
it is not, and that it cannot be known. It seemo that just as Plato 
earlier corrected Parmenides in the light of histQrical criticisms 
of the One and its consequent modification by. Mellssus, so here 
1. Pa.rmenides 137.D-8B condensed. 2 .. Page 159 above. 
3. Cp. Wild, Plato's Theory of Man 229, that this corrects Parmeni-
des• conception of the One as a motionless sphere. Compare also 
Journal of Philology XI. 310 and Skemp, The Theory of Motion i.n 
Plato's Later Dialogues 13. 4. Parmenides 139:B & E, condensed. 
5. Parmenides 140B-D. 6. Parmenides 140E-1A. 7. Parmonides 141E;.. 
142A. 
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he goes even further and makes his own fresh deduction in respects 
which seemed to him to follow necessarily from the definiti on ot: 
the One as having no parts. 
Thus, hypothesis 1 gives the One as formulated by Parmenides, 
but makes two sorts of correction :ln 1 ts deduction., flirstly it takes 
account of historlJ.cal cr1 ti~isms of it, and secondly 1 t modifies 
Parmenides 1 deductions where Plato felt that they were not strictly 
deduced. such a One, as thus correctly deduced, however, appears to 
be nothing:nl3ut is it possible for the case to stand -tth'!-ls in regard 
1 
to the One ? - It does not seem possible to¢me." We expect, then, 
to find in hypothesis 11, which follows, the correct FORMULATION of 
the One; since Parmenides• formule. tion has been shown in hypothesis 
i to have been incorrectly deduced, the correct deduction made by 
Plato having led to the impossible. If Parmenides' One, when correct· 
ly deduced, leads to silence, his One must be incorrectly formulate~ 
we expect to find the correct formulation in hypothesis ii, but 
before dealing with this, it will be convenient to dee..~ with hypo-
thesis iv, which is the complement of hypothesis i.· 
5l1pothesis iv. As this hypothesis leads to a position similar 
to that of hypothesis i - viz, the denial of any possible attribute 
in respect of the Others, as hypothesis i denied the.se of the One -
it is usual to interpret this hypoth e sis as the cgpmplement of the 
other. If, then, hypothesis i dealt with the Eleatic One, Pa.rmenides 
Way of Tr\).th, we expect hypothesis i v to deal with his Way of Seem-
ing.3 If, then, hypothesis i dealt with the Universe as the object 
of knowledf:,e, hypothesis iv should deal with the Universe as 
Appearance a,nd the Others should represent the multiplicity of sense .. 
This hypo the sis, then, shows that just as according to Parmenides• 
formulation of the One there can be no knowledge of the One, the 
alleged supreme object of knowledge! so here (in hypothesis :tv) 
no attributes whatsoever can be predicated of the Others, the world 
of Appearance, so that there can be absolutely nothing at all accord· 
t\ Y.~ ing to the assumption of the Elea.tic tV f r . 
The argument runs as follows: 5 The One and the Others are 
1. Parmen1des 142A. 2. Hypothesis 1 is interpreted as a refutation 
of the Eleatic One by Lieb!iucks, Platons Ehtwicklung zur Dialektik 
188-190; Bury, Journal of Philology XXIII .180; Taylor, Mind v. 489 
& VI.32; Cornford, Plato and parmenides 135; Milhaud, Les Philo-
sophes Geom~tres de la. Gr~ca 333; Stewart, Plato's Doctrine of 
Ideas 83; a.nd others. Almost the only other interpretation of this 
hypothesis is tha.t of Robin, Platon 134, that it exhibits the 
consequences of denying the notion of rela.tion, cp. Shorey, What 
Plato Said 292. . 
3. Jackson, Journal of Philology XI.313 & 324, and Chen, Classical 
Quarfrerly~XXXVIII.l09, take hypothesis iv as exhibiting the 
)(""'~',...f'O f of things and Ideas in 11lato' s Early Theory. But 
this has alreedy been suff'icit ently c;riticised in Parmenides I and 
led not to nihilism and the impossibility of predication as such, 
but only to the denial of any relation between Ideas a.nd things -
but things were a.llowed to have relations among themselves,. 
4. fn hypothesis i. 5~. Pa-rmenides 159B-l60B, condensed. 
. -r-
' 
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distinct conceptions exhal.Sting the whole of reality. As they are 
1 
separate and the one has no parts, the One cannot be in the others 
either as a whole or as parts, so that the Others can partake of the 
one in no way a.t all. Nor can the Others be me.ny since then each of 
this many would be a unity and a part of the whole, which has just 
been denied. Therefore, the Others, containing neither unity nor 
multiplicity, can have no single attribute nor any number of a.ttri-
butes, and are neither like nor unlj_ke, neither same nor other, 
neither 1n motion nor at rest, neither in a state of becoming nor of 
being destroyed, neither great.er nor less nor equal, nor have they 
experienced anything else of the sort. 
Hypotheses lb and iv, then, shoVv that Parmenides had incorrectly 
formula.ted his One, since if correctly deduced - and Parmenides had 
not deduced it correctly - no predication would be ~~~~iiti either 
of tho one itself nor of the others, neither of the Universe as the 
object of Pure Reason nor of its Appfeazrance in the world of sense. 
Elea.ticism led to nihilism because its One had been incorrectly 
formulated. Its correct formulation a_nd the resultant position both 
in respe ct of the One and the Others is given in hypotheses 11 and 
iii, to which we next turn. 
!!.uothesis ~.1. The second hypothesis is a subject of much 
controversy. That school of thought which sees in the Trope nothing 
more than a. logical exercise places the first and the second hypo-
theses on the S\3-me level, and asserts that " the indiscriminate 
assertion of hypothesis ii is no more satisfactory than the indiscri-
'minat e negation of i ~'~ With this point of view I cannot agree; as 
Taylo.:r3 sa.ys, "We are meant to gather from the opposite results of 
these hypotheses some fundamenta:l difference in the interpretation 
of first principles.'' Ja.ckro n 4 pointed out that knowledge is stated 
to be possible for hypotheses ii and v·, but not for i and vi, and 
hence,' as 11 solves the problem of the combination of opposite Ideas 
Plato must haV'e held this correct and i wrong. 5 Thus, I ha.ve above6 
interpreted the signif~cance of the Parmenides to be that hypothesis 
1 shows that the Eleatic One' must hawe been incorrectly formulated 
since its deduction - that is Plato's deduction, Parmeni.des' own 
deduction ·in his We.y of Truth having been wrong - leads to absurdity, 
so that we are led to expect a. cot·rected formulation of the One in 
hypothesis 11. That this new formulation, when its implications are 
drawn out by Plato, leads to the a.ssertion of opposites of the one 
is not reason why this.should be regarded as 'chaos', but points to 
1. This shows tllla.t we are dealing with the same One as in hypothesis 
i 1 cp. Parmenides l37CD. See also page 227 note 2 above. 
~. Ross, Plato's Theocy of Ideas 95; cp. Rob1.n, Pla.ton 134: "The Rm::tilc 
notion of relation was denied in i and led to chaos in ii"; cp. 
Journal of Philology XXIII.166:ttit is difificult to suppose that 
Plato mixed up the positive and nega.t ive side of his doctrine 1n 
inextricable confusion.*' 3. Mind v.326. 4. Journal of Philo-
logy XI.308. 5. Classical Quarterly XXXVIII.l06-7. 6. Page 229. 
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1 just that combiila.tion of oppos1 tes with which the dialogue opens. 
' 
If there seams to be nothing to choose between indiscriminate 
assertion and indiscriminate denial it is not Plato's fault, but our 
own incorrect interprteta tion of the denotation of the One. %.k:e But 
this does not necessarily mean that the One here is exclusi vely tm 
. 2 
Platonic Idea. For if the One is taken to be the Idea of One, · or 
any one Idea, and the Others of hypothesis iii as other Ideas, 3 one 
might well despair vvhen one finds that thi.s leads to the conclusion 
given in that hypothesis -namely, that the One - the Ideas -have 
4 
motion and increase and are in space and time. For to interpret the 
one and the Others as Ideas sharing in spa .. ce and time makes nonsense 
of Plato 1 s Later Theory, even though one alleges that Plato had by 
this time abandoned the earlier separation of the tV~o worlds of 
Ideas and of things, as does Taylor, 5 Liebrucks, 6and Stenzel. 7 
What, taan, is the denotation of the One and the Others, for it 
is certain that.the Others mentioned in opposition to the One in 
hypothesis ii a.re the same entities as the Others of hypothesis iii. 
surely if the One of hypot.OO sis 1 is the Elea.tic One, which has been 
sufficiently demonstrated above, and if that One is the Universe 
itself, whicb is generally accepted, then the One of hypothesis i1, 
which a.m wers hypothesis i by giving a fresh and corrected formula-
tion of the One, must be of the same nature, must be in fact tha.t 
same Universe, and the Others are the n 1 ts ·pa.rts. 8 It is indeed the 
T~ n•vl"t~c;r o~t' of the Sophist, which will be discussed later. The 
proof of this Jies in the fact that this interpretation makes expli-
cable the co·urse of Pleto• s argument, as we shall now show. 
That hypothesis ii was intended t:ts the alternative but correc-
ted formulation of the One, which hypothesis i had refuted a.c,cording 
to the Eleatic conception thereof, appears~from Plato's opening 
words: 9 "Let us return to the hypothesis from the beginning a.nd see 
if it a,ppears in a different light to us when we re-examine 1 t." 
This One is defined as a One having Being, and as the unity of its 
Being can be distinguished from the being of its Unity, it has parts 
and so is a whole •10 These. parts, which surely mean concrete exis-
tents, are inf1ni te in number sin-ce each part, as one existent, has 
both Unity and Being, and thls Ifni ty a.nd Being again are each 
similarly subdilrided, and so ad infinitum, so that the Existent One 
. b 11 h is infinite in num er. T e same result is obtajjned if one considerl-
the unity of the One in the abstract. This can be distinguished from 
its~ Being, and since the One is neither its Unity nor 1 ts Being, 
1. The solution of this diff'icul ty in the world of sense is g1 ven on 
page 234 below; cp. also page 242 sub fin.-243. 
2. ClasGical Quarterly XXXVIII.l05. 3. So a.pparently Cornford, 
Plato and Parmen1des 2f8. 4. Skemp. The Theory of Motion in 
Plato's Later Dialogues 14; cp. Classical Review LV.76. ~70 2 5 •.. Mind v.484. 6. Platens Entwicklung zur Dialektik 156-9 HBOCX:lj~' 
7. Plato's Method o.f Dialectic 147-8. B. That this phrase, 1 1ts 
parts•, can be used here will appear below. 
9. parmenides 142J:S. lO.Parmenides 142B-D. ll.Parmenides 142E-3A. 
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this difference can be ascribed to the Other - a teaching which we 
are to meet again in the Sophist. From these facts it is deduced 
that there is 2 and 3 and so Odd and Even, from which Numbers are 
derived by mult:1plication. 1 This ~son2 interprets that a finite 
plural! ty must intervene be tween unity and plurality for knowledge 
to be possible, but actually Plato goes on to say that as Number is 
infinite in multiplicity~here must be an infinite ¢multiplicity of 
Being. Being must be distributed over the whole multitude of things 
and con·currently with :tt the One must be so split up. 3 Allt this 
probably means no more than that the parts of the One, the concrete 
particulars within the Universe, are infinite in number. 
On the other hand, "inasmuch as the parts are parts of a v.rhole, 
the One, as a whole, will be limited; for are not the parts 
contained by the whole? ••• a.nd that whitb contains is a limit?."4 As 
a whole, it has beginning, middle a.nd end, and so partakes of 
figure, eitper rectilinear or round or a union of the two. 5 This 
refers to the Universe as a whole, not as in the previous pa.ragraph 
to the pa.rts constituting the mniverse, and it rightly appears to 
be limited and of a certain figure, in contradistinct ion to 1 ts 
parts, .which are infinite in number. 
The same distinction between the Universe ase. whole and its 
constituent parts lies behind the next pair of deductions. Firstly, 
the Universe can be regarded both as its parts in .the aggregate and 
as the whole comprising these pa.rts. As the forme r}tis in the latter 
the One is in itself, and what is in itself cannot move. Therefore,. 
the One is at rest. But se·condly, the ~atter cannot be said .to be 
in the former, the ,,hole is something outside .tf its parts, so that 
the OIJ.e; as a whole, is not, in 1 ts parts, but must be in anotre r, 
and hence is in mot1on. 6 That is, .as a whole the Universe rests, 
but .it:s parts are iij. motion. Bury7 has pointed out a fal·lacy in this 
argument, but he allows the general conclusion~ to be just. 
The next set of antin.omies8 is rathe11:: complicat.dd, but amounts 
to this. The Universe can be conceived either as the whole, or its 
parts, or both, or neither but in abstraction. As the whole over 
aga.inst its parts, which a.re the Others, it is other than the Others; 
as its parts, it is the same -with the Others; as both, it is other 
than 1 tself -the Un1 v.erse a.s the parts 1 s .other than the Universe 
as the whole; and a,s neither, it is the same with itself, since the 
a .. bstratt notion of Unity cannot be other. than the One. The argument 
is rather forced, but tarns on mo more thaD the distinction between 
the Universe as the sum tota.l of things as a whole, as the e.ggregate 
of its constituent parts, and as an abstract conception. 
1. Parmen1des 143A-4A. 
3. Parmenides 144A-E. 
5. Parmenides 14 5AB •. 
1. Journal of Philology 
2. Encyclopedia. of Relig:ilon and Ethics x. 58. 
4. Pannenides 144E-5A. 
6. Pa.rmenide s 14 5B-6A. 
XXIII.l79-18Q. 8. Parmmides 146C-7B. 
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The next set of ant1nomies1 is fundamentally g:ii6~j~ on the 
previous set of concLusions. Inasmuch as the One is other than the 
Others it is like the Others, since the Others are likewise other 
2 than the One .. By a fa lla.cious contraposi ti ve , the One as the same 
with the Others is shown to be unlike the Others. As from its Same-
ness with and othernesB from the Others 1 t is shown to be like and 
unlike the Others, from 1 ts sameness w1 th and otherness from 1 tself 
it is thus like and unlike itself. 
It is, I feel, unnecessary to follow up further deductions, 
except to notice that use is made of a long and involved argument 3 
to show that the One partakes of Time, which again has a certain 
speciousness. 2 And the hypothesis, if the AJ:Imdix, as it is called, 
1 s dealt wi t'Bt separa.tely, concludes w.i tb the words: "Then the One 
was and is and will be, and was becoming and is becoming and will 
become •••• And since we have at this moment opinion and knowledge and 
perception of the One, there is op:lnion an.d knowledge and perception 
of it •••• Then there .is )Sname and expression for it, and it is named, 
and expressed, and everything of this Jm~ kind which apperta.ins to 
4 
other things ~ppertains to the One.'' This is a fair enough conclu-
sion of the condition of the One if interpreted as the Universe 
with all tha..t 1 t contains,. 
A£pend!~· The so-called Appendix differs from all the other 
arguments in that it combines two hypotheses, or at:. least it seems 
so to d.o. Ftar 1 t begins: "If the One. is both one and many as we have 
described and is nei,ther one nor many, and participates in time, 
must it not, insof.a.r as it is on~. partake at times of Being and 
insofar as 1 t is not one, at times not partake of Being?"5. The "'as 
we have, described' .clearly refers to the. results of the second 
hypothesis, but that hypothesis did not show that the One was also 
neither one nor mm1y. But a,s the first hypothesis led to this result, 
6 Liebruck,s interprets the Appendix as based on the Eleatic. concep-
tion of Becoming as the passage from Not-Being as iU, hypothesis 1 
to Being_ast~,in i1. But this is difficult: it is exceptiona:t. for one 
of th.e arguments of the 'J'rope to be based on e ... synthesis of two 
. 7 
separate hypotheses, not to sa~- fe.llac.ious, and further it implies 
that such was Plato• s conception of Becoming, which can hardly be 
8 
correct. Hence, I prefer Taylor's interpretation that the Appendix 
deals with the same One as hypothesis 11, a,nd ·to say that the One is 
one means 1 t is not many, and to say that 1 t is many means that it 
1 s not one. This is also preferable because, if the Appendix w-ere a. 
symthe sis of the two hypotheses, 1 t should alec take into account 
that according to hypothesis i the One does not partake in Time. 
l. Parmenides 147C-8D. 2. Bury, Journal of Philology XXIII.179-80. 
3. Pa.rmenides 152A-5A. 4. Pannen.ides 155D. 5. Pa.rmenides l55E. 
6. Platens Entwicklung zur Dialektik 233. 7. Cp. Wild, Plato's 
Theory of Ma.n 237, that the Appendi;x is ;not a synthesis of i and 11, 
8. The Parmenides of Plato 157 and Mind VI.lO end 12. 
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The argument then goes on to state that nthe One partakes end 
does not partake of Being at different times, for tha.t is the only 
. 1 
way in which it can partake and not pa.rtake of the sa.rne, and this 
1s~xpla1ned by me~ns of the conception of the ffer,-c'cfV'J f. 2 This 
confirms our interpretation of the One and the Others in hypothesis 
11 as re~ng to tho Universe and its parts, for such a One as that 
desrtibed in the Appendix is clearly a particular. 3 Further, this 
seems to be Plato• s answer to Zeno 1 s a.ntinomy to replace that 
offered by socrates in liHL0 f the Early Theor' of Ideas which had 
been placed in jeopardy by Parmenides. Sensibles can partake of 
opposite attributes because the possession of opposite cha.ra.cters 
is possible in succession. The real problem is how the Ideas can 
partake of contraries since they a.re not in time. This problem is 
dealt with in the second leg, so to speak, of the Trope, to which 
we shall refer presently. But fn:-st it is necessary to complete the 
pre.sent investigation by turning to the remaining hypothesis of the 
first•leg of the Trope. 
~xpothes1s 1i1· We have already stated that th!lts hypothesis 
deals with the same Others as are mentioned, in ~IJE:S opposition to 
the One, in hypo the sis 11, namely, the parts of the Universe, which 
are not necessarily particulars, although it mas be that the Appen-
dix was intended to act as a bridge between the One of hypothesis 
11 and the Others of iii. If so, then as the· entity there discussed 
was the sa&sible part1cJIIJ.ar, 1 t would seem that the Others of hypo-
thesis iii would be the same. iHence, I do not think those commenta-
4 ' . . 
tors are correct who interpret these Others as other Ideas. But on 
the other. hand, I do not 'agree that they are exclusively sensible 
part1culars. 5 The parts of th~ Universe can be both Ideas and 
sensible s, not to mention ~uls, e.nd it is in this sense that I 
6 interpret them. So Cornford, .who allows the Oth e rs to represent 
the units of number, numbers as wholes, Forms, geometrical magnitudes· 
or bodies in space and timet according to the context. 
Except for the derivation of Numbers, all the conclEions that 
were made of the One in hypothesis 11 are here made in respect of 
the Others, so far as the hypothesis goes. For what was found true 
of the One in relation to the Others must also be true of each of 
the Others considered as a unity in relation to other such ent!lties. 
So, "the Others are other the.n the One inasmuch as they have pa.rts; 
for if they had no parts they would be simply one •••• and p~r.rts as 
we affirm have relation to ::tlrfJR: a. whole ••• and the parts will be parts 
of the One, for ea.ch of the parts is not a. part of the Many but of 
a whole. if1 7 That is, the parts of the Un1 verse in the aggregEtte a:re 
l. Parmenides l55E. . ft. Parmm.!ides 156D. 3. Shorey, What Plato 
Said 293. 4. Jackson, Journal of Philology XI.313; Liebrucks, 
Platens Entw'lcklung zur Dialektik 240. 5.· Chen, Cla,ssical 
Quarterly XXXVIII.l08-9; Wild, Plato's Theory of fl.an 218. 
6. Plato a.nd Pa:rmenides 205. 1. Parmenides l57C. 
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related to the whole Universe a.s pafts to a whole. 
Just as the One of hypothesis ii was shown to consist of parts 
and each pa.rt again of further parts, so that the one was infinite 
in number, so here too, ••If the Others have parts, they will partici-
pate in the whole and in the One ••• and the same argumm~t holds of 
each part, for the part mustt pan·ticipate in the One •••• and the 
things which; are other tha .. n the One will bo memy; for if tre things 
which are othet tban the One were ne~ther one nor more than one 
1 they would ba nothing. n The argument then goes on to ela.borate 
and this thistJlllU&::f:tjfo is important beca.use a .similar position underlies 
hypothesis vii, as we shall see. "They do so (pa.rta.ke of the One), 
then, as multit&des in which the One is not present ••• And if we were 
to abstract from them in idea. the very smallest fra.ction, must not 
that lea.st fra.ction, if it does not partake of the One, be a. 
2 
multitllde and not one?1' on the other hand, "when each several pa~t 
becomes a part, then the parts have a lim1 t in relation to the whole 
and to ea.ch other, and the whole in relation to the parts,n so that 
as parts of Ua whole universe, the others are limited. 3 
By tal.:ing together the Others as both limited and unlimited, a.s 
previously established, the Others are shown to be like both them-
selves and one another, inasmuch as they are affected in the same 
way, but unlike themselves and one another inasmuch as they suffer 
4 
opposite affections. In conclusion the Others are stated, without 
further proof, to be the sam.e with and other than one another, bttth 
moving and at rest, and exper,iencing every sort of opposite affec-
5 tion. · 
The above four hypotheses, VJhich form the first half of the 
Trope, can bp summed up as f:ollows: 'Parmenides• had undertaken to 
investigate, the implications of his own hypothesis, If the One is, 
and again If th~ One is not. The first four hypotheses deal with the 
former. This again e:rtails a. twofold invetstigation, tho implications 
of this hypothesis in respect of the One, a.nd its implications j_n 
respect of the Oth ersr~ Hypothesis i shows that according to Parme-
. C'- (' 
nides' formula-tion of the One as the EV fY , the One is in fact 
nothing, not even one, and hypothesis 1.v shows that when the One is 
. R d • 
~.efined as a.fY"fY there can be no Others either. Hypothesis ii 
C\ , 
takes the One it'll a different sense as too EY o¥ ,and in this sense 
the One has all possible attributes. The Appendix explains that this· 
is possible be:cause these attributes exist in temporal succession. 
In the same sense of' the One, hypothesis iii shows that the Others 
also can ha.ve all possible attributes. In all four hypotheses what 
is denoted by the One is the Universe, and by the Others is meant 
the parts of the Universe, its Appea.rance. We tm.rn now to the last 
four hypotheses where the imp~cations are discussed of the hypothesis, 
1. Parmenides l57E & l58B. 2. Parmenides l58C. 
3. Parmenides 158D. 4. Parmen ides 158E-9A. 5. Parmtrrides 159A. 
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If the One is not. 
tll:Eothesis...,!l. The first four hypotheses dealt with the assump-
tion., If thf} One is; the last four vvi th the assumption, If the One 
is n9Jt. Of these, the f1r·st hypothesis demonstrated the Eleatic One 
as it should have been deduced, hypothesis two as it should have 
been formulated. Hence, it is reasonable to suppose that hypothesis 
' 1 
six, VYhich shows the results of the isolation of Not-Being, likewise 
2 ! demonstrates the Elea.tic Not-Being as it should have bem1 deduced, 
a.nd hypothesis five as it should have been formulated. 
'So, then, hypothesis vi is the reflhta.tion of the conception of 
Not-Being as formulated by Pannenides, 1. e. as having no share in 
Being at all. For, '"' Not• signifies absence o~ Being, and What Is 
Not ha.s in no sort of way or kind participation of Being. It neithea:-
perishes nor becomes, and so is not alter~d at all. So it cannot be 
moved and c¢a.nnot stand. Nor is there a:ny existing thing that can be 
attributed to it, neither sma,ll, nor great., nor equal; nor likeness 
nor difference either to itself or to others. Nor can knowledge or 
opinion or perception or expression or name or any other thing be; 
attributed to it. It has no condition of any kinct.n 3 
Hence, ij.ust as hypothesis i showed that the One as formulated 
by Pa.rmenides was unthinkable, so hypothesis vi shows that the Not-
formulated 
, One~ Not-Being, as xm:rm by Parmmddes was likewise unthinkable. 
£!!Eothesis_,!. The fifth hypot.ftsis, aspwe have sa.id, can be 
expected to give the corrected formulation of Iio t-Being, and ;this is 
in fact given in the preamble: 11What is the meaning of th.is hypothesis 
If the One is not? Does it differ from this, If the Not-One is not? -
It is the contrary. - What if one says, If Size is not, or If' small-
ness '&s not, or anything of .that kin·d, surely ft is clear in each 
case that one states what-is,-not as something different? Thus here 
'!: 
' a.lso it is clear that Not-Be:ing im.plies difference from the Others. 
In the' first place, then, one states a known fact in nam.ing the. One, 
·whether as existing or as not existing, ,and in the second that it is 
different from the Others. ~' 4 That is, when we deny the existence of 
tae(one, whereas Parmanides woul. d have said .-that we cannot make a 
significant statement about such a non-en ttty, Plato assorts that 
we can; and the reason for this is that such non-existence does not 
mean that its subject does not exist at all, but the.t it is different 
from the present existent state of affairs. - If Size is not, implies 
that Smallness is, and If the One is not, implies that the Not-One . 
. . is. The non-exist:entce of the One, then, means that the One is 
different f ... rom the Not-One, and the Not-One is a known fact. 
1. Cp. Classical Quarterly XXXVIII.lll-2. 
2. Hence I reject Jackson, Journal of Philology XI.324, that the 
Cynics are here alluded to, whicfu: in any case does not squa.re w1 th 
the text, since Jackson describes the Cynic position as only t:m 
1nf:lni ty of things, whereas Parmellilides 164B allows no perception. 
3. Pa.rmenides 163C-4B. (condensed). 4. Parmenides 160BC. 
r 
/1 
! 
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What does Plato mean by this? Plato uses in this connection the 
verb • to be'- f7Val - with 1 ts inflections. Its meaning at that 
time, ·certainly in pa rmm1.idest day, was that of concfrete or material 
existence. But he has just pointed out that the One Cffi!ll be an object 
of thought, a known fact, even d.f it does not exist as a. material 
. 1 
object. Plato, then,· aistinguishes two senses of the verb, Qr 
rather two modes of existence, fir~ly what we might call substanti-
~1 existence, which is here denied of the One ex hypothesi, and 
secondly being different - if the One does not exist substantia.lly 
it can still· be an object of thou&ht as the contrary of the Not-One, 
just as wo can deny Size and yet assert it·is tho contrary of small-
ness. This seems to point to a. distinction between concrete exist-
2 
ence end meaning. So Wild, although we need not as yet commit our-
selves to his interpretation of this meaning a.s the pure and 
unsubstantial existence of Ideas as objects of Understanding:"When 
we say that m~ltiplic1 ty does not exist, v;e do not mean sheer non-
ant~ ty: it· is a. mode of Being not material but not non-esse. such 
a.re the Forms, the mem ing by which we mean a t hing. n 
This is explailned further tn Parmenides 162A1 which can be made 
clear if we ~iMH~tili 8 the verb 'to be• and its inflexions in differ-
ent ways according to the meaning, thlil.s:ttThe non-existent One must 
1- o''-" have the affirmation of :ZE:i:H~ Not-Being (To" E Y~' f'? ... ) as the 
bond of 1 ts n<:>n-existonce { Jt~f' 0"' ..,.0 ~ f'1 ~ 1,4-C. ) , in order for it 
' LL '' \ " T ' '' not. to exist (ft r' /lf\t'- f'1 t v .. c. ) , just as the exis tJllmt One (ro op ) 
. ' ... " 7), ... 7 
must have the negation of Not-Being flo f' DY E,.l 'f.tY ft? ec/"¢(. )., in 
Cf. l , r.: I 
order thet it exist completely (r~tt h fW6 ,t:<v f) )."The p«roof of 
this is given in the preceding statement, 161E-2A: 11It needs to share 
in some way in Being., otherwise Yie could not truly say tha.t the One 
is not, since if we spea.k truly we are obviously stating a reality ••• 
" 
••• Consequently the non-oxistent One IS, for if it were not, but 
remitted its Being altogether insof~r as it does not exist, then 
straightway it would oxist." That is, Not-Being must be something 
since we E~ii make the statement, the One is not. But if to say it 
is 
:rm::s not moa.nt that .it had no sort of .Being at a.ll, that much reality 
\'\'h1ch it·. ha.s by virtue of which we can make the statement at all v1 
would be remitted .. Tha.t is wha.t Parmen1des ~ould ha v~s bel ie:ve, but 
Plato argues that !If Not-Being remits all cla1m to Being, ~ixtMxfi~fll 
this causing 1 t to lack existence mo ro completely; it ~ctuallJ fmJ>ii::r: 
implies its existence. For the statement The One is not = the Not-
~ . -
One is, but if it remits all claim to -Being, i.e. the Not-one is 
not, this= the One is, 3 so that this remission of Being actuelly 
im13lies 1 ts •xistence. Plato thus demands that to a denia.l of exist-
ence be added an affirmation of the Not-Being of the object in order 
&o allow of its being a subject of discourse, and contrariwise a 
statement of existence must require the negation of its Not-Being, 
1. Cornford, Plato and pa.rmenides 129. 2. Wild, Plato's Theory of 
Man 2~8 and 232. 3. Partial inverse. 
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thus: 
. ' " ,, Not-Being, IO ft? ol'. ' If Being, }o oY. 
Its non-existence, 7~ }A-'i tlrac.. " ~ Its existence, To erytrc.. 
Its affirmation of Not-Being, Its negation of Not-Being, 
.,.o ETY«' 14 ;- o'~. ra 1'.,' J'v f#? f lY~~.c .1 2 . ., 
Therefore, Plato concludes, n1f Being (T~ oVTL ) shares in Not-
- " .., - ... ,, -Being (..,...,., f'., tcY«c.) and Not-Being (7'v f'' oPt(.. ) shares in 
- 1'" Being (7ov tcVa~, the One~ since it is not, must share in Being in 
order to be ste.ted as !{ot-Being. n 3 
This corrects Perm en ides in this way: Parmenides asserted the 
non&existence of Not-Being a.nd no more: Plato adds an affirmation of 
Not-Being as its meaning. The affirma.tion means that 1s " ~known 
fa.ctn and the Not-Being the.t)" is known is Difference - i t~J differ-
ent .from the Others. This is necessary in order to allow the 
possibility of any si[:..nifi cant staterre nt concerning Not-Being. But 
Plato is silent as to the ontological ground of this meaning. We 
shall ·deal with this when treating the Sophist. 
It remains to deal vri th the other conclusions made in respect 
of the non-existent One and the question of its denotation. This 
4 Not-One is like itself and unlike the Others, both moves and rests, 
cha.Ott:Jges and does not chm)ge, becomes e.nd perishes, and yet does 
neither. 5 The former conclusion, that j_t is like itself and unlike 
the Others 1is just, since qua meaning it must remain like itself and 
qua Different it must be unlike the Others, but the other conclu -
· sions a.:r;e not rigidly deduced .• They turn on a shift in mem ing. Its 
ability to cha.nge rests on its sharing in both Being fu"ld Not-Being, 
and from 1 ts ability to cha.nge follows 1 ts motion and its becoming 
and perishing. But it shares¢in Not-Being in the sense of non-exis-
tence, in Being in the sense of aff'irJJation, which distinction Plato 
has himself drawn, but·if Plato is serious about this dialectical 
exercise we must assume that,· despite the falla.cy, he meant the 
conclusion to hold true. The contrary attributes of rest and the 
exclusion of becoming and perishing are valid and follow directly 
from its mode of Being as meaning. But to arrive at any conclusion 
"ff/il . 
Lwhat is here denoted by the One which is not we must accept both 
pairs of contraries; for to dismiss the fallacious deductions is to 
imply that the whole hypothesis was not seriously meant. Wht.t, then, 
can be the nature of a. One which assuming it does not exist,. can be 
said both to move and to rest, Become and yet not Become? 
1. The wordlhng of the sellltence following, 162B, makes one think that 
the text is corrupt and should read, in respect of the negation rf; 
'b" T ', of the Not-Being of the Existent One1TO r7 ftYec.t }4~ oP ,and Burges , 
offers an ~menda.t1on along these lines, but as he sugge sts<8" o--jeoY 
,~ > -· .... ,~ ,r· f t•" 7D 11 £'"""' ..,., f'~ fd'41' "f which might be translated '1has as the 
b nd of its existence the negation of Be1ngft whi~ is nonsense,! 
cannot agree w1 th him. 2Ji. Permenides 162B.. 3. 'Ihis is the 
basis of the contradictory opposites (e.g. Being and Not-Being) 1n 
VYhiclru the Idea., as the mea.n ing of particulars, shares. 
4. Parmenides 161AB. 5. Pa.rmenides 162 C-3B. 
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If it moves, it cannot be the Idea., for a motionless Idea does 
not move simply be cause its existence is denied; by the same token 
1t cannot be the sensible pnrticula1· if it is at rest- i.e. accord-
ing to the doctrine of Flux which Plato accepted. These predicates 
are nonsen91 41f applied to the bare notion of Unity. What remains is 
that this non-existent One is the Universe, just as the One ~f the 
first two hypotheses wa.s the Universe. So far there is n() change :tr. 
in the denttattion of the One in tho dialectica.l exercise. Let us 
examine the suitability of' the U#iverse as the denotation of' the 
non-existent One in hy!4thesis v VoJith the attributes ascribed it. 
We have seen that Plato distinguishes two characteristics of 
the hypo the sis, If the One is not: firstly, one states a. know~af~g1J 
A 
in naming the One, irrespective of whether it exists or not. This 
is the meaning of the 'One', its affirmation of Not-Being. This 
One was defined in hypothesis 11 as a &hole of parts 8nd on pages 
232-3 1 t Vias shown that, as these parts were in the whole 1 the 
One was in itself and so rested. Further, that from its being both 
a whole and parts, the One was shown to be like itself, and we can 
add to this that such a non-existent One could partake in neither 
Becoming nor perishing. Secondly, this hypot~.s, that the One is 
n~~~.nrstH!lr~fent from the Others, i.e. that this non-existent one 
... 
is different from the Existent One, different in that it does not 
exist. This, however, does not mean that thGre is nothing at all~ 
but only that th~, Universe does not exist as the whole embracthng 
the parts, but t~parts could still continue to exist, are in fact 
the Others. Hence, the deductions in hypothesis ii in respect of 
the parts taken in abstraction from the whole should hold good for 
the non-existent One of hypothesis v. Again, on pages 232-3 we saw 
that, inasmuch as these parts in the aggregate· did not contain the 
whole, the Universe was in another a.nd so moved. That is, grant the 
existence of the parts and there must be motion, even though there 
is no Universe. Further, from an analysis of the irnplic~ioBs of 
such parts, taken by themselves, hypothesis ii deduced that the One 
was unlike these Others. And it is these parts that Become and 
perish. Hence, if there were no such existent a.s a Universe. but 
grant that sensible pantiGLLlars existed - as otherwise there would 
be nothing at all as in hypothesis vi - one could still make the 
e,ssertions about this Qon-ex:istent UniVerse what its meaning is and 
..---.. ---- ·- . 
-- ~-- -----
that it differed from a Universe comprising these same parts if KHE}I 
such existed, and by combining the implicattions of the notion of 
Universe (the whole) and what still would exist in tre event of 
the non-existence of such Universe ( parts abstracted from the 
whole), one could still say that this One was like itself and 
unlike the Others, both rests and moves, Becomes ~.nd does not Be-
come, as we have just argued. Hypothesis v then exam·ine s the impli-
cations of the denial of the existence of a Universe embracing 
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sensible events in time and space, and shows we should still have the 
notion of ''Universe' and the existence of Becoming and perishing~~ 
Hypo the sis vii. Jackson1 sees in this hypothesis a reference to 
Socra.tes' concepts, Plato showing tho.t a. rigid deduction of their 
implications leads to Opinion of variable classes and not to know-
ledge, which Bury 2 rightly dismisses as fanciful.. but his own ascrip-
tion of the reference to the pythagoreans3 is no better. What is 
described is something much more vague than Opinion and even vaguer 
than the imaginal content of sense-experience which Wild4 discovers 
here. As in a.ll the preceding hypotheses, what is here dealt VIIi th is 
the Universe, but from a very specialised point of view. In hypothe-
sis 1 it was the Eleatic One without pa.rts, in ii the new Pla.tonic 
one as a whole with parts; in iii and iv it was the Others that 
were more particula.rly dealt with, the Universe a.s it appears· to the 
senses; in hypotheses v and vi the implications were examined of the. 
denial of the existence of the Universe, according to the implica.-
ttons respectively of Plato's new definition of Not-Being and of the 
Eleatic Principle of' Contradiction. Here in hypothesis vii we return 
to the Others, the Universe as revealed to our senses, bu~ •the One• 
seems to have a. new sense. As Taylor 5 says, "If we abstra.ct from the 
world of perception its systematic unity, what appearance will it 
present? •••• i.e. if we fail;t to take it into account, not that it is 
denied. 11 What results in fact has already been hinted at in hypothe-
sis iii6 :'"The Others pa.rt~:lke of the One as multitudes in whichh the 
one is not present •••• And. if we were to a.bst ract from them in idea 
the very smallest fraction, must not that lea.st fraction, if it does 
not ji.f~Hi of the One, be a. multitude and not one?" Here 'the One' 
is obviously Unitjlland not the Universe, and it is this abstraction 
of Unity from the Universe as the Others, the Universe as revealed 
to the senses, that is elaborated in hypothesis vii. 
The Universe, then, in the absence of any systematic unity, is 
\ 
thus described:''Each mass of them is infinite in multitude, and even 
if one tries to grasp wha.~ seems smallest, as in a dream it suddenly 
seems many instead of' one and exceedingly la.rge instead of very 
small, as compa.red. with its subdivisions ••• Thus, there are many 
masses, each appearing one but not really?fso, if the One is not •••• 
And J'while it seems very small in itself, it appears many and large ¢ 
as compared with each of the many and small •••• While limited as JJ.gat:tR 
against another mass, it has in itself neither beginning, middle nor 
,lend, be ca.use when one at any time tries to gra.sp any of t&em1n one'E 
mind as an existent i~!Dg'preceding the beginning another beginning 
a~~ays springs up, and after the end another end is still left over, 
and in the middle true middles within, but smaller ••• It is just a.s if 
one stood a li:ttle wa.y from a painting, all of it then appearing one 
1~ Journal of Philology XI.324 cp.313. 2. Journal of Philology XXIII. 
166. 3. Op •. cit. 183. 4; Plato's Theory of Man 218. 
5. Mind VI.27. 6. See pages 234-5 above. 7. See this meaning on 
page 232 sub fin. 
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and the same and alike, but on approaching it becomes many and 
dl1.fferent end unlike ••• Therefore, they are the same yet different 
from one another •••• ,and moving with all possible motions yet staUo-
1 
nary in every way, and becoming .and perishing, and yet neither." 
Further discussion of the above description will be left over 
for the Synopsis whidru follows the next hypothesis. 
Hy2oth~sis !!!l• We have seen that hypotheses i and ii set out 
the condition of the Universe as an object of thought accordi.ng to 
the Eleatic and the Platonic formula-tions of the One respect!vely, 
and .these are followed up in respect of .the Universe as e.n object of 
perception in 1 iv and iii; further, hypotheses vi and v give the 
implications of the Elea.tic and Platonic assumptions of the meaning 
of Not-Being as applied to the denial of th~ existence of the Uni-
verse, Wt-barea.s vii followed up the latter by giving a description of 
the J world ·of Appearance in the absence of any kind of systematic 
unity. We expect, then, that hypothesis :viii should give the results 
for the same abstraction of unity according to the Eleati c conception 
of unity. That is, as, fOr Pa.rmenides, the qne was the All, if there 
was no One there could be nothing a.t all, w.lllereas hypothesis vii 
showed what there was in the absence of unity Claording to Jla.to' s 
conception the reof - Unity was not tm All, but there was a.lso 
Being according. to hypothesis ii and Not-Being or the Different 
according to hypothesis v. Thts means in effect that the Others of 
2 
viii belong to the genus of Other, as Liebrucks expresses it, but 
according to Parmenides' assumptions there could be nothing at all if 
the One was not - Parmenides erred by not taking into account the 
Different. 
So hypothesis viii runs:"If the One is not, and the Oth~rrs are 
different from the One, ·the Others cannot be one nor even many, since 
if many the One would be in them ••• Thus, the Others could be neither 
one nor m!lllY nor even -,appear one or many •••• nor is there any of 
Not-Being present in any of the Others •••• Therefore, there. ~an be no 
' opinion of wha.t is not, nor any appearance on the side of the otre rs 
., •••• In a word, if thl One is not, there is nothing at all. •t3 Thus, 
·~ i 4 
there.is not even App~arance according to the Eleatic postulate~ 
§l!!OJ2Sis. The question here to be dealt with is what connection, 
if any, these eight hypotheses have with plato's Later Doctrine of 
Idea-Numbers as attested by Aristotle. To start with, hypothesis 1, 
iv, vi, and viii, have nothing to do with it. A~ has been shown above 
the s e conuern Eleati c1 sm alone. Hypothesis i gives Plato's deduction 
1. Parmenides 164C-5D. 2. Platens Entw1cklung zur Dia.lektik 251. 
3. Pa.rmenides 165E-6A.C. 4. Liebrucks, op. cit. 254, cp. Robin, 
Platon 137: nHypothesis viii points to ·a. nihilism that causes 
Eleaticism to founder,'' end Comford, plato and Parmtn.ides 244: 
"Pa:rmenide s confused the Dyad .with Non-Entity and so was una blel!to 
provide for a world of appeara.nce." 
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of the One according to parmenides' formulation thereof as without 
parts - it is thus a corrected deduction of the Eleatic One. It is 
meant to demonstrate that the One, as defined by Pormenidest so far 
from revealing the truth behind the Universe, is a contradict. ion 
in terms - to defihe the One as nothing else than one leads to the 
impossibility of even naming the One. Hypothesis iv eompl e m~s this 
demonstration by showing that, according to the Eleat1c postulate, 
not only can there not be a One, but there can be nothing else 
either, no world of Aprearance. Hence, Parmenid..::s' so-called Way of 
Truth was entirely erroneous, and his other Path, that of Not-Being, 
which Pa.rmenides had denied to have any reality whatsoever,. was 
equally erroneous. Hypothesis vi proves that there can be no knowledg 
I 
oTion, perception, expression or name about Not-Being as conceived 
by parmenides., so that, it is implied, he could not merely not have 
explained the nature of Uot-.Being so defined, but he could not have 
even n~med it. An~ hypothesis viii completes the investigation by 
showing that even &f the ineffable Eleatic one d~d not exist there 
could be nothing in any case, not even Appearance, according to the 
Eleatic assumptions. 
But one might object, How could a complete refutation of 
Elea.ticism be put into the mouth of its founder, Parmenides? The 
answer lies in the other hypotheses. Hypothesis i1 gives a d3duction 
of the oneja.s Plato,Cconsiders Parmenides should have formula ted 1 t, 
as a whole of parts, and sllllows}t tha.t such a One can be the object of 
thought, of opinion, OJ:' of perception. Hypothesis iii complememts 
this by sholtiJrg,£ a. similar condition to hold for the Others when the 
One has be'en thus redefined.- A Universe is possible both as the 
One (as the All), and ,as the Others (the aggregate of its parts, the 
world of sensible particulars and whatever else belongs to 1 t. )·. 
Similarly hypothesis· v redefines ~at-Being as having as the bond of 
'ts non-existence the affirmation of its 'No't-Being - it is a some-
thing, and this someth,ing is the Different·. Fmnally, hypotheEts vii 
returns to the world of sense and describes what there would be everi 
in tne absence 'of any Un1 ty. It seems quite appro pr1ate· to me that · 
thls doctrine should bepput into the mouth of Pat·menides if, as ·I 
have interpreted it, Plato understands 1 t as a reformulated, c 
corrected Eleatic1sm. 
One might go even further and show that these four constructive 
hypotheses were intended by Plato to resolve the problem with which 
the dialogue opens., for if Parmenides wa1wrong. in saying that there 
1s nothing else besides the One, and what is not this One (Not-Being) 
is nothing a.t all, then it becomes unnecessary for Zeno to support 
this pos1 tion by x§Ht refuting the existence of the Many. Pla.to now 
shows that Zeno 1 s a;rgument against the Many, that the Many combines 
contrary attributest can be answe~6d. Hypothesis 11 sho~s that the 
very conception of the One as a whole of parts entails its 
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multiplicity, and hypothesis iii applies this to the Others - they 
too, Zeno•s Many, like the One, a.re both same and different, like 
and unlike, rest and move., etc. Hypothesis v shows tha.t even a 
! non-existent One cam be said to be like itself and unlike the Others,. 
to share in both Being and Not-Being, to rest(and move, and to be come 
emd yet not become. And fina~ly hypothesis vii shows that even 1n 
the absence of the One there is still the appearance of contrary 
chara.cteristics. As the conclusion to the dialogue, Parmenides 166C, 
puts it:nWhether the One is or is not, itself and the Others are and 
are not, seem and do not. seem, to be everything in every way both 
in respect of themselves and of one anot.her.n Thus, the combina.tion 
of contrary attributes in any entity is a. kno-..n fact, and so far from 
signifying self-centrad i ction is a J!lJfEif:rrocJ necessary resltl t of the 
constitution 'of the One as a whole of parts. 
The whole Trope, the:r;l, is an essential part of the dialogue, 
and. if it vvetat noffurther than this, that it corrects Parmm.ides and 
answers Zeno, it would have been worth the writing. But as 1 t belong9 
to Plato's L~:tter Period, one expects to find in 1 t more than suits 
its dramatic mise en scane exclusivel,. One expects to find in it 
some contribution tt or application to Plato's own tee.chings. In fa:ct 
one looks for an answer;i to Socra.tes' challenge to remove the paradoJ:) 
of contrary attributes to the realm of Ideas, and it is hardly 
sufficient to say that, juC as the One is necessarily many, so is 
every Idea also both one and many. One expects to find some hint as 
to the constitution of' Ideas and things as the explam .. tion of this 
combination in each of opposite attributes. In other words, we expect 
some ind:!ca.tion of' a modification of the Earlier Ideal Theory in the 
Trope. ·rhis question I propose to deal with 1n two parts, first:, the 
constitution of sens ibleb, second, the const.i tution of Ideas• 
The constitution of -sensibles seems to be reflected or perhaps 
foreshadowed in hypothesis vii, with which I she.11· begin. Its 
position in the Trope ~corresponding to the Others of hypothesis iii 
a.nd following after the investigat·. ion of the One tha . t IS NOT in v 
and vi, indicates that it deals with the world as revealed by our 
senses. The particula.r ¢aspect from which this is considered is that·. 
in which Plato deduces that it '1\Jould be in the absence of any syste-
matic unity. It is then revealed1 a.s seeming very small in itself but 
appearing large as compared with its subdiYisions, as limited as 
against another mass but when one tries to gra.sp any of its limits, 
preceding the beginning another beginning springs up, and after the 
end another end is still left over, and it moves with:. all possible 
motions and yet is sta.tdonary in every way, etc. It is, in fact, an 
indet ermina.te mass of· possible qualities ranged as continua from 
the infinitesimal to the inf1ni te degree of each. And a similar 
2 
analysis was given in hypothesis 111 : if we were to abstract from 
·l. See page 240-1 above. 2y{. See page 235 above. 
~·· 
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them in idea. the very smallest fra.ction, must not that least frac-
tion if it does not partake of the One be a multitude and not one? 
Hence, it seems to me that Plato now conceives the sensible world a.s 
constituted from a substrate of quali tat·, i ve continua by their deter-
mine. tion by means of a limi t:lng f're tor having the nature of unity. 
So Bl!7ommer1 end Cornford 2 have argued, naming this substrate the 
Unlimited. Whether they are correct in narn-4.ng this substrate the 
elememt 
Unlimited, which implies a connection with the pythagorean llimBm:t 
end perhaps with the later Unlimited of the Philebus, is something 
whic11\1 needs to be discussed below, but it seems inevitable, accord-
ing to the interpretation of the~ialogue here adopted, that Plato 
now constituted sensibles :'from a substrate as described and a. limit-
ing factor with the nature of unity. As we know the .. t this limiting 
factor of sensibles was the Ideas, each of which is not ii.!i!jY a 
unity but unique, I conclude that hypothesis vii testifies to the 
construction of sensibles from qualitative continua and an Idea., 
or at any rate it analyses existing sensibles into these two factorg. 
These two factors are put together, or at any ra.te seen in combina-
tion; inthypothesis iii, Vihithshows that the sensible worJd, the 
parts of th e One, must·. necessarily combine contro.ry attributes by 
reason of the very definition of the One a.s· a whole of parts in ii. 
We turn now to the question of the composition of Ideas. Of 
those crlics who accept a const,ructive purpose in the Trope, there 
are broadly tv'IO camps: those who interpret the One of hypotll; sis 11 
os an Idea, and those who believe Plato has here abandoned his 
earlier iMit~~m. ·As examples of the latt,er we might inst~mce Taylor4 
that the ascription ~~ tm One of perception in l55D shows that here 
is no dualism,and Stenze1, 5 that the radical separatton of two 
worlds has vanished. But such an inter pre tat ion runs counter to· all 
other evidence and rests entirely on the inability to explain how 
the One can be. a.n Idea and yet be an object of perception. This same 
difficulty ma.kes it Unacceptable the t the One should be a separate 
f rmer Idea,, the :rim• view alluded to, which is held for example by 
Tocco, 6 that multiplicity is introduced into the Ideal Sphere and 
that this modification explains Aristotle's evidence about Idea-
Numbers.B~i»tflfie, in ·'fact, is not the Idea of Ono nor the Idea. in 
A 
--general, but the Universe, as has been shown above. Nor is Co:tfnford•s 
interpretat'ion7 above criticism, although along these lines. He says 
that hypothesis 11 restores the possibility of the Pythagorean 
evolution of Many from the One: Limit and Unlim1 ted follo~mYti~iaii:!:Y 
afte:r_ the dofini illon, then comes the evolution of' Numbers; in 145AB 
1. Mnemosyne XI.1v.289. 2. Plato and Parmnnides 211,235,239. 
3. But Liebrucks. Pl~ons Entw1cklung zur Dialektik 241, andStenzel, 
Zahl und Gestalt 54, argue thot there is no material substrate, 
slhnce the Dyad is the IDEA of Other •. But how can an Idea be the 
'Dyad' as described in hypothesis vii? 4. Mind v.5o6. 
5. Plato's Method of Dialectic 147. 
6. Journal of Philology XXIII,l65. 7. Op. cit. 135-9, 145-7. 
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vva pass from Number to geometrical figure, and 145B-E gives the 
transition til physical body, as in the pythagorean evolution. But :tk 
the pythegoreans derived Numbem from the Llmi t and Unlimited, whereas 
in hypothesis ii they are derived from One, Being and Other, and the 
•Limit' and 'Unlimited' a.re not principles but- attributes of which 
no further use i~ made. 
To me there seem to be only two possible interpretations: e1the1 
the One is the Universe as object of thought and no reference at all 
is intended to the constitution of Idea.s, or the Ideas are included 
as some among the ps.rts of this Universe, aLong with sensible things 
and perhaps souls as the otre r ~x~_pa.rts. 1 favour the latter s1 nee 
this a.ccounts for the One being tho object both of knowledge and llf 
perception, both moving and resting. In this case, os every part 
of' the one is said to consist of the same two ultimate elements as 
the one itself, namely Unity end Being, the Ideas can be expected to 
con eli st of Unity and Being; but sensible s also must be similarly 
constituted, since Plato dra.ws no distinct ion between pa.rt and pe:rt. 
Non we have seen that hypothesis vii analyses sensibles into two 
factors, Unity and a substrate, and I believe that these represent 
the Unity and Being of hypothesis 11, the Being or substrate making 
possible the existence of sensibles, the Unity making them possi;.ble 
objects of opinion or perception - as single things. If this is so, 
then hypothesis 11 hints a.t there being tv.o factors also in Ideas, 
Unity by which they be come possible objects of knoY1lcdge, ani Being 
by which they exist as realities. But of the nature of this Being 
t: 
there is no further Jn<ft.' cation. Hov,ever, from this dual cons~tution 
are drawn the v4J'ious. pairs of contrary attributes, such as that. they 
are both one and many, which intaroduces multiplicity into the .Ideal 
Sphere as a necessary condition of its existence. '1'here is, then, 
-~'-- . · 1 contention 
some ,1-U'uth J.n Brommer• s r:emarxx: that Numbers y!.are generated ill 
hypothesis ii from Even, produced by One and Being, and from the 
Other implicit in their conjun.ction; but I think he errs in equat fr1 
the One and Being taken together wi thjSthe Grea.t and Small on the 
grounds that 1n l53A: the One is called t:he smallest number, and 
Being is Great: since all things come from it. This leaves no place 
for the One as t formal element', unless 1 t is taken tv1ice overt 
We can conclude, then, that the Pannen 1d6 s te stif'ie s to a Eri:f: 
crisis in Plato • s thought when he dis covered that his Ideas were 
open to grave objections. He felt that these difficulties arose frcm 
the current conception of Unity and Being along Eleatic lines, am 
undertook the task of doing Parmenides' wot'k over again.Ti')is brought1 
him to a new defihi tion of Unity and of Being, or rather of ·Not-
Being, whidh in turn led to a modified concept ion of the ultimete 
Wiiii~:s-the Ideas. But he seems at this point to have got no 
further than to analyse them into two factors- Unity and Being. 
1. Mnemosyde XI.iv.266. 
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;') Plato• s Later Dialogues. 
The Sopl1s~ The ostensible purpose of this dialogue is to define 
the sophljt, but as this attempt has led to the defini1on of the 
' l 
I sophist as soscerer a.nd mimic, this ra1s5 the question of' the 
1 
possibility .of appearance and untruth, 26he real purpose of the 
dialogue becomes a demonstration of the realitl oJ_Not-Be.ing; for 
/ Parmenides had said tha.t this would never be proved, that the real 
: is not. 3 For a.ppearance., as untruth, is unreal, a.nd, according to 
I 
i the Elea.tic postulate, Not~Being (the Unreal) is impossible, indeed 
in.ef:fable. 4 To speak, then, of the sophist as a sor¢cerer and f'a,lsi-
' fier leads to these difficulties, and forces the Stranger to attack 
. his 'fa.ther• ,parmenides, by saying that Not-Being IS a.nd Being IS 
I . 5 NOT. By mea.ns of this transition the dialogue turns awa.y from the 
def1n1 til on of the sophist to an inve~stigation of .Being and Not-Being 
commencing vtitb a review of the theories of plato's predecessors, 
Here the Eleatic One is attacked to t~is effect. 6 Parmmides 
says that the One alone exists. Then it must be Being. Then it has 
two names, namely One r:md Be.ing. But this is ridiculous if by hypo-
thesis there is only one entity, for if the name is difi'erent from 
the thing, there are two things, and if the name is the ;same a.s the 
thing, then it must be the na.rne of nothing, or, if of anything, then 
it must be the narn: e of a name and nothing more. 1 Again, 8 the Whole 
/ 
is either the same as the One Being or different. Parmenides 
de scribes the Whole as a;{.sphere,. whi cb :ta. s pa.rts, whereas the Truly 
One cannot have parts, i.e. the Whole cannot be the same as the One 
Being. But if 1 t is d1fferen~, either Being, ha.ving the accident of 
the One, is both One and a. Wh l B 1 i t Wh l t 11 f , o e, or e ng s no a o e a a .I 
it is both a One end a Whole~it is more than the One; but if it is 
not a Whole, it will be in w~.nt of itself since what is prOduced is 
always produced as a whole. 1Thus the Eleat,ic One is untebable. 
This argument against E:J:ea.ticism bears a relat;ion to the Pail"llle-
nides • 9Each of' the two a.rgtiments rests, for its effect, on the 
assumption that the One has tiP parts -thus, in 24413-D One and ~e1ng 
can only be two~ f«rr one thing, which is shown to be absurd, 
'· 1. Sophist 235A. , 2. Sophist 236E. 3. Sophistr_ 237A. 
4. Sophist 238A-C, cp. Jack~on, Journa.l of Philology XIV.l89, who 
points out that this conc;Lusion agrees with that of hypo the sis vi. 
5 .. Sophist 24lB-D. 6. Sophist 244B-D. 7. For the translation 
compare Cook Wilson, Cla.ssica.l Quarterly VII. 52-3. 
8. Sophist 244E-5D. 9. Jackson, op. c1 t. 193 and 216 note 1; 
Liebrucks, Pla.tons Entwicklung zuz· Dialektik 188-190; and lilornford, 
Plato's Theory of Knowledge 222, agree in seeing t.he same conclu-
sions here ss_ in hypothesis i, but Ross, Plato• s Theory of Ideas 
98 and 10 5, interprets it as showing that extreme Monism entails 
its oppostte as in hypothesis ii. But this hypothes1s,while assert-
ing that the All i& One Being and proving it is either a sphere or 
some other figure, as in Sophist, differs in this that such. a. One 
is defined as a Whole with Par·ts, whereas the Sophist, folloVvf;ng 
Parmenides, exp•essly denies this. As this· is the assu~ption of 
hypothesis 1, the connection must sti,rely be with that hypothesis 
rather than vd th the secondt 
----..!.---~~~- ----·-· --· -· 
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so is acted u,pon, there must be an Incorporeal that knows, that a:ets~ 
Hence "'Can we be persuaded that the Completely Real (7~ llavTf ~,;S' 3yl<. ~ 
does not share in motion and life and soul and thought,neither lives 
nor thinks, but remains motionless and w1~hout mind, solemn and holy'! 
This is clearly a. rejevtion of Parmenides1 conception of the One, 
the Universe, Plato asserting that just as the Materialists must 
a-dm:f.t the reality of Soul and of Forms, so the Idealists must admit 
the reality of Soul, so that Body, Soul ahd Forms constitute the 
whole of Reality, and Pa.rmenides1 solemn, motionless One must be 
replaced by a Reality which includes Soul, life and the possibility 
of knowledge. So in 249CD Plato sums up by saying that we cannot 
accept the conception of the All as Rest whether according to those 
asserting the One (Parmenides and his school) or according to those 
all!:serting many Forms (the Friends of Forms~;nor the _conception of 
the All as Motion according to the conception of those asserting 
Flux, but it must be both moving and unmoved. We have come, then, to 
plato'' s new theory of Being4, resembling the PC1Si tion of hypothesis 
- . 
11 of the Parmenides, that the Universe both moves a.nd rests, and the 
ontological basis of this conception is worked out in the following 
account of the K oc.. V'OV ,'' of Kinds, to which we now turn. 
5 . . . . 
Plato starts .by pointing out that Motion and Rest are contra-
ries and each exists,but that since both do not move and both do not 
west~ their existence, J;eing, must be a third something which 
accounts for~he existence of each_ Motion m .. d Rest without being 
either of them. Being, then, neither rests nor moves, but shares in 
both Rest and Motion. Now this analysis of Being, Res~ and Motion is 
clearly made from the preceding discussion of the histor&cal concep-
tions of Reality, where Motion characterised such conceptions as 
that of Heracl:tt.us, and Rest the noetal content of the Universe of 
,._,___.--.. 
Pa.rrnenides and of the Friends of .Forms. Hence, by Being Plato here 
means the sum total of Reality, the Universe, and by Motion he means 
the world of sense, perhaps including Soul, and bp_ Rest the world of 
Forms. The Universe, then, includes both sensibles and Forms, both 
Motion and Rest, which was in fact the conclusion reached .in the 
. 6 
second and third hypotheses of the Parmenides. 
. . 
~hat Plato indeed had the Parmenides in mind and intended the 
following account of K.r:>tVUJv/C(. to· be interpreted as a commentary on 
the conclusions of that dieJ.Qgue is shown by the next passage, 
Sophist 251AB:"Let us recall in what way we call the same thing at 
any time by many names.1 ••• We call a man by many names, specifying hif 
different colourings, shapes and sizes, his virtues and vices, in 
1. Sophist 248A-D. 2. Cp. Page 231 above. 3. Sophist 248E-9A. 
4. Compare Solmsen, Plato's Theology 80, that here Plato has glided 
over from one conception of Being - Ideas - to another - Commos. 
5. Sophist 250A-C. 6. See page 234 sub Hyp. iii. Compare Ross, 
· Plato's Theory of Ideas 242, that Rest • the Ideas, Motion = other 
things. 
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all of which cases and ten thousand others VIe not only say he i.s a. 
man but that he is good and an infinity of other things, and similar .. 
ly in the case of other things we call ea.ch of them many vri th many 
names ••••• But the late-learners assert it is impossible for the 
Many to be one or the One many ••• n With this compare Parmenides 
129D: 11 If one undertook to show that such things as stGnes. logs and 
the like were both one and many, not however that the One was many 
or the Many one, he would say nothing marvellous." Just as the Trope 
was intended to be the ansv;er to Socrates' challengll, to show that tt 
the world of Forms could share in contraries as well as the world of 
sense, so here in the Sophist the following account ofl(pty~y/~«. will 
counter the assertion of the Late-learners by giving the ground of 
the ab~li ty of the Ideas to share in contrary attributes. 
For this purpose l?lato picks out some of the widest Kinds to 
see how far they communicate, explicitly stating that he has no 
1 . 
intention of being exhaustive, but makes a chcme of Being and 
Not-Being so as to understand them better within the limits of the 
investigation, viz. to show that Not-Being in a way Is. 2 The first 
of these Kinds are, as has been already determined, Being, Motion, 
and Rest. Motion and Rest are shown to be exclusive but Being 
embraces them both. 3 As each term is the same with itself but diffe-
rent from all the others, we further require a fourth and a fifth 
. 4 Kind, Same and Other. This, then, is not only an example but also 
the explanation of the Ideal World's sharing in opposite attributes, 
for "We must agree th'at Motion is both the same and not the same. 
For whei!Il we say 1 t i's the same and not the same, we do not me an in 
the same way, but it is the same at one time by sharing in the Same, 
and at another time it is not the same by communicating Vl'ith the 
5 Other. u- Thus, ant Idea shares in opposite attributes in the same n. 
way as, in Parmen1des, Socrates had as'serted tha.t any thing shared 
in opposite attributes, by pa:rta.king in opposite Ideas, whether 
these be Likeness ·and Unlikeness or Same and Other. But let us pass 
on to· the crux of the problem,· Heing and Not-Being. 
Since Motion has been agreed to be other than Being, one could · 
say that Motion IS NOT, but yet 1 t IS since it shares in Being. Thus, 
of necessity NottBeing runs through Motion and through all the Kinds 
For the nature of Other in all cases makes each thing other than 
Being and so each IS NOT, a.nd ag~.in by sharing in Being each IS. 6 
and .tieing itself was said to be other than the other Kinds, and in 
when that respect IS NOT. Thus, we say 'Not-Being' we assert something 
that is not the contrary ~f Being but only what is other than Being~ 
But this is the opposite of what Parmenides ha.d said, and the quota-
8 . 
tion given in 237A is repeated here. "For we have shown not merely 
l. nLet l'lls select A FEW of those which a.re reck.tned to be the 
principal ,nes." 2. Sophist 254B-D. 3. Sophist 254D. 
4. Sophist 254D-5E. 5. Sophist 256AB. 6. Sophist 256DE. 
7. Sophist 257AB. 8. Sophist 258D. 
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that Not-Being IS, but in what its nature consists; for by shoV\Iing 
that the nature of the Other exists and is distributed over all 
existents, we have made bold to say that that part of each entity 
1 
opposed to Being is really Not-Being. 11 
The contradictions of sense, then, hold good also of the world 
of Ideas because the Ideas are not each by}Sthemselves but communi-
cate one with another so that each is the same as itself and is 
different from the others; and the ultimate ground of this differenct 
and of the nature .of Not-tleing (as when one says A is not B) is the 
nature of the Other. 
In hypothesis v of Parmenides, Being was shown to exist and. to 
he.ve as the bond of its existence the denial that it was Not-Being. 
So here we see that, as the same with itself, Being lxists, but by 
its sharing in the Other it is not Not-Being. Again, Not-Being did 
not exist but had as the bond of its non-existence its affirmation 
of its Not-Being. So in Sophist, Not-Being is different from Being, 
but is the same with itself as sharing in the Same. The Sophist, 
theQ, gives the all-pervasiveness of Same and Other as the ground of 
the existence of lje.ing and i.ts difference from Not-Being and the 
non-existence of Not-Being but its sameness with itself, as implied 
in hypothesis v of Pa.rmeni.des. Thus, the Other of the Sophist is not 
. 2 
the same thing as the Not-Being of the fifth hypothesis, but is its 
ontological ground. 3 Plato, however, while starting out f rom an 
investigation of the ontological meaning of Being has passe.d on to 
the sphere of logic, as is shown by two considerations. Firstly,; the 
main purpose of the dialogue is logical - to find the sophi.st by 
means of the Method of Di vis1~on - add that Plat~ bears this in mind 
is shown by the passage immediately 'preceding the l('ot.Y'...,.,.,'.-._ ~~V" 
ytY~v and anticipating it, 253DE, where the mark of the Dialecti-
cian is described as the ability to know which Kinds communicate and 
which do not. Secdndly, hav.ing arrived at the meaning of Not-jjeing, 
Plato immediately turns to apply it to opinion and discourse, 260B, 
in order to see if Falsehood is possible, and so to define the 
sophist, thus completing the task intitially undertaken.Hence, this 
analysis of Being .and Not-.Being was tntended by Plato first and 
foremost to serve in Dialectics, to have a logical application, .But 
this does not mean that 1 t has no ontological application at all. 
If for Plato truth la.y in an externally existent world of Ideas. and 
was discovered by Division, that Division of concepts would surely 
reflict a similar articulation ~n the hierarchy of Ideas, would be 
1. Sophist 258D:Fl. 2. So Tate, Classical Review LV .76, states that 
it is a kxJtXJ: hasty conjecture of Grote's that the Not-Being of 
hypothesis v • the Different (Other) of the Sophist. 
3. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato 46, Riddle of the Early 
Academy 54, denies that the schemata of Diaeresis portrayed a:ny 
relational arrangements in the world of Idea.s, each Idea wh:ther 
a 'genus' or a 'species1 being a dtstinct Ideal unit of indepen-
dent nature; Poss, Plato's Theory of Ideas 239-241, counters this. 
251/ 
groumdad, in fact, on objective relationships among the Ideas them-
selves. Hence, while it is not the main,perhaps not even a secondary 
purpose of' the Sophist to cast any light on the constitution of Idea.e 
and things, if, as has been argued, the analysis of Being and Not-
Being discussed above had any objective ground at all, it must bJ 
that very fact be a~i,¥i for the reconstruction of Plato's beliefs 
about the const1 tutio.n of the Real. 
The Elements of Ideas!.We have seen that in Parmenides sensibles 
were analysable into the Others of hypothesis vii., a mass of indefi-
nite qualitative continua, and a principle of unity there supposed 
to have been abstracted, a.nd which was doubtless the Idea having the 
same name in any particular case. Further, hypotheses ii and iii 
implied that the Ideas could be analysed correspondingly into a 
principle of unity and a subttrate called, there, Unity and Being 
respectively. But no further description was given of these prine 
ciples. Now the Sophist has been shown to bea.r a relationship to tre 
Parmenides. It refers.back to it specifically at 217C and implicitly 
at certain other points mentioned above, ahd serves in these respects 
to corroborate and elaborate its findings. It seems then justifiable 
to interpret the Parmenides, or rather pa.rts of it. whether or not 
Pla.to at the time of composition had worked out his new 'l"'beory of 
Ideas, as giving a provisional statement of an analysis of the 
structure of Ideas ·a.nd of things, as stated above, and tcytind in the 
Sophist further information in this respect. This information, 
however, does not take us far, and it is difficult to determine 
whether this is because Plato had not fully worked out the analysis 
but was feeling towa.rds a more complete statement., or whether, sihce 
the subject-matter of the Sophist'was ldgical rather than ontologi-
cal, and. the work wa,s a dialogue and not a systematic treatise, Pla1D 
did not feel himself bound to go beyond the strict limits of the 
subject in hen d. However that may be, this information, such as 1 t 
is, seems to be as follows. 
My interpretation depends for its effect on whether there are 
five or six Kinds in the Sophist. Plato numbers only up to five, and 
seems to im.ply that Not-Being and Other are synonymous. that Not-
Being is simply that part of Other opposed to ~eing. But I maintain 
that he held Not-Being to have been a sixth Kind, and led up to thiE 
conclusion by the long argument in 255E-6E, which I abbrevi.ate as 
follows:"F.irst (let us start with) Motion, that it is in all ways 
different from r•est. Therefore, it is not Rest •••• Again, Motion is 
different :from the Same, and therefore is not the Same; but it is 
the same by partaking of it ...... Motion is different ifrom the Other, 
just as it is other than the Same and Rest. Therefore, it is not the 
Other, and yet is other according to the same argument a.s before •••• 
May we then confidently a.ssert that Motion is dif.ferent from ~eing, 
and thus Motion really 1s not Being, and yet is being since it 
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it shares in Seing? Therefore, of necessity Not-Being IS, in respect 
of Motion and all the Kinds. n Plato's point seems to be that just 
as Same and Other are contraries, so Not-Being is a necessary sixth 
term (besides Motion and Rest) to serve as the contrary of Being. 
For Motion is here shown both to be and not to be the Same, Other, 
and Being. It is each becallse it partakes of each on account of the 
pervasive nature of these Kinds; it is not the Same beca.use it 
partakes of Other, 1 t is not the Other because it parte,kes of the 
Same, therefore, it is not Being because it partakes of Not-Being. 
Being, then, inasmuch as it partakes of the Same, is the same with 
itself, is Being; inasmuch as it partakes of the Other, is different 
from itself, is Not-Being. We have, then, as some of the all-perva-
sive Kinds ( there are doubtless otre rs1 ) the two pairs of contra~ 
ries, Same and Other, .Being and Not-Being • 
.Applying this to the analysis of the Idea in the Parmenides, 
we d1stlingu1sh as its factors Unity and Being, but Being is shown in 
hypothesis v to share in Not-Being, and the Sophist goes further by 
showing that this is because Being is pervaded by the pair, Same 
and Other. Hence, the Idea is consti.tuted b~ two factors, firstly 
Unity, secondly Same and Other, 13eing and Not-Being. But the Sophist 
is silent in respect of the composition of sensibles. F~r this we 
must turn to the Timaeus. 
1. Compare page 249, note 1, above. 
253/ 
. 1 
The Timaeu£_. :rne Receptacle is not Emnty Sna.c~. It is ofteh assumea 
that the Receptacle in the Tima.eus is Empty Space, and consequently 
that this dialogue makes no use of what is commonly called Matter, 
indeed that there is no room for Matter in tpe cosmology of the 
2 3 Timaeus. But, as Cornford points out, '"'Matter' appears sometimes 
as an indeterminate substance, sometimes as mere space. Elsewhere 
it seems to be reduced to a logical principle of Otherness or multi· 
plicitYu••" There is no denying that while the Receptacle is some-
times described as Space, it is also described a.s an indeterminate 
substance, and whereas it would. be foilll1sh to interpret the latter 
as .Matter in Aristotle's sense of the word - i.e. that which was 
this particular potentiality and which, having become 1 t actua.lly, 
' . 4 
is po¢tentially the contrary of its present detel~ination ~- it 
must therefore be denied that, if this description of the Receptaclt 
a.s an indeterminate substance 1 s really meant by Plato • G9N-1eo8. it 
is empty space; and if it is £illed space it is merely a question 
of vocabu::Bry whether it is to be called 1 Matter• or something else. 
'Ihe interpretation which I ha,ve adopted here is the oppos:t te of 
that of the critics cited: they accept the mention of the Receptacl1 
as Space as Plato's true meaning and ignore his other references to 
it as an indeterminate sub.stance; I take its description as an 
indeterminate substance as Plato• s true meaning and regard lt as 
only secondarily if not provisionally Space. For the Receptacle is 
described as Space only in Timaeus 52, and this in respect of a 
particular argument, wheeeas its other description as a.n indetermi-
nate substance is more frequent. Let us investigate this question. 
I 
The essence of my interpretation is that the Timaeus does not 
give an outright exposition of Pl~to's beliefs in the matter here 
discussed a.s distinct from his accounts of transmigration, physio-
logy,e,tc., but deduces prograssivsly ?...nd step by step what he 
believed was the truth of the matter. This expltins why the concep-
tion of Ideas at the openi~g of the discourse of Timaeus reflects 
Plato's earlier conception and not obviously that of the Pa .. rmenides 
or Sophist, a.nd this also places the description of the Receptacle 
as Spa.ce in its right perspective, as will be seen. This is hardly 
capable, however, of prot6f, since the speaker Timaeus never says as 
mueh, but it is in keeping with Plato's general method, 5 as is well 
exemplified in the Thea.etetus, where he investigates the nature of 
knowledge by starting ou~from the current supposition that it was 
1. So for example van der W1elen, Die Ideegetallen van Plato 104, 
1-/Cherniss, 'fhe Riddle of the Early Academy 22, Cornford, Plato's 
Cosmology 181, and other references cited in note 2 below. 
2. So van der Wielen, op. cit. 182 & 192; Burnet, Greek Philosophy 
343-4; Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus 323 & 380; 
Cherniss, op. cit. 23; Stenzel, Zahl und Gestalt 123. 
3. Cambridge Ancient History VI.ix.IV.329. 4. Cp. Cherniss, op. ci· 
22 cited i:Q note 1 above. 5. Shorey, What Plato Said 515t note 
ad Meno 86B:"Plato limits his dogmatic as~ertions to a minimum." 
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identical with sensatton, that is, he proves the higher nature of' 
knowledge not from the assumptions of his own Theory of Ideas but 
by leaving the Ideas out of account entirely. 
1 Timaeus• discourso, then, opens with nothing more than the 
assumption of Ideas and sei'lsibles, as is obvious from the5.r respec-
tive descriptions, which indeed imply t,he 'crude' position of the 
Republic2 : we must distinguish "That which 1-lways is and has no 
becoming ••• a.nd that which is always becoming and never is: that Y.Vttt 
which is apprehended by intelligence and reason is always in the 
same state, but that which is conceived by opinion wi tltl: the help of 
sensation and without reason is always in a process of becoming and 
perisl,!ing. and never really is.« The next step is to deduce tha.t 
conception of the Cause as ~emiurge or Creator which Plato had made 
use of in Republic X.597A, thus:''Now everything that becomes or is 
created must of necessity be created by some cause, for without a 
cause nothing can. be created •••• (And the world was) created, I 
reply, being visl ble and tangible and having a~ body and therefore 
sensible, and all sensible things ••• are in a process of creation 
and created! Now that which is created must of necessity be created 
by a cause.n 3 Plato, then, here starts out from the assumptions of 
the Republic - sensible things, in particular the world, are created 
by the Demiurge after the pattern of the Ideas. 
The argument then goes on to deduce the nature of the creative 
activity of the Dem.iurge from the assumption of his goodness., start-
ing, "God desired that all things should be.good and nothing bad, so 
\ ' 
far as this was attainable. Wherefore a.lso finding the whole visible 
\ 
sphere not at rest, but moving in an irregular and disorderly 
DISOBD'<'E HE WEOUGHX bFD~£R fa.shion, OUT OF IIDZKXJtEXl'lNE1:HHI£Xf:I~S0 ·'"" ' considering that this was 
was in every way better than the other ••• In f:m:eitmg framing the 
universe he put intelligence in soul', a.nd soul in body, that he 
might be the creator of a work which .was by nature the fairest and 
best." 4 The rest of the account of the works of Reason deals chief-
ly with the World-Soul, the four classes of living creatures, and 
Transmigration, with whicfu: we are not here concerned, and in 
respect of what might be called Physics, Plato ddes not sa.y much 
more than what was alrea.dy accepted by contemporary Greek ph1lo-
sophy,5 namely, that. the Universe, if corporeal, is also visible 
and tangible; to be visible, it must have Fire, to be tangible, 
Earth. As solid bodies require two means to be compacted, between 
Fire and Earth was placed Air and Wa:ter. 6 This goes no further than 
1. Timaeus 27D-8A (JovJett). 2. So Bury, Journal of Philology XXIIl. 
197. 3. Timaeus 28A-C.. 4. Timeeus 30AB. 5. Cp. Conacher, 
Philosophy XVIII.l01: 1'The early account shows the conventional 
Greek account of the transformation of elements as before Diakos-
mesis; but to give a scientific account, to make knowledge of 
sensibles possible, Plato sees the need ~o posit a third eidos,the 
Receptacle, into which and from Vihj.ch the appearances of sense 'PrE 
pass." 6. Timaeus 31B, 32B. 
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to supply a. teleologica.l expihana.tion of the 4ccepted four Roots. 
And after the Universe had been thtils brought to order, its shape 
was that of a sphere, having its extremes in every direction equi-
distant from the centre, the most perfect an.d most like itself of 
all f1gures, 1 recalling Parmenides' One, and one of the possible 
shapes deduced for the One Being in the Parmenides, hypothesis ii. 
Having reached this point, that lllf the assumption of two forms, 
Ideas and sensibles, implies a cause, the Demiurge, and that the 
work of the Demiurge was to bring order to disorder, ·as we have said 
Plato further develops his subject in these terms:"Thus far in what 
we have been saying, with small exceptions, the works of Intelli-
gence have been set forth; now we must place by the side of them 1n 
our discourse the thi~gs which come into being through Necessity •••• 
Wherefore we must return again and find another suitable beginning, 
as about the former matters, so also about these. To which end we 
must consjider the nature of Fire and Water and Air and Earth, such 
as they were prior to the creation of the heaven, and what was 
2 happening to them in this previous state." As the bulk of the rest 
of this second portion of the discourse is concerned with physics, 
with the sensible world and the four Rooys, it is to this that 
Plato particularly refers when he says that he will discuss the 
operations of Necessity, and as he says that this entails the 
consideration of the nature of the four Roots pr1o"t' to the creation 
of the heavens, he would seem t.o be returning to 30A, where the 
Demiurge is said to have found the whole visible sphere moving in 
an irregular and disorderly fashion, and out of disorder he wrought 
orderi. Such a state of affairs is in fact dealt with later on, but 
' 
before :Plato is able to explain this properly he requires another 
principle than those already assumed in the opening part of the 
discourse. There, in order to explain the works of Reason; besides 
Ideas and sensibles was re~uired a. Cause; here, in order to explain 
the works of Necessity, is required besides Ideas and sensibles a. 
third form. In his ovm words:"Then we made two classes, now a third 
must be revealed. The two sufficed for the former discussion: one, 
which we assumed, was a. pattern intelligible and always the same; 
and the second was only the imitation of the pattern,generated and 
visible. There is also a third kind, which we did not distinguish 
at the time, conceiving that the two would be enough. But now the 
argument seems to req~ire that we should set forth in words another 
kind ••• the Receptacle and Nurse of generation. n 3 This Receptacle, 
then, is required in order to explain the nature of things before 
Creation; it is not to be assumed but to be demonstrated, and 
after a preliminary warning, making use of the analogy of figures 
of gold, that Empedocles' Roots are not the umtimate principles 
that they were claimed to be, Plato goes on to deduce the requisite 
1. Timaeus 33BC. 2. Timaeus 47E-8B. 3. Tima.eus 48E-9A. 
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third class:"Wherefore also must we acknowledge that there is one 
kind of .Being which is always the same, uncreated and indestruct1.ble. 
•••• And there is another nature of the same name with it and like XD 
to it, perceived by sense, created and always in motion ••••• And 
there is a third nature, which is Space, and is eternal, and admits 
not of destruction, and provides a home for all created things:. • ••. 
which we beholding as in a. dream say of all existence that it of 
necessity must be in some place and occupy a space, but that which 
is neither in heaven nor earth has no existence ••• For an image, 
since the reality after which it is modelled does not belong to it, 
and it exists ever as the fmeeting shadow of some other, must be 
inferred to be in another, grasping existence in some way or other, 
1 
ot it would not be at all." That is, if we posit two kinds, Ideas 
and sensibles, and if sensibles are the copies of the Ideas, then 
since sensibles, as copies, can get no reality from the Ideas their 
patterns, they must find their reality in soiJlething else; and since 
we can visualise nothing as real which is in no place, .it must be 
Space in which sensibles find what reality they have. 
!lie Receptacle is Fi,lled Space. This is where the Receptacle is 
described as Space - as part of the argument for the necessity of a 
third form besides Ideas and sensibles, and a.s the argument follows 
the line of reasoning that sensibles, as copies of Ideas, must be 
copied IN something., 1 t is only natural that this third form .should 
be described as Space. But this does not mean that this is Plato·' s 
last word on the nature of the Receptacle. Space meant for theGreeks,~ 
at least after Empedocles' day, Not-Being, and Absolu'te Not-Being at 
that. Plato, it is true, had shown that Not-.Being had a. relative 
sense, the Other. This he described in hypothesis vii of the Parme-
nides, to Vihich ~e shall refer below. But Plato's Demiurge does not 
fashion the images of tlle Ideas in empty space, he does not create 
2 
something out of nothing: it has already been seen that he merely 
BRINGS ORDER TO DISORDER. And so Plato continues, a~most immediately 
after the passage 'quoted: "The Nurse of generation, moistened by 
water and enfla.med by fire and receiving the forms of earth and air, 
and experiencing all the affections which accompany these,presented 
a strange v·ariety of appearances. n3 And after giving a description 
of this in terms resembling the Vortex of the physical philosophers, 
he goes on to sa.y:nAt first they were all without reason a.nd. measure. 
but when the world began to get into order, Fire and Water a.nd Earth 
and Air had only certain faint traces of themselves and were alto.:. 
1. Tima.eus 52A-C. Ha.ckforth, Classical ~arterly XXXVIII.39, gives a 
translation which better brings out the force of the argument: 
nseeing that for a.n image, inasmuch as the very purpose for which 
it has come into existence is to present, not itself, but something 
else which it presents by way of continual motion, it is accord-
ingly appropriate that it should occur in something else, clinging 
in some sort to existence on pain of being nothing a.t a.ll." 
2. See quotation on page 254 above. 3. Timaeus 52DE. 
\ 
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gether such as everything might be expected to be in the absence of 
God: this I say wa.s their nature at that t.ime, and God fashioned 
1 them .by forms and numbers.n That is, prior to Creation, as in 30A, 
there was not Nothing, Empty Spa.ce, but an irregular and dir;orderly 
motion, a strange variety of appearances, certain faint traces of 
Fire and Earth,· etc., without reason and measure, Filled Space in 
fact, which disorder the Demiurge brought into order, fashllctning 
them by forms and numbers. What is meant by these forms and numbers 
we shall presently see, but f.irst let us turn back in the Timaeus to 
the passage skipped in the above resume. 
As an illustration, not of the spatiality of the Recepta.cle,but 
of the fact that the Receptacle alone is entitled to the designation 
of 'this' or 'that', whereas the so-called four Roots2 are not 'thid 
' 3 ' or that' but merely 'such', ~la.to supposes "a person to make all 
kinds of figures of gold and to be always transmuting one form into 
another - someone points to one of them t?...nd asks what it isl. By 
far the safest and truest ansV!er is, That is gold; and not to call 
the triangle or any other figure which is fommed in the gold tthese' 
as though they had existence, since they are in the process of 
change whi.il:e he is maki~g the assertion.n 4 From this is deduced that 
"the.natura.l recipJsnt of all impressions is stirred and informed 
by them and appears differently from time to time by reason of them. 
• . ; 5 
But the forms which enter into and go out of her are the likeness-
es of real existences modelled after their patterns in a. wonderful 
6 
and inexplicable manner, which we will herel.nafter investigate." 
Hence 1 the Feceptacle "is formless and free from the impress of any 
6f those shapes which it is hereafter to receive from without."? 
The passage concf.udes by returning to the true nature of the four 
Roots: "Fire is that part of her (the Receptacle's) nature which 
from time to time is_ enflamed, and Water is that which is moistened, 
and ••• the Mother substance becomes Earth and Air insofar as she 
receives the impressions of them. n8 The discourse then goes on to 
distinguish Ideas and Becoming_and the need for a third class in 
which the latter can appea.r a.s copies of the former. 
How can this be ~ description of ¢Empty Space? 'Ihe sole feature 
which might be taken as corroborating this is the formlessness of 
the Receptacle, but this formlessness seems to mean not total a.b:s:eRc 
absence of form but indeterminateness of form. Gold is hardly;{ a 
good example of Empty Spa.ce since it is substantmal. The triangle 
may be modelled IN the gold, but after all it is formed OUT OF the 
gold, and it is as a substance rather than Space that the gold can 
be said to be 'this'. True, the alternative designation of the 
1. Timaeus 53AB. 2. I use this term in order to avoid the more 
usual term 'elements', which I reserve forkhe constituents of any 
entity. 3. Tocrc. , 7o~'ro and -ro~.o,;ro¥ respectively. 
• , '~= , 4. Tima.eus 50AB. 5. Ct."'Jor'i' and E)ror"rC<. • 
6. Timaeus 50C. 7. Timaeus 50E. % ;Y. Timaeus 51B. 
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Receptacle as the Mother in Timaeus 51A has a purely spatial conno-
tation, but this is a metaphor which seems to have been used not so 
muc-h to point any special significance a.s to form part of the more 
elaborate metaphor of Mother, Father and Child in 50D. If we were to 
take it literally to col!7'roborate a spatial connotation, why should 
'Fa.ther• not be similarly pressed to argue that the Forms, thereby 
symbolised, h.a.ve that generative power bat ural to the sire? But; that 
1 the Receptacle is indeed Filled Space appears from the conclusion 
of this digression, 51B quoted above, lihere the Receptacle is 
de scribed as being variously and at various times enflamed and 
moistened, and appearing like, Earth;{and Air, which is just 'tlha.t 
disorderly appearance; those faint traces, which,Ccha.racterised the 
' 2 third,ffn~m prior to ·Creation. We have seen that the work of the 
Demiurge was to bring order into this disorder by means of forms and 
num~ers, and this was again hinted at in 50C as the 'wonderful and 
inexplicable manner' in which the likenesses of real existences, the 
1 I . 
fCC' I o Ytll:.. , enter into and go out of the Receptacle. The forward 
reference here can only refer to the composition of the Roots by 
means of triangles3 which is described and applied to Transmuta'tion 
in f~~£f· This account is too well known" to require repetition, and 
I shall simply state here that 1 t is obvious that the Forms and 
I I 
numbers of 53.8 and the fct:l-toV.,..._, of 50C are these triangles, which a.re 
put together to make up the four regular solids. Further, I believe 
1 t is wrong to say that Plato made no distinction between the 
geometrical solid, the tetrahedron~ and the phySical body, :b,ire, and 
so fot" the other Foots muteltis mutandis - a. view which is required 
by the interpretation of the Peceptacle as Empty Space - for this 
would mean that, for the pre-Cosmic Vortex and other similar descrlp-
tions of the Receptacle referred to above to have had any faint 
traces a,t all, any part enflamed or moistened, these tetrahedra and 
cubes, etc., would have had to be in the Receptacle before the Demi-
urge brought this disorder to ordet". But this ordering can be nothinE 
qxcept the application of the regular figures to the existing 
disorder in orlller to bring them into order. But if the Demiurge 
·brought order to the existing disorder by the introduction of these 
regular figures, by the introduction of forms and numbers as Plato 
1. Compare Frank, Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer 96:"Nothing 
remains of body except its empty space AND ITS OCCUPYING FORCEn; 
op. cit. 99:"0ur world is formed when the lawless motion filling 
eternal space is shaped by the motionless Ideas 11 ; M1lhaud, Les 
Geometres Philosophes de la Grece 292-3: Space with reservations, 
full space; Cornford, Plato and .Parmen ides 15: 11 Plato a.dds auali ties 
a~ existing in Chaos 11 ; Ritter, The .Essence of Plato's Phil;sophy 
266-7:"Filled Space or rather space-filling matter"; Robin, Platen 
234: 11This Receptacle is a sort of qualifiable space and its quali-
fications consist in configurations caused by the Ideas. To this 
first act is added a second act, organisation by ~hought, and this 
gives the Cosmos." 2. See pages 256-7 above. 3. Compare 
the mention of a triangle as one of the figures in the gold, 50AB. 
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plainly states, then some part at least of tpe sensible nature of 
Fire must have come fr0'1'II the pre-existing state of being enflamed m 
tetra.hedron. 
and only a part of that nature from its configuration as a. xzr%ra ,. 
I conclude, then, that in respect of the four Roots, Plato 
analyses sensibles into two elements, of vvhich: one is here called 
the Receptacle, and is described in 30A as a disorderly and irregu-
lar motion, has no natural form but appears differently from time 
to time in 50C, is enflamed and moistened etc. in 51B and 52D, with 
certain faint traces of the Roots at 53B, and is described in terms 
resembling the Vortex of the physical philosophers at 52E-3B. This 
seems to me to agree exactly with the description of the Others in 
Parmenides, hypothesis vi1, 1where Plato envisages the sensible wor» 
when the One is abstracted, except that there the qualities of the 
Others are not qualitaitive like the being enflamed and moistened of 
the Receptacle, but quantitative, in accordance with the .choice of 
contraries adopted in the ~~~~~i~: themselves doubtless borrowed 
from :C:.eno. There "each mass of them is infinite in multitlude, and 
even if one tries to grasp what seems smallest, as in a dream it 
suddenly seems many instea.d of one and exceedingly large instead of 
very small •.••• and moving with all possible motions yet stationary 
in every wa,y, and becoming and perishing, yet neither. 11 
But what is the other element in the Timaeus that brings order 
I ' 
- out of disorder, 30A, thetc~tot"'l"4. of 50C which are described as 
likenesses of real existences modellec after their pa.tterns, the 
! 
fmrns and numbers of 53B by which God fashioned the Roots? They are 
clearly the ~g¥r' regular figures built up from triangles, as 
described in 53Cff. These are not the unique Ideas of Tetrahedron 
etc • b . h ~Af , - . XRE:¥: ut copies t er\JGI# , since they are many. But this does not mean 
' ~· \ 2 3 they are the Mathernaticals,Tt& pt.,ttsv , as Mabbott, Adam, Foss in 
his earlier work, 4 and Field5 have sta.ted, since they are not -
perfect exemplifications of Ideas but only close approximations to 
6 I 
them, and none of our evidence sugges't;s that Mathematicals played 
any part in the generation of sensible~. 7 Hence, it is copies of 
the Ideas that act as the element of order in the disorder of the 
sensible qualities making up the Receptacle that givek)rise to the 
\, 
particular sensible existences - tetrahedra in the case of Fire, am 
mutatis mutandis. i¥~~~»:~Yii~x~~ix~~~fxi~l.Jti~:t~~~ijEt~li!I~·i~*~iigtER:i 
at 51B-E, Plato does not say, nor is it possible to surmise.However 
that rna.y be, these copies of the Ideas whi cf:l act as the limiting 
element in sensibles seem to be Plato's answer to the difficulty 
raised in Parmenides 131Aff, how the Idea could be in things, whethfJI 
by being divided or by being multiplied: it does neither, but its 
copies are present, one in each sensible particular, and these E!J~:tm 
1. Cp. Cornford, Plato & Pa.rmenides 240·; Fi tchie, Plato 116. 
2. Classical Quarterly XX.75. 3. Republic of Plato II.161. 
4. Aristotle's Metaphysics I.i& 168. 5. The Philosophy of Plato 
141. 6. Foss, Plato's Theory of Idea.s 224.. 7. ross, op. cit. 223. 
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copies, as copies of the Idea.., can be said to be each a un1 ty, such 
as the One which wa.s abstracted in hypothesis vii. S& far then a.s 
the constitution of sensibles is concerned, the Timaeus seems to me 
to agree perfectly with the Parmenides - concening the composition 
of Ideas, however, the Timaeus is silent. 
It might, however, be objected that this interpreta.tl!lon makes 
a copy of the Idea the formal element of sensibles, whereas Plato 
says it is the sensible 1 tself that is the copy of the .Idea. That is 
so, but there is a distinction. The sensible is such a. copy by virtuE 
of its formal e lament; this formalelem ent can only be such a. copy 
when it is imprinted in the Receptacle, when it becomes the sensible 
1 tself. As the Timaeus does not go into this and affords no exact 
terminology in this question, 1 t is inadvisable to take the matter 
further than this at the present juncture, but it will be shown on 
page 269 below what is the true nature of this formal element, and 
a terminology will be made use of there which will be borrowed from 
a statement in the Philebus in this connection • . But until the 
Philebus has been discussed, it would be premature to make use of 
its terminology, and so for the present I shall leave the matter as 
' , it stands - t}?.e ecu--1 oy'i'"~ or 1 forms and numbers' which act as formal 
elements are copies of the Ideas,- but with this proviso, that this 
is purely metaphorical, is provisional, an;d will be modified in due 
course. For the Timaeus does not go back to first principles:tti will 
not now speak of the first principle or prin~iplos of all th1ngs"1-
the Timaeus is only a 'likely account'. We can, then, go no further 
than this, that. hypothesis vii resihlves or aQalyses senGi~les into 
an element of unity and an element which can best be described as 
an a,ssemblage of quanti tat1 ve and (presumably' also) quali tat 1ve 
continua; that n the Timaeus describes the Creation of the world as 
the bringing of order into a disorderly and irregularly moving m.ass 
of indeterminate quali ta.ti ve appearances by means of what might be 
provisionally called copies of the various Ideas. 
Tha.t this interpretation t s something like the truth, better at 
any rate than the interpretation of the Receptacle as Space, appears 
from the third. a.pproa.ck, where after concluding the account of the 
role of Necessity, Plato returns to the po~nt where he had broken off 
the account of the works of Reason, first reca.pitulsting the earlier 
part of that account, at the same time incorpor$ling the conclusions 
of the account of Necessity: "As I said at first, when all things 
were in dfsorder God created in each thing in relation to itself;{¢\ 
and in all things in relation to each other, all the measures and 
har1jlon1es which they could possibly receive. For in those days 
nothing had any proportion except by accident ••••• And ,.f.these the 
-Creator first set in order and out of them he constructed the 
1. Timaeus 48C. 
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n
1 d th t k th k f th J" .... ior God•" i·n universe.... an en a. es up e wor o · e l..Wol .., 
respect particularly of man. 
Before leaving the Timaeus one might touch on two :QOints 2.!. 
resemblance betwe~n the_1imaeus and the~hist and Pa.rm~ide§..:. We 
ha.ve seen that the One of hypothesis 11, a. One Being that incl&des 
as real both Rest and Motion, is worked out as them:ry7f).ws oY of 
the Sophist. The latter not only includes the same Rest and Motion, 
but is shown to necessarily include Soul, to be in fact a f~o, .so 
------------ ~- . - --
in the Timaeus not only has Becoming some sort of reality in its liB 
own right over and above that of Being - by virtue i.n fa,ct of the 
reality of the Receptacle - but the Universe is a "f~oy ,has a 
World Soul. In the reality of sensibles and the existence of Soul~ 
of a Soul of the Universe, then, the Sophist a.nd Timaeus are a.greed 
and are to a. certain extent anticipa.ted by the Parmenide s. 
A second point of resemblance is the employment in the Timaeus 
of' the terms Being, Same and Other in the composition of the World 
Soul, whiclnt terms remind us of three of the Greatest Kinds of the 
2 Sophist. Ross, in fact, identifies the Being, Se.me and Other used 
in the composition of Soul with these Greatest Kinds of the Sophist: . 
. and more accurately Cherniss3 identif1g~t¥hese Kinds the IndivisibU 
A 
Being ,Same and Other, leaving Divisible~ Being, Same and Other to 
the phenomenal dispersion of these Kinds in Space. W:i.tb.out going 
into the very vexed question of the precise composi~ion of the 
4 World Soul, which. is not strictly relevant to our theme, we might 
quote Timaeus 35B:"When he had mingled them with the Essence and 
out of the three made one, he again divided this whole into as 
many portlions as was fittinSI each portion being a. compound of the 
Same, the Other and Being. 11 As Soul was made up from the salle 
. ~? 
constituents as the Ideas and a.pparently also of sensible s, so that 
it could know and perceive them, it would seem that, like Soul, 
both Ideas and sensibles were composed of Being, Same and Other. 
This analysis, however~ is not necessarily complete, so that it is 
possible to see here the same conception of the composition of 
Ideas as in the Sophist, 5 where Same, Other and Being are part of 
their constitution; and in the case of sensibles it may well be 
1. Timaeus 69B. 2. Plato's Theory of Ideas 130. 
3. The Riddle of the Early Academy 46. 
4. van der Wielen, Die Ideegetallen van Plato 159-160, is almost 
certainly wrong· in identifying Divisible, Indi visi1hle and Inter-
mediate Being w1 th Space, Ideas and 6opies resp. :Nor do I like 
Taylor• s version, A Commentary on Plato• s Timaeus 108-9, that the 
three elements are Inqivisible, Divisible and Intermediate Being, 
the former/two equallJng Same and Other respectively. Impressive 
interpretations are those of Cornfarrd, Plato's Cosmology 61, and 
Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas 121-3, that the 3 elements are an 
Intermediate form of Being, a.n Intermediate Same, an Intermediate 
Other,,iand that of Robin, . Platon 198-9, that they are Intermediate BeintY,~ ~arne and Other, the former two keeping, the latter excisin@ 
ct.J n I fJ' . 5. See page 2 52 above. 
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that Divisible Being masks some principle of mul tipl~, . since we 
. 
have de script ions of Being being cut up into an infinity of pa,rts 
( 
and being scattered everywhere b'th in hypothesis ii of the Parme-
nides1 and in the Sophist. 20f this, however, we have no ·further 
evidence, and indeed it is not at, all clea.r what relation this has, 
or the Same and Other have, to the Receptacle. This much, at least, 
is clear, that the Being of the Ideas - Indivisible - is different 
1n kind from that of sensibles - Divisible. 
A final point, in itself not of much significance, but showing 
that Plato was serious a.bout the connection of the Demiurge with 
the life on this earth, is an anticipation of this thought which 
runs through the Timaeus,in Sophist 265C, noticed by De Lacy 3 and 
Ross 4 :nsha.ll we say that all mortal creatures and also such plants 
as grow on the ground from seeds and roots, and such inanimate 
bodies as are both molten and unmelted within the earth, shall vve 
say that all these came into existence later, not h~ving been in 
\. 
existegce before, by any other means than a Demiur~c God? Or shall 
we accept the theory of the many that these were generated by some 
spontaneous cause and without design'?· •••• *' There is also a myth in 
. 
the Politicus where use is made of a Demiurgtc God, but as this is 
myth .1 t is saf.est not to make too much of 1 t. 
1. Parmenides 144B, where the key word is Kt:t7tt.ICCI(~/'jett' lcf1",...,.c_ 
2. Sophist 258DE, note the l<tt"rett<CKZ;4ftA. "!"c. ~jLE1Y#J s-. 
3. Classica,l Philology XXXIV.ll4. 4. Plato's Theory of Ideas 127. 
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!!!LPhilebus. The passage on Limit and Unlimited and the four-
fold classification of Being is really the only one in the Philebus 
which holds out the promise of finding the key to Plato's Later 
Theory of Ideas, if the dialogues are to supply this key at all. 
Yet it has been denied by Shorey1 and Ross2that the passage has any 
El!value in this connection. Thus the former says,nThere is no cause 
to take the fourfold classification of Being as a reconstruction of 
his entire philosophy, since 23B explicitly says it is to be used 
as an instrument for solv!flng the ethical problem," viz. whether 
Pleasure or Knowledge constitutes the good life, and .if neither, 
which shall occupy second place. Again, Ross, that 11.The passage is 
not meant to throw light on the Ideas •••• The doctrine of the four 
kinds is introduced to settle the priority of Reason or Plea.sure in 
the Mixed Life •••• There is no reference to Ideas.n I believe these 
critics are correct when they a.ssert that the doctrine is meant 
primarily to throw light on the ethical problem, but I disagree that 
this purpose is incompa.tible'witb any reference to the Ideas. I 
mean that while the classifica.tion referred to is mea::nt to be used 
as an instrument for solving the ethica·l problem, it is at the same 
time a classification of Being, of Realitij{es, and is seriously 
meant, and so must. incorporate part at least· of Plato's beliefs 
about Reality, unless with Ta.y:lor 3 and Raven 4 we deny that Ide as 
have any place in the classification because the whole doctrine is 
not Pls.tonic at all, bpt Pythagorean. 
But it is not Pythagoree.n; at least, while the bare skeleton 
is Pythagorean, the doctrine in its entirety, as given in the Phile-
bu'S, is Platonic, a Pla.tonic construction on a Pythagorean founda.-
5 . 
tion. So even Raven allows that the attribution of q~alitative 
chara.cter1st1cs to Limit and Unlimited, the using different propo~~ 
tions of these principles in different things, the making both 
opposites continua -hotter and colder - and the addit1lon of Mind 
6 
as a fourth class, are Platonic. Ross also grants that Plato has 
added Mixture and Cause to the Pythagorean Limit a.ild Unlimited, ·and 
by interpreting the Limit and Unlimited as genaral names for a 
whole family of limits and 1 un11miteds 1 he implicitly admits that 
the reconstruction goes even further. When, then, the very protago-
nists of the View ·that we cannot find a statement of any part of 
the Theory of Ideas in the fourfold classification of Being never-
theless allow that this is not so much a reproduction a.s a. reconetf 
struction of a Pythagorean theory, the fact that this doctrine is 
used as an instrument for solving an ethical problem must be with-
out prejudice to this doctrine's 1ncorpora,t1ng some part at least 
of Plato's own Theory of Ideas. That this is so, and what i't incor-
porates, we shall now attempt to demonstrate. 
1. What Plato Said t319. 2. Plato's Theory of Ideas 136-8. 
3. Plato the Man and his Work 416 note. 4. Pytha.goreans and 
· Eleatics 185-6. 5. Op. cit. 183-4. 6. Op. cit. 132. 
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Limit and Unlimi~. The immediate ethical problem is to shovv 
that Pleasure is not the Good because there are bad pleasures. That 
there are both good and bad plee.sures implies that Pleasure is many, 
and this leads to the ontologdcal problem how the Many can be one 
1 
and the One many. "Let us esta.blishtt, says Socrates, "this marvel-
2 lous principle, that One is many and Many one." Prota:rchus asks if 
he means that he, Protarlthus, is one and yet many as being great and 
small, etc., and Socrates repl1es: 3 "Those wonders are common 
property. What I mean is the Unity which is not the unity of things 
that come in~o being and perish, ••• but that Man is one, Ox is one, 
Good is one •••• We should first ask whether one must maintain the 
indivi.si ble . 
existence of such completely Jtxx~:s%11XIll . _units, and then how, if 
each is one and the same for ever, and admits of neither Becoming 
nor Perishing, it can be most surely one, and yet then be said to 
be either dispersed and pluralised arnongf{a.n 1nf1ni ty of things that 
·come into being, or present as a whole in them apart from itself, 4 
being one and the same at the same time in both one and many." 5 
There is a. very clear back-reference here to Parmenides 129A-B: 
"Do you not .think there is an Idea of' Likeness, itself by itself ••• 
in which both you and I part1c1.pe,te and the other things which we 
call many? •••• If that which is One Itself you showed to be many, or 
the Many one, I should be amazed •••• but if you showed me to be both 
one and many, saying •••• that one part of me is right and another 
left, etc.- for I a.dplit I share in multiplicity- but yet one •• by 
sharing in Man e.nd One, what won~er is that?" In the Pa.rmenides 
Socrates thinks ,1 t no marvel that he should be both one and many, 
but would be amaze,d if the One could be shown to be many or the Ma.ny 
one; i~ the Philebus he dismisses'lthe thought that he is both one 
and many as childishly obvious, ahd posits the real problem as how 
an Idea, Man, Ox or Good, can be .both one and. many. Thus, here, 
although the immediate problem is the ethical one of showing tha.t 
Pleasure is not the Good, 1 t depepds 'k 1 ts solution on the ontolo-
gical problem of showing that an Idea can be both one and many, for 
the proof that Pleasure is not the Good depends on just this, that 
Pleasure, being both one and many, can be both good and evil, and 
insofar as it is evil it cannot be the.Good. Hence, the auswer to 
1. Philebus 14C. 2. Philebus 14D. 3. Philebus 15AB. 
4. This is a further explicit reference tp Parmenides l31A-E, where 
Participation in the Ideas is shown to lead to the Idea being 
either dispersed or separated from itself, DIVIDED OR MULTIPLIED. 
5. I have here followed Ross1 translation, Plato• s Theory of Ideas 
131 with note, but Bury's reading, referred to in Hackforth's 
Plato's Examination of Pleasure 20 note 1, seems the best. It 
comes to much the same thing. Other discussions of the passage are 
given in Journal of Philology XXVII.229-230; Mind VI.34; Greek 
PhtUo sophy 326; and Hardie, A Study in Plato 82. 
6. Observed by Tocco, Journal of Philology XXIII.l65; Taylor, Mind 
VI.35; Ritchie, Plato 115; Robin, Platon 93-4; s·tenzel, Plato's 
Method of Dialectic 140; and Zahl und Gestalt 16; and Ross, 
Plato's Theory of Ideas 130-2. 
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be given to this problem of the One and the Many is an ontological 
one and, in its immediate context a.t least, refers to the One and 
the Many in the realm of Ideas - Man, Ox, Good, and, we may add, 
Pleasure •. And what is the solution offered of this problem of the 
One and the Many in the realm of Ideas? 
This solution is giveg 1n Philebus 16B-E:"There is no better 
road than that which I have a.lways loved, one easy to point out, 
difficult to folilow. I mean a gift of the gods to men, tossed down ••• 
through the agency of a Prometheus, whence the tradition is handed 
down that all things are sprung from One and Many,and have inherent 
in them Limit and Unlimited. We must thus always assume that there 
is in every case one Idea of everything and look for it, then for 
two or three, and treat each such unit in the same way until we see 
not only that the original unit is one and many and infinite,. but 
bow many 1 t is. And we must not apply infinity to plurality until Dl 
we have a view. Clf its· whole number between infinity and unity; only 
then may we let each untit pass on into infinity.u This clearly 
. l 
refers to the process of Division and the infinite number of 
particulars in the case of each Idea. The Genus is one, its species 
are a finite many, and the partic11l!lar instances afe infinite in 
multi tude,. One determines the limited plura.li ty 4tf' the Species by 
means of the process .of Division, of which Socrates had said in 
Phaedrus 266B that he was a great lover. The solution to the prob~ 
of the One and the Many, then, is that the ~enus is one, its Spec&es 
a.re a LIMITED Many, and its particula.r instances are UNLIMITED in 
multiplicity, this Limit and Unlimited being inherent 1n the nature 
of things. Its application to thel ethical problem is that while the 
Idea of Pleasure is one, it has Many Species and an Infinite multi-
tude of instances, so that it. is quite feasible that some pleasures 
be good and- others bad;. hence, as the latter case. shows, Pleasure 
. ; 
is not the Good. In this passage, then, Limit means no more than 
. , 
the limited number of the Species, the JA!f>-"'- , and Unlimited the 
unlimited multiplicity of part'icular instances. These are inherent 
in the na.ture of the Ideas: it is a. fact that the Uenus can be sub-
. divided ·into Species and is mirrored in 1 ts instances; that is all. 
An example is given of this in the case of Sounds, the point is made 
that Pleasure has many Species and Knowledge or Wisdom likewise, 
that the Good can really be neither of these since it is perfect 
and suffieient, but must. be a life which is a mixture of the two,or 
of the best parts thereof, and the problem to which Socrates then 
turns is to determine which is second-best - Pleasure or Wisdom -
if the Mixed Life 1s the best. 
c. 
The Fourfold Classification of Being. Socrates asserts that 1n 
order to solve this problem new weapons are necessary, and finds 
l. Cp$ Jackson, Journal of Philology X.277; XV.296; Schulhof, Jour~ 
of Philol::>gy XXVII I. 2; Stenzel, Plato 1 s Method of Dia1~t;!t1 c l4l & 
Zahl und Gestalt 13 and 18-19. 
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:these by returning to that gift of the gods mentioned earlier, that 
1 all things should have inherent in them Limit and Unlimited: "We said 
I 
: that the god revealed the Limit and Unlimited in things ••• Let;1us, 
1 
then, posit these two kinds and add as a third the Mixture of both ••• 
I 1 j But we seem to need also a fourth kind ••• the Cause of their Mixturet't 
i 
I This fourfold classification, it is true, is posited in order to 
i 
ideal with the ethical problem:"Which takes second place, Pleasure or 
f Wisdom, if the Mixed Life is the best?" But since a clear back-
1 reference has been made to the Limit and Unlimited, which have been 
1 shown to be mean.t ontologically, this classification also must have 
an ontological ground - Plato deals with the ethical problem by mea,ns· 
1 of a classification of real things. Nor, AT THIS STAGE, does the 
r Mixture mean the Mixed .Life, 2 for that would be begging the question. 
1 
Plato'fs argument here is similar to that in the Pha.edo 3 where, in 
1 order to prove the immortality of the soul, a division of reality is 
made into the visible and the formless. These kinds represent sen-
sibles and Ideas respectively, and only when the soul has been shown 
1 to belong t; the formless rather than to the visible can its priori-
ty be de,imonstrated. It is an argument from analogy .• So here the 
i Mi.xed Life, Pleasure and Wisdom ~iii analogically assigned to their 
respective places in the fourfold classifica ..tion in order to deter-
mine their pr,ority, but the classification and the relative positio.n 
of each kind must first be determined independently of the ethical 
problem. Plato does not make it quite clear in what order his four 
classes stand, except that the Cause is the highest and the Unlimited 
I 
the lowest. From its very name the Mixeq Life is assigned to the 
class of the Mixed, 4 (which is fJ: weaknes-~ in his scheme as this shoulo 
be the highest 'f Pleasure by reason of its nature is assigned to the 
class of the Unlimi ted,6and in virtue of its inseparable association 
with Soul, Mind is identified with the Cause, hence Wisdom likewise1 
This vindicates the claims of Wisdom as against Pleasure, and e:zpi.at.m 
explains why , in his examples of the Mixture, ·Plato confines himself 
to instances of tteasil; discernible works of Reason".f/Now such a 
procedure is meattlingless unless there was some independent basis for 
the classifica.tion. Our problem is to determine what this was: the 
sensible or the intelligible universe or both together. 
Since Plato refers back to the Limit and Unlimited of 16c, 9, it 
might seem that these terms have the same denotation in both places. 
But in 16C the Limit represented the limited number of Ideas as 
Species.in any one Genus, the Unlimited the infinity of particular 
1. Philebus 23CD. 2. Shorey, What Plato Said 320. 3. Phaedo 78C-
80C. 4. Philebus 27D. 5. Compare Hackforth ad loc. in Plato's 
Examination of Pleasure 52 note 1. 6. Philebus 27E. 
7. Philebus 30CD. 8. Hackforth, op. cit. 38, cp. van der Wielen, 
Die Ideegetallen van Plato 111-2. 9. In 23C and 24A. 
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instances, but this meaning hardly seems apposite in 23Cff since the 
Mixed Class could hardly consist of a mixture of Ideas and of 
sensibles, ~hicb is perhaps why Brommer1 says that the distinction' 
of One and Many in 16C is not the same as that in 23C-7C. As Limit 
and Unlimited are undoubtedly Pythagorean categories and were the 
elements of all things. it is natural to suppose that this is their 
meaning here - they are the elements fof which the Mixed Class is 
composed. In this case I would interpret the rela.tion between their 
meaning in 16C and that in 23Cff as that of effect to cause. The 
Limit as element is the cause of the limitedness of the number of 
Species in the Genus; the Unlimited as element is the ca.use of the 
unlimited multiplicity of sensibles. This implies that the Ideas 
are behind the Lim1 t of 23Cff, if not 1dentica.l theretith, and that 
some principle of mulitiplicity is included in if not identical with 
the Unlimited of 23Cff. A more precise determination depends on the 
analysis of the respective terms as defined by Plato in the course 
of this passage. We shall, then, turn to the definition of each 
class, except that the Cause, 2 whicb Plato clearly defibes in terms 
of Soul or Mind, lies outside our purview. 
The Class of the Mixed. This seems to mean the sensible world, 
0 r at any rate that part of it which is good and beauti.ful: 3 "If 
these two elements are unified, a third cl~ss is revealed - the 
class of the equa.l and double 4 and everything which puts an end to 
\ 
1. Mnemosyne XI.iv.281 n.3. 2. To interpret the Cause as the Ideas 
.is manifestly incorrect - Adam, The Republic of Plato II.l6l; 
Zeller, Plato and the Older Ac~.demy 266. 
3. Cp. Tima.eus 28A.: 11 When th.e Demiurge creates 1 t s form and power by 
constantly looking to~ards what is according to the Same, using 
1 t a.s a sort ,of pattern, it is necessarily beautiful:' 
4. The reading here is difficult\ I follow Fowler in the Loeb 
Edition, but Jowett reads :'"Whe'n the two are co,mbined a third will 
appear.- Wha.t do you mean by the class of .the Flnite?(71ot'4'vK•t ,7-;,r 
"Aift'5 ; )- The class of the equal and the double ••• " Fowler seems 
to me to be the more correct, but Jowett evidently wishes to refer 
the class of equa.l and double to the Limit as in 25A. Jackson, 
Journal of Philology X.269 note 1, achieves the same result by 
transposing two sentences and making other chan:ges, but this is not 
wa.rranted. by the manuscripts. TJfe only telling objection to the 
text as it stands is tha.t it says that the class of the Lim:it was 
not reduced to unity· as was that of the Unlimited, whereas examplas. 
were in fact given in 25A. But the text is correct: no attempt wa.s 
made there to give one designation to it, to "impress upon it to 
the best)tof our a.bili ty the seal of some single nature' It as was 
done_in the case of the Unlimited at 24E-5A by dubbing it the More 
and l..ess. On the other hand, the cfescription of the third class in 
25E as th~t nwhich puts an end to the differences between oppoe 
sites and makes them commensurable and harmonious by the introduc-
tion of number" seems to suit its further illustration as health, 
and es,.cially 26A:"The addition of these same elements creates a. 
limit and establishes the whole art of music i.n a.ll its perfec-
~ tion". I explain the attribution of Equal and Double to both 
classes thus: 1:1 and 2:1 of the Limit, when imposed c1n the 
Unlimited as the Unequal, gives rise to the Equal and the Double 
respectively - and 1:1 and iii 2:1 are the equal and the double. 
After all, in the case of numbers, the Limit and the Mixture would 
surely hav·e the same name, for what other name could there be for 
either except that of the number in question? 
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the differences between opposites and makes them commensurable and 
harmonious by the introduction of number. So :i.n the case of illness, 
1 the proper collbimation of these opposites produces health." Again, 
"In the case of the acute and grave, the quick and slow, which are 
unlimited, the addition of these same elements creates a limit and 
establishes the whole art of music. In the case of cold and hot 
weather, the introduction of these elementf; removes the excess and 
indefiniteness and creates a moderation and harmony, and thence all 
seasons arise and all the beauties of our world, by mixture of Unli-
2 
mited with Limit. I pass over countless other things, health, il:e: 
beauty, strength, virtues. " 3The choice of examples here seems to kxv1 
have been made in accordance with the provenance of the doctrihe,fr-CJP'1 
Pytha.goreanism, and this explains the emphasis on hanmony and music 
and the medical doctrines of the Sicilian school implicit in the 
paroper combin-tion of oppos1 tes to produce heal t.h. However, examp'l.es 
from Pythagoreanism notwithstanding, and the apparent- restriction of 
the Mixed Class to the harmonious part of the sensible world, 4 it 1s 
clearly the sensible and not any Ideal world that is asserted to be 
the Mixed Class. So Ross 5 points out, with references to the text, 
that the Mixed Class is Becoming, is generated, tha.t Plato is making 
an analysis of the present contents of the universe, and that the 
Ideas are elsewhere referred to as unmixed. His arguments seem to me 
6 to .be sound, and while a few comment®rs ,doubtless influenced by 
Aristotle, allow that Ideas are tacitly included in the class, the 
great majority7· cohcur in ~onfining the Mixture to sensibles. Hence, 
I conclude that the Mixed Class represents sensibles, and is 
analogically illustrated8 _by the harmonious, the well-mixed. 
~t_Ie Class of the Llmi t. Thi:s is characterised as !'all that. doeE 
not admit of Morea_y~ Less - firs't equality, then double, and anyth~ 
which is. a finite number or measure in relation to such a number or 
·9 
measure." The latter part of this sentence, a number or mea,sure 
standing in relation to another number or measure, clearly refers 
' 10 
to ratios, which is why inany commentators interpret the Limit as 
Ratio. But if the Mixtures were chosen analogica.lly, it is likely 
that the Limit also 1s only analogically meant, and this is the 
I ~ \ t , 
1. Philebus 25DE. 2 ;iwY 11fi4«r t'l'foY?"..,v • Hackforth, Plato's Examina*-
• ' J ljt tion of Pleasure 43,. points out that 17!/' .. rand-rq n~r- ~~ ui-J~ 
are used indifferently.. 3. Philebus 26AB. 4. tiee p. 66 n.7. 
5. Plato's Theory of Ideas 134. 6. Jackson, Journal of Philology 
XIII.34; Burnet, Greek Philosophy 331-2; Miiha.ud, Les Philosophes 
Ueom~tres de la Gr~ce 354; Robin, Platen 142. But van der Wielen, 
Die Ideegetallen van Plato 129 and 185, and Stewart, Plato's 
Doctrine of Ideas 99., would make the Mixture Ideas exclusively. 
7. De Lacy, Classical Philology XXXIV.llO; Dora Mason, Classical 
Quarterly III.l3-4; Cook Wilson, Classical Quarterly III.l25-6.; 
Brommer, M.nemosyne XI.iv.285 & 288; Cherniss, Riddle of the Early 
Academy 18; Grube, Plato's Thought 301; Hackforth, Plato's Emam1-
nation of Pleasure 37; Ritter, The Essence of Plato's Philosophy 
192. 8. Cp. Robin, Platon 156. 9. Philebus 25AB. 
lO.Ha.ckforth, op. c:i.t. 42-3; van der Wielen, op. cit. 110; R()ss, 
Artstotle's Metaphysics !.171, Plfltots Theory of Ideas 135. 
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more prabable~ ~hat n the constitution of sensi bles from the four 
1 
Roots mixed in certain ratios is characteristic of Empedocles, and 
2 
as recurring in the Tima.eus was perhaps of Pythagorean provenance. 
Hence, if we interpret the Mixture as sensibles in general, a.1though 
· the actual examples are confined to pat terms of health, music, etc., 
we must also interpret the Limit, although specifically no more than 
: ratios are menti®d, along similar broad lines, as the whole of that 
I class of which ratios are the most important examples. Hence, I do 
not think there is any warrant for confining the Limit to mathemati-
cal terms •. If ratios are specifically Pythagorean, then in Platonic 
language the Limit is number aa.d figure, 3 possibly in more generali-
' , sed terms, 1 image.s' of Ideas in general, corresponding to thefco-toY~ 
of the Timaeus. 4 The Limit, then, comprises various 'images' of the 
r:; 
Ideas and is one general name for the whole family of limits.~ But 
here we ca.n make use of a better terminology than that of "images of 
Ideas." In 15AB Socrates had asked how the Idea, when either divided 
or multiplied in Becoming, could yet be a unity, and the answer was 
g1.ven in l6~ff tha.t this was inherent in the composition of things 
from I.imi t and Unlimited. Applying th.is, we can say tha.t the Limit, 
I I i a.nd the f ~o-tor' ~ of the Tima.eus, are in fact the Ideas either 
divided ar 6 lilxE~HrB:em multiplied in wondrous wise. Hence, where we have used 
the expression 111mages of Ideas"above, we now substitute "Ideas 
either divided or multiplied". Behind the Limit, then, are the Idea~. 
The Class of the Unl1mited, 1 lt!},,C,~~acterised a.s "Hotter and 8 
colder",. and "to hotter and colder add drier and wetter, more and 
less, quicker and slower, greater and smaller.n9 Indeed, "all things 
appearing to become more or less, to a.dmi tj!the emphatic and gentle, 
and e:mcessi ve and the like, are in the class of the Unlimited. tt10 
Thus, the material element of the sensible world is an indefini te11 
assemblage of such opposites as hot and cold, dry and wet, etc., 
which characterise the world of sense. As Scb:dllhof12 and Ross13 put 
it, the Unlimited is multiform, is a genere.l name for a whole family 
1. Diels 21A78 & B96. 2. Timaeus 73E, 74CD. 
3. Conacher, Philosophy XVIII.l03: 11 (As in the 1!iima.eus) so in the 
Philebus the Limit has a mathematical cha.racter; n Robin, Platen 
155: "The Lim1 t introduces measure and number ••• into discontinuous 
qua:ilati ty. " 
4. Adam, The Republic of Plato II.l61, and Ste\tart, Plato's Doctr:ine 
of Ideas 100, take the Limit to be Intermediates, but then they 
Vlrongly interpret the Ca.use as Ideas. Grube, Plato's Thought 301-
302, points out that while the Intermediates m.aY be found along wit! 
Ideas under the Limit, Plato does not differentiate them here. 
5. So Pc:>ss, Plato's Theory of Ideas 132; Cp. Shorey, What Plato Said 
320, that rrlttt ~ is a i#eneralisation of the idea of Limit, whether 
of matter by form or of cha . os by a principle of order, etc. 
6. See page 260 above. 7. Ha.ckforth, op. cit. 41; Classical Philo-
logy XXXIV.lll note 19; M~nemasyne XI.iv.288. 8.Philebus 24AB. 
9. Ph1lebus 25C. 10. Philebus t 24E-5A. 11. Philebus 26CD, where 
t.he multit1lde of this class overwhelms Protarchus. 
12 •. Journal of Philology XXVIII.3. 13·. Poss, op. cit. 132. 
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of unlimiteds. Further, the force of the comparative dfgrem in each 
case - hotter and colder, etc. - seems to indi. cate that here continUI'II 
are in question, forming a continuous gradation from one opposite to 
1 
the other. In this sense the Unlimited is interpreted by Hackforth, 
Taylor, 2 Raven, 3 and others. 4 This not only agrees with Platots 
description of the Unlimited as quoted above, but with the descrtp-
tion of the material principle in the Parmenides and Timaeus. 
Before 
alternative 
and pe rha.ps 
comparing these, it will be as well to mention here an 
5 6 interpr~tation., which is sup;ported by Shorey, Stenzel, 
othars, 4 that the Unlimited is the indefinite infinity 
of particulars, the undetermined Many befere they are determined by 
the Idea. This is, perhaps, best explained in the arithmetical field 
. 7 
a.s the collection of all possible positive real numbers, the 
1ndefin1 te plurality of all unequal numbers ranging from 2 to 
1nfinity.8 The Limit determines which of these numbers is in 
question .. But it is difficult to see why the numbers so determined 
should be termed 'Mixed•; further, which perhaps comes to the same 
thing, is there really any difference between the Mixed and the 
Unlimited in this case? It could only be the thinking pro cess that 
could change undetennined particulars into determinate particulars, 
and is this change so great that one could class the former as Unli-
mited, the latter as Mixed? The sensibles are surely there, as sen-
sibles, even b·efore they become determinate, their qualities are the 
same before as they are aftert And if, as seems almost certain, there 
is a close connection betwe·en the. Cause of the PP,ilebus and the Demi-
urge of the Timaeus, how could the cause of such determinateilless, 
viz. a mere process of thought, b1e conceived, no matter how •mythi-
cally' , as Creation? By Cause Plato means something o bject1 ve - Soul 
0 r Mind - and not a thinking process; his Creation is an actual 
coming into being and not a mere change in awareness; the coming into 
being is meant as the appearance .of concrete particulars where before 
there was only chaos, tmd not a merely mental arrangement of things 
which existi~ as actual concrete particulars in the S8lJ!e form 
objectively both before .and after tile act of cognition. Let us 
summarise and then compare the doctrine of the Philebus wi th'.,those 
of the Pa.rmenides and Timaeus, so far as these dialogues go into the 
questions discussed in the Philebus.- for the Sophist has little 
that is directly relevant. 
1. Plato's Examination of Pleasure /J 42. 2. A Commentary <\n Plato's 
Timaeus 325. 3. Pythagorea.ns and Eleatics 183. 
4. Ross, Aristptle's Metaphysics 1.170-1 & 175-6, Plato's Theory of' 
Ideas 136-7 & 184, is so vague that I cannot decide whether he 
means qual! tati ve continua or undetermined particulars. So also 
ven der Wlelen, Die Ideegetallen van Plato 109, 116-7, 158, whom 
Ross apparently follows. 5. What Plato Said 326. 
6. Zahl und Gestalt 19, cpo Plato's Method of Dialectic 148. 
7. van der Wielen, op. cit. 116-7. 
B. Ross, Plato's Theory of¢Idea.s 203. 
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·"""<:~·\i)';'''flctve- seen that, in order to show that Pleasure could not be 
the Good be cause there a.re bad pleasures, 'Socrates• turns aside 
from the ethical question to the onto logical one, how the One can be 
many, not in the sensible world, but. how one Idea can be many. In 
the Parmenides this was shown to follow from the reformulation of 
the One a.s a whole of parts; in the Philebus this is said to be the 
result of the constitution of all things from two elements, .the 
Limit and the Unlimited. Because of this universal principle any 
generic Idea has many Species, limited in number, and the Idea has 
further a. mul;tiplicity of particular_instances, unlimited in number. 
This is made use of, the former to analyse the species of Pleasure 
and of Know1ihdge in order to separate out the better from the worse 
for use in the Good Ltife; the latter to show that many ·instances of 
.Pleasure can have no place at. all in the Good Life si~nce they are 
undesir~ble. But the principles of Limit and Unlimited are not elab~ 
rated further until 23Cff, where they are used to cla.ssify the four 
kinds of Being as a basis for determining whether Pleasure or 
Wisdom holds second place, the first being the Mixed Life itself. 
Here the sensible world of experience is analysed into three 
kinds: the elements Limit and Unlimited already referred to· and as 
a third kind the resultant mixture,. i.e. the sensible world itself. 
For a reason to be dealt with in the next chapter, which reason 
accoun,ts for the choice of Pythagorean nomepclature in. the case of 
the tvvo fundamenta.l elements;. viz. Lip~i t and Unlimited, Plato cites 
as his examples of the Limit and of the Mixture the sort of examples 
that might have been given by the Pythagoreans - ratios in the forme~~ 
case, hea.lth., music, weather, in the \latter. But sihce the Mixture 
is intended to i~~ii~it the sensiblJ world in general and not merel 
.... 
health, music, etc., the Limit can b~ interpreted as 'images' of 
i 
all the Ideas, and not merely those o'f Number and Figure. The Limit, 
,, 
then, is the 'images' of Ideas whicfu 'determine the Unlimited and so 
£ive rise to the sensible. world - the Mixture. The Unlimited itself 
I 
is described as the hotter and colder, weT.ter and drier~, etc., i.e. 
qua~j.tative continua. such as are revealed to the senses in the 
stabilised form in which they appear· 'a.s already' mixed' in the 
present universe. And the cause of the Mixture, the cause of the 
placing of the Limit in the Unlimited, is Soul or Mind. 
A descrlption of the material element of sensibles resembling 
that of the Unlimited in the Philebus appears also in hypothesis vii 
of the Parmenides, 1and a . .gain in the description of Chaos in the 
2 Timaeus, the former being the appearance of the universe with the 
One abstracted, 1. e. in the absence of a.ny prtnciple of unity, the 
latter being the appearance of the universe before Creation, i.e. i;n 
., , ... 
the absence of thefcu-t oY•' , the ordering principles. Similarly, 
1. So Brommer, Mnemosyne XI.1v.289; Cornford, Plato & Parmenides 156. 
2. Journal of .Philology XIII.l7; Ha.ckforth, Plato's Examination of 
Pleasure 40; Poss, Plato's Theory of Ideas 136-7. 
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)ust as the Lirni t is described in the Philebus in ma.thema.tical terms 
as ratios, which in Platonic terminology means the numbers and 
figures that are timages' of the Ideas of Number and Figure, and so 
of all such 'images' generally, so in the Timaeus it is number and 
figure particularly, illQ.Strated in the case of the four Roots by 
the four regular geometrical figures made up of triangles, and by 
T4 el~M dY~ generally, which doubtless refers to • images' Gf any 
Ideas, that the disorder of Chaos is brought into order. So even 
1 Shorey sees in the Limit a generalisation of the ideal. of limit, 
including that of Chaos by a principle of order, which seems to be 
an allusion to the Timaeus, and referring to the Timaeus Conacher2 
says that in the Philebus also the Limit has a mathematical charac-
ter, and effects the change of Process as a change of quantity -
from a sma.ller to a. greater degree of the quality. Finally Ross3 
compares the configuration of the world by means of shapes and num-
bers via triangles in the Timaeus to the numerical and metrical 
definiteness of the Limit in the Philebus. 
The identity of t~ Cau~ of the Philebus with the Demiurge ol 
the Timaeus is obvious4and is made explicit by Plato in Philebus 27S, 1• ~,' Gtj nJr-7"4. )'o4 ii 7"q, .[;?f'«OcJ;"fO;, , which is taken by Hackforth5 and 
3 . . . 
Ross as a back-reference to the Timae.us •. But even the Mixed Class 
6 
seems to have been anticipated in the des.cription of the constitu-
tion of thesoul in Tima.eus 35AB, where a third class of Being is 
formed ~y mixing the Indivisible with the Divisible Being.~? 
However that may be, the consti t.ution of sens1 ble s from two 
elements, one being qualitative comtinua, the hotter and colder, 
drier and wetter, etc., a. so.rt of pre:cosmic. chaos, the other being 
a. principle of order t of quanti tat.i ve defini teiless, effect~ d by 
'images' of the Ideas - which ma.y be ·.no more than to say that Plato 
can only explain the presence of the Idea. in the infinite multitude 
of' particulars by means of this metaphor - this constitution of 
sensi bl es is explici tlv given as s~ch tn the Philebus and the ·rimaeus 
and is implied in the Parmenides, and must the :refore have been pa,rt. 
of Plato's later doctrine. Let us, then, condlude this section by 
comparing the evidence of the dialogues with Aristotle's testimony 
in respect of the points made use of in Part I., Chapter 2, above • 
.. 
1. What Plato Said 320. 2. Philosophy XVIII.lOJ. 
3. Plato's Theory of Ideas 137. 4. See Classical Quarterly XXX. 4; 
Journal of Philology XIII.l6; Field, 'the Philosophy of Plato 129; 
Ritchie. Plato 135. 5. Plato's Examination of Pleasure 39. 
6. So 1n Classical Philology XXXIV.llO note 63. 
7. Hence the four classes of the Philebus - Limit, Mixture, Gause 
and Unlimited - correspond respectively to those of the T1maeus -
firstly Pattern and Copy, next, to a.ccount for the works of Reason 
the Demiurge, and finally, to account for the role of Necessity, 
the Receptacle. The Demiurge (Gause) puts the t..',.,o'y~ (Limit) int1 
the Receptacle (Unlimited) in order to ge:merate sensible copies 
of the Ide as ('.Che Mixed Gla.ss). 
"'-
-• ...r I. 
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r> A Comparison between Aristotle's Evidence ahd the Dialogues. 
Itte ChaBS!L_in Platonism. We havt~ seen1 that Aristotle's language in 
Metaphysics 1078b9-12 sha,ws that he understood Plato's Theory of 
Ideas to have undergone a change 1 this change being connected with 
the derivation of Ideas from the elements of Number, the One and the 
Great and Small. Now there is no evidence whatsoever in the dialogues 
that the Ideas were ever derived from juRt these two elementst the 
One and the Great and Small, but there are definite indications that 
Plato modified his Ideal Theory and that as the result of this modi-
fication, the Ideas, instead of being each isolated and indivisible, 
became or were conceived as capable of being divisible and intercom-
municable. For in the Parmenidas the Earlier Ideas, as expounded by 
'Socrates' , are cri ti c1 sed as inf!!:dequate. This criticism is devasta-
ting and is not refuted either in this dialogue ot elsewhere, so 
that the implication is that Plato was ready to abandon his earlier 
conception of the Ideas, which, as appears from Socrates' sta.temamt 
of faith in this dialogue, were characf=e'tfsed by their separateuess 
from the world of sense and their isolation one from the other -for 
he would be amazed if it could be shown that Likeness is u~like or 
that Unlikeness is like, that the One is many or that the Many is 
0 ne. But as their critic, 'Parmenides1 , 'insists that Ideas of some 
sort are necessary for thought, it cannot be supposed that Plato, 
while abandoning his earlier conception of Idea.s, abandoned Ideas 
altogether. As l?armenides says that Socrates is yet young and should 
exercise his mind; and .undertakes to give an example of the}5typa of 
dialectical exercise he has in mind, it is reasonable to suppose 
th~tt in this exercise.- the po--called Trope - a new conception of 
the Ideas .is to be revealed -VJhich will obviate Parrilenides' criticism 
and that these Ideas, by answering Socrates' challenge to show that 
the One can be many, will be characterised by sharing in contrarfil 
attributes. How such Ideas could share in these contracy attributes 
and whether this characteristic had any connection with the deriva-
tion of such Ideas from elements~ we shal.l leave over for the nnJm:ed 
moment, but clearly, if this ability to' share in contrary attributee 
is shown to depend on the derivation of Ideas from elements, whether 
o r: not it can be shown that ,the e lem en t s in question were those of 
Number, then Aristotle's evidence must be accepted, since silence 
in the dialogues is no proof that Plato did not hold any particular 
theory not mentioned there. For if Aristotle is corroborated 1:0 
this, that there was a change in Platonism and thl'l.t this change was 
connected with the derivation of Ideas from elements, the presump-
tion is, in the absence of any indication in the dialogues either 
for ar against, that he is correct also in this, that these elementf: 
were those of Number. 
1. See pages 66-67 above with page 125. 
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The R~Q!! for_ the Changs:_:.. Before discussing the new ~~~ption of 
the Ideas, let us go into the question of Plato 1 s moti\t~a.iion for 
--------- - ----thus reconstituting the Ideal Theory. Why did he find it necessary 
to derive the Idea~ from elements? Or, alternatively, why did he 
find it necessary to allow the Ideas to share in contrary predicates? 
One must distinguish between Plato's real reason and that advanced 
in the Parmenides, which may or may not have been his real reason. 
This dramatic reason was to account for the contradictions of sense. 
Socrates dismisses Zeno's disproof of the Many- of the world of 
sense - which assumes that no sensible can be real if it is at once 
both like and unlike, by arguing that to share in contrary attributes 
does not mean that the subject is unreal, since, if there are Ideas 
of Likeness and Unlikeness, there is no reason why any particular 
sensible should not partake of both Ideas, assuming it can partake 
of any one. Although Socrates' explanation is rejected by Parmenides, 
who by criticising Socrates' whole conception of the Ideas shows 
that the assumption is untenable that any particular can partake of 
any Idea whatsoever, the matter is thereby not dropped since the 
whole Trope turns on the effort to show that the One is both llke 
and unlike, both one and many, etc., which is summed up in 166C, that 
the One, whether it exists or not, is both one and many, and is 
neither, etc. Hence, it would seem that., since the deductions which 
justify this conclusion a.re not obviously fallacious, Plato really 
means that the One can share in contrary attributes without thereby 
forfeiting its reality. Indeed, in the case of sensibles, at least 
one feasible explanation .of this is given in the so-called Appendix, 
that sensibles can partake of opposites in temporal succession. But 
how this is also possible in the case of Ideas is not made clear. 
The possession of contrary attributes is deduced in hypotheses ii and 
iii from t!Je campo si tion of the One out of the parts, Unity and Being 
and since in the Philebus i.t is said to be a gift from the gods the.t 
all things are both one and mmay, one might say that the possession 
of contrary attributes follows from the constitution of things from 
two elements as something inherent in their nature. However that may 
be, it is both Ideas and sensibles that are included in the One, and 
as Socrates had challenged his respondent to show that the Ideas as 
well as sensibles could be characterised by contrary predicates, the 
conclusion 1 s implicit that in the Trope Plato ra.ises thE:l ¥ig~li:mm:of 
the One and the Many from the world of sense to that of Ideas. In 
other words, any explanation of the contrary attributes of sensibles 
requires a corresponding explana~ion of this problem in the Ideal 
world, and conversely the explanation of the One and the Many among 
the Ideas is what explains this problem in the sensible world. The 
dramatic reason, then, for any reconstitution of the Ideas would 
seem to have been the need to explain the contradictions of sense. 
But Aristotle had said that Plato 1 s moti vo.tion was to account for 
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the multiplicity of sensibles; at least, he says:"There are many 
causes which led them off into these explanations, and especially 
that •••• they thought all things would be one if one did not join 
issue~with and refute the saying of Parmenides •••• They thought it 
necessary to prove that that which. is not IS; for only thus - of 
that which is and something else - could the things that are be 
1 
composed if they are many." This may mean tha,t Plato sought an 
expla.na.tion either how things a.re many or how things exist at a~l. 
In the former sense there is a. certain resemblan.ce to the dramatic 
reason suggested above. Plato found it necessary to recast his Ideas 
in order to explain how things could be both one and many, could 
share in contrary attributes, be cause any valid explanation required 
the raising of the problem to the realm of Ideas - to explain how 
sensibles could be many, Plato had to explain how Ideas could be 
many. But this 1 s 1n the sense of sharing in contrary attributes, Gf 
being not merely both ·one and many, but also Of both like and unlike 
etc., whereas Aristotle seems to mean that Plato recast his Ideal 
Theory to explain the mul tipli ci.ty, if not simply the reality, of 
sensibles, which is not quite the same thing. 
But the dramatic reason adduced in the .Parmenides for the need 
to recast the Ideal Theory is not nec~ssa.rily Plato's real reason. 
What the real reason was must remain a matter for conjeCture, apart 
from what Aristotle says on the matter. One would· have thought, in 
view of the important part played by the method of Division in his 
later period, that his real reason for reconstructing the Ideal 
Theory was to explain how a generic Idea., like Animal, could be both 
Man and Horse, etc. - to;'{allow for and explain, in short, the inter-
communication (Koui~VY' ,'c.. ) of the Ideas. There is nothing like 
this in the Parmenides, but this problem ofl'(o&VWYI-.. is raised 
and at least partially solved in the Sophist, where there are defis 
' nite 1nd1cations of a connection or this~C"""'"".,'' with. the method 
of Division, but the locus cle.ssicus is the Philebus. Here the 
problem of the One and the Many 1s raised in terms suggesting the 
introduction to the Parmenides, and is likewise raised to the realm 
of the intelligible. It is not problem how an individual can be at 
once both one and many; the real problem is how Man or Ox, any Idea, 
can be both one and many, and the answer is given, that it i~n¥~ii!ib 
in. all things to be both one and many - the Idea a limited or number. 
ed many, sensible s a.n unlimited or infjjni te many. The f'o~er refers 
to the many species revea.led by the method of Division, so that 1 t 
seems justifiable to state that Plato concerned himself with the 
' 
problem: of the One and the Many, especially in the realm of Ideas, 
in order to give an ontolo.gica~ foundation to the method of Division. 
In the Philebus ,. then, we are on the track of Plato's real reason 
for recasting the Ideal Theory. Now in this dialogue the problem is 
1. Me.tsphysics 1089a.l-7, quoted on page 125 above. 
1T 
276/ 
raised in order- to prove that Pleasure is not the Good, and the 
immediate question is whether there can be MANY pleasures. Here we 
have· t.he reflection of Aristotle's alleged r-eason- in order to 
show that thi.ngs can be many, Plato derived them from Being and 
Not-Being, and since this Not-Being had first to be shown to exist 
1n some way or other, his whole Ideal Theory had to be recast. But 
surely Plato would not have done so merely to prove that pleasures 
e~ be manyt This particular point is pure~y ~i~ii~i~!1 • but it is 
a possibility that Plato's problem was simply to show ho~R any 
sensibles at a .. ll could be m?.ny. 
This is my solution. I base it on what Aristotle says, arguing 
that if he is right in so many points in this connection, such a.s 
the change in Platonism, the derivation of Ideas and things· from 
elements, and the demonstration of Not-being - which will be dealt 
with· presently,- he is right also in this, that Plato was led to· 
reconstitute his Ideal Theory in order to avoid things, sensible 
things, being one, i.e. to explain the multiplicity of sensibles. 
I accept Aristotle on this point specifically because, in this 
respect, his evidence is borne out by the Philebus. In other wards, 
I take the reason implied for a change in the conception of Ideas 
by what is said ad loc. in the Philebus as Plato's real reason, as 
it agrees with ~hat Aristotle says. The key is this: "What I mean is 
the Unity which is not the unity of things that come into being and 
perish •••• but that Man is one, Ox is one, Good is one ••• We should 
ask ••• how, if each is orie and the same for ever ••• it can be most 
surely one, and yet then be said to be e1ther dispersed and 
pluralised among an infinl ty of things that come into being, or 
present as a, whole in trem apart from itself •••• n1 That is, the real 
problem that is agitating Plato's mind is hov.> the unity of the Idea 
is compatible with its'pre·sence' in a multiplicity of particulars; 
The answer given is that· the solution is to be found in the inherent 
constitution of all things in Limit and Unlimited. Plato, then, 
recast his Ideal Theory by deriving all things from elements, the 
Limit and Unlimited, to use the Pythagorean terminology, in order 
to explain how the idea could remain a unity while it was divided 
or multiplied in the infinity of sensible particulars. This is just 
what Aristotle says from another approach: Plato derived sensibles 
from the Ideas (.Being) and Not-Being in order to account for their 
mul tiplic1 ty. 
One point remainfi before investigating this derivation of a.ll 
things from elements: the demonstrat.ion that Not-Being IS. This need 
not detain us long. It has, I think, been amply demonstrated that= 
in hypothesis v of the Parmenides and in the account of #O(YU.Jr/04. 
1n the Sophist, Plato shows, as against Parmenides, that Not-Being 
is not simply nothingness but is the contrary of Being, that it has 
1. Plillebus l5AB, quoted In page 264 above. 
/' 
) 
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as the bond of its non-existence the affirmation of its Not-Being 
and so can be a subject of discourse, in a word that it IS. 
The Deti'l!at±.,Q,n of Sensibles from Elements. We come nov. to the 
....... , 
question of the derivation of sensibles from Being and this Not-
Being, and more generally to that of the de ri vat ion of all things 
from elements. In the Parmenides, hypotheses ii and iii show that 
the One and the Others share in contrary predicates and are each 
one and yet.many, because the One consists of the parts, Unity and 
Being, and e.s ea.ch part and again each part of these parts ad infi-
nitum can be s:tmilarly subdivided into Unity and !eing, the implica-
tion is that the Idea and the sensible are each divisible into these 
two parts, Unity and Being. Now it is hypothesis vii that deals 
more partlbcularly with the composition of sensibles, and this sets 
out the condition of the Others in the complete absence of any 
systematic uni ~Y. But the denial of unity carries w 1 th 1 t the denial 
of Being, since where there is unity there is Being, so that to 
deny Unity of the Others means denying their Being likewise, and we 
1 
are le f't with Not-Being. This Not-Being is described inter alia 
thus: 11 And while it seems very small in itself, it appears many and 
large a.s compared with ea.ch of the many and smalll" - 1 t is in fact 
an assemblage of indef:i.ni te continua. This is Not-Being and this is 
one of the two elements out of which sensible things are composed, 
the other element being called Unity, which is not further described 
but is .pe.rfectly compatibihe lli.th this other element being the Idea. 2 
This principle is fur,Sther described in the Tima.eus as the 
Receptacle •. The Parmenides deduced the existence and characteristics 
of Not-Being from the logical side; the Timaeus ~pproaches the 
q~estion from the phySi.<cal side. If sensib~es are co pies of the fli:e. 
Ideas, there must be a tertium quid in which the copies are copied -
the Receptacle. But the· Creator did not produce something from 
nothing; 1He merely· ordered what was plleviously in disorder. Hence, 
this Receptacle was more than just Empty Space - 1 t was Filled 
Space, consisting of varictus qualitative continua which were ordered 
by the Creator by the imposition of 'forms and numbers' to give the 
Sosmos., and it is chare,cttristica.lly described3 thus:"The Nurse of 
generation, moistened. 0 e. and enflamed •••• and experiencing all •••• 
affections •••• , presented a strange variety of appearances.fi" The 
account differs from that of hypothesis vii only in its emphasis on 
qualitative appea.rance whereas the other deals rather with quanti ta.-
tive appearance; but the latter seems to be due to the particular 
1. See pages 240-1 above. 
2. If Plato means 'Uf)ity' literally, it is because he is dealing with 
the One particularly. Then any sensible UNIT would have as the 
cause of its unity the Idea of Oneness. If he means 1 t only analo-
gically, then since what especially cha:tacter1ses the Idea. is its 
unity, 'Unity' is pa.rticularly appropriate as the representat1 ve 
of the Idea in general. 
3, See pages 256-8 above. 
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r choice of a.ttributes determined by the mise en scene, i.e. Plato 
~ uses~ the concepts which form the stock-in-trade of JWno•s parad~es 
,J 
such as like and unlike, one and many, large and small. Such attri-
butes as hot and cold, wet &ld dry, which are implied by the 'mois-
tened and enflamed' etc. of the Timaeus would be quite out of place 
in the Parmenides. Apart from this reservation, the~, it is one and 
the same description of the material element of sensibles that 
appears in hypothesis vii and in the Timaeus. 
As for the description of the other element in the Timaeus as 
I ' ...._ 
'forms and numbers' ,ect?t o,..,,., triaB9les, etc., a.s Plato is here 
concerned not with the generation of all sensibles, but only with 
the four ·Roots, and his particu.lar intention was to explain their 
transmutation mathematically, I interpret these triangles as hatsing 
only this particlUlar reference, so that the formal element of 
sensibles in general would not be 'forms and numbers' specifically, 
but generally tha.t class of entities of w}ch these 'forms and 
numbers' are an example. The same argument applies to the Philebus, 
where the Limit is designated 1 ra.tios 1 (literally number : number 
and measure : measure) because the Mixed Class has been illustra.ted 
by such Pythagorean concepts as health, good weather and music, where 
no doubt the determining element was in the nature of a ratio. The 
resemblance between 'number : number' and •measure : measure/' in 
the Ph1lebus and 'forms {i.e. geometrical figures) and numbers' in 
the Timaeus is so close that it seems reasonable to equate them. 
These are interpreted in Philebus by the introduction to the whole 
pas Gage concerning Limit and Unlimited and the fourfold classifica-
tion of Being, where these elements are presented as the answer to 
the question, How can the Idea ·remain one and yet be 11 ther divided 
or multiplied in sensible r.ea.lities?1 The Limit, then, a.nd hence the 
I f}t:'-t ol"~' al'so, are thus, in general terms, the Idea as split up 
or as multiplied (Pla)oleaves this an open question) in Becoming. 
The formal element of sensibles, then, is the Idea as it appears in 
Becoming. As for the Unlimited, it too i.s described in terms similar 
to hypo the sis vii and to the Receptacle as the 'hotter and colder, 
the drier and watter', 2 i.e. as an assemblage of qual1tativg0~~¥¥iH 
Is Aristotle's Great and Small, which is the material element 
of sensibles, of a. simlla.r nature? Unfortunately, apart from his 
implication that the material element was a principle of mul tipliciii-; 
· ty, 3 Aristotle gi ve.s no description of 1 ts nature, but in Phyllics 
209bll-17 with 209b33-210a2 he draws a distinction between the 
Receptacle and Plato's material principle, which must be examined. 
This rea.ds: 11This is why Plato in the Timaeus says that Matter and 
Space are the same; for the •participant' and Space are identical. 
(It is true indeed that the account he gives there of the 'Partici-
pant' is different from what he sa.ys in his so-called 'unwritten 
1. See page 264 above. 2. See page 269 above. 3, Pages 107-9. 
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teaching'. Nevertheless, he did identify Place and Space.) •••••••• 
Plato, of course, if we may digress, ought to tell us why the forms 
and the numbers are not in Place, if 'what pa:rticipates' 1B Place -
whether what partic1pa.tes is the Great and the Small or the Matter, 
as he called 1 t in vvtri ting in the Timaeus." This has puzzled the 
commentators, and their difficulties turn about two points, the 
failure to distinguish the intelligible from the materi~:d Great and 
Small, and the failure to distinguish the description of' the Recep-
tacle as Space as purely provisional. Thus, in his earlier work, 
Ross1 says that Aristotle is here misunderstanding and misinter-
preting Plato, since the Great and Sma~l in Number can only be an 
indefinite plurality, while the material principle in the Timaeus 
2 is indeterminate Space. In his later work, Ross accepts a distinc-
tion between two kinds of Great and Small but ae!cuses Aristotle of 
confusing them: "Therefore Aristotle -vtas mistaken that, if Plato 
ca..lled the Great and Small in the genesis of Idea-Numbers the 
Participant, it was the same Participant as in the Timaeus. In the 
former case 1 t is indef.1n1 te plura.li ty, in the latter unlimited 
extension •••• Plato did not use the same Participant, but in one 
case indefinite plurality, in the other indefinite extension." But 
Aristotle does not, in my opinion, either sa.y or imply that the 
Grea.t and Small to which he refers was the· substrate of Idea-Numbers 
The difficulty vanishes if. the passage is read, understanding 
Aristof.le to refer to a Great and Small which is the material 
principle of sensi bles different from the substrate of Id.ea-Numbers 
in nature and in kind. 
l . 3 As for tl{le other d~fficulty, take for examp e van der Wielen: 
He says tha.t.Aristotle is correct that the Participant • Space, but 
there is no question of Mat-ter· in the Timaeus, and where Plato 
describes a. Matter - the Unlimited of· the Philebus - there is no 
question of Space. Hence, the identification of the Great and Small 
wlth Space is Aristotle 1 s deduc~ion and is incorrect. But Aristotle 
says notP.ing about the Great a~d Small being Space~ Milhaud4 is on 
the right lines: he sees that Plato held two different kinds of 
material element, for he ~ays: 11 Ar1stotle says that while the 
Participant is Space in the Timaeus this was not the true view. I 
beli.eve we h~ve two different views in Plato be cause ~hys1 cs is a 
different order of knowledge from Idea~s and so 1 ts language is 
different." Finally; Robin5 correctly interprets Space a.s Filled 
spacer~'. For finding a preliminary difficulty in equating the ReceJ?-
tacle wlth the Unlimited of the Phi)tbus, he points out that this 
Unlimited is quantitatively determined by the L1m1 t to give lie coming 
~-
and Aristotle says tha.t Plato called the same thing the Great and 
1. Aristotle's Metaphysics I .169 ·a.d 987b20 to 170. 
2. Platc:)'s Theory of Ideas 221-3. 3. Die Ideegeta.llen van Plato 
181-2 and 185-7. 4. Les Ph:tlosophes Geometres de la Grece 291-2. 
5. Platon 233-4. 
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Sma~l in his Oral Dtiscourses ahd¢ the Receptacle. in the T_lma.eus, thus 
the Receptacle is a sort of qualifiable Space. 
Remembering, then, that the Great and Small is one thing in the 
generation of sensible s and another in that of Idea-Numbers, and 
that the Receptacle is described as Space in the Timaeus only 
provisionally_ and is better described as Filled Spa.ce, Aristotle's 
comment becomes clear, and shOViS that he regarded the Receptacle as 
the Great and Small in sensibles. In the ~receding paragraph to our 
quotation Ar1sitotle says that in the case of magnitudes, when the 
form is abstracted, nothing but the Matter is left, which in this 
case is Place qu! Extension. NoVv Plato identified Place and Space, 
or rather, we should say, he failed to distinguish them. Hence, a.s 
Plato called the Participant Space in one passage, this is cl.ted as 
a corroboration of what Aristotle is maintaining, for he knows that 
the Participant is Matter and so deduces that Plato makes Matter and 
Space the same, which is what be had just said: Matter is Place qua: 
Extension. The argument, of course, is rather forced, and Aristotle 
qualifies it by granting that the accoupt given there, i.e. where 
the Particip~t is called Space, is different from what he taught 
orally, where the Participant wa.s Matter. And yet in other pa~sages 
of the Tima.eus, as we have seen, the Pa.rticipE!_nt is indeed Matter 
since it is Fi.lled Space. Aga.in, in the Tima.eus 'forms and numbers' 
enter into the Receptacle to order 1 t, and we have seen that these 
'forms and numbers' are the Idea.s,tspli t up or mul tiplted. Hence, 
Aristotle asks, why are :these Ideas not in Space if the Receptacle 
is Space - whether it ~s Empty or Filled Space here is rea.lly 
immaterial. This .is a topical hit, and I do not think Aristotle 
would have put much store by 1 t .• However that maJ be, in the last 
sentence quoted, Aristotle implies that the term 'Participant' was 
used in the Unwritten T~aching and w as there the Great and Small, 
and that while not called. this in the Timaeus 1 t was indeed Matter. 
The passage is not a mo~el of perspicu1 ty w1 th 1 ts in.d1scr1m1nate 
use of Place and Space, ,·nox is 1 ts logic beyond rep_roach since Plato 
expressly postulates Space as the IN WHICH Ideas can be copied, but 
Aristotle affects to place the Ideas in this Space, but it does 
testify to the essential ~denti ty of the Hecepta.cle with the Great 
and Small a.s the Matter of sensibles. 
Plato gives little indication that his material principle was 
a principle of multiplicity, but it is implicit in the Philebus, 
where the Unlimited is given as the ground of the infinite multipli-
city of sensible instances of the Idea. 1 As for Aristotle's examples 
in this connection, Gold, Ta.bles, etc., they have already been 
sufficiently discussed above. 2 
We turn now to the last point where there is some possibility 
1. See page 267 above. 2 •. Page 108-9. 
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of corroborating Aristotl~Ks evidence in question. This is ~ 
deriv~n of Ideas from element.2.:,. In the Parrnenides, hypothesis i 
deals with the Eleatic One witlrrout parts, which is· shown to be 
absurd, and the One is refo!lmtUlated in hypottmsis ii as a whole 
having parts. These parts are, in the first place, Unity and Being., 
and as the One there is the Universe it seems that both Ideas and 
sensibles are conceived as consisting of these two parts. In any 
case, it is reasona.ble to suppose that the One has a more general 
applica,tion, so that any Idea, as a One, will in any case be so 
constituted. Translated into more general terms, these parts are a 
principle of unity and a substrate (Being). Being is further analysed 
in the Sophist as including in itself Not-Being {since ti.eing both is 
and is not) by virtue of the presence in it of s~~e and Other, so 
that the substrate is complex. It consists of at least these two 
pairs, .laeing and Not-Being, Same and Other. Similarly in the passage 
concerning the' composition of the Soul in the Timaeus, as the soul 
is said to be ma.de from the same constituents as Ideas and sensibles, 
and is 1 tself composed of an intennediate type of Being, Same and 
Other, the presumption is that the Ideas and sensibles also are made 
out of Being, Same and Other, the Ideas from Indivisible and the 
sensibles from Divisi¢ble Being. That is, the substrate of Ideas is 
different from that of sensibles in being indivisible f1t~¥1filjJitl: 
(i.e. incorporeal), and consists of the pa.ir Same and Other, with 
~eing doubtless representing both Being and Not-13eing, just as the 
Being of }1ypothes1s ii_is elaborated in the Sophist into· being and 
Not-Being. No further evidence is given in the Philebus, except that, 
I ' 
since ALL things a.re said_ to be. composed of Limit and Unlimited, it 
is possible that, while the. actual analysis there undertaken applies 
only to the senstble world, . the Ideal world is a~ so tacitly a.ssumed 
to consist of these twq elements. The terminology used is Pythagorean 
but since in the actual ~nalysis of the sensible world the Limit 
appears to be a de1frmi:r:ting .element and the Unlimited a substrate, 
applying this to the Limit and the Unlimited in the Ideal world, one 
could say that the Limit is an alternative term for the principle of 
unity, the Unlimited for.the pairs Being and Not-Being, Same and¢ 
Other,lix for they function in these ways respectively. It is posElible 
that these two¢pairs do not exhaust the content of the substrate 
since the Sophist, where they are most fully elaborated, expressly 
states tha.t these are only a selection of the Greatest Kinds. 
Thus, the Ideas seem to have been composed of two elements, one 
being~ a principle of unity, the other a substrate consisting of suer 
pairs as Being and Not-Being, Same and Other. Further than this we 
cannot go, but it 1 s highly pro ba.ble that the principle of un1 ty was 
in fact the One, and the pa:!.rs cited might well have been subsumed 
under some more general :term, which, in (;)rder to embrace both Ideal 
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and sensible substrates, was termed the Great and Small. While in 
respect of the composition of Ideas it cannot be said that. the 
dia.logue s corroborate Aristotle, at least they reveal something 
which ·Was conceived along similar lines, and suggest a doctrine :wllf:h:ll 
which is compatt\ble with Aristotle's evidence. That the dialogues go 
no further than we have stated here is no argument that Plato li~i 
no further; there is another body of evidence, independent of' Aris-
totle, whicla will be investigated in the next section and which 
complemEnts the dialogues. But before turning to this, it may be 
useful to detail what ,!modern commen tat.ors have had to say about the 
relation between the metaphysics of the dialogues, especially of the 
Philebus, and the Theory of Idea-Numbers, as attested by Aristotle. 
The Views of Modern Commentator&. Shorey1 denies both t.hat 
there was any Doctrine of Idea-Numbers, that the relevant p~lssages 
in the Philebus mean a reconstruction of Plato's pijilosophy, and tH 
2 that they have any reference beyond ethics. Cherniss likewise 
denies that Plato held any Theory of Idea-Numbers and that the 
Sophist, Philebus and Timaeus mean that Ideas are made up from 
elements, but he seems to accept the composition of sensibles from 
Ideas and the Receptacle, from Limit and Unlimited, and argues that 
Aristotle erroneously extended this latter doctrine to include Ideas 
also. Brommer3 denies that the Limit and Unlimited of the Philebus 
hav~ antything to do with Aristotle's evidence of the One and the 
Great and Small as elements of Idea-Numbers, but finds the latter 
in the Unity and. l;eing of the Parmenides; the Limit and the Unlimit. 
ted are ~lements of sensibles onli and as such the latter can be 
equated with the Receptacle. 
On the other hand, many critics incline to the view that the 
_One and the Great and Small, if they appear or are hinted at any-
, . 
where in the dialogues, a.re most akin to the L1mi t and Unlimited of' 
4 . 
the Philebus. Thus, Ross says that the Philebus is the only dia-
logue where the doctrine of Idea-Numbers is foreshadowed: it gives 
no hint that the Great and Small unites with the One to give Ideas 
. nor that it unites with Ideas to give things, but the description mf 
of tb:e Unlimited is an anticipation of the Great and Small. Similat-
ly Hackforth 5 e.llows that the Limit and the Unlimited. show the said 
. 6 ' doctrine 1n the making. Elsewhere Ross goes even further and admit.$1 
that from the numerical nature of t~e Limit 1 t is but a step to the 
doctrine of Idea-Numbers. By this he means7 tha.t the Great ·and Small 
was taken over from the 'greater and smaller• of Philebus 25C -which 
is J)just \'Yhat Cherniss says Aristotle did in order to build up his 
. 8 
fanciful notion of Idea-Numberst However that may be, Ross sees in 
the Philebus a sort of halfway house to the doctrine of Idea-Numbers:· 
1. What Plato Said 316 ad Philebus 16C and 319. 
2. The Riddle of the Early Academy 19-20 etc. 3. Mnemosyne XI.iv. 
270-1. 4. Aristotle' s· Metaphyf:'tlcs !.170-1. 
5. Plato's Examination of Pleasure 40 note 2. 6. Op. cit. lxix. 
7. Plato's Theory of Ideas 135. 8. Op. cit. 184 and 203. 
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"Plato found Numbers presuppose the same two elements which in the 
Ph1lebus he had a.na.:t,ysed sensible phenomena into" and 11 In view of 
the un.doubted descent of the Great and Small from the More and Less 
1 
of the Phi~ebus ••• '1 Along the same lines is Milhaud, that the 
Philebus substitutes for the Pythagorean Unlimited Plato's More and 
Less; his Oral Teaching went further and substfltuted the Great and 
Small. 
Finally. there are the views which interpret the action of the. 
Limit and Unlimited; not a.s a p11ecursor of that of the One and the 
Great and Small, but ~milar thereto. 1,So Robin, 2 Ran der Wielen, 3 
4 5 . 6 Burnet, and Cornford, to which can be added Cook Wilson, that the 
One and the Dyad is an arithmetical translation of L1m1t and 
Unlimited. 
I conclude, th(m, that~ the dialogues give clear evidence 
corroborating Aristotle that sensiblespre derived from the Ideas 
and a substrate, vvhi ch has the nature of an a.ggregate of quali ta ti ve 
continua., suclll as hotter and colder, wetter and drier, etc., as 
appears from hypothesis vii, the Unlimtted and the Receptacle. 
There are plain ind:i cations tha.t this substrate is different from 
that of Ideas, such as the distinction between Divisible and 
Indivisible Being in the Timaeus. And that there are hints of the 
composition of Ideas from two elements, as in the Unity and Being 
of hypothesis 11 and the der1 vatt1on of ALL things from Limit and 
Unlim}~~d in the Ph1lebus. But there is really no sign whatever in 
the dialogues that this Being, this Unlimited, is a Great and Small 
in the case of Ideas as of sensibles, and even the mention of Being 
a.nd Not-Being, Same and Other in the Sophist and Timaeus does not 
really add very much. But the dialogues do not exhaust the sources 
of Platonism, apa.rt from Aris.to_t1e. There remains an importan.t body 
of evidence, in which, perhaps, more specific :e::x infollTilation can be 
gained as to the construction of Plato• s Ideas, and to this we now 
turn. 
1. Les Philosophes G~ometres de la Grece 357, cp. Ross., Aristotle's 
Metaphysics I.'/.1.'/.tJ lvii :nA further pha.se is the derivation of 
Ideal Numbers from the One and the Great and Small. 'rhe More and 
Less of the Philebus is an earlier form of this phase." 
2. Greek Thought 218. 3. Die Ideegeta.llen van Plato 169. 
4. Greek Philosophy 329. 5. ¢Plato and Pa.rmenides 236-240. 
6. Classical Review XVIII.254. 
284/ 
Section iii. Other Evidence Independent of Aristotle. 
We have seen what evidence there is in the dialogues of Plato for 
the Doctrine of. Idea-Numbers, as ascribed by ArisiJ~otle to Plato. We 
saw that there wa.s corroboratory evidence, but only up to a point/. 
Obviously, if Aristotle's ONLY source for Platonism was the dialogues 
then where his evidence differed from them or went far beyond them, 
(and it cannot be denied tha.t h.is evidence does go beyond anything 
tha'tt can be fairly deduced from the dialogues in several points) he 
must hav-e been. inv-enting or distorting. Hence, in order to corr~~ate 
Ar1.stcttle' s evidence, it ts essential to show that there was other 
evidence ~i~:ft~ili to him besides that of the dialogues, am such 
ev-idence is most obviously Plato's teaching in the Academy and what 
lectures he might have given to the public. The task of this section 
iS to determine whether Plato gave oral instruction in the Academy 
on which Aristotle could have drawn, am whether in the sole public 
lecture1which Plato 1~ known to have delivered, that on the.Good, 
he made statements on the Doctrine of Idea-Numbers which could have 
served as Aristotle's source. As our information on tre former head 
is negligible, it will have to suffice that it be proved that Plato 
delivered oral discourses in tre Academy .- this will show that 
Aristotle did have a source for Plo..to' s doctrines besi.des his 
dialogues, so that we should have a.n a priori case for the correct-
ness of his testimony. On the latter head, our information tis fuller 
and requires detailed examination. 
~ l Plato's !e.achi!!,8 in~~de~. Chern1ss2 ha.s alleged that 
Plato d1ci not teach in the Academy a.t all in the proper sense of the 
word; this notion has arisen on account of a. tendency to retroject 
,___...._____ 
the modern meaning of ~-acalllemy' to. Plato's Academia.. In actual fact, 
3 he continues, Plato did noit l~cture on the Doctrine .of Ideas at a.ll 
but formal instruction was limited to the Propaedeutics, especially 
geometry. He suppl.ied formal instruction in the ground work alone and 
left the knowledge of the Ideas to come from within the ~~nul itself. 
There is something to be sa:td for this view. Pha.edrus 27 5Df'f, which 
Robin4 thinks describes the metho'B of instruction favour¢ed in the 
Academy, deprecates the written word and allows 1 t to have value only 
"as memorials to be trea.sured against .the forgetfulness of old a.gen t 
and praises the method of the dialectician who, "finding a congenial 
soul, by the hepp of science sows a.nd plants therein words which are 
able to h:epp themselves." This, however, bears a striking resemblance 
to the Socratic method., and we cannot be sure that it is not;tput into 
the mouth of Socrates for purely¢drama.ti c reasons. On the other hand, 
the sentiment finds an echo in Epistle vii; to which we shall refer 
., ' 
pr~sently. But 1f Plato took part in such • Socra.t ic conversation~• 
in the Aca.demy, he might well, like Socrates before him, have put 
1. But see page 288 note 2 below. 2. The Piddle of the Early 
Academy 61. 3. Op.c it. 69-70 & 81-3. 4. Platon 12. 
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le~ding questions, which could naturally be taken as ex cathedra. 
1 Thus, while, as Jaeger says, the classic doctrines about the Ideas, 
etc., were be:f.ng constantly tested, defended and altered in. the 
Academy, and the lea,rners themselves took part in this, there is no. 
reason to suppose that Plato also did not take part in the discus-
sions and so express his own convictions on any question. All this 
is, however, guess work, sing_e the actual evidence we possess of the 
proceedings of the .. Acadamy(e9so slight that no certain concluSion 
can be drawn from it. 
2 We have a note by Simplicius, quoted by Field, that Plato used 
to set the problem to find the slmplest mathematical formula to 
account for the rno tion of the hea.venly bodies consistent with the 
facts. But this does not mean he always 'stood behind the scenes'. 
3 The comic poet, Epicrates, quoted by Jaeger and others, states: 
"For they marked off in nature end separated the genus of living 
creatures, the nature of trees, and the kinds of vegetables, and 
then examined of what kind among these was the cabbage." This see!JIS 
to indicate that one of the preoccupations of the school was Divisioilt 
I 
bcor.c~'f'O"tcr ,, and this is corroborated by Aristotle's De Generatione 
et Corruptione 330bl3 and De Part1bus Animalium 642bl0 and. the 
spurious Platonic Epistle xi11.360B, cited by Ross4 in a similar 
connection. These passages indicate that one at least of the studies 
undertaken at the Academy was research, if it can be so called, into 
the d1rv1s1on and classifj. cation of the various na,tural species, and 
that Plato took part in these investigations since the former quota-
tion from· Aristotle sta.tes that "We may compare what Plato does in 
'the bivisions': for he makes 'the middle' a. blend" and the latter 
mentions • the published dichotomies' as what Plato ·is alleged to 
be dispatching to his correspondent in the Epistle. If Plato could 
h~tve claimed some share of responsibility in this one department, 1 t 
is reasonable to suppose as against Chernj.ss that he made some 
positive contributions in others, such a~ in the Doctrine of Ideas. 
Hence, Ross 5 gives several arguments against Cherniss' v:iew and 
cites nine passaees from Aristotle in which it is probable that he 
is referring to sources for Platonism other than the dialogues. We 
have already rnent:i.oned two of these, and of the otfters tre most tell-
ing is Physics 209bll-17 with 209b33-210a2, which has already been 6 . 
quoted above. In the :fl!J.nnr former part of the passage Aristotle says 
that the account of the Pa.rt1ci pant given in the ONWFITTEN TEACHINGS 
was different from that given in the Timaeus; in the latter part, he 
implies that the Participant was the Great and Small in these 
Unwritten Teachings since this account is contrasted with that given 
l. Aristotle 14. 2. Plato and. his Contemporaries 39. 
3. Op. cit. 19 note 1. 4. Plato* s Theory of' Ideas 144-5. 
5. Op. cit. 142-7. 6. Pages 278-9. 
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"IN WRITING in the Timaeus", where it is Matter. This is good 
evidence that Plato did give scme sort of oral instruction and that 
whatever else he may have expounded, he at least spoke also of the 
Great and Small. If this does not refer to the Doctrine of Idea-
Numbers, it is something very much like it. And in this case, since 
Aristotle could not have drawn his evidence about Idea-Numbers and 
the Great and Small from the dialogues, but states in the passage 
from the Physics quoted that Plato called the Participant the Great 
and Small in his Unwritten Teachings, it is reasonable to conclude 
that his entire knowledge of Idea-Numbers was drawn from the same 
source- Plato's oral instruction, which may or may not incllude his 
Lecture on the Good to be discussed presently. 
Besides Aristotle's evidence, we have Plato himself in Epistle 
vii, which is generally accepted as genuine. 1 Pla.to tefers to 
lhony slus' claim to have made a written treatise on Plato' s philo so-
phy or some unspecified part thereof and denies the possibility of 
this., saying, 341C-E: 11 There does not exist nor will there ever exist 
any treatise of' mine dealing therevlith. For it does not at all admit 
of verbal expression like other stud61s, but. as a result of 
continued a.pplication to the subject 1 tself and communion therewith, 
it is brought to birth in the soul on a sudden, as light that is 
kindled by a leaping spark, and thereafter it nourishes itself. 
Jlotwi thstanding, of this much I am certain, that the best statement 
of these doctrines in writing or in speech would be my own statement 
' 
•••• But were I to undertake this task, it would not, as I think, 
pro~e a ~oo' thing for men, SAVE.FOR SOME FEW WHO ARE ABLE TO 
I 
DlbCIDVER THE TRUT't1 THEMSELVES WITH BUT LITTLE INSTRUCTION; for as to 
the rest, some 1 t would fill with a mistaken contempt, ard others 
' 
with overweening and empty aspiration~ 11 Of these rest, !socrates is 
meant by those whom it ~auld fill with an empty contempt, as has 
2 . 
bee:& pointed out by Post ; and obviously Dionysius is referred to 
1. Cherniss, Riddle of the Early Academy· 13, and Zeller, Plato and 
the Older Academy 2 note 1, doubt the genuineness of Eplistle vii,~':. 
and Richards, Classical Review XIV.337. and 340, rejects it, in 
spite of Cicero's reference thereto 1 be cause the tone is ":¢vs.in, 
egotistical and ineffective". There are¢, further, 'Certain resem-
blances betVteen parts of it and Phaedrus 276D, which could thus 
have served as a source ¢'for a would-be forger. On the other hand,. 
Ritter, Classical Revievv XXV.77 and XXVI.l2, while rejecting some 
of the Epistles and doubting others, accepts iii, vii and viii as 
genuine. Hackforth, Classical feview XXVIII.232, agr~es with this 
and argues on this basis against Harward, who regarded all except 
i~ as gel6uine, that he should also have rejected ii, since this is 
generally doubted to-day, Cla.ssical Review XLVI. 212. Burnet, 
Greek Philosophy 205-6, accepts all Plato's epistles of any 
importance as genuine, and so objects to Howald, who accepted onl) 
vi, vii and viii as authentic, that as this is half the corpus, 111 
is difficult to see how the other half could have got into tJ!be 
Academic edition of the 2nd century B.C., Classical Review XXXVII: 
28. As Foss, Plato's Theory of Ideas 139, accepts the le.tter as 
genuine, it is difficult to deny its authenticity. 
ft.. Classical Quarterly XXIV.ll5. 
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as those filled with overweening and empty a.spira.tton. ~ut our 
concern is with the few who are able to discover the truth themselvef 
with but 11 ttle instruction. These, Plato sa.ys, would beneftt 1i' he 
were to undertake the task of putting his doctrines in writing or in 
speech, but he implies they would not. require this - they are· capable. 
of discovering the truth themselves. Indeed, that is how the know-
ledge of the Ideas is come by - by continued application to and 
communion with the subject itself. But note that Plato allows that 
these choice spirits re-quire some instruction, albeit only a little. 
Plato is exaggerating when he denies altogether the possibility of 
any exposition at all, even an oral exposition, since his object is 
to castigate Dionysius' presumption. But he admits its possibility 
when he says, "Were I to undertake this task, 11 and that he had under-
taken this task to some extent at least is implied by his reseJrva-
tion, "with but little instructionn. For these choice spirits are 
doubtless the Academicians, a~while they were expecteo to discover 
the truth themselves, Plato, it seems, gave them SOME help. 
A similar conclusion may be drawn from Plato's \"'ords a. 11 ttle 
r1 this is lower down, 344Cr>:"Jnd :f:sxfk:Ix the reason why every serious man in 
dealing with really serious subjects carefully avoids writing, lest 
thereby he may possibly cast them a.s a prey to the envy and stupidity 
of' the public. In a. word, ••• whenever anyone sees a man's written 
composition· ••• these are not his serious works, if so be that the 
writer himself is serious.n Surely, with this emphasis on written 
works, it is possible to conclude tha.t,Plato did regard his UNWRITTEN 
instruction as the serlous !?art of his work~ At any rate, there is no 
denying .the fact that Plato gave at least one public mcture on the 
Good, which will be referred to next; why should he not, then, have 
also given oral instruction in the Acaqemy? And this would be the 
Unwrit'ten Teachings referred to by Aristotle in the Physics. 
11) Plato's Lecture on the Good. Aristotle, in his evidence on 
Idea-Numbers, may have drawn on Plato 1 s teachings in the Act:tdemy, or 
he ·may have drawn on the published texts, to which we shall refer, of 
plato's Lecture on the Good, or more probably on both. We have almost 
no information concerning t~e content of his Unwritten Teachings 
specifically, but there is a certain body of evidence drawn from the 
Lecture on the Good. Let us first examine the accounts given in our 
evidence of the Lecture and then the accounts given of the con.tents 
of this Lecture. 
mn our evidence, the account which is nearest 1n time to the 
1 2 . 
event is that of Aristoxenus, quoted by Zeller: '1Aristotle said of 
most of the audience that attended Plato's lectures on the Good, that 
they came, every one of them, in the conviction that they would get 
from the lectures some one or other of the things that the world 
1. Harm. Elen. 11.30-31. 2. Plato and the Older Academy 285 note 
165, translated by Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas 147-8. 
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calls good: riches or h.ea.lth or strength - in fine, some extraordina-
ry gift of fOrtune. But when they found that Plato's reasonings were 
of z.tk:e mathematics - numbers, geometry and astronomy ~-and to crown 
1 
all, to the effectYthat there is one Good, methinks their disenchant· 
ment wa.s complete. The result was that some of them sneered at the 
thing, while others vilified it." This extract sho~s that th1~ 
l 2. t Lecture, or rather lectures as Ross points out ad oc., was no so 
much concerned with ethics - the Good - as with, inter alia, NUMBERS, 
and, if we follow Ross' suggestion, 1 that the One is the Good. 
Of theY.later commentators, the only one who seems to have seen 
the De Bono, ·Aristotle's recorded notes of the Lecture or lectures. 
1£:. Alexander. 3 He is reported to have said: 4 11 Alexander says that 
according to Plato the principle of all things and of the Ideas 
themselves abe the One and the unlimited dyad, which he called the 
Great and Small, as Aristotle narrates in his account of the Lecture 
on the Good. One might corroborate this from Speusi;6ppus, Xenocrates, 
and the others who were present a .. t Plato's lecture • .For a.ll wrote 1 t 
down and preserved his opinion and they say he used these principles!' 
Here we see that Plato's pupils, who were present at the lectures. 
wrote down what was said, so that Aristotle's De Bono here referred 
to was a report of what Plato said. Thus, anything drawn from this 
book would presumably go back to Plato himself and be evidence 
independent both of Aristotle and of Plato's di,alogues. And here we 
have it that the principles of all things AND OF THE IDEAS THEMSEEVES 
were the One and the Great and Small, and this is the more valuable 
in that Alexander cla.imed that the same account, in this .. respect, as 
Arictotle's was to be found in the lecture notes of others who eere 
present, such as Speus1Jppus and Xenocrates. Of the notes of these two 
we have no further trace, but we have one more presumably independent 
record of this iecture. 
Simplticius quotes Porphyry, whose source was Dercyllides, 5thus: 
• 
11 The-Unlim.ited is both in sen~ible thl.ngs and in Ideas. For they. sey 
that Plato called the princip~es also of. sensibles the One and the 
inclefinite dyad. He said that the indefinite dyad, which he placed in 
intelligibles, was unliroi ted, and unlimited also the Grea.t and Small 
which he posited as principles; so he said in his lectures on the 
1. Milhaud, Les Phiiosophes GE!mm~tres de la Grece 194, translates 
"The Limit is identtcal with the Good, 11 ~ut 1 Cherniss, Hiddle of tre 
Early Aca.demy 1 note 2, points out tha.t7o Tttf'~~t~ is adverbial, 
and cannot mean this. Him Ross follows, Plato's Theory of Ideas 244 
but thinks that AriE:tox·eiius -should-rather have said "One is the 
Good 11 and not "1here is one Good." 
2. Cp. Hosst op. cit. 148:"There is no need to limit the unwritten 
teachine;s tha.t Aristotle knew to one course, but his knowledge 
seems mainly derived from that. I say 'course' rather than •lee-
. ture' because tha.t is what the references point to." This seems to 
be directed against Cherniss, op. cit. 2, that the De Bono was a 
lecture and not a. series of lectures. 
3·. Allan, Classical Feview LXV•N.s.l.28-29. cp. van flier Wielen, Die 
Idtregetallen van Plato 8 note 9. 4. Aristotle, fragment ft8 (Rose) 
5. Cherniss, op. cj'_ t.l2 note, who makes much of the 'enigmatic form' • 
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Good, which Aristotle and Heraclides and. Hestiaeus and other friends 
of Plato who were present wrote down verba,tim in the enigmatic form 
in which it was said. Porphyry wrote about these matters and prefes-
sed to explai.n them in his Commentary on the Phile bus, thus: •••• That 
is what Porphyry ,satld, following the words of the speech closely and 
professing to explain what was expounded in an enigmatic form in the 
Lecture on the Good. He said also that it accorded with what was 
written in the Philebus. And Alexa.nder also, in his Commentary on 
Plato1s .Lecture on the Good, agrees. Quoting what Alexander andJother 
1 ' 
of Plato's friends narrate, he wrote thlll.s ••••• " This rather fuller 
account indicates that among the audltence were friends of Plato, and 
that what was there said was said enigmatically, not that Aristotle 
or Dercyllides found 1 t enigmatical. Doubtless Plato deliberately 
gave his expos1 tion an enigmatical form in certain places because 1 t 
was not for the Many. His friends, I think, would haw~een able to 
understand. what was said, but when even what is familiar is delibe-
rately expOunded in riddles,, an.yone taking notes is practically 
obliged to take it down verbatim, leaving it to his leisure to inter-
pret the rlaning behind the enigmatic form. Simplicius doubts ,. 
Porphyry• s success in interPreting the verbatim account, which may 
very well be so, but as Simplicius himself never had access to the 
2 ' 
De Bono he was hardly in a position to judge. At any rate, Alexander 
arrived at the same conclusions as Porphyry, so that, despite 
Cherniss, the Lecture could not have been so very unintelligible 
after all. At all events, the a~ove.passage corroborates the previous 
one in that the principles of both sensibles and Ideas were the One 
and the Great and Small, which is an Unlimit,ied. It is implied in the 
earlier part of the quote that the indefi~i te dyad which Plato placel 
in intelligibles was different from the Unlimited from which sen-
siblespiare composed. ~urther, P9rphyry made out that this doctrine 
is to be found in tho Philebus •. This confirms firstly that Aristotle'S 
evidence in Metaphysics A.vi tha.t the elements of the Forms and of 
sensible s are the One ·and an indefinite dyad of the Grea.t and Small 
iS correct, viz. that it goes back to v;hat Plato said in his Lecture 
on the Good,. and secondly that the identification of the Unlimited of 
the Philebus with the Great and Small (at least that phase of 1 t 
which is in sensibles}, which we have made above was just4f'1ied. And 
that this doctrine wa.s in effect an identification of Ideas with 
Numbers in respect of their origin, which could not be established 
from the dialogues, seems to be borne out by these two parallel 
passages in Aristotle, fragment 28 (Posl :"In h1.s De Bono, Aristotle 
says that Fle.to posited the One and the dyad as the principles of 
NUMBERS and of all real things,"3 and "Alexander says that according 
to Plato the principles of all things .and. of the IDEAS themselves 
l. Simplicl.us in Phys.l04b in Aristot"le, fragment ~8 (Rose) 
2. See page 288 note 3 above. 3. Alexander in Ar.Met.42,22. 
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1 
are t~e One and the indefinite dyad." 
~-
iii) More Detailed Evidence on Plato's Doctrine of Id~-Numberp,:. 
On~ the previous page we quoted Simplicius, leaving a lacuna in 
respect of his record of "i\lhat PorJ2hY£il said about the Unlimited. 
This lacuna runs as follows: fiPla.to himself classes the more .and the 
lesspnd the exceedingly and the slie;htly as belonging to the class 
of the Unlimited. 2 For ~henever these are present, advancing in 
respect of intensification and relaxation, tha.t which shares in them 
do~s not come to a. stand and to a limit, but goes on to the indefi-
niteness of infinity. So it is with the grea-.. ter and the less. and 
3 
with the Great and the Small, which Plato uses as their equivalents. 
Let us take some limited magnitude, e.g. a cubit, and let it be 
bisected; if we left the one half cubit undivided, but divided the 
other and added it little by little to the undivided part, the cubit 
would have two parts, one diminishing and the other increasing, 
wibhout limit. For in dividing the cubit we should never come to an 
indivisible part, since the cubit is a continuum and a continuum is. 
divided into perpetually divisible parts. Such an unceasing process 
of cutting revaals a certain infinity enclosed within the cubit, ot' 
rather, more than one, the one advancing towards the Great a.nci the 
Smni: other iaullf. ttowards the Small. 114 
The meaning of this is clear ehough: the Great and the Small is 
a continuum, and is thus infinitely divisible and indefinitely 
extensile. The exact same example to illustrate such a continuum is 
used by Aristotle in· Physics 206b3-33, 5 and the question is whether 
Porphyry simply borrowed this illustration from the Physics, or 
whether both Aristotle and Porphyry were drawing· on an example 
actually used by Plato himself, ,possibly in the Lecture on the Good~ 
In either case, Porphyry's application of the example seems to be 
erroneous. The Small; certainly, is well enough illustrated as 
infinitely divisible: the limit of the series in questi.on is o. But 
since, on the other pole, the limit of the series is 1, how can this 
illustrate the Great? Aristotle ad loc. cites the example to show 
1. Simplicius in Phys.32B. 2. This clea.rly is a restatement by 
Porphyry of Philebus 24E-5A:"All things appearing to become more 
or less, to admit of the exceedingly and the slightly and excessive 
and the like, are in the Class of the Infinite." 
3. This is Porphyry's comment explaining why the More and the Less 
are classed with the Infinite. The 'ereater and the sma~lerl• is 
one of the terms used in Philebus 25C, the Great and Small is 
tak.en from the Lecture on the Good. Porphyry used this to show tme 
fundamantal agreement of the Philebus with the Lecture on the Good. 
As this is Porphyry's own comment, it need not go back to Plato-
probably it did not, as we shall argue presently. ·• 
4. Translated by Foss, Plato's Theory of Ideas 199-200. 
5. See page 103 above. 6. So van der \Vielen, Die Ideegeta.llen van 
Plato 121ff, uses the illustration as an image of the generation 
of Ideal Numbers., Brommer, Mnemosyne XI.iv.271 & 289, criticises 
this as a misapplication: how can the Unlimited be an ime,ge of 
the nature of Ideal Numbers? This criticism seems to me to be 
justified, a.nd yet Poss, Plato 1 s Theory of Ideas 199-201, commends 
VAn der Wielen in this matter. 
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the essential similarity between the infinite by addition and the 
infinite by division - the one is the inverse of the other. For this 
1 reason, Plato made the 1nf1nites two in number, and Aristotle's 
words here imply that the Great was what exceeded all limits, i.e. 
its limit is infinity. Thus, Porphyry misses the point - this 
example does not illustrate the Great and the Small, but only the 
Small. Nor has this example anything to do with the Philebus. Since 
. . l Aristotle criticises Plato's use of his two Infinites, saying that 
his smallest number wa.s the Monad and his greatest the Decad, in 
neither of which is the Infinite present, this example of infinity 
must illustrate the substrate of Ideal Numbers, if it illustrates 
any of Plato's elements at all. But the More and the Less, or the 
Greater and the Smaller, of the Philebus refers to the substrate of 
sensible things, not of Ideal Numbers. Hence, Porphyry's explana~ion 
is erroneous, whicl'w is perhaps why Simplicius, who was not impressed, 
2 
said, "professing to explain them." 
Thus, all I would accept of Porphyry's evidence in this matter 
amounts only to this: there is a resemblanee between what Plato 
wrote in the Philebus concerning the Unlimited as the matter of 
sensibles and what he said in his Lecture on the Good about the 
Great and the Small. In its r6le as substrate of Ideal Numbers, the 
Great and Small was an infinitely divisible continuum. '!'his adds no 
more to our knowledge than what could be gained from Philebus 24E-5A 
and Aristotie's Physics 206b3-33. 
~~ source independent of the Peripatetic tradition and at the 
same time very close, chronologically, to Plato, is Hermodoru~, one 
of· Plato's pupils and his biographer, who is quoted by S1mplicius: 3 
nWhen Aristotle says that Plato named Matter the Great and Small, 
one may add that Hermodorus said that Plato, positing Matter accord-
ing to the unlimited and the indefinite, made it out to be one of 
those things which receive the More and the Less, among which is 
also the Great and the Small. For ·Hermodorus said of Reals, Plato 
makes some absolute, like Man and 'Horse, others relative to some~­
thing else, of which some are contraries like good to evil, and 
others are relative, of which again some are limited and others 
indefinite. Be continues that all those things which a.re named like 
great to small have the More and the Less; for it is More to be 
greater and less indefinitely. In .this way also the broader and 
narrower, the heavier and lighter, and all things named thus, are 
thought to belong to the Unlimited. Things like the Equal and Rest 
and the Fit do not have the More and the Less, but their opposites 
do. For the Unequal is more than the unequal, the Moving. than what 
is moving, and the Unitt· than the unfit-, so that of these pairs all 
1. Physics 206b28-33. 2. ~ee page 289 above. 
3. Quoted by Zeller, Plato and the Older· Academy 242 note 47, and 
by van der Wielen, Die Ideegetallen van Plato 113-5. 
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terms except that of the element, the One (i.e. the Equal) receive 
the More and Less, and the unstable and shapeless and unlimited and 
Not-Being are named by negation of the One. It suits such a thing to 
have neither principle nor essence, but to be borne in a sort of 
indeterminateness." 
At first brush, what is here expounded seems to be a dichotomy 
l 11keJith1s, and so van der Wielen interprets it: 
' 
' Absolutes 
Reitls 
t 
' I Relative to something else 
t 
t 
' ' Contraries Relatives. 
------------------------------
' ' Limited Unlimited 
But I do not think so, for Hermodorus says that not only do things 
named lik_e great to small have the More and Less, but also the 
opposites of things like Equal and Rest. In other words, the More ano 
the Less comprise two classes, contraries relative to each other 
like Great and Small, and relatives which are unlimited like the 
2 Unequal a.nd the Moving. This leaves us with three cla.sses, of wh~ch 
one has two subdivisions, thus: 
A. Absolutes like Man and Horse; 
B. Limits like Good, Equal, Rest and Fit; 
C. Unlimiteds, which comprise a) Contraries like greater and smaller, 
,Sk11r bll7oader and narrower, heavier and lighter; and 
_b) Rela:tives which. are the opposites 
of the Limits of B, ·like Evi-l, J4Unequal, Motion, the Unfit .. , 
The last class, C, is said in the quote to have been Plato's Matter, 
! 
and subdivision a.) a.t least agree,s with the Unlimited of the Philebus 
Now both the things named like great to: small and such oppo s1 tes as 1 
the Unequal, etc,, have the More and the Less, which is thus a more 
general conception than either the Unequa.l or the Contraries, and in 
order to make a comparison with ·a scheme which will be given below, 
the above can be set out in the following form: 
(One) 
~ 
Equal, etc. Unequal, 
(=the Ll!!!!-t) .~ 
Absolutes ftelatfus . 
(Man, Horse) (Equal & Unequal) 
The More and the Less 
~(= the Unlimited) 
~· 
Contraries , 
(greater & smaller) 
I have placed *One' in brackets, because it is implied a.s a more 
dhoY~ general concept behind: .. the Equal by the parenthesis in the quote ~
1. Die Ideege tall en vati Plato 115-6. 2. Cp. Allan, Classical Review 
LXV.,_29:"A threefold division of Reality into independent entities, 
contraries and relational terms~'fi 
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This extract is not based on the Philebus, at least not exclu-
sively .• The terms 'evil' and 'motion' belong rather to the same 
sphere of thought as the disorderly motion and recalcitrant nature 
of NecetSi ty in the Timaeus - for the Philebus confines 1 ts expo si-
' tion to the pleasanter and more perfecyaspects of nature. We have 
something si.milar in a fragment· of Eudemus:1"Plato ca~ls the great 
and the small, the non-ex1stept and irregular and all things which 
through})these incline to the same place, Motion. But it seems 
a.bsurd to call this very thing Motion. For when Motion is present, 
that which is in it appears to move, but though Unequal or Irregu-
le,r exists, to insist tha.t it moves is ridiculous." The pair 
broadter and narrower, again, has a reference to plane su1·:f'aces that 
is not f.ound in any dialogue, but recalls Aristotle's evidence in 
2 
this respect. Lcstly, the term Unequal reminds us of much of 
Aristotle's testimony concerning the numerical side of Plato's Idea-
Numbers, where 1 t is often opposed to the Equal, sometimes to the 
one. Hence, we have here some part of .an exposition by Plato whlch 
goes beyond anything found in the di~logues and seems to unite in 
one doctrine strands of thought which are expounded from one limited 
a,spect in each the Philebus, Timaeus, ·and parts of the Oral Teaching 
But the quote is not a complete exposition, and further detail is 
. 
given by Sextus Emp,ti cfus. 
The relevant ,part of pextus EmEi1ricus3 runs as follows: 11 All 
.things were ,divided into three groups. 1) Absolutes like Man, Hors~, 
etc., ii) contraries like Go~d, Bad, etc., iti) relatives l.1ke 
Greater and Smaller, More and Les~.· The second was distinguished 
from the third group l:?Y two characteristics: a) the gene sis of one 
; • ' j t 
of the two contraries is the destruction of the other, while the 
destruction ~f one of two relativ1es is the destruction of the oth~r~ 
and b) there is a.lwa.ys a mean between two relatives, but never a 
\ 
mean between contraries. The One was treated as the generic nature 
of everything in the first group •. The Equal and Unequal were genera 
under which all contraries f~ll, ·e.g. ~est under Equal because it 
does not admit differences of degree, but Movement fell under the' 
Unequal because it admits of such differences. Relatives fell under 
the genus of Excess and Defe,!ct. But while th~ Equal and Unequal 
together formed the genus under wh~ch contraries fell, the Eq_ual 
itself fell under the genus of the· One (because the equality .of the 
One with itself is the primary ease of Equality),a.nd the Umequal 
fell under the heading of Excess and Defect. Finally Ex~ess and 
Defect involve two things of which one exceeds the other. Thus the 
One and the 1ndefin1 te dye"d emerged as the supreme principles. u 
1. Diels 35A23. 2. MetB..physics· 992al0-16 & 1085a.9-13. 
3. Cited and tr~nslated by Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas 185-7. 
4. This is just that distinction of Prior and Posterior mentioned cy 
Aristotle as Platonic in Metaphystcs :J_Ol9al (!.nd which Ross, op. 
cit. 145; takes as evidence for the Ora~ l:eachings, since this 
distihction is not found in the dialogpes. 
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This threefold division is essentially the same as that of 
Hcrmodorus, except for the termint\logy and the greater detail given 
by Sextus, whose account is, in fact, a more thorough-going analysis 
leading back to more uitimate principles than the former. This will 
1 
a,ppear at a glance from Ross' scheme, as follows:-
One Indefinite dyad. 
~ Exeess lnd Defent • 
. Equal Unequal~ 
Absolu es ~t~ 2 Relatives 
This goes beyond Hermodorus• evidence in several respects. The 
Absolutes are here led back, like the Equal or Limit t to the One. 
Excess and Defect or the More and the Less (=the Unlimited) is led 
back to the indefinite dyad. But before going on to attempt an 
interpretation of this account, we. must mention the evidence of 
Alexander. 
A third passage alongf;these lines is. that a.ssi~ned tff..lexa:ndf!.r 
in Aristotle fragment 31 (Rose):"Almost all things lead back to the 
principle, and the One and Plurality (lead back} from the ~election 
of contraries •••• as Aristotle has said in De Bono II ••• In some way 
all the contrlU!es lead ba.ck to the One and Plurality. n Here Plura-
lity replaces the indefinite dyad, ( whl ch I do not think wa.s Pla.to' s 
own term, but crept into the evidence·from the term used by .Xenocra-
tes, just as Plurality is the te:rm used by Speus~ippus), but the 
thought is the same - two ultimate !principles to which each of a 
pair of Contraries, inter alia, lead back, for Alexander is silent 
in respect of Absolutes and of Relatives. 
What does all this mean? The fact that Hermodorus uses the term 
Limit to designate the class of Equal, etc., and Unlimited for the 
class of More and Less or Excess and Defect, seems to indicate that 
he has the Philebus in mind. Here these terms represented the Ideas 
as formal elements of sensibles and 1the material substrate respec-
tively. In the Philebus, however, this material substrate, the 
Unlimited, is described in terms the.t suit only one of Herrriodorus 1 
two subdivisions of the Unlimited, the Great and the Small, to use 
one of his examples. But the other subdivision, Motion and Evil,etc~ 
' is hinted at in the Timaeus as the condition of the Receptacle prior 
to the formation of the Cosmos, and a more complete expostition of 
Platonism would doubtless include both classes under Matter or 
Excess and Defect. But Plato also dealt with the Ideal World, and 
Sextus shows that the formal element of Ideas, whether of such a 
nature as the Equal, which is itself the formal element of equal 
things, or of Absolute.s suclit as Natural Kinds, is the One, while the 
1. Plato's Theory of Ideas 186. 2. The terminology here is diffe-
rebt from that used in the previous evidence, where Relative is 
divided into Equal and Unequal as Contraries are here. 
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material substrate is whown to be a sub-type of a more gene1·al 
principle, an indefinite dy.ad, whicn.t is not said to be the substrate 
of the Ideas, but ma.y well be, and is commonly testified to as such 
by Aristotle. The fact that Alexander calls th'tls Plurality seems to 
corroborate our contention that these ultimate princip:il:es, the One 
and the indefinite dyad or Plurality, were the elements of Number, 
so that by reason of their derivation from these same elements Ideas 
are Numbers. 
We now turn to, a different group of evidence, commencing with 
1 that of !!?;eophras~§.: nMost people go to a certain point and then 
stop, as do those who set up the One and the indefinite dyad; for 
after Numbers and Planes and Solids they leave out almost everything 
else, except to the extent of jusit touching on them and making this 
much plain, that some things proceed from the indefinite dyad, e.g. 
place, the void, and the infinite, and others from Numbers and the 
One, e.g. soul and certain other things •••• but of the heavens and 
the remaining things in the universe they make no further mention; 
and similarly the school of Speusippus does not do so, nor does any 
of the otller philosophers except Xenocrates; for he does somehow 
assign to everything its place in the universe, alike objects of 
sense, objects of. reason or mathematical objects, and, divine things 
as well ••• Plato in reducing things to the ru.ling principles might 
seem to be treating of the other things in linking them up with the 
Ideas, and these wi tb the Numbers, and inpproceeding from the Numb en: 
to the ruling principles, and then following the order of genera.tion 
\ 
as far as the things that we have named." 
\ 2 This passage has become a locus classicus because Fobin has 
' used it to give an interpretation of Plato's Doctrine of Idea-NumberE 
according topwhich Ideas are subordinate to Numbers, in fact, Number£ 
are the formal causes of Ideas. This h.e corrobora.tes from the Phile-
1 
bus, py interpreting the Limit, which appears there as Ratios, as 
determined by these Numbers.- But this cuts directly across Aristotle~ 
evidence, and Theophrastus, as Aristotle's pupil, must surely have 
got his information from him, so that this interpretation seems 
prima facie to be incorrect .• For Aristotlefjl)identifies the Ideas xi: 
with Numbers, and posits the One and the indefinite dya-d as the 
:flllrmxi elements of both Ideas and Numbers. Ross, 3hoi81er, follows 
Robin, and thus tacitly dismisses van der Wielen•s4 refutation of 
Robin's interpretation, whereby van der Wiel~n confines Ideas to 
Ideal Numbers, so that to put Numbers on the highest grade of reali-
ty is tantamount to putting Ideas highest, and takes the lower grade 
of 1 Ideas' as not true Ideas a.t all, but as quasi-Ideas subh as the 
Triangle, etc., which are actually What-come-after-the-Numbers. In 
other words, what Theophrastus sa.id is correct and is to be underl9t¢s 
1. 6a23-bl5, translated, except for the last portion, by Ross, op. 
cit.216. 2. Platon 147. 3. Op. cit. 216. 4. Op.cit. 153. 
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stood as he says 1 t, Numbers are the highest grade of reali t.y and 
Ideas stand at a lower level; but by Ideas Theophra.sflbs means not 
THE Ideas- these are in fact the Numbers- but Ideal·Magnitudes. 
In this wa.y van der Wielen finds corroboration for his thesis that 
there were only four Idea-Numbers, 1,2,3,4. 
I believe that van der Wielen is On the right track in his 
interpretat,ion of Theophrastus. The key part of the passage is the 
last part where Theophra.stus says that Plato links up things with 
the Ideas and these with the Numbers, and proceeds from Numbers to 
the ruling principles. The balance of the sentence requires tha.t, as 
the Ideas are the formal elements of things, so the Numbers are the 
formal elements of the Idea.s, and again the elements of Numbers are 
the One and the imdefin:l te dyad. Now Aristotle identifies the Idea.s 
with Numbe.rs and posits tlJe One and the indefinite dyad as the 
elements of both Ideas and Numbers, i.e. of Idea-Numbers. Hence, 
when Theophrastus says·Plato proceeded from Numbers to the ruling 
principles, what is meant is that he sought in the One and the dyad 
the ruling principles of Idea-Numbers. The use of.the word 'Numbers' 
is especially appropriate because Theophrastus, I believe, is think-
ing of one particular class of Idea-Numbers, as will be shown - viz. 
the Idea-Numbers 2,3, and 4. In this I follow van der Wielen, but I 
disagre~ that these were the ONLY Idea-Numbers. The One and the dyad 
were the principles of all Idea-Numbers whatsoever, b&~t Theophrastus 
has in mind only a very special class thereof, 2;3 a.md 4, a.s was 
said.. Again, I agree with van der Wielen· that by 'Ideas' i.s here 
meant the Idea of Line, that of Plabe ~nd of Solid, whether or not 
plato actually ca~led them Ideas or merely 'the things after the 
Numbers.' Tha.t Plato led these Ideal Magn1 tudes back to the Numbers 
1". 2, 3 and 4 means simply, as van der Wielen has shown, that the forma· 
element of the Line is ·the Id~a-Number/l 2, of 1?1h.e Plane 3, and of t,. 
Solid 4, as is independently witnessed in De Anima 404bl6-27. 2 But 
just as 'Numbers', whil,e here referring only to 2, 3 and 4, are yet 
not the only Idea-Numbers, .so also 'Ideas', while here referring 
only to the Line, Plane and Solid, have also a wider connota.t ion in 
' that the statement is true in general that·things a.re led back to 
Ideas. Hence, Theophrastus confirms the evidence of Aristotle that 
Plato led things back t~ Ideas and that the elements of the Numbers 
were the One and the dyad, but in his statement that he linked up 
Ideas with Numbers he 1 s referrin~nt~ one vlass IJ.J!!:iJt of Ideas and to 
... 
one class of Numbers, ~namel;j, tha .. t the formal elements of the Line, 
Plane and Solid were 2,, 3 and 4 respectively. And just because Theo-
phrastus has a special class of Ideas in mind, this is no evidence 
that Plato regarded Numbers. as standing on a higher grade of reality 
thaO Ideas in general. 
1. Op. cit. 152. 2. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas 210. 
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If it be thought that my interpretation is far-fetched, glance 
again at Theophrastus' words:ttMost people go to a certain point and 
then stop •••• for after NUMBERS AND PLANES AND SOLIDS they leave out 
almost everything else, except to the extent of just touching on 
them.n Thus, when he concludes, after mentioning wha.t Xenocrates ~ 
had done, "Plato, •• might seem to be treating of the other things in 
linking them up with the ID.EAS AND THEtSE WITH THE NUMBERS", he is 
\ 
reverting to his original reservation - Plato did not go very far 
in his reduction of things to elements, except that he linked up 
Planes and Solids with Numbers, sc. with 3 and 4 respectively. 
One further point explains perhaps what Aristotle had in mind 
when in Physics 209bll-17 and 33-210a21 he said that the Participant 
and Space a.re identical in the Tima.eus but in his Oral Teachings I 1: 
apparently is Place, and there the Participant is the Great and 
·small. Theophrastus says that Place and Void (=Space?) proceed from 
the indefinite dyad, 2 which van der Wielen3 interprets to mean that 
Plato derived Place from the Great and Small. That is, the tlrea.t 
and Small as material substrate was described as the Participant 
and from this was derived Place; in the Timaeus the Receptacle is 
in one place described as Space for a special purpose, and so Aris-
totle identifies this Space a.nd tha.t Place. 
4 Ross accepts Robin's interpretation of Theophrastus because 
......_ 
he is confirmed by a pa.ssa.ge from :Sextus Empttl:eu§., Adv .11/lath. 258, 
but this is not really so. The pass@.ge reads:liThe Ideas, which are 
incorporeal, are according to Plato prior to bodies, and each of the 
things that come into being is modelled on them; but they a.re not 
the first principles of existing things, since while each Idea taken 
separately is said to be a unity, by virtue of its inclusion of 
another or other Ideas ft is said to be two or three or four, so that 
there is something higher than their nature, namely Number, by 
participation in which •one' or 'two' or 'three• or yet higher 
Numbers are predicated of them. 11 But apart from the fact that we are 
, 
here dealing again with a particular case - the number of the frt.O"tt -
>Jextus does not say that Plato held tha.t Numbers are higher than 
Ideas: he deduces the priority of Number because, obviously in 
Division, any Idea not an infima species is a numbered many - the 
genus including two o~ more speci.e s. The passage, in fact, reminds 
us of Philebus 16D-17A: 11 We must thus always assume that there is in 
every case one Idea of everything and look for it, then for two or 
three, and treat each such unit in the same way until we see not MRi 
only that the original unit is one and many and infinite, but how 
many it 1s. 11 But as THE Idea. par~ excellence is the infima. species, 
Number¢"does not enter into it in this wa.y, but~ only into Ideas which 
' arei.Ggenera. or sub-genera., the ftrrtt. But in any case, such Numbers 
nre not essential but only incidental to these Ideas. 
1. See pages 278-9 above. 2. Cp .• Metaphysics 1084a.33:''Thoy gene-
rate Yoid~ ••• within the Deca.d~" 3 •. Op. cit. 184. 4. O.c.216. 
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Corroboration of Aristotle from th~_l!}<_!epenflent Evi§.~. The 
evidence quoted above is mostly drawn from Pla.to' s Lecture on the 
Good, either from HermodOrus' notes or, in most cases, from Aris-
totle's, and so is independent both of Aristotle's own interpreta-
tion of Plato, and of the dialogues. This evidence corroborates 
Aristotle in the following respects. 
1) In Metaphysics A.vi, es~cially 987bl8-22 and 988al0-14, Aris-
totle asserts that the elements of the Forms are the elements of all 
things, the Forms being derived from the One and the dyad of the 
Great. and the Small, things from the Forms and the Great and Small. 
So Hermodorus says that the Matter -is the More and Less, in which is 
to be included the Great and Small. One phase of this is the Unlimi-
ted, which in the Philebus is the material element, while the Equal 
he identifies with the Limit, the formal principle, and this again 
with the One. Sextus Empiricus is clearer: the ultimate prffinciples 
are the One and the indefinite dyad, the One and Plurality according 
to Alexander, and the One and the indefinite dyad according to Theo-
phrastus, who adds that Numbers are led back to these, and things 
are led back to Ideas. In spite of the variant terminology, these 
a.ccounts have in common that the ultimate elements are the One and 
an indefinite dyad, whose nature is that of, Excess and Defect or 
More and Less, and is named Grea.t and Small by Hermodorus. 
ii) Aristotle understood Ideas to be Numbers in respect of their 
derivation from the same e;Lements as Number. This is hinted at by 
Theophrastus, when be says th~t Plato led back the Numbers to the One 
and the indefinite dyad. The ,_same thj.ng seems to be meant in Aris-
totle fragment ,28, quoted above on pages, 289-90, where the One and 
the indefinite dyad are the principles of Ideas in one place, of 
Numbers in another. 1 
iii) We found the analdgue of the Great: and Small in the Unllrni ted 
of the Philebus; so Porphyry p.nd perhaps Hermodorus, judging from 
his use of the terms Limit and :Unlimited in a. similar connection. 
i v) The generic nature of the Great· and Small as including or embody-
ing the species Long and Short, Broad and Narrow, Deep and Shallow, 
etc., ;ts givem by Aristotle in Metephysics 992al0.-16 and 1085a9-13. 
Similarly, according to Sextus, the in41efinite dyad is a. more general 
term embracing both Excess and Defect, among which is listed the 
greater e.nd smaller, the Unequals, and Hermodorus likewise gives the 
More and Less a generic connotation, among which is incl. uded. the 
greater and smaller, and the broader and narrower. 
v) Sextus also cites the Unequal, in which respect Hermodorus agreeE 
with him, e.s the principle of one of the t\vo terms constituting 
Contraries, and it is itself a sub-type of the dyad. It is possible 
1. Cp. the ringing of the changes between 'Ideas• and 'Numbers' in 
Metaphysics A.v1 and especj_ally 987b22, 11 from the Great and Small, 
by participation in the One, come the Numbers," wher~we expect 
XE 'Ideas'. 
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that this refers to the same alternative nomenclature used of the 
Great and Small in 1087b7-9 and the other references cited on page 
117 above, viz. the Unequals. But the evidence is too fragmente.ry 
to make out in what connection this Unequal stands to Plato's genera-
l tion of Numbers, in which connection Aristotle cites tt .. 
vi) Finally, there are some grounds for finding corroboration of 
Aristotle's interpretation of Participation as the relation of 
sensibles to Ideas as copies mi: to a model in Sextus Empirictis, 
quoted on page 297 above·:"Ea.ch of tre things that come into being is 
modelled on them." With this compare Diogenes Laertius 111.13, 
possibly an interpolation~"Hence, Plato says that Ideas stand in 
nature as archetypes, and that all{things else bear a resemblance to 
the Ideas because they are copies of these archetypes." Also Theo-
phrastus ii:f lla27ff: "P-1-ato and the Pythagoreans make the distance 
between the real and the things of nature a great one, but hold that 
all things wish to imita.te the real." 
1. As a suggestion, it may be that, since in the case of Contraries 
the generation of one term 1s the destruction of' the other, the 
generation of the Numbers was grouped under Contraries rather than 
under Absolutes. Each success! ve term, then, when it wa.s generated, 
would be subsumable under the Equal, and the 'Matter' out of which 
the Numbers were generated under the Unequal. 
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Cha.pter 3. The Question -of Pyt,ha.gorean Influence •. 
i) E'V1den ce of Plato' s Conta.c ts with Pythagoreans. 
a) The External Evidence. 
The evidence for Plato's contacts with Pythe..goreabs turns chiefly 
about hls first visit to Italy and Sicily, 388-7 B.C. Diogenes 
Laertius III.6 states that he went "to Italy to see the Pythagorean 
philosophers, Philolaus a.nd Eurytus,"but this cnn hardly be correct. 
As Miss Freema.n1 says, the tradition that he acquired the book or 
books of Philolaus, from which he copied the Timaeus, 2 imply that he 
did~ot meet ··Philolaus. However, there may be this much truth behind 
Diogenes' statement,that Plato went to Mae.na Graecia to see some one 
or other of the Pythagorean philosophers, whether or not he had the 
addi tiona~ motive attested someirhere 3 by Diogene s of wishilmg to see 
~ . 
the island and the craters of Etna, and that, since definitely Eury-
tus and proba.bly a.lso Philolaus belonged to the school of the 
Auditors, 4 the school in questiton was that of the 'Italian philosop~ 6.,; 
An apparently more reliable account 5 is that given by Cicero. 
So in his Tusculan Disputations I.xvii.39, we rea.d:"The story goes 
that Ple.to came to Italy to study the Pythagoreans and he lea.r11nt al 
the Pythagorean doctrines." This is made more expl1 cit in De Repub-
lica I.x.l6:"After Socrates' death, Platcfwent on journeys, first to 
Egypt for purposes of study, and later to Italy and Sicily in order 
to become acquainted vii th the discoveries of :tMm: Pythagoras; and he 
spent a great deal of time in the company of Archytas of Tarentum 
and of T1ma.eus of Locri, and also e,ot possession of Philolaus' ,Snotes 
And as Pythagoras' reputation was then great in that country, he 
devoted himself entirely to that teacher's disciples and doctrines." 
Also in De Finibus V.xxix.87: 11 Were it not so (that the system of the 
philosophers gives us happiness), why did Plato ••• visit Archyta.s at 
Tarentum, or the other Pytha~orearis, Echecrates, Timaeus and Ar~on 
at Locri, intending to append to his pteture of Socrates an account 
of the Pythagorean system and to extend his studies into those 
branches which Socrates repudiated?" 
It is difficult to decide how much of this can be accepted as 
true. The mention of Timaeus of Locri seems inspired by Plato's 
dialogue, the Timaeus, since we have concluded that he was not an· 
historical character, and the story of his having got possession of 
2 Philolaus' notes is highly dubious. It seems more likely tha.t the 
whole tradition had been invented to account for recor{gnised traces 
of Pythagorean influence in dialogues posterior to Plato's first 
voyage, coupled w.ith his known relations with Archytas, as witnessed 
1. The Pre-Socratic Philosophers. A Companion to Diels 221. 
2. This story is toltd with variations in Diels 32Al, 8 and elsewhere,. 
but seems to have been a 11~bellous 1nvent1ont cp. Gellius in 
32A8, and Field, Plato and his Contemporaries 176. 
3. Diogenes La.ertius III.l8. 4. Bee pages 171-3 above. 
5. His evidence goes back ultimately to Theophrastus, see Burnet, 
Early Greek Philosophy 423-4. 6. Classical Quarterly XVIII.l35. 
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by several of Plato's epistles, and especially the seventh. Even so, 
the tradition,as we have seen, is not unanimous that it was Archytas 
alone whom Plato w.ent to visit, as one would expect &f the trad14lion 
was based entirely on the epistles, and as the dialogue which seems 
to have been uppermost in the mind of the putative in-uentor of the 
story is clearly the Timaeus it is not altogether clear why such a 
one should have selected the first voyage as the occasion for this 
visit, since he would surely ha,ve had more means of ascertaining the 
date of composition of the Tima.eus than we have. lienee, there seems 
to be some grain of truth in the trad 1 tion, namely, that Plato made 
his first voyage in order to make the acquaintance of Archytas. 1 
Hence, Aristotle is so far corroborated, when he ascribes Plato 1 s 
Doctrine of Idea,-Numbers to a 1 following of the Italian philosophers~ 
that the external evidence indicates that Plato went to Italy in 388 
to malce the acquaintance of Archytas, learm his dmscover1es and use 
them, as he is implied to have done in at least the· Timaeus. 
b) The Evidence of the Dialobues. 
As our concern is with the 'sctentific' rather than the 'rel1gious1 
side of Pythagorea.ni.sm, 21 shall dismiss the latter by citing Ross, 3 
that Plato lealtllt about Philolaus from Cebes and Simmias, and Black4 , 
that Plato could have learnt· all the Pythagoreanism of the Pha.edo 
and Gorgias from refugee Pythagoreans of the mainland. 
There are, in the first place, certain mathematical references 
in some of the early dialogues. Thus, "Fear is a more extended 
notion, and reverence is. a part of fear, just as the Odd is a part 
of Number, and Number i£ a more extended notion than tpe Odd.-,. .If 
you had asked me what is an .even number, and what part of Number tre 
EVen is, I should have had no difficulty in replying, a number which 
represents a figure having tw" equal sides. u 5 This· translation, 
however, omits an important distinction, and I would rather translate 
the last part of the passage thus: 11 I would say it is that which is 
not scalene but isosceles.n6 Now the parts of' Number are given as 
the Odd and Even, arid as the Even is isosceles the Odd must be the 
scalene. 7 Isosceles means, 11 tera.lly, 'with equal legs', cmd scalene 
'limping', and this suggests a setting out of Numbers thus - ::: = 6 1 
:::. = 7. This wef.took to be Italian on page 44 above. 
l. So Field, op. cit .14 note 1, cp. Raven, Pythagorea.ns and Eleat1 cs 
78. 2. See page 8 above. 3. Plato 1 s Theory of Ideas 160 note 4. 
4. Classlt.cal Heview LXV= N.S.l.87. 5. Euthyphro l2CDo 
6. £/fiOY q'-" S-r'- &'5 ;,;.,. !'o1 t?"'l(~t">-'7¥~( b ~ ).~· :"'otHC.c'A-)5. 
7. Fra.nk/3 assigns this terminology to Theodorus, connecting 1 t, on ;t}i,. 
the strength of the Thee.etetus., with Irrational Number. This is 
unlikely. The terminology does not correspond to Theaetetus 14 7E-
8A, where Numbers are di vlded into Square and Oblong, the former 
equal-sided, the ls.tter of va,rious lengths. This implies a. setting-
out of Numbers as plane figure.s, which 1. s quite different from that 
in Euthyphro, ncrrcould oblong be regarded as limping, since while 
its l~ngth :'1. s greater than 1 t.s breadth each pair of sides is after 
all of equal length. 
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Another pas~:wge is Meno 76A: "Do you call something a. surface 
and another thing again a solid, like those used in geometry? •••• 
In a word, I should say that 'figure' is the limit of a so1id~.YTh1s 
might seem to be an alluslon to Eurytus, who constituted solids as 
Extension defined or limitec by surfaces, but t~e context mentions 
prodicus, ara.d he might well have taught geometry: "Do you call an 
end something? I mean some such thing as a limit or extreme - I mean 
that o.ll such things are more or less the same, but perhaps Prod1cus 
' 1 t would beg to differ from tus ••• 11 SocrB,tes, we know, ook a course 
from Prodticus, albeit a cheap one, and. Plato himself may well have 
learnt his geometry from a wandering sophist. In any case, the next 
reference as good as assigns the Platonic Socrates' geometry to the 
' . 3 
so,phists. - 11 The sophists call this the diameter ( = diagohal )~1 • Surely 
the sophists would have taught the who~e science of geometry and not 
merely the name of one line; indeed, geometry seems to ha.ve been an 
autonomous science, and not merely the arcana of the Pythagoreans,, 
as is clear from Ueno 86E-7B, especially the beginning: "I mean the 
me~hod of hypothesis, such as the geometers often use ••• " 4 
Thus, I conclude that, in these geometrical and arithmetrical 
references, even where the terminology agrees with that used by the 
Italian school as in Euthyphro 12CD, we a.re not compelled to see a. 
kno\'iledge by Plato of Pythagoreanism, but that Vrhat we have here is 
real.Ly geometry, and doubtless ari thmet.ic also, as an autonomous 
science, probably ta,ught by wander~ng sophists. Indeed, w1 th two 
exceptmons which will be discussed and explaitned presehtly, it is 
safe to say that in the difi.logues prior to the fii:·st v1s1t to Italy 
Plato show.s no knowledge of the • scientific' doctrines oi' the Itali-
an school, as distinct from the Pythagorean religious teachings. 
Plato's sole mention of the Pythagorea.ns by name is in Republi< 
. 5 
VII. 530C-1B. Here the Pytha.goreans are distinguished by their 
connection of harmonics with astronomy ( 530D) ,, in which they proceed 
empir.icllly 1 measuring consonances and tones which we actually hear 
( 531A) by the measurement of ·strings ( 531B), in contrastt1 to those 
who use the ear only (531A), the folly of which is shov;n by the 
contradiction between the school of Agathon, who denied any differ-
ence between two co.nsecutive enharmonic quarter-tones, and that of 
Democritus, who used.just this interval as the i:~l~ of an additive 
theory of music. Plato's own method is quite different ( 531C): he 
seeks to find consonant numbers a priori and why they are consonant 
and despises Pythagorean empiricism as on the same level as the 
1. Meno 75E. 2. Meno 96D. . 3. Meno 85B. 4. Compare Republic 
VI. 510C: ''You are aware that students of geometry, arithmetic, 
and the kindred sciences, assume the Odd and the Even, and the 
figures, and three kinds of angles and the like tn their several 
branches of science; these are their hypotheses, which they and 
el!lerybody else are supposed to know. 11 5. This has bee~ well 
expl<:lined by Frank, Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer 150-162, 
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geometer's measuring of a diagram to solve a. theorem. This, a~/hovm 
by the characterist:tc connection of harmonics with astronomy ,A·shovvs 
that the Pythagoreans in questlon are more precisely the Italian 
school. 
A further reference to this school is the musical one in 1Repub-
li c III. 400A: "For I should lay it down, saying that there are three 
priinciples of rhythm, from wh:tch the metrical systems are framed, 
just as in sounds there are fuur notes whence all harmonies are 
composed." The four notes from V!ihich all her monies are composed are 
cleerly those standing in the relation of fourth, fifth and octa.ve, 
related proportionelly as 6 to 8 to 9 to 12. The ratios in question 
seem, from the evidence we have, to ha.ve been known to the early 
Pythagoreans, but further investigations along these lines were 
2 3 
cha.racteristic o.f the Audit-ors, such as Hippasus and Archytas, and 
it is probable that Plato had the latter in mind. Ho?lever that may 
be, it is possible that the conception of the soul as harmony belongs 
here, as in Phaedo 85E-6D, for music is of importance ln education 
for its introducing harmony into the soul, as in Republic III.:ti~i) 
401D, which follows shortly after the preceding quote - the soul 
must. reflect the harmony of tre Cosmos and make audible the harmony 
which is visible in the heavens. Here again is the characteristic 
1 
connection between harmonics and e.stronomy, and we find the same 
with the addition of arithmetic in Theaetetus 145CD:"I should like 
to ask what you learnt of Theodo rus: some thing of geometry, perhaps? 
- Yes. - And a.stronomy end harmony and calculation. 11 In Phaedo 98A 
we get more exect information as to tQe scope of their studies, 
which, dealing as it does with astronomy, may belong to the Italian 
school: "About relatlve -speeds, tropes, and other phenomena of the 
sun, moon and stars. tt 4 Sj.milarly, in one of the two exceptions refer-
red to above- for these dialogues are prior to Plato's Italian 
journey - Gorgias 541C: nAstronomy deals with the motion of the stars 
a.nd sun and moon, and their speeds relative to one another." 4 More 
definite is the second exception, Cratylus 405CD: "All these move 
together i.n a kind of harmony, as the Smart say in reg~ to music 
a.nd astronomy. 11 
These references in tl11e Cratylus and Gorgias may be explained, 
if it is accepted that Plato only became thoroughly ac~uainted with 
the doctrines of Archytas after his visit to Italy in 388, thus: at 
the time of writing these dialogues Plato had somehow heard about 
the 'musical' astronomy of Archytas., to which reference is there made 
and determined to make his visit in order to gain more exact informa-
tion - for the 11eferences are after all couched in general terms and 
argue no great knowledge of the details of astronomy. Having learnt 
all that Archytas had to teach, Plato retunned home, founded the 
1. See 3 on page 174 above,. 2. See page 170 above. 3. See page 
171 above. 4. Cp. Archytas, cited on page 171 above:"The speeds 
of stars and their risings and settings. 11 
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Academy,, and included ln his curriculum the geometry, harmonics flnd 
astronomy that .he had learnt and which is given such promlnence in 
these books of the Republic which deRl with education. Thus, we have 
some details of the content of these branches of learning in the 
astronomy of Republl c X., the Timaeus, and Laws X; in the mathematics 
of the Nuptial Number of Republic 546BC; and in harmonics there is 
the 'scale' used in the Timaeus for the composition of the World 
Soul. Plato, then, made his first voyage to Italy in order to learn 
from Archytas the arcana vf the Italian philosophy, and in dialogues 
subsequent to this voyage there are frequent references to doctrines 
characteristic of this school, which are almost completely absent in 
earlier dialogues. As a final example o~ his ~_nowledge of Pythagoreen1 
arcana, I cite Cornford's1interpretation of Tima.eus 32B. 
This reads:"It ~i~g~Hxi~xigxg~x~x~~lid•and solids }!¢never have 
one but always two means, so that God, placing Water and Air in 
between Fire and Earth, and giving them as far as possible the same 
ratio one to another, constituted and bound together the visible and 
tangible universe thus: n.s Fire is to Air, so is Air to Water, and 
as Air to water so is Water to Earth. 11 Cornford explalns that in the 
series of 1, successively doubled, there is one mean between succes-
sive squares but two between successive cubes. Thus, in the series 
1, 2, 4t 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, the successive cube numbers 
8 and 64 have no one geometrical mean {since there is no rational 
square root of tho~.r ~XMI!Ud~: product 512, but there are two rrref}ns -
8::;6::16:32::32:64. 2 Tlfa.t this is Pythagorean is shown by Aristotle 
Problems XV.U.:t.910b37ff:"Or is it because in ten ratios 4 perfect 
cubes occur, from which numbers the Pythagorean a constitute the 
universe?" The above are the ten numbers referred to, being ratios 
because each stands to the other as 2:1, and the 4 cubes are 1, 8, 
64 and p512. So the editor of the Loeb edition. That thi1v~s not 
merely Pythagorean but Italinn is indicated by Diels 35Al4 and 15, 
where Archytas soueht the means betv;een 2 given lines in order to 
solve the Delian problem, that is, if the lines are a and b, such 
that b = 2a, find x andy, such that a:x::x:y::y:b. The cube erected' 
on x is then double that erected on a. 
But to show that Plato went t.o Italy to 1 earn the philo ro phy of 
the Italians, and that he revealed his knowledge thereof in dialoguE~~ 
written afterwards, does not prove that he was influenced thereby in 
deriving Ideas from the elements of Number. 
l. Plato's Cosmology 47-50. 2. While there are other interpreta-
tions of the necessity for two means between solid numbers, that 
of Cornford seems to be the best. Milhaud, Les Ph1losophes Gt!p-
metres de la. Grece 325, says the solid numbers a.a.a and b.b.b 
require two means, a 2b and ab2. This agrees with Cornford' s EXHm~i 
example above. Miss Freeman, The Pre-Socratl.c Philosophers 219 not 
al, cites the Del:'J.an Problem, as referred to above. They do not, 
therefore, contradict Cornford, but overlook the particular ser1e' 
whicb Cornford thinks Plato had in mind. 
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ii) Plato's Acknowledgement of Pythagorean Influence. 
It is the contention of this last part of our argument that by 
ascribing the constitution of things from elements to a Pythagorean 
source, as will presenl.ly be shown/is the case in the Timaeus and 
Philebus, Plato, in accordance with the canon dete unined for the 
choice of his protagonist above, 1is thereby virtually acknowledging 
his debt to Pythagorea.nism in this respect. But the issue is 
complicated because in the Parmenides and the Sophist, Plato seems 
to ascribe the ~ia point at issue to Eleatic influences, since the 
doctrine, or perhaps we should say the incipient idea, is put into 
the mouth of Parmenides and of the Eleatic Stranger respectively. 
Hence, it is necessary, before broaching the question of Plato's 
acknowledgement',! of Pythagorean influen.ce, to explailn this apparent 
inconsistency, and to do this we must draw a distinction. 
The Distinction between the Provenance of the Pro2~em anQ_af 
,!he Provenance of the Solution. The Pa.rmenides and the Sophist are 
concerned primarily with the Ideal world. The Pa.rmenides, as has 
been argued, sets out from the problem how sensibles ca.n be both 
one and many. It argues in effect thet the explanation to this pf¢"1>1-• 
problem lies ultimately in the realm of the Ideas. If the Ideas can 
partake of contrary predicates without thereby forfeiti.ng their 
reality, there is no reason why sensibles should not do sojlikewise; 
but any answer to the contradictions of sense is incomplete unless 
the problem is raised to the Ideal level. This -vvas the weakness of 
the Early Theory of Ideas: it attempted to answer the problem in 
the case of sensibles by asserting that sensibles.could partake of 
both of any pair of contrary Idea.s. But the problem tacitly remains, 
how cmlYidea. be both one and many? This is not brought out, since 
... 
'Socrates' flatly denies the possibility, but it is shown that if 
the Ideas are such as 'Socrates' asserts them to be, no adequate 
account can be given ofit.he manner in which sensib.Les are supposed 
' 
to partake of Ideas, so' that the conception of the .Ideas requires 
modification. As Plato apparently sees the problem, the Ideas are 
incorrectly formulated, ; each being virtually an Elea.ti c monad; he 
sees tpat what is required is a. new conception of the Idea as a 
whole having parts. The root of the trouble is the Eleatic defini-
tion of the One: it should not have been defined as without parts -
hypothesis i shows that this definition ~ads to nihilism- but as 
a whole of parts, which is deduced in hypothesis ii. Al.L this is 
put into the mouth of Parmenides because Plat-o here poses as the 
genuine liiii~c, a.s the corrector of Pa.rmenides. Plato then hereby 
acknowledges his debt to Eleaticism in respect of the problem, how 
can sensibles be many? The Eleatics had denied the possibility of 
this - sensibles were unreal because both one and many - b~t Plato 
argues that their doctrine requires correction - the One itself is 
1 • See page 204 above. 
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both one and many, therefore any one sensible, any one Idea, can be 
both one and many. The provenance of the problem of the One and the 
Many is, then, Eleatic, but, while its solution - by reform'fjllating 
the One as a whole of parts - is a sort of up-to-date Elea.ticism, 
the provenance of this solution could not have been Parmenides and 
zeno - for they would never have allowed that the One has parts. 
This, then, is the distinction that must be. drawn - between· the 
provenance of the problem of the One and the Many and that of 1 ts 
solution. Eleatic is the indivisible One that lies at the root of 
Plato's difficulties in connection with Participation and the knowa-
bility of the Ideas; to correct the formulation of the One is to 
carry on the Eleatic tradition of the hypothesis, If the One is; but 
the formulation itself of the One as a whole of parts is not Eleatic: 
it is something q~ite different - and what is the provenance of this 
solution, of this One as a whole of parts, is the next question. 
plaj;;g' s Solutign ;tQ. .!JlfL.QnL.ang_j"JJ.LM[U)~ is Pfth~go rea!!• ifhe 
problem of the One and the Many raised in.the Parmenidcs is referred 
1 back to in the Philebus, as we have seen. Just as it} the Parmenides, 
so in the Phil.ebus the problem is :raised from the realm of sense to 
that of the Ideas: it is common property that Protarchus is one and 
yet many as being great and small, etc.; what is meant is that the 
Ideas are each one and yet ma.ny, in that they are either dispersed 
or reduplicated among sensible things. The solution is given tmt the 
one and the Many is a ngift of the gods to men, tossed down through 
the agency of a Prometheus,. whence the tradition is handed down that 
a.ll things are sprung from one a.nd many, and have inherent in them 
Lim1 t and Unlimited 11 • 2 The solution .of the problem of the One and the 
Many in Ideas, to which'level it must be raised if any account is to 
be given of its presence ln sensibles, is ,that all things, apparently 
both Ideas and sensible~ together (and in the following passage it 
is Ideas that are ·referfed to as being each one and yet having in 
them a numbered many). ate inherently one and many because composed of 
Limit and UnlimJ.ted. In~the hypotheses of the Parmen1des the One was 
sho\\'n to be also· many, especially in hypothesis ii, and now this 
property is explained as due to the constitution of 1ill1ngs, and so 
of tm One, from two. elements, the Limit and the Unlimited. 
Now the terms, Lirni t and Unlimited, are characteristica.lly Pytha-
gorean, and in the Italian school the One, and all othet things too, 
was composed of the Limit and the Unlirn1ted. 3 Furthermore, it is 
4 generally agreed by the commentators that here Prometheus = Pythago-
ras. It was he who introduced th{not1on and the terminology, but this 
iS without prejudice to Plato's immediate source being someone nearer 
to him in time. Of this, there is no further indication in the Phile~w 
1. See pages 264-5 above. a. Philel:ms 16C. 3. See 7 on pages 174-
5 above. 4. Hackforth, Plato's Examination of Pleasure 21; Raven, 
Pythagoreans and Eleat1cs 181; Stenzel, Zahl und Gestalt 12. 
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bus, but his ascription of his solution of the One and the Many by 
means of the composition of all things from the Limit and Unlimited 
to the founder of Pythagoreanism indicates that in thts way Plato 
acknowledges his debt to this school. For he is not simply reprodu-
cing a. Pythagorean doctrine: the. a'plication of the One and the Many 
to Division in Philebus 16B-E, ~ the addition of the classes of 
~ . . 
the Mixed and the Cause, etc.;~1o the division of reality into Limit 
and Unlimited in the later fourfold classification of Being, tXIiliiEEEn 
transcends Pyth?...goreanism and erects a Platonic construction on the 
pythagorean foundation. Plato, then, in using the termlimology ,Limit 
and Unlimited, and in alluding to Pythagoras under the pseudonym, 
,t~i~~a~s, is acknowledging the provenance of his solution of .the 
problem of the One and the Many. 
But a clee..rer acknowledgement is to be found in the Timaeus, 
and the vague acknowledgement in the Philebus is explicable if _one 
accepathe view, here folb~ed, that the Timaeus was compose~ prior 
to the Phi1ebus: ·for in the Tima.eus Plato's debt to Pytha.gorea.nism 
is explicit. Indeed, it is not difficult to show that it is above 
all Archytas who was his master. 
While there ·is, it is true, no indication in the 'I'imaeus that 
Ideas are composed of two elements, nor even that ALL things are so 
constituted, the deri va.tion of the sensible world from elements, the 
1 forms and numbers' on the one hand and the Receptacle on the other, 
is clearly shown to have been Plato's own construction since 1 t is 
deduced from the implications of the Theory of Ideas: "We must, 
according to my opinion, make the following distinction: there is 
eternal Being which. has not generation, and Becoming constantly but 
1 
which is,!never Being" •. From the very nature of a copy, which Be com-
' ing is here assumed'to be, a Place is required, since a copy must be 
in so.me place. 2 In this way the material element is derived as a 
' 
development of what: is impltcit, or held to be implicit, in Plato's 
I 
Earlier Theory of Ideas. But because in actual fact Plato had arrived 
at this conclusion, ·not by an a priori deduction from the 1mplicat1ofll 
' 
of his 'theory, but f,rom quite other considerations, Plato feels bound 
to ackno~ledge its provanance by putting ~he whole doctrine in the 
mouth of -Timaeus - such, a.t .least, was the signif.icance o~ the choice 
of Plato's chief .character :i.n his other dialogues. 
In other words, if Plato's deducti~n of the existence of Ideas 
from the very nature of the Socratic defl<ni ti on had led him to rega.rc' 
hl!lmself as a, follower of Socrates and so to ascribe this Theory to. 
hd!m in his earlier dialogue.s; if his deduction of the nature and the 
definition of the One from a consideration of the inadequacy of the 
Elea.t1c definition and deduction of the One had led him to regard 
himself as the true successor to Parmenides and the Eleat1cs, and so 
to ascribe this to Parmenides and to the Eleatic Stranger in the 
' 1. Timaeus 27D. 2. Timaeus 52BC. 
I 
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dialogues concerned; if these facts are so, then consistency demands 
that if in the Timaeus Pls.to' s cosmology is ascribed to a Pythago-
rean, T1maeus of Locri, then the reason for this was that Plato 
regarded himself as following up the logical implications of a. 
fundamenta~ly Pythagorean posi ti.on. It is the Philebus that shoV#s 
what the fundamentally Pythagorean position was - the derivation of 
all things from Limit and Unlimited. From this position we have in 
the Tirnaeus the Platonic construction in respect of the sensible 
world - the Limit of sensibles iii the Ideas, their Unlimited the 
Recepta.cle. But we can go further than this. 
We agreed that Timaeus of Locri was not an historical person. 
This name,)tithen, must cover Plato's acknowledged master in respect 
of the derivation of the sensib~e world from elements, of which tre 
derivation of the Ideal world was t~e inevitable extension. And the 
1denti ty of this person is revealed by a comparison of what is here 
alleged of Tima.eus with what is known of Archytas - for it is he who 
in meant. Thus, Timaeus is described so:"Here is Timaetlls, of Locri 
in Italy, a city which has admirable laws, and who is himself in 
wealth a,nd rank the equ.al of any of his fellow-citizens; he has held 
the most importa..nt and honourable offices in his own state, and as 
I believe has scaled the heights of all philosophy 11 • 1 With this, 
compare what is said of Archyta.s: 11 Archytas the Taren tine was a. t once 
a statesman and a philosopher. 112 "The Tarentines were a.t some time 
a. powerful state, having an exceptiona.,lly democ%ra.t1c constitution. 
l They re~eived the Pythagorean philosophy, especially Archytas, who 
stood at the head of affaits for a. lon~tlme. 113 nne was generally 
admired for his excellence in all fields; thus he was generalissimo 
of his city, seven ·time,s, whereas the liJj excluded all others even 
! 4 . 
from a second term~of office.'* "He was head of the affairs of an 
! 
Italiote confederacy, being chosen general with autocratic powers 
bY his countrymen and the Greeks around. At the same time he taught 
philosophy and had 'many famous pupils and wrote many books. n 5 'fhe 
correspondence is not exact, but it is reasonably close. For even 
though Timaeus is said to be "the most of an astronomer amongst us, 
l 6 
and had made the na.ture of the uni vrerse his special study", whereas 
Archytas was most renowned for his mechanics, music and geometry, 
he was also interested in sstronomy. 7 Thus, Frank8 sees no difficul-
ty in equating Timaeus with Archyta.s on the strength of the pa.ss&gss 
auoted above. 
- ~ 
l. Tirnaeus 20A. 2. Diels 35A8. 3. Diels 35A4. 
4. Diels 35Al,init. 5. Diels 35A2. 6. '.fimaeus 27A. 
7. Diels 35Bl :'*They have provided us with a correct account of the 
speed of the heavenly bodies, their risings and settings''; and 
35A3 :"Nor does &t eught avail thee to ha.ve attempted the d~ell1ng£o 
ofithe sky, and in thought to have sped through the vault of 
heaven, doomed e.fter all to die". 
8. Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer 129. 
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§..l!mming U£• Plato, then, was led to a realisation of the 
inadequacy of his Earliber Ideal Theory by the incompatibility of 
the Idea as a One with its presence in a multiplicity of sensibles, 
because he regarded himself in the Eleatic tradition insofar as he 
posited what was known by Pure Reason as the Real, and minimised 
the status of sensibles. But the Ideas, conceived as Eleatic Monads, 
could by no means be considered able to be present in the Many, and 
iD this case were in fact unknowable. To explain how sensibles could 
be at once one and many, Plato saw it was necessary to ra,ise the 
problem of the One and the Many to the Ideal world. To do this he 
found 1 t necessary to revise the Eleatic conception of the One, and 
this led of necess~ty to a revision of his conception both of the 
constitution of sensibles and tha.t of Ideas. In drawing up his 
mod!ified Theory of Ideas, Plato was influenced by the system of 
Archytas, defining the One a.s a whole of parts just a-s Archytas had 
made the one the first product of Limit and Unlimited, and just as 
Archytas derived all th1.ngs from this Limit and Unlimited , so Plato 
derived Ideas from two analogous elements (which,. according to 
Aristotle, were in fact the elements of Number),and. sensibles from 
these Ideas as their Limit and a material substrate, called the 
Unlimited 1n the Philebus, the Receptacle in the T1ma.eus, and the 
Breat and Small in his Oral Teachings. 
In this derivation of Ideas and things from the elements of 
Number, Aristotle sa.ys no more than· thet Plato 'followed' the 
philosophy of the Italians. But Plato was actually influenced by 
this philosophy and acknowledges his debt in this respect to the 
1 Pythagoreans', without any more particu.lar ascription, by his use 
' 
of their terms, Limit and Unlimited, in this connection in the 
• 
philebus, but by setting out his 
' 
of Locri, who' seems 'to have been 
I 
tum, he tacitly acknowledges his 
f 
Ita.ly j.n particular.' 
' 
cosmology as a discourse 
a pseudonym for Archytas 
debt to the philesopher 
of Td:maeus 
of Taren-
or· Lower 
Thus, so far as the dialogues and the extant external evidence 
touch oij. the relevant; points at all - for in many important respects 
th are.silent, b 1 . ey XBEXXEHX e ng neither for nor agaaast- Aristotle is on the 
whole corroborated in his account of the relationship between Plato-
nism and the philesophy of the Italians in Metaphysics A. vi and in 
other pa.ssages discussed, so that 1 t is reasona.ble to accept his 
uncorroborat'ed details also at face value, since in these respects· 
there is no evidence. to the contrary. It remains, then, to make a 
synthesis of the evidence of Aristotle, the dialogues, and evidence 
independent of both, in order to explain the significance of what 
Aristotle sa.js in MetaphySics A.vi.l. 
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Conclusion. 
1. Pythagoreanism. a} The Evidence. It is perhaps overoptimistic to 
hope to,f:r.each any finality in respect of Pythagoreanilm, since there 
was only an oral traili tion down to the end of the fifth ~~~¥,jY B. C. 
and the source of all later accounts, Aristotle's work on this 
subject, has been lost except for a few fragments. And the notices 
which Aristotle has left us are seldom assigned to the various 
schools which held variant views, and so are subject to the suspici-
on firstly that he mixed up these various vdews indiscriminately, 
and secondly that he felt no scruples about interpreting the1.r 
various doctrines in such a way that they would lend support to his 
own theories, quite apart from the possibility that he might have 
misunderstood or have been ill-informed about certain particulars. 
I have, however, attempted to find sure ground fi~stly by making a 
more,ithorough analysis of Aristotle's evidence tha11 modern commenta-
tors have usually done, and secondly by subjecting the conclusions 
derived from this examination to a check from an investigation of 
independent sources. This more thorough analysis of Aristotle 
consists in demonstrating that, except for the 'others of the same 
school• of 986a22-30, it is the same school of Pythagoreanism, the 
Italian philosophy, that is referred to throughout the whole of 
·Metaphysics A. It is next demonstrated that this book, together with 
certain other references ascribed to this school, gives an account 
of a philosophy which forms one consistent whole, whereas most of 
the other references not so demarcated give an account of a Pytha-
goreanism essent1aily different from this Italian school. The 
investigation 9f the evidence independent of Aristotle cmhtres 
around the deductidn of the tenets of Pytha,goreanism cri tiai&Eld by 
Parmenides and Zeno·, and of the sort of changes that would have been. 
made in order to obviate these criticisms. To this can be added a 
deduction of the so!rt of tenets which early Pythagoreanism might 
have held in view ot' the beliefs taught by Anaximander and .Anaxime-
nes, who immediately preeeded Pythagoras, the tradi t:ton of a split 
1n Pythagoreanism, "arid certain fragments and accounts given of 
named Pythagoreans at the end of the fifth centucy. As the conclu-
. d f h e.v1dence 1 b s1ons rawn ·rom t is independent EEIXMEREB large y cot~o orate 
Aristotle, 1t is reasonable to accept. the whole of his evidence 
about Pythago reanism at fa.ce value, arguing that if he 1 s correct 
where he can be checked, he must also be correct where the indepen-
dent evidence is silent - for in no instance does the independent 
evidence contradict his statements. On this basis, the9, I give the 
following account of Pythagoreanism from its beginnings down to the 
end of the fifth century B.c. 
b) The Early Pythagoreanism. Confining the account to the 
'scientif1 c' side of this ph~losophy, it l'.ould seem that Pythagoraf; 
and his immediate followers held an animistic view of Nature. The 
,_ 
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onojcrune into being as a Seed. Outside of this wa.s the Void, which 
was confused with Air. The One breathed in this Air-Void and by 
reduplicating itself' or perhaps by being divided up, it reveived the 
Void into its interstices, limiting it,. each unit being separated 
from the 6thers by this Void. The un1 ts were called the Limit, and 
the Void the Unlimited. bens1ble things, then, were composed of 
units having magnitude delimiting a Void. But these units were 
numerical units, since Number was similarly constituted as points 
· set out in a background, geometrically f3.gured as $square or oblong 
numbers, etc. Things were thus Numbers. Finally; various members of 
sets of contrary pairs were analogica.lly identified w.i th the primary 
pair, Limit a.nd Unlirni ted, e.g. the One and the Gond were both 
insta.nces of the Limit, Many and Evil were re..nged under the Unlimit.,S 
ted. To thi.spphilosophy belong, in Aristotle, the references Meta-
physics 986a22-30, l080bl6-21 and 31-34, 109lal5-l8, Physics 213b23-
28 and De Caelo 300al4-19. 
Parmenides criticised this philosophy in that no adequate 
account was given of how the One, as Seed, ca,"'le into being; he 
criti:cised the derivation of the Limit and the Unlimited, the latter 
1n that what is other than the One should ge nothing at all accord-
ing_tto the Principle of Contradiction, the form.er because, a.gain 
according to his defin1 tion of· the One, the One could ne1 ther be 
divided into units nor become many; and he touched on the discrete-
ness¢of things resulting from their constitution as units set out 
1n Void, and cer,a.in other points shared by the Pytha.goreans with 
other philosophies, such as the imposSibility, according to Parmeni-
des, of· generation and destruction. 
The Pythagorea.nS counte'ted by ridiculing Parmenides' own One. 
I 
As(finite, they said, it must have a limit and so becomes two 
instead of one; 1 t imust have beginning, middle and end and so become£: 
three; and j_f corporeal, 1 t must have parts and so be many instead 
of one • 
. Zeno took up the cddgel in defence of his master, and showed 
that the doctrines. of Pythagoreani sm led to contradictions, by 
taking as his premisses the implications of the Pythagorean Limit 
a,nd of their Unlimi'ted a.ltemnately. Thus, as made up of a number of 
points or units, the Many was finite in number, but as infinitely 
divisible, in that the Void is a continuum, the Many, was infinite in 
-:number; a body is infinitely di visible since it is set out in a 
cont1nuum 1 but as it is made up of points, if these points are 
arithmetical units the body can have no· magnitude at all,~"ff the 
points have any magnitude at all tpe body will be infinitely large. 
c) The Later Pythagoreenism. 1) The Students or Theologiensj .. 
On its religious side, Pythagoreanism lived on, and despite the 
Elea.tic cr1.t1cism its exponents retained the or1ginal doctrines, 
. 
except that they seem to have placed the Good later in the scheme 
. l' . 
312/ 
of • evolution', instead of making it primary. Perhaps they felt that 
the other doctrines could not be altered without losing much of the 
religious appeal of the philosophy. However that may be, Philolaus, 
if his fragments a.re spurious., as is generally believed, w~s the 
chief representa.ti ve of this wing at the end of the fifth century 
B.C., and they are referred to by Aristotle as 'the Theologians' in 
Metaphysics 109la34-b3, and he/seems to mean this school in Metaphy-
sics 1072b31-35, 1075a36-37, 1083b8-19, and 1090a21-35. It wa.s this 
school that Speusippus is said to have followed, and most of its 
adherents seem to have fled from Italy to Greece as the result of 
civic disturbances in their homeland, bringing with them the belief 
in the Transmigration of Souls. 
ii) The Auditors, Italian Philosophers or 'So-called !'ythagore-
ans~ Tradition disttinguishes from the above-mentioned genuine 
followers of Pythagoras a. sort of 'heretical' school, if one may use 
the term, who abandoned the religious teachings of the '·Master and 
modified his doctrines in order to obviate the criticisms of Parme-
nides and Zeno. Apparently the founder of this school was Hippa.sus, 
and among other famous names we distinguish Eurytus, Archytas, and 
perhaps the fragments of Philola.us - assuming that the tenets which 
they embody were held by someone, whether by Philolaus or not. It is 
this 'scientific' wing of Pythagoreanism, which centred largely 
around Tarentum and. perhaps Croton and Metapontium, which is referred 
to by Aristotle in Metaphysics book A and certain other pla.ces 
detailed dn page 32 a.bove., and this is the school Plato followed. 
To meet Pa.rmenides' objection that, if Being is one, there can 
be nothing else - no Unlimited because the other than the One IS NOT; 
no Limit be cause the One cannot be many - they posited two elements 
a.s primaty, the Limit and the Unlimited, and der1 ved the One from 
them as their first product. This enabled them to explain all other 
things as,Ccompounds of Limit and. Unlimited. This a.lso met Zeno' s 
criticisms, because the Limit was no longer an aggregate of arith-
metical units, except in the case of Number itself, and numbers have 
no magnitude. To a.void making things discrete; they co_nceived things 
as composed of Extension bounded by various limits: Number was 
bounded by units, Lines by points, Planes by lines, and Solids by 
plebes: thus, in the case of themj.nimal figures, the Line wa.s 
bounded by 2 points, the Plane by 3 (triangle), and the Solid by 4 
points (teftrahedron), and the simplest cosmic bodile:s were composed ¢ 
of the regular geometrical figures, Tetrahedron., Cube, etc. This 
required a modification in the leading Pythagorean doc trl.ne that 
things were Numbers;now things had the same elements as Numbers - the 
Limit and the Unlimited, but of course the Limit was in fact differ-
ent in the case of Numbers and of things, just as 1t differed in the 
case of Lines and of Planes, as stated above. But the identity, if we 
may call it that, of the Limit of things - bounds such as points, 
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lines, surfaces/ - with that of Numbers (units) was established by 
an argument from analogy. Number W8 s set out as rows of units in 
the form of •isosceles• and 'scalene' numbers, as explained abOve 
0 n pages 44 and 301. Since even numbers consisted of two equal rows, {.; 
this was taken to symbolise the Unlimited; since odd numbers had the 
equality of these lines limited by the odd unit left over, thfl.s 
symbolised the Limit. But I think the identity of Limit and Unlimi~,Jfl 
ted with Odd and Even was established rather by means of their 
method of¢definit1on. According to this, they thought that a thing 
was to be definldt in terms of the first occurrence in nature of its 
characteristic attribute, and in determining what was first, they 
gave precedence to Numbers. So J·ustice was reciprocity or the equal-
ly equal, and the first example of this was the number 4, which 
consists of tv.o 21 s. Thus Justice was 4. In this' Vtay, the Odd which 
exhibited in the realm of Number the attributef;of limitation ~as the 
essence, so to speak, of the Limit, and the Unlimited was the Even 
s1nee this displayed itscharacteristic attribute of divisibility. 
flov1ever that m·ay be, the elements of Number, the Odd and Even, were 
by analogy~ or by definition the same as the Limit and the Unlimited 
which were the elements of all other things. 'Ihus the elements of 
.th:lngs were those of Number. 
Further, these philo ro phers were devoted to mathema.ti cs, and 
in Harmonics worked out the harmonic concordancesi and the connec-
tion between the length of a string and its rate of vibration, which 
because the notes depended on the length of the string, thus det~r­
mined 1 ts musical tone. In astronomy they held that the earth, the 
counter-earth, and8 other heavenly bodies circled about a Centra~ 
Fire, 10 bodies in all. And harmonics was connected with astronomy 
by identifying the distances of the heavenly bodies from the centre 
of the universe and their speed of revolution with the length and 
ra.te of vibration ofa musical string, so that in Et way the heavens 
were a musical scale. This is the doctrine of the Harmony of the · 
§jQfi~s, if one may use the term, since the use of spheres to expla~ 
the movements of the stars actually belonged to a later day. 
From this 'philosophy of the Italians', then, let us pass to 
Platonism. 
2. Platonism. a) The Evidence. Inthe case of Platonism there 
are three sets of evidence, each presenting 1ts own difficulties. 
Aristotle, as in the case of Pythagoreanism, does not always make it 
clear whether he refers to Plato's Earlier Theory of Ideas or to his 
later Idea-Numbers, or indeed to some Academic interpretation, not 
necessarily held by Plato him self. Again, he shows a tendency to 
couch Plato's thought in his own te!1Jlinology and to draw deductions 
from the implications which these terms would have had in his own 
system. In ltne{with this, when he is uncertain as to Plato's mean-
ing, he sometimes t~s to 
reach a decision by interpreting Plato's 
1-
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notions in terms of his own conclusions in that respect. And there 
1.s th~furtherp possibility tha.t he may have misunderstood, have been 
misinformed, or may even have misrepresented Plato's thoucht. Most 
of the former difficulties arising from Aristotle's evidence ca.n be 
largely over~ome by making due allovvance for these weaknesses¢, 
~hich are not peculiar to Aristotle, especially since Aristotle's 
own~ terminology is well lano~n to us. In any case, in treating the 
broad lines of Platonism, which is the subject of this work, these 
weaknesses do not materially affect the present investigation, since 
cases of dl11.spute are mostly points of d'etail. As for the latter, 
we have sought to obviate the difficulty by checking Aristotle's 
information in the relevant respects against Plato's own words and 
the body of independent evidence to be mentiaec presently. 
While we ha.ve apparently the whole body of Plato' s ~~if~· the 
dialogues/ offer in certain respects greater difficulties as eviden~ 
·for Platonism than Aristotle's account itself. They give us no 
complete, no sys~e~,ic account of his philosophy, but are primarily 
dra.matic works of art. For this reason there is a presupposition that 
the views expounded by the various characters, especially those of 
the protagonist {to use the technical term of tre drama concerning 
wha.t are actually works of art), represent not Plato's views but 
those¢1Df the character portrayed, especially when such chara.cter is 
an hisltorical persona.ge • .An examination, however, of the earlier 
dialogues leads to the conclusion that, while in its broa.dll'1r lines, 
the thougjlt put into the mouth of the protagonist, Socrates, is in 
chara.cter, it shows an/ever increasing tendency to incorporate and 
fina.lly to pass into Plato's own thought. Plato makes use of certain 
artistic devices to mark where Socrates' utterances go beyond what 
Socrates actually would have said, and this leads to the canon that 
in general, that is in later dialogues also where some character 
other than Socrates is the chief speaker, Plato chose his protagoniEt 
' 
as a form of acknowledgement that the doctrines there :i:H expounded 
owed a special debt to their dramatic exponent. Nevertheless the 
difftcul ty still rema.ins that such doctrines underwent, or might k:2:r 
have undergone, an undetermined measure of reconstruction in order 
to suit the requirements of the dramatic date and the historical 
characterisation of the protagonist. Further, the dialogues were 
occasional pieces, ea:ch being written to make some particular po:int, 
and where Plato's own doctrines are introduced, only so;lmuch of them 
1 appears as is relevant to that point. This raises grea.t difficulties 
of interpretation as to detail, but as in the case of Aristotle's 
evidence this does not make our task as formidable as otherwise woul~ 
be the case, since we a.re concerned for the most part only with the 
general philosophical position underlying the dialogues. Our great 
difficulty 1 s not so much the interpretation of the significance of 
any particular dramatic utterance for Platonism as the silence of 
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the dialosues, the lacunae in the evidence, consequent upon the 
occasional nature of these works. For most of the Platonism in the 
' dialogues occurs in digressions. 'Ihis is especially the case in 
respect of the Doctrine of Idea-Numbers, am it is for this reason 
that certain evidence independent of both Aristotle and the dialogueE 
is so valuable. 
Most of this evidence is drawn from notes on Plato's Lecture 
on the Good ma.de by his hearers, especially Aristotle, and it is a 
natural supposition that these notes were merely transcriptions of 
what Plato actually said. Especially valuable is the account of 
Hermodorus, since there can be no suspicion that he wa.s influenced 
by any deliberate misrepresentation of Platonism on Aristotle's 
part, 1 as he was not a. Peripatetic. His account of the Lecture is 
confirmed by the agreement therewith of accounts gi von by Sextus 
Empiricus and Alexander of Aphrodisias. In the second pilace it is 
reasonable to accept accounts drawn from Aristotle's notes on the 
Lecture, as said above, {which unfortunately do not amount toif;muc}l;~ 
as these notes did not remain extant until the time of most of the 
extant commentarie~··:; they may, however, lie behind the evidence of 
Theophra.stus, Aristotl-e's pupil).But even in the case of this 
evidence there are difficulties of interpretation, since it consists 
of fragments isolated from their context, i.e. from their original 
context, and their relation to the doctrines ~hich we may suppose 
Plato to have expounded in his Lecture is not always clear, and a 
comparison of threeJreports of the same doctrine, those referred to 
above, clearly shows that such reports were made with v~ing degrees 
of detail. 
IIowever, a comparison of all three bodies of evidence,mak1ng 
due allowance for their( :respective difficulties in interpretation, 
leads to a· rea.sona>ble agreement between Aristotle's evidence on the 
one side, and that of the dialogues and accounts of the Lecture on 
the Good on the other. Where the evidence in question covers any 
point made by Aristotle, he seems to ha.ve rendered a fair account of 
that· point, if, as said above, we make due allowance for his weak-
ness of interpreting other philosophies in terms of his own, and the 
conclusion seems warranted that, where his evidence cannot be corro-
borated be cause it is not mentioned j_n the dialogues nor by the 
extant accounts of the Lecture on the Good, it is to be accepted 
since it is now¢'here contradicted and is compatible with what has 
already been checked. On this basis I give a reconstruction drawn 
from these various sources, but confined Ja rgely to those poi.nts 
of a.greerre nt with and difference from Pythagoreanism listed in 
Metaphysics A.vi - for only such points are really relevant. 
1. This question is more fully discussed in the Appendix. 
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b) Plato's Earlier Theory of Ideas. Despite Burnet and Taylor, 
1 t 1 s now generally a.greed that Plato was the first who asserted 
the existence of Ideas. In arriving at this conclusion, Plato was 
influenced from two directions: Hera.cli tean Flux for the sensible 
world, and Socratic definitions as the objects of knowledge. Since 
objects of knowledge could not be in a. sensible world that was 
always changing, for that v1hich is constantly changing cannot be 
known, Plato separated the universal from its sensible particulars 
and called them Ideas or Forms. These were what we would call 
intelligible entities, and there seems to be no doubt that they were 
really separate from sensible s, at any rate in the later dialogues.t 
of this period. Sensibles were named after these Ideas and existed 
by participation in them. This word,filrfcr , was adopted from 
the current term for denoting the relation between qua.li ties and 
their substrate. Plato seems to have been not quite clear in his 
own mind as to the nature of the manner in which sensibles partici-
pate in the Ideas, but tends to pass, in the course of time, from 
more commonly conceiving the sensibles 1 to share' in Ideas to more 
commonly regarding sensi bles as copies of Ideas. One of several 
classes of Ideas were Ideas of Number. These imply the existence of 
Mathematicals as something between the Idea and the sensible embodi-
menttthereof to serve as.the objects of mathematical thought, but 
there is no clear evidence that Plato held such entities in his 
earlier period: perhaps he had not yet worked out completely the 
implications of his thought. 
c) The Change in Platonism. The problem that seems to have 
especially engrossed ~lato' s attention was that of the One and the 
Many. This had two phases: in the world of sense nnd in that of the 
? Ideas. The Eleatic vi~w was currently accepted that the One was 
indivisible, had no parts, ~d-that what was not l)eing had no 
existence at all. Thus, if any one thing appeared to be many, its 
appearance of multiplicity must be false. This meant that the world 
of sense, which in general was characterised by multiplicit.y and 
whl.ch in particular had been shown by Zeno to combine contrary 
attributes, was unreal. Plato seems to ha.ve a t.tempted to g1 ve an 
explanation of the contradictions of sense in terms of its partici-
pation in Ideas of opposite meaning, but this raised the fundamental 
question of the mode of Participa.t'ion. If this was a presence of 
the Ideas in its particular instances, how could the Idea, as a 
unity, be either sub-d1. vided or reduplicated? If this was a copying, 
of' J{the Ideas by sensibles, there must be a substrate, a tertium 
quid, in which these copies could be copied. But then the problem 
arose in wha.t relation the copy which entered into that substrate 
stood¢to the original pattern. On the other hand, Plato had worked 
out a method of Divisi.on, and if this had an ontologica.l ground 
the Idea.s must have been capable of intercommunion, by which each 
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would be at omce both one and many. Judging from Philebus 15AB, 
Plato put these two pha"ses of the problem of the One and the Many 
together, and asked hov. Ideas, as each unities, could still be many: 
meny as the~ontoltgical basis of Division - for example, Animal is 
both Man and Horse - and many as split up or perhaps reduplicated 
in the world of sense, whether sensibles shared in the Ideas or 
whether copies of the Ideas, as emana..tions so to speak, were present 
in some substrate, whence the sensible came into existence.1 The 
problem of the One and the Man.y in the world of sense required for 
1 ts explana~ion a solution in the world of ~~i~· And Pla.to saw that 
the root of the problem was the Eleatic definition of the One as 
having no parts and of the other than the One (or of Being in 
general) as Rbsolutely non-existent. For the solution of the 
problem, Plato had to refute and reformulate the conceptions of the 
One and of Not-Being. He saw that the One was really a whole having 
parts and that Not-Being was only VJha.t was different from Being. 
This problem, in its phase of the multiplicity of sensibles, 
Plato set out in the Parmenides, casting Socrates in the r6le of 
the upholder of his (~'la)o' s) Earlier Theory of Ideas. and Parmeni-
des (for the root of the problem was Parmenides' definition of the 
One and of Not-Being) in the rSle of Plato's own maturer~ judgment. 
sett1.ng out from Zeno' s refutation of the Vtorld of sense, the 
dialogue gave Plato's ea!t"lier answer: sens1bles can participate in 
either or both of two contrary Ideas, and so combine contrary 
predicates. Parmenides, however, shows that this will not do - no 
adequate account can be given of this Participation. He then under-
¢takes in effect to put SocraJtes on the right path. He then pro ce6ds 
to demonstrate the incorrect deduction made it} the poem, . the Way of 
Truth, both in respect of the One and of Not-Being, and complements 
the refutation by setting· out a correct deduction of the One and of 
Not-Being (in hypotheses 11 and v), in the course of which 1 t a.ppearE 
that the fundamental error of the poem was the def'init:ion of these 
concepts: the One is really a whole of parts, Not-Being the other 
than Being. The nature of this Not-Being is further described in 
hypothesis vii a.s an indeterminate continuum. The presumption is, 
and this is confirmed by Aristotle, that sensibles ere composed of 
Being and this Not-Being of hypothesis vi:i.. The~roblem is solved. of 
tne One and Many of sensibles in the Appendix to hypothesis ii, 
-lh'here it is argued that a sensible can partake of contra.t-y attri-
butes in temporal succession. 
1. This is not the 'orthodox' view, but seems to be consistent with 
the former part of the following quote from Ross, Plato's Theory 
of Ideas 30:-
Idea.s imperfectly imitated by Qualities 
exemplified in ~ ' exemplified in 
Numbers and Shapes " " sensible things. 
These 'Qualitfles' seem to be what Plotinus calls f"~~~ £1.'.5? .So 
I interpret the e/~,oY~~ of the Timaeus as copies of the Ideas 
which are embodied in sensibles. ,_ 
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The Parmenides; then, testifies to a crisis in Plato's thought. 
Plato found that his Ideal Theory was una1ble to give a sat1sfa.ctory 
a.ccount of the multiplic1 ty of sensibles, much less that of the Ideae 
themselves - for if Division had an ontological ii~i~, the Ideas 
had to communicate, azrl so be at once both one and many. He saw 
that the root of the problem of the One and the Many lay in the 
Eleatic definitions of the One and of Not-Being, and reformulated 
them, incidentally following up his demonstration that Not-Being in 
some way IS in the Sophist. In the Sophist the ground of the Not-
Baing demoastrated in·hypothesis vis found in the Other, ani while 
Plato is not explicit, it seems that just as he found the solution Bi 
of the One and the Many in the sensible world by deriving it :from 
Being a.nd Not-Being, so 116 solution in the Ideal world is to be 
found in its derivation-from some representa~ive of Being and this 
Other, the ground of relative Not-Being. But for his particular 
interpretation of these elements, we must turn to the next point. 
d) The Question of Pythagorean Influence. 
As the subject of this thesis is concerned only with that relation-
ship between Platonism and 'Pythagoreanism referred to by .Aristotle 
in Metaphysics A.vi.l, the question of Pythagorean influence, so far 
as we are C{)ncerned, is confined to the relationship bet ween the 
philosophy of the Italians, that of the Auditor.s, and that phase of 
Platonism that centres around the deE'ivation of Ideas and of things 
from elements, which is still to be discussed. Some time before 
plato wrote. j;he Parinenides, which h:as been discussed above, he made 
a journey to Italy and Sicily, 388 B.C., and according to Cicero's 
evidence, this was in order to learn from Archytas of Tarentum the 
\ details of his philosophy. Of this philosophy Plato had already some 
\ gelll:eral knowledge, judging from allusions thereto in- the Cra.tylus 
I , 
1 and Gorgias, and in dialogues written after this voyage he shows 
I some detailed knowledge of the Italian philosophy. When he ca.me to 
, the decision to modify his Theory of Ideas, this knowledge was I appl.1 ed 1n a parti ct>la.r ly apposite fashion. 
For the Erttrly Pythagoreanism had been criticcised by Parmenides, 
inter alia, for its derivation· of the Limit by the reduplication of 
the One, Parrnenides arguing that what is one is nothing but one and 
so cannot be many, as 1 t would become if reduplicated, or 1 t may be 
if divided, for our evidence does not allow us to determire exactly 
in what way the Limit arose from the One, by multiplication or by 
division. Now this was, in· a. way, precisely Plato's own difficulty 
at the time of' the crisis in his thought. He could not give a 
precise account how the Idea could be pluralised in its sensible 
pa.rt1cu.lars, whether this was by multiplication or by division, for 
this very reason, that the One, by definition, could not be nor 
become many. But the post-Zenoni c Pythagorean school had found a 
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way to obviate Parmenide s '· critic ism, namely, by deriving the One 
from the Limit and Unlimited, so that the elements were now primary 
instead of being deri veifrom the One, and the One, instead of being 
an original unity, was in its very nature a compound of these two 
elements. Further¢', after the fashion of the One itself, all other 
things were likewise derived from these same tvvo elements. Plato 
apparently sa\'f here the solution to his own problem just as the 
Pythagoreans had earlier been confronted by his own pmblem, and, 
allowing for the differences between his and the Pythagorean philo-
sophies, he solved his ~fi~·em by applying the Pythagorean (Ita~ian) 
solution to the set up of his own ~rather different system, i£ it 
can be named that. 
Taking the One as analogous to his Idea, and seeing that this 
Idea could not be pluralised in sensible particu.. lars any more than 
the Pythagorean One could have beel!'l pluralised into the units making 
up the Limit, IF IT COULD BE REGARD~D AS AN ELEATIC MONAD, he 
followed the lead of the post-Zenonic philosophers by making the 
Eleatic definition of the One, namely as having no parts, inappli-
cable to his own One, the Idea, by deriving it from two elements 
analogous to the Limit and the Unlimited, and likewise derived all 
oth.er things, i.e. sensible particulars, from these same two elementj1 
the Limit a..YJ.d the Unlim1 ted, after the fashion of the Ide a. Then, df 
element 
the Unlimited as the HiDIN:t:s of sensibles was a principle of multi-
p11city,and the Unlimited as the element of Ideas was a principle of 
otherness or differentiation, not only was thypro blem solved of how 
an Idea, as a One, could yet be many 'both in 1 tself and in the 
infinite multtplicity oft~articulars, but his principles, the Limit 
#llil 
and the Unlimited, were used to effect the limited multiplicity of 
of the Ideas in themselves end their infinite plurality in the world 
of sense into which they were tither divided up or reduplicated -
this problem Plato seems .)Snever to have solved. Thus, in the Philebus 
; 
it is asked how an Idea, being a. One, can yet be many in its sensi'ble 
particulars, and this is ,answered as inherent in the constitution of 
all things from the Limit and tpe Unlimited; further, the distinction 
is made between the numbe.red many into which an Idea, sc. a Genus, is 
divided, namely its Species, and the infinite many of its sensible 
particulars, and by¢making use of just these terms, Limit and 
Unlimited, which is ascribed to a Prometheus, (which is generally 
accepted as a pssudonym for Pythagoras} Ple.to in this way ackno\'Pledg69 
bis debt to Pythagoreanism. Further, in the Timaeus wbere Plato deals 
with the constitution of the sen§ible world from elements, but where 
he uses the term 'Receptacle' instead of 'Unlimited't Plato further 
acknowledges the influence¢ of the Italian school by putting the 
whole discourse into the mouth of a Pythagorean, Timaeus of Locr1, 
who is described in such a way that he can be recognised as Archytas 
of Taremtum. It remains to give a more detailed account of the Theory 
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of Ideas. 
e) The Later Doctrine of Idea-Numbers. Pla.to~s ultimate prin-
ciples were the One and the Great and Small. The latter term was a. 
generic one, embracing various 'species' or types analogously 
constituted, ~~~h as the Long and Short, the Broad and Narrow, the 
Deep and Shallow, the Hot and Cold, etc. From each of these a 
different class of/entity was constituted. Thus, from a principle 
possibly called the Many and Few, although. it is generally referred 
to as the Unequal, were derived Ideas of Number. This principle was 
probably a temporal continuum end gave rise to the Numbers by being 
1 eq_ua.li sed', i.e. marked of{ at equal· j_nterva.ls. This 'equalisation' 
was effected in some way not kno~ to us by the One.' From the Long 
and Short, doubtless a one-dmmensional cont1.muum, Vl'as derived the 
Idea of the Line, although. van der Wielen and others have argued 
that the Ideal Magnitudes were not really Ideas at all, but a. 
'fourth class•. So from the B4\"Da.d and Narrow, a two-dimensional 
continuum, was dE:ri ved the Ideas of various Planes, and from the 
Deep a.TJ.d Shallow, a three-dimensional continuum, came the Ideas of 
Solids. If these classes of entities were not Ideas but a 'fourth 
class' - Ideal Magnitudes - then their formal principle would be 
not the One, but the Two, Three and Four re spe cti vely. Such a view 
was held by somebody, and most commentators believe 1 t was Plato, 
partly on t~e strength of some notices by Aristotle, but more 
defin1 tely from an allusion made by Theophrastus. With this I agree, 
!u~:_i t.hout prejudice to. thE: acceptance of the term 'fourth class' 
_!;o Aristotle's critica.J; method. That is, Aristotle calls it such, 
but Plato may or may not have interpreted these Magnitudes as Id·eas. 
However that may .be, other Ideas, such a.s those of the Natural Kinds 
would doubtless have been derived from some sort of substrate 
embracing various qualita-tive continua, and/f from the One. Of this, 
' however, we have no evidence except perhaps in the Sophist where 
some of these Kinds are discussed. From this it would seem that the 
most fundamental of these continua,doubtless because common to all 
Ideas~ were Being and Not-Being, which accounted for the existence 
of the Ideas, and Same and Other, which accounted for the self-
identity of each Idea and f~i the differentiation of the Idea.s 
respectively. All the various sets of continua were subsumed under 
one all-embracing, or perhaps typical, continuum, the Great and 
Small., though in what sense this could be called all-embracing 
rather than the More and Less, or in what sense it is particularly 
typical, is)!{ not at all clear. In the case of all theideas, of true 
Ideas as distinct from the 'fourth class', the other element~, 
corresponding to the Pythagorean Limit, just as the Great and Small 
corresponded to the 11Jnlimited, was the One, possibly to account for· 
the unity which cha.racterises the universal as against the J)i:t 
plurality of sensible particulars. 
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Now the fundamental tenet of Early Pythagoreanism was that all 
things were Numbers, and as the Italians altered this to the elements 
of all things being the elements of Number, and substantiated this 
by their method of defining the essence of anything in terms of 1 ts 
first occurrence, that is of its occurrence in the realm of Number, 
(the Limit being in this way equated with the Odd and the Unlimited 
with the Even), Plato, who was influenced by this school, derived 
Numbers from two analogous elements. As among the Greeks,ng~xQHiil~ 
the zero, Number was universally conceived as having its origin from 
the a.e, Plato found his formal element (to use the Aristotelian 
term) in the One, and to a.ccount for their serial order, while at 
the same time keeping close to the Pythagorean Essence of the Even -
the Two - he made their material element an indetenninate dyad, under 
which the Great and Small itself was apparently ultimately subsumed. 
For Plato could not, like the Pythagorea.ms, derive his Ideal Numbers 
from the Odd and Even since this ~ould have given mathematical and 
not Ideal Numbers. Thus, Ideas, being composed of the same elements 
as Numbers - the One and the indeterminate dyad of Great and Small -
were Numbers in respect of their origin. But little of this appears 
in the dialogues. 
As Plato's Ideas were separate from sensibles, whereas the 
Numbers of Archytas were phenomenal numbers, it was necessary for 
to make . him lb a use of two Unliml.teds, one for Ideas, discussed above, 
and'r..nother fer sensibles. But just as the various types of the 
Unlimited in the case of the different types of Ideas were all 
analogical~y the same as the generic term, Great and Small, so his 
sens1 ble substrate was but another ve.riety of this. Such were the 
Hoth{and Cold, the Wet and Dry, etc. - sets of qualitativv continua. 
As the Pa.rmenides is the ;rirstr; dialogue in which elements of the 
sensible world are hinted a.t and it is confined in its terminology 
to the nomenclature forced upon it by its mise en scene, it is 
difficult to decide whether quantitative continua such as the One oil 
and the Many, the Great and the Small, which are implied by hypothe-
sis vii, also were constituents of the sensible substrate. Howeftr 
that ~y be, it is described in the Philebus as the hotter and drier 
etc., and named the Unlimited; described in the Timaeus as Space 
~n~lt¥11:1'" 
moistened and ~s4, and named the Receptacle, where it is also the 
source of motion and irregularity in the sensible world; and it is 
furtm, r described by Ar1s:totle a.s a. principle of mul t1pl1c1 ty, plura. 
11sing the Ideas which. it receives, so that from one application of 
the Idea of Ta.ble, for example, the substrate yields a plurality of 
tables. But Aristotle's other illustrations drawn from the dialogue, 
the simile of gold and the metaphor of Mother or NuPsa, do not seem 
to be particularly apposite to the point he is making- the plurali• 
sing property of the substrate. The principle of unity in the 
sensible is the Idea,or rather the Idea 
as multiplied or perhaps 
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divided in the world of sense., and it is Soul that puts this 'image' 
of;ithe Idea into the substrate to effect the sensible particula.r, 
the first such act on a cosmic~scale being described by Plato in 
the Tima.eus as Creation, a bringing of order into disorder. 
Such is the reconstruction suggested by the evidence. It is 
highly tentJive and inc~mplete because our evidence is fragmentary 
,.. -
or deals only, with pa,rticular points. It seems impossible at this 
late stage of time to discover how all tthis worked out, perhaps 
, indeed Plato did not succeed in bringing all the various strands of 
his beliefs into one all-embracing system. Perhaps that is what he 
m:ea.nt whsn in Epistle v11. 341C he wrote: "There does not exist nor 
will there ever exist any treatise of mine dealing therewith. For 
1 t does not at a.ll admit of verbal expression like other studies, 
but, as a. result of continued application to the subject itself and 
communion therewith, it is brought to birth in the soul on a sudden, 
as light that is k~ndled by a leaping spark." 
••••••• ooOoo ••••••• 
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Appendix.. 
In addition to the po si ti ve account of the interpretation of Meta-
phJfics A.vi.l given in this dissertation, it~ seems to me to be 
advisable to append here a negative side to complete the argument, 
namely, to refute Cherniss' rather formidable arguments that 
Aristotle, because he could not understand how Idea.s could exist 
unless they were Numbers, assumed that they were such, and put 
together the details of his interpretation from isolated passages in 
the dialogues, which he interpreted incorrectly in any case, and 
that, in order to btolster up his fiction of Idea-Numbers,he inventa:l 
for it an alleged Pythagorean influence, rewrit:J.ng the transition 
from his account of Pythagoreanism in A.v to his account of Platon-
ism in A.vi for this purpose, and, under the influence of this 
alleged connection between Pythagoreanism and Platonism, he further 
invented the necessary deta1.ls of Pytha.goreanism required in order 
to establish such connection. We shall recount Cherniss' argumemts 
on these points in detail, followed by. a refutation, but preliminary 
thereto it will be advisable to deal with the question of the order 
of composition of books A, M, and N, since C~erniss' interpretation 
depends to a. large extent on his conception of ftlheir order,and the 
re.futa.t1on likewise requires the correct order to be established. 
1 •. The_Order of Books A, M a.nd N.. Cherniss' V!i!• Cherniss1 
2 
takes the back-reference to the influence of Socrates in M.ix.l086 
a.29-bll to refer to the mention of Socrates in M.1v • .ii5§: 1078b9-36, 
because Socrates is there dealt il'i th fairly fully, whereas in A. vi. 
987a.32-bl0, the only other passage which could be referred ·to, Socra-
tes is reduced to a. minimum. Indeed, A.vi is later than either of the 
other two passages, because it gives added information in connection· 
with Flux, viz. that Cratylus was Plato's teacher, and in connection 
with Pythagoreanism, but it reduces the account of Socrates to a 
minimum, andjd:does not mention at all the duplication of reality by 
the Forms, which characterises the other two passages. Hence, he 
argues, A.v1 was a. last recension of the description of Platonism 
given fir-st in M.iv and for a second time in M.1x, with the purpose 
of reducing the influence of Socrates to a minimum and repla.cing it 
by that of Pythagoreanism, in order to bolster up Aristotle's 
fiction of a Platonic Theory of Idea-Numbers. The order of' these 
passages, then, is M.iv, M.ix, A.vi. 
A Refutation of Cherniss' Arf@!!Jents. The argument that A•vi 
must be later tha.n the other passages because it red&oes the picture 
l. Aristotle's Criticism of Plato 189-198. 
2. The possibility is disregarded t.ha.t an editor of the letaphysics 
might have inserted this reference after the work had been put 
together in the form in wlil\ich it now exists, which was certainly 
not its ·original form. Compare Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics I. ,. 
xiii: 11/(The Metaphysics w~s produced by combining separate treatises 
and op. cit. xxxii: "It may have been edited by Eudemusn. 1 
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gacrates to a dlinimum and elaborates the account of Pythagorean! sm, 
is purely subjective. For why should the argument not be turned 
about and usee to show that, e.g. M.iv is later than A.vi because 
1 t puts th,account of Pythagoreanism in parenthesis and elaboraJes 
the influance of Socrates? 
) It is no proof that A.vi is later than the other two passages 
because it omits the argument that Ideas duplicate;freali ty and adds \~,l the point that Cra.tylus was Plato's teacher. Cherniss ca.nnot have 
it both way.s. Why not argue that M.iv is later than A.vi because 
it omits the point about Cratylus arid adds an argument that Ideas 
duplicate reality? In other words, Cherniss is not clea.r which is 
the characteristic of lateness: the omisaion of certain points or 
their addition. When he takes both chara.cteristics together as the 
mark of lateness he is using a. ppeely subjective criterion, sihce 
theret'is no reason why the addition of 'a' and the omission of 'b' 
should be preferrad to the addition of 1 b 1 and the omission of 'a'. 
The question of the back-reference is more involved. If it was 
added by Jithe editor, who placed the separate books in thepresent 
order not because they were composed in that order but because he 
thought that order best representee Aristotle's development of his 
subject, then clearly the passage to which the reference refers is 
not necessarily either la.te or early. But let us meet Cherniss on 
bis own gro'!llld and assume that the reference was Aristotle's ·own. 
At first sight his argument seems to be cogent ·that the reference 
must be to M.iv and not to A.vi because the account of Socrates in 
M.iv ls fuller than in A.vi, and therefore M.iv is earlier than M. 
ix. Since then the account of Socrates is fullest in M.iv, which 
is early, and less full' in M.ix, which is later, a.na.logy proves that· 
A.vi, in 'which the accotint of Socrates is reduced to a minimum must 
be latest of all. But this really misses the point, The back-refer-
. . 
ence rea.ds: "And Socrates gavethe impulse to this theory, as we,isaid 
j 
in our earlier discussion, by. reason of his definitions." Hence, 
what it refers to is not a full and detailed discussion of Socrates, 
but to an account which mentions that SOCPATES GAV}i THE IMPULSE TO 
THIS THEORY. Novv M.iv does not at all state this, and its implica-
tion that his definitions influenced the Ideal Theory is rather 
vague:"Socrates became the first to raise the problem of universal 
definition ••• but Socrates ddd not .make the universals or the defini-
tions exist apart; they, however, gave them separate existence, and 
this was the kind of thing they called Ideas." I maintain a clearer 
statement of the point is given by A. vi: "Socra. tes fixed thought for 
the f'irst time on definitions; Plato accepted his teaching, but held 
that the problem applied not to sensible things but to entities of 
another kind •••• (which) he called Ideas." Admittedly one could not 
be certain to which of these two passages M.ix refers 1£ one consi-
dered only the words quoted. But I add the following argument to 
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clinch the matter. After the back-reference cited, M.ix continues: 
"But he did not separate universals from indi vidua,ls. 11 Now since 
this comes after the back-reference, 1 t would seem that the}Spa.s;:>age 
referred to did not inc~ude the Statement that Socrates did not 
separEtte. This is in fact not included in A.vi, but it is included 
in M.1.v. Therefore, A.vi se11ms to suit the requirements of the 
passage referre~ i.n M.ix1 better than does M.iv. T,h~refore, A.vi ~) (.ill?). . 
is early and M. 1~a. little later, with presumably M.i,Vthe !latest. 
We conclude, therefore, that Cherniss' arguments for the late-. 
ness of A.vi are not conclusive,but could be used with equa~ effect 
to argue the lateness of M.iv. 
2 ~a.eg.!=lr's 'we-they'_Argument. Jaeger assigns book A to that 
period of Aristotle's life when he was at Asses shortly after 
Plato's death and stilJ. regarded himself as a Platonist, a.s is 
witnessed~by references in A to the Theory of' Ideas as "WE" hold it. 
M.ix.l086a21-N.fin. also belongs to the same period, since it 
reveals the same attitude in 1086bl8-9:nwe shall destroy substance 
in the sense in which WE understand 'substance' n. In fact, it formed 
with A, and a form of BrE reflected .in the student's notes whicn 
constitute part of K, an early version of the Metaphysics, which 
was later fi!1G:ed by Aristotle, and in which, inter alia, M.l086a21-
N .fin. was meant to be repla.ced by M. ini t. -1086a21. This latter is 
shown to be later because 1t systematically removes the "we" from 
those criticisms of the Ideas in A.ix which are repeated in M.iv,, 
replacing the ''we" by "they"., Thus, at this time, Aristotle was no 
longer a Platonist, and the book can be assigned to the pe~iod whan 
the Peripatetic school was hostile to the Academy., which must have 
been after Aristotle's return to Athens in 335. Therefore, the . 
occurrence of "we" in books A ,and M.ix.l086a21-N .fin., 1 ts absence 
in M.init.-1086a21, and the systematic replacement of nwe" by ttthey•· 
in the latter, indicates that the latter was written mo~e than 10 
years after book A, so that Chernif·s' a.rguments for t.he later date 
of A.vi would seem to collaps~. The more so since Ross, 3 while 
differflng in many details from Jaeger's reconstruction. of the 
sta~ in the comp1la.t1on of the Metaphysics, agrees in this, which 
is the only part that directly concerns our argument, that A is 
obviously the first part of a.course of lectures, and is early 
because of its "we" passages; book M is later because it replaces 
the "weu by "they", was meant to replace the criticism of Platonism 
in A.1x., and was pa .. rticularly concerned with Speus1ppus and Xenoc·-
rates in contradistinction to A which is concerned with Plato. 
Cherniss' however has rather dashed this argument, at least 
insofar as it concerns his own thesis that A.vi is later than M., 
1. Ja.eger, Aristotle 189 note 1, takes 1086b2 to re.fer to 987bl. 
2. Aristotle 171 with note 3. 178-139, etc. 
3. Aristotle's Metap,Jsics I.xv and xxi1. 
4. Aristotle's Criticism of Plato 489-493. 
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by pointing oth.t that the "we" does not always mean that Aristotle 1s 
speaking as a Platonist but that he is agreeing with what Plato said; 
that in any case 11 we" is confined in book A to A.ix - indeed, A.vi 
988a2-3 has "they" - and both "we 11 and 11 theyn occur in the same 
connection in A.ix and B. Thus, the ttwe" is not evidence of early 
composition, butonly shows that in the particular passage in which 
it occurs, Aristotle there drew on earlier writings, not n~cessa~i­
ly hms own. I must allow that Cherniss has here made his point, and 
some other criterion must be sought to demonstrate that M.iv is 
later than tA.vi - for this is the~ the matter. 
A Demonstration that A.vi is~· than_M&.. The criterion 
which I here adopt is that, where two passages are obviously related,1 
one as a recension of the other, that one is the later in which any 
sentence can. be shown to be out of plac-e in the context. Such 
passages are tre first parts of A.vi and M.iv, where descriptions 
are given of' Plato's Earlier Theory of Ideas. This account in A.vi 
falls into three parts: i) the influence of Cratylus, ii) the 
influence of' Socrates., and iii) Plato's argument by which he arrived 
at the conception of Ideas. M.iv reflects these three divisions, and 
with the exception of a long par,lenthesis on the history of the 
definition, which is not strictly necessary., there is no detail in 
M.iv which is not found in A.vi, with one exception: that Socrates 
did not make the universals exist apart, but the Idealists sepa.rated 
1 1 them. T~en follows a series of c:r:iticisms that are a most word for 
wordtidentical with the firs~ four .criticisms of A.ix. 
Now, dividing .these passages into the said three parts, we find 
that A.vi rea.ds as follows, the capitalised sentence being the crux: 
i) Plato became familiar with the Heracli tean doctrine tha,t all 
sensible things are ever in a. state .of !'lux AND THERE IS NO KNOWLEDG£t 
ABOUT THEM; ii) the Socratic definition;·iii) Plato accepted his 
teaching but referred the problem to other entities than the sensibl£1 
for this reason that the common definition could not be a. definition 
of any sensible things, as they. were a.lways changing. Here the capi-
talised words are stated as part 'of the Heraclitean doctrine, a.nd 
Plato•s argument (iii) is that the object of knowledge must not 
change. But in M.iv we find a different account of this: i) the 
Idealists accepted the Heraclitean sayings that describe Ill things 
as ever passing awa.y, iii) so that if knowledge or thought is to 
have an oUJect there m~st be other entities apart from sensibles,FOR 
THERE COULD BE NO KNOWLEDGE OF THINGS IN A STATE OF FLUX. ii) But 
1 .• This addition can be explained on the view that M.l v was .intended 
to replace an earlier account, M.1x, where this point, that Socra-
tes did not separate universals from particulars, is made for this 
reason, that the account is preceded by the cri ti<e:ism that the 
Idea,lists erred in making Ideas both universal and separate as 
pa.rtimula.rs. It is, then, natural that Aristotle should there add 
tha.t Socra.tes did not separate in contrast to the Idealists who 
did. If, then, M.1v was written to re 1·· 
well k · P ace M.ix, 1 t might very 
eep this point concerning sepa.rat1on. 
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socrates introduced the definition, which he did not separate. Here 
the capitalised words are added to Pla,to' s argument for separation, 
vrhich is simply that if knowledge is to have an object, it must be 
outside of the sensible world. That is, Aristotle here gives as 
Plato's argument for separation, not that the sensible world is 
always changing, but that it could not be known. But that there is 
no knowledge about the sensible world belongs rather to Cra.tylus' 
outlook as in A.vi, since we find in Metaphysics 1010a.7-9: 11Because 
they saw that a.ll things in this world of nature were in movement, 
and that about what changes no true statement cem be made, they said 
that, regarding that which everywhere and in every respect is chang-
ing, NOTHING COULD BE TRULY AFFIRMED." Further, the dialogue, 
Cratylus, confirms A. vi, that Plato's argument for Ideas was that 
the object of knowledge could not chalage whereas sensibles changed, 
and proves M. i v wrong in arguing that Ideas must exist because there 
could be no knowledge of sensibles. 
Further, the?J"order of treatment in A. vi is the na.tura.l one: 
first thetinfluences on Plato, lastly his use of these influences. 
But in M.iv the influence of Socrates comes last, and in order to 
complete the account of Plato's argument before mentioning part of 
that argument, namely Socrates' contribution, Aristotle has to anti-
cipate this by introducing 'objects of knowledge and thought'. 
Aristotle is at liberty to arrange his accounts in any way he pleases 
but the point is this: if M.iv is a recension of A.vi, one can under-
j~fii how Aristotle, in rearranging his material, b?tched it by 
shifting part of the Heraclitean doctrine to the part dealing with 
plato's argument; but how could A.vi, if it were a recension of M.iv., 
displace part of Plato's argument in M.iv and ascribe it to Cratylus"? 
Which is the earlier: the passage where the sentence in question is 
inpplace, or that where this sentence is,m1sapplied? The answer is 
obvious. 
Finally, a comparison of A.yi and M.iv with the parallel passage 
in M.ix shows that M.iv is the il:atest. M.ix:"The reason why those 
who described their substances as universal combined these tv10 
characteristics in one thing, is that they did not make substances 
identical with sensible things. lhey thought that the particulars in 
the sensible world were in a state of Flux and none of them remained, 
\, 
but that the universal was apart fro~ these and something different. 
And Socrates gave the imptlllse to this theory •••• tt Now here 1 t is 
explicitly sta.ted that the Idealists separated, not because there 
was no knowledge of sensibles, a.s in M.iv, but because sensibles 
were in Elux, as in A.vi. Thus, M.iv is the account that differs 
from both A.vi and M.ix, and so is the one that is the recension. 
Hence, Chern1ss is wrong, A.vi is not a later recension of M.iv, but 
M.iv is later than A.vi. 
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2._!g§inst Cherniss that Aristotle Inveg,ted Igea-~;!liDbf!!s~ 
1 ~ The Alleg~d Invention of the Elements of Ideas. Cherniss takes 
the account of the elements of Idee,s in A.vi as a compressed state-
ment of M.vii.108lal2-17, that Ideas must be Numbers, must be 
derived from the elements of Number, if they are to exist at all. 
Since Aristotle, he says, could not understand how Idea.s could exist 
unless composed of elements, as in 108lal2-17, he simply assumes 
that .they were so conceived. 
We ha.ve shown above that M.iv was written later than A.vi, so 
that M.vii, which forms an integral part of the book in which M.iv 
2 is a pat·t, as Jaeger has dcm,ionstrated, must be later than A.vi,not 
only in position but also in time of compos 1 tion. How, then, could 
Aristotle malce a. compressed statement of this 'demonstration' in 
A· vi? There is an interval of 10 o'f more years between the comptis i-
t ion of A.vi and,iof M.vii, and even if Aristotle had anticipated 
that 'demonstration• at the time he wrote A.vi - when he was at 
Assos, mark you, shortly after Pla.to• s death and at a. time when, if 
Jaeger is correct, he was still a Platonist - what sort of work is 
it that ascribes to Plato a theory which, according to Cherniss, was 
not only unknown to Plato but is not even hinted at bjf Aristotle as 
a compressed statement of a deduction as to the nature of Ideas; nay 11 
more, Aris$tle only 'demonstrated' that the Ideas, if they were to 
exist at all, he,d to be composed of elements, 10 or more years later,, 
and in,fa portion of his v1ork which apparently was intended to form 
1 ts CONCLUSION? 
But even if hhis could be accepted, Cherniss is stil~ wrong. 
. . 
So far from l08lal2.-17 being a demonstration that Ideas must have 
elements, it has the very opposite import, when read in its context. 
M.vii opens with a consideration of the possible constitution of 
Numbers, which Aristotle assumes have units. The question is then 
raised whether these units are associable, inasl$ociable; or mixed. 
Firstly Aristotle considers the results if the units are all associ-
able: in this case we ha.ve mathematic~l ~umbers and the Ideas can-
not be the Numbers. This clearly assumes that the Idealists referred 
to posited the Ideas as Numbers. If there is any doubt about this, 
read the sentence which follows:nBut if the Ideas are not Numbers, 
neither can the:w exist at all. For from what principles will the 
Ideas come? It is Number that comes from the One and the Indefinite 
3 . . . . 
Dyad,· add the principles or elements ARE SAID TO BE the principles 
and elements of Number •••• " The italicised words show that it is 
not Aristotle's deduction that Ideas must have elements if they are 
to exist but that the Idealists themselves stated that the elements 
1. Aristotle's Criticism of Plato 180 note 104; Riddle of the Early 
Academy 58. 2~ Aristotle 178-180. 
3. I believe that this expression was fa.voured by *enocra.tes; book 
M was aimed especially at Xenocrates; and Aristotle here has 
Xenocrates in mind and not Pl t 
a o at all· 
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of Ide as are those of Number. 
In any case, the whole passage shows that 108~la.l2-17 is not a 
demonstration that if Ideas are to exist they must be Numbers. It 1s 
a .. n integra.l part of a dtlemma PROVING THAT IDEAS CANNOT BE NUMBEPS. 
I repeat, it proves not that Ideas must be Numbers but that they 
CANNOT be Numbers. For the argument is es follows: 
The Ideas are either Numbers e.r are not Numbers; 
If they are not Numbers, they cannot exist at all, for from 
what elements could they be composed? (l08lal2-17) 
If they are Numbers, their units are either ass4c1able, inasso-
ciable, or mixed; 
If associable, any particular 3 is no more Man-Itself than 
any other 3, 
If inassocia.ble •••••••• refuted in 108lal7-b26, 
If mixed •••••••• refuted in 108lb35-3a,l7. 
Therefore, the Ideas can neither be Numbers (on Aristotle 1 s assump-
tion ~ Numbers of units), nor not be Numbers (on the Idealist 
assumption of numbers in respect of their deri va.tion}. 
Cherniss1 has another theory about the Doctrine of Idea-Numbers. 
Ee argues that Aristotle's source for his statement that the One is 
the essence of Ideas is the deduction that just as the Ideal's Being 
comes from the Idea of Being in the Sophist, so its unity comes from 
the Idea of ){One. If, then, the One i.s a principle of Ideas, all 
Ideas must be Numbers, as in 
Small Aristotle made up from 
in the :Phileb.us. This hardly 
1054a4-13. Further, the name Great and 
,...ent;ort 
the mtfJ:ion of 1 the greater and smaller~ 
accords with Cherniss' thesis, for if 
Aristotle argued that, in order to ex~st, Ideas had to be derived 
trom;ithe elemmts of Number, surely h.e would have posited as Plato's 
the 
elements the One and an indefinite dy~d or the One and iXRM Even, 
which really a.re the elements ·Of Number, rather than the One and the 
ir:eat and Small, which latter no one yet had called an element of 
Number. But to refute Cherniss here it will' I think, be sufficient 
2 . t . 
to quote Ross, that the greater and smaller' in the Philebus is· 
no more prominent than the 'hotter and colder' etc., that the analy-
sis there is of the sensible world and not of Ideas, much less of 
Numbers, so that Aristotle could not have derived the Great and Sme.ll 
from the Phileb.us; indeed, Physics 209bll-17 with 33-210a2 is 
conclus1vejevidence that the term was Pla,to' s own, and what Aristotle 
says in the Metaphysics was derived from Plato's ora~ teaching and 
not from J{J{ the dialogues,not to mentio{j the independent e11:1dence to 
this effect from Aristo:tenus, Hermodorus, and Alexander. Neither 
could he have got the One· a.s a. formal cause from the dialogues., for 
the un1 ty of each Idea is a d1ff.erent thing from the deri va.tion of 
the Number series from the One. 
1. Riddle of the Early Academy 51 and 58. 
2. Plato • s Theory of Idea.s 147-150. 
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b) The Alleged Invention of Ele~gts of Sensibles .• 1 Cherniss' 
argument is that, because Aristotle believed that form and privation 
are contraries and the substra.te is a tertium quid, it is the 
essence of his critical method to make out that his predecessors 
neglected privation and made form and substrate contraries. Hence, 
as Plato's Ideas are Being, Aristotle argued that Plato must have 
derived sensible existence from Not-Being, and consequently that 
sensilbles were derived from two elements, Being (i.e. the Ideas) and 
Not-Being. Further, since the Idea/was Absolute Being, the substrate 
was Absolute Not-Being, the opposite of ~eing,as Parmm. ides had. 
show~. In this connection he cites, inter alia, Physics 19lb35-2al 
and Metaphysics 1088a35-9a6. 
In Physics 19lb35-2al Cherniss has overlooked the context.Taken 
by itself this passage does indeed seem to imply that Plato derived 
Becoming from Absolute Not-Being:"They allow that a thing may come to 
be withou-t qualification from Not.-Being, accepting on this point the 
statement of :Parmenides." But an e:xs.mins tion of the context shows 
that Aristotle does not in fact mean that Plato erred in deriYing 
Becoming from Not~Being, but in not drawing a distinction between 
Absolute a:td Pelative Not-Being; that Aristotle does not conceive 
Plato as deriving sensibles from Absolute but from 8elative Not-
Being. For at the end of Physics I. vii Aristotle la.ys down that there 
are three principles -form, pri va.tion, and matter - of which Form= 
Being, pri va.tioD; 1:1 Absolute Not-Being, and matter = Relative Not-
' Heing, as can be seen in 192a4-5: "Now. we distinguish ma.tter and 
privation,, a#fjnold that one of these, namely the matter, is Not-
' Being only in virtue "f en attribute which it has, while the pri-v:a.-
tion in its own nature is Not-Being." H~nce, Arietotle distinguishes 
two contraries, form and privation, corresponding to Being and 
Absolute Not-Being, and his matter is a tertium quid, Not-Being only 
relatively. Bearing this in mind, let us review the context. 
Aristotle explains, l9la23ff, that Hthose who studied science," 
by whom he seems to mean the Eleatics, went astray in denying that a 
plurality of things could exist because it was impossible for anyth:il. 
" that comes to be to do so either from Being (because it IS alr6ady) 
or from Not-Being (because something must be present e.s a substrate). 
When, then, Aristotle says in 19lbl2ff that he is in agreement that 
nothing can be said without qualification to come,il'rom what is not, 
but¢mainta1ns that a. thing may come to be from Not-Being in a quali-
be fied sense, :x:s is insisting on a substrate which shall be Relative 
Not-Being. 'Ihe Elea.tics were correct in denying tha.t Becoming could 
be derived from Absolute Not-Being simply., but erred in not pos1 t1.ng 
a substrate, Relative Not-Being. When, then, in 19lb35-2al he turns 
to Plato., he must mean something different from whajJ he had said 
1. Aristotle's Criticism of Plato 90-94, cp. Riddle of the Early 
AcadetJty 19. 
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about Parmenides, since he begins, rrothers indeed have apprehended 
the nature in question, but not adequately." This nature in quest-1ori 
is surely Relative Not-Being\ Aristotle. agrees ~ith these others :Pro 
(no dobbt Plato and his followers) that a thing may come to be from 
Not-Being - he could only so agree if this Not-Being, this substrate 
was, like his own, Relative Not-Being - but their account is ina~e­
qua.te in.ithat "they think that if the substratum is one numerically, 
it must also have only a single potentiality, vrhich is a very 
1 different thing. n For his om view is that both Absolute and Rela-
2 tive Not-Being are necessary in orderto derive Becoming, since he 
distinguishes ma:tter and privation, ·the former as Relative, the 
latter as Absolute Nat-Being, as said above, but "they identify 
their Great and Small alike with Not-Being ••• their triad is there-
fore of quite a different kind from ours." That is, Plato has three 
principles,eccording to Aristotle's way of counting - F'orm, Great, 
and Small, but as both the Great and t~ffiall are identified, or are 
A . 
one numerically, with relative Not-Being, this differs from his own 
form, privation, and matter, of which the former is Absolute~ the 
latter Relative Not-Being. In a word, Plato's error lay not in 
deriving Becomllng from Not-Being, but in overlooking privation, 
Absolute Not-Being, as one of his elements. Surely, then, his sub-
strate is Relative Not-Being, and Cherniss is wrong that Aristotle 
deduced that Plato must have derived things from Being and Absolute 
Not-Being because he thought all philosophers derived Becoming from 
contraries and that the contrary of the Ideas as ~eing was Absolute 
Not-Being. 
Cherniss is probably correct that, if Plato did not derive 
sensibles from elements, Aristotle would have deduced his elements 
to be Being and Absolute ·Not-Being; the very fact, then, that he 
reports Plato's elements as Seing and helative Not-Being, as we have 
• 
shown above, indicates that this was not Aristotle's deduction, and 
therefore Plato must have held that sennibles were so derived. We 
can, I think, go further and argue that unless Plato had actually 
held the dpad of the _Great and the Small Aristotle would not have 
said, uror even if one philosopher MAKES A DYAD of it, which he 
CALLS the Great and Small, n 3 but would simply have· stated that 
Plato ·overlooked Priva.tion, by making his other element Not-Being. 
The argument·rrom Metaphysics l088b35-9a6 is clearer. So far 
from proving that Aristotle ·thought that Plato's sensibles had to 
come from Not-Being in an absolute sense, as Cherniss understands 
it, it quite clearly proves that multiplicity had to come from · 
F:elative Not-~eing. For the quotation itself says that the Plato-
nists thought it necessary to prove that that which 1s not is, FOR 
ONLY THUS (i.e. from a -No~eing which had been proved to be in some 
sense, and so was Relative Not-Being) could _the things that are be 
1. Physics l92a2-3. 2. Physics l92a4-5. 3. Physics 192all-l2. 
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composed. 
Cherniss,then, has mis1n:terpreted Aristotle. He does not say 
that Plato derived things from Being and A!Jsolute Not-Being, but 
from .Being and Pelative Not-Being. If he conceived the principles 
of JUs predecessors-6 to have been contraries, he could no~ have · 
deduced that, for Plato,since the Idea was Being, the substrate of 
sens1bles mutt have been Relative Not-Being, since this is not the 
contrary ·of ~eing, but only something different. If, then, Aristot~ 
said that Plato's elements were Being and Relative Not-Being, it 
was because Plato himself had said or implied as much. 
Accordingly, Cherniss• argument collapses that Aristotle mis-
interpreted the dialogues and So found corroboration for his fictior 
of a material substrate - for the substrate was in fact alrea.dy 
there, at any rate in the Philebus and Timaeus. Cherniss thinks that 
because Aristotle conceived the substrate as Absolute Not-~eing 1n 
his predecessors,. finding Not-Being in the Sophist he took 1 t as 
confirmation of his view, despite the fact that it was Felative and 
not Absolute Not-Being, despite the fact that it was an 1 element•, 
if 1 t can be s~-calJ.ed, not in sensibles at all bl\t in Ide as. 
Cherniss is right in this,. that Not-Being in the Sophist is no 
substrate of phenomena., but it is difficult to believe that he is 
serious in alleging that Aristotle thout,ht it was, and even more so 
in alleging that Aristotle interpreted it as Absolute Not-~eing. 
But if Plato held a substrate, even though it does not appear in 
the Sophist, it is qulite unnecessary to accept Cherniss' compl1ca-
. 
ted chain of reasoning. He also alleges that Aristotle mistakenly 
found evidence of a substrate in the Receptacle of the Tima.eus. But 
Plato di"d in fact hoi! that theYReceptacle was a su.ibstrate, as I 
ha-ve tried to show above, and this is Space only incidentally. 
Finally, if·Aristotle misinterpreted the Unlimited of the Philebus 
, 
, ~ 
as a.isubstr.ate, th~n so .did Porphyry, bextus Empiricus and l1ermo-
dorus, and what is more,:sB most modem commentators have also done 
so. 
I I conclude, then, that Cherniss has failed to make his point 
that Aristotle deduced that the Ideas must have e.lements, that 
sensibles must be derived from Absolute Not-Being, and ascribed 
this belief to Plato, misinterpreting the dialogues to substantiate 
his claim. Plato actually held· that Ideas and sensibles have 
elements, but his substrate was not Absolute Not-Being - it was 
Relative Not-Being, as Aristotle, when examined, can be shown to 
have known. It reuins to turn to the last point, that by misinter-
preting the dialogues Aristotle got the idea that the material 
element of both Ideas and sensibles was the same. 
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cj Arist~tle's Alleged Identification of~ Great and Smal! 
. 1 
in 'Ideas with that in Sensible s. Cherniss sta,t es that the identity 
of the Great and Small in sensible s and in ·Ideas is to be found in 
. 2 . 
Physic·s 207a28-33, 223a,9-10 and Metaphysics 988al0-14. I do not, 
however, believe that Aristotle, in these places, conceived of the 
Great and Small as the same numerically in both ·Ideas and thin~s. 
In 1085a9-19 Aristotle lists the Long and Short, Broad· and Narrow, 
Deep and Shallow as 'species' of the Great and Small, from which 
come Mae~itudes, and speaks to.the same effect in 1089bl0-15,where 
the Great and Small, and the· above-mentioned Long and Short, etc., 
are called "many Unequals besides .THE Unequal. 11 If we compare with 
these references 1090b37-lal ("He makes spatial magnitudes out of 
somE? other Small and Great"), it seems that tl'J.e Great and Small was 
a generic term embracing a variety of 'species'. While this term, 
the Great and Small, is not used in lOOlbl9-25, the same thing is 
1mplied by "We must inqui:te why and how the product will be some-
times a, Number and sometimes a Magnitude, if the not-One ••• was the 
same principle in either case. n When, then, Aristotle says in 988a 
10-14, ".And it is evident what "the underlying matt.er is, of which 
cc.rt. 
the Forms Md predicated in the case of sensible things, and the 
One in the ca.se of the Forms, viz. that this is a dyad., ·the Great 
and the Small", he may well mean one variety for sensibles and 
another for Ideas. And I see no rea.son why this should not apply in 
the· case of the other. two references also. Similarly, when Aristot·l3 
identifies the Great and Small with .the Receptacle or Pa.rtic1pant 
in Physics 209bll-17 with 33-210a2, 3 it is not necessary to inter-
\ . 
I 
pret this, with Cherniss, to mf.'Jan that. Aristotle identifies the. 
I 
Ideal w1 th the sensible substra.te, ·but · 1 t can easily" mean that by 
the Great and Stnall Aristotle here refers to ·that varie~y of it 
which was the .sensible substrate; indeed; ·this seems to be implied 
by "Whether what participates is the Great and Small or the Matter, 
as he called it in wti ting in the Tima.eust•;C 
· I maintain, then, that Cherniss is mistaken ·in saying that 
Arlstotle identified the material element of Plato's Ideas with that 
of sensibles. Aristotle knew that these were differen~, but were 
both subsumed·under the generic term, Great and Sma~l. 
d) The Argument that the Ideas could not ha.ve been Numbers. 
Chern1ss4 rai"Ses ~o arguments that the Ideaspcould not have been 
Numbers according to Aristotle's OV'In evidence. The first is that 
Ideas as Numbers is contradicted by Aristotle himself in l084al0-7, 
where Number is limited to 10; in 10738.14-22, v;here Number is unli-
.mited;and in 1070al8-19, where X~~ii~x~i~~~~l~fi~~~~ Natural Kinds, 
·wherefore Number could not be ~i~fiaa· But this·is quite beside 
1. Arlistotle' s Criticism o'f Plato 479. 2. We have dealt with 
C~n1ss' allegation in Aristotle's Criticism of Plato 108-9 that 
the account in 988al0-14 ~s different from tha.t 
ollber allied matters; on pages 104-5 above in 987b18-22, and 
4. Ri.ddile ef Eer,.ly llcec6c--T -?'-.ttl. • 3 • See _pages 278-9. 
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the point: if the Ideas are Numbers, it is be cause they are com-, '· 
posed of the elemnts of Number, as Cherniss himself admits, and not 
because Man equals 3 or what have you. In any case, while the limi-
tation of Number to 10 is generally .accepted as Platonic, what 
evidence can Cherniss adduce to show that the reference to Number 
~Jiig unlimited was· meant by Aristotle to refer to Plato, and not, 
for example, to Speusippus or Xenocrates? Again, the limita:tion of 
Ideas to Natural Kinds is misunderstood - Aristotle does not mean 
any restriction; but ·only that Plato posited Ideas of Natura:1 Kinds 
. 1 
without prejudice to there being other Ideas,- the reference a.d ·loc. 
saying nothing about the deduction, which is Cherniss' own, that in 
this case Number could not be limited. Indeed, there were Ideas of 
Numbers, as Cherniss himself admit& by taking th;e exclusion of the 
connection of the Ideal Theory x~ with Number in M.iv to mean th~ 
exclusion of Ideas ·of Number. 
2' • 
The second argument is that the crititf;sm of the Ideas iri 997b 
5-13, lOJ)40b30-la}, and 1059all-1•, is arrant nonsense if the Ideas 
3 
are Numbers, and Field cites the first and last of these refell&Ces 
with the same remark. In these places the criticism referred to 
amounts to this: tha.t the Forms a.re in effect nothing but eternal 
. 4 
senslblt:: s. I have taken this type of critic ism to refer to the 
Earlier Ideas, whicl\:1... were not Numbers l.n any sense, and the recur-
rence of this type of criticism in M.iv and M.ix, whete the Earlier 
Theory is dealt with, confirms this. ·I re·fe:r- to· the argument that 
the Forms duplicate reality in M.1v.l078b3lff and 1079a31-32:"But 
the :tkH same names indica. te subst·ance in this and in· the Ideal xmri 
world", and even·more clea.rly in M.ix .• l086b9-ll:"But (he) gave 
separate existence to these uni ve-rsal;Ly- predicated mbsta.nces, so 
that it followed that un~versals and individuals we~e almost the 
same sort of thing. 11 But even if Aristotle is attacking Idea-Nbbere 
the criticisms do not make arrant nonsensei • .An Idea-Number is 
simply an Idea composed of the elements of Number. If the Idea of 
Man, for example, is not simple, but is made up from elements, how 
does that prevent this Idea from being desribed as an eternal 
sensible, the more so since sensibles are similarly constituted 
from two analogous elements? 
Cherniss, then, seems to me· to be wrong at every turni. In the 
words . 5 of Tate, "If there is any defect in Cherniss• equipment, it 
. . 
is an undue lack of sympathy with the Aristotelian point of viee. 
While Cherniss is content with words, Aristotle tried to read. the 
mind of Platonism." 
1. Cp. Black, Cla.ssical Review LXI. 75 note 5:" J11<fl'tt. is not necessa-
rily 1·estr1cti ve in. meaning." 2. Cherniss, Aristotle • s Cri ti-
cism of Plato 197. 3. Classical Quarterly XVII.ll7. 
4. See page,t 73 above.- 5. Cla.ssica.l Feview LX. 32-33. 
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~· ft~nst Cherniss that Atistoihe Altered th~_Qt!ginal Trans!= 
!!6ti from A.v to A.vi. Cherniss1 alleges that Aristotle invented 
~ 
Pythagorean Imitation in Metaphysics 987bl0-14 to find an ·:_nfluence 
for the Doctrine of Idea-Numbers that he had foisted on Plato; that 
the account of Pythagoreanisrn given in the latter part of A.vt and 
brought into connection with Platonism at various points-in A.vi is 
entirely an unhistorical fiction of the same type as Imitation; and 
that this can be demonstrated by traces of botching, there having 
been originally a direct transition from 987a9 to 987a32, which was 
clumsily recast in 987a29-31 with the insertion of 987a.9-31 to 
establish a,Cconnection between his new interpretation of Pythagore-
anism and the Idea-Numbers now ascribed to Plato. 
l ' I !U ImitatiQ.!!. Cherniss points out thatf"t"f'?''f in 987b10-14 
,, )' \. , , 
is an q,R•) "f'fopu'" invented to supply an influence for Idea-
Numbers which did not exist. I am not clear what interpretation 
. I • 
CJ:lerniss gave to jAt}4'J(I"'' 1 but since he says, "This is the only 
place where Aristotle ascribes such a doetrine to the Pythagoreans, 
WHO ARE ELSEWHERE CONTRASTED WI'lH PLATO IN THIS RESPECTu, citing 
. several passages to show that Pythagorean Number was not separate, 
it will probably not be doing Cherniss an injustice to say that he 
. ( 
conceives fif?''f as things being copies of Numbers, of separate 
Numbers. 
NoYJ while the f'fc7'"11s, in this connection, undoubtedly an 
d114( ).tr:fff"l)", the notion of t~in~s imitating Numbers is not .;.. 
grant, however, that these Numbers are not.sepa.rate. For example,in 
985b32-33, which is not cited as a la.ter addition, we have :"Since, 
th~ all other things seemed in their whole nature to be MODELLED 0~ Numb~rstt, .the key word,rlf~A~~0'wtr~ , meaning "to have been made 
like", whereasf''~7"'r comes fromf«tr'f'fl'-1.•<, "to imitate, copy". 
, 
Thus,f"'f'7''f is not an invention unless 985b32-33- also is a.n_ 
invention. Further, I cnn see no necessity for Aristotle having · 
I 
invented f" •J-17 ,., ~ in any case, since, in the sense in which Chern1se 
understands it, it has nothing to do with Idea-Numbers as such, and 
in that sense it would more easily refer to the Earlier Ideas. 
Indeed,. its present position in the Metaphysics would incline one to 
think 1.t was in fact meant to Tefer to the Earlier Ideas. If these 
were models, of which sensible things were copies, then f''r"~ tJ'-1 r 
would undoubtedly have been a po sni ble influence, th1.ngs im1 tat ing 
2 separate Numbers. But Cherniss is wrong in this interpretation. If 
ft; _ft7P.' f. is the se.me notihon as that given in 98 5b32-33, it was. not 
invented by Aristotle; if it means imitation of separate Numbers, it· 
was indeed invented, but hardly as an alleged influence for the 
conception of. Idea-Numbers, but as an influence for Early Ideast 
1. Aristotle's Cri tioism of Plato 189-198, cp. Aristotle's Criticism 
of Pre-Socratic Philosophy 392. 2. See pages 96-97 above. · 
' 
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RJ Th.e Alleged Botch!!!& 1 Cherniss states that 987al3--28 AZ· ; .... 
is redundant; 1 t is fntroduced by 987all-13 which repeats 987a7-9 
with a different meaning; and the ending, 987a27~28, is makeshift. 
Aga.in, the trans! tion of 987a29-31 is botched s1nce7ot7~1s made "tP 
refer to the philosophy of the Italians instead of its natural 
meaning, "the earl tar philosophers and their successors 11 , andyJ/' 
does not make sense. Finally, the account of M.iv, which Cherniss 
takes as the original, has a paran.thesis on the halting attempt of 
the Pythagoreans to define, whiph- is omitted in· A. vi, being excise. 
by Aristotle, when he ma.de the· recension, as unimportant. I shall . 
take up these points.in turn. 
!l That 987al3-28 is redundan1. I agree with Cherniss that t~ 
passage is· redundant, but not for the reason he alleges • He argue9 
it is redundant because Aristotle inserted it in a deliberate 
attempt to foist on Plato a Pythagorean influence for Idea-Numbers 
Now,ff it was inserted for this purpose, since the Ideas are Num~­
because derived from the elements of Number, the sentence in 987a~ 
28 that deals with this is:ttinffnity itself and Unity itself were 
the substance of things •••• That is why Number was the substance of 
all things". But this tenet had been expounded previously in 985b 
24-26:"The principles of mathematics were the principles of all 
things •••• Of these principles Numbers are by nature the first", anc 
in 986al-2: '1Since Numbers seemed to be the fl-r§l~ things in the whcJI 
of Nature, they supposed the element~ of Number to be the elements 
of all things," .and in 986a17-21: "The elements of Number are the 
Eve~a.nd the Odd; of these the latter is Limited, the former Unlimi-
ted; the One proceeds from both of these ••• AND NUMBEF F.KOM THE ONE" 
The accounts, are, granted, not identical, but if. Aristotle was 
looking for a Pythagorean precedent for Idea-Numbers, for Ideas 
composed of tho elements of Number, he need not have added 987al3-
28 a.t all, since ip his original account we find that the elements 
of all things are the elements of Npmber, and that Numbers proceed 
from the One and the Unlimited or Even - for elsewhere these are 
identif1 ed. 
But, in fact, the reason why this passage wa.s added, for it 
certainly does seem to be an afterthought, appears from that very 
change in meaning seized upon by Cherniss. For 987a7-9 states that 
some posit two causes, matter and a source of mov.ement, which is in 
some cases single, sometimes twofold, whereas 987all-13 repeats 
this, and continues that the Pytha[oreans also had two¢princ1ples,. 
but instead of these be:i.ng matter anq{novement, they are matter and 
2 ' 
form :"But on the question of essence they treated the matter too 
scimply". Now I maintain that, since the express object of this book 
A is to investigate the anticipations of the four causes, and since 
1. Aristotle's Criticism of Plato 192. 2. Cp. Foss, Aristotle's 
Metaphysics I .156 ad 987al3: "· •• While the others had material and 
efficient causes, flhe Pythagoreahs had the material and formal. tt 
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the previous philosophers had been shown to have anticipated, in a 
way, Matter and the Efficient Uause, and Plato was to be shown to 
have ha.d something like Matter and Form, to make the transition 
Aristotle inserted, perhaps as an after thought, perhaps in the 
rough and ready way in which lecture notes might be prepared, the 
halting anticipation of the Formal Cause by the Pythagoreans here. 
The facts, Justice as 4, etc., had already been mentioned in the 
previous Etccount of Pythagoreanirm, but Ar:i stotle did not there 
stress this because at that point it suited him to regard Pythas~­
rean Number as Matter in order to bring them under the ge~eral 
class of Pluralists. Having concluded that account, he can now, 
before passing on to the next class where both Matter and Borm are 
anticipated, include as a transition the halting Pythagorean anti-
cipation of Essen.ce. The passage objected to, then, may ha:ve been 
an interpolation, but it was insetted, not to bolster up a doctrine 
of Idea-Numbers- for it conta1ns_nothing not already dealt with 
in the earlier part of A.v- but to lead up to Plato's anticipation 
of the Formal Cause. And this anticipation of the Formal Cause 
belongs quite as much to Plato's Earlier Theory of Ideas as to any 
later Doctrine of Idea-Numbers. 
The ending, 987a27-28, may be makeshift, but it would be 
equally so even if it followed 987aB as a concluSion bef~ore Plato 
was dealt with in A.vi, but this woul4. hardly prove that the pre-
ceding passage was an afterthought. . 
1i) That the TransitionL-A.vi.lJ. is Botched. Cherniss1 gives 
, 
two reasons for th:is statement :7041.,..,tf should refer to "the earlier 
\ philosophers and their successors", andy~makes no sense. I main-
tain that he is mistaken in both respects. 
, 
jo.,~tJ'f refers to the pa:rties dea.lt with in the preceding. 
passage, the alleged interpolation in fact, who are the Pythagore-
ans, a.nd who are there referred to as the Italian school, just as 
f 
shortly after,....<>'-l'"Ck r the philoso.phy of the Italians is again 
mentioned by name. That by "Down to the Italian schoolfi'' Aristotle 
means the same 'so-calle_d Fythagoreans' of A. v is shown by De 
Caelo 293a20-27, where .we find, "The I tali an philo II> phers known as 
Pythagoreans 11 , where the Greek for 'known as' is the same as for 
'so-called' - ~~~6~~~~~. 
r ~ (' has a meaning: it means that Plato ha.d certain pe culiari· 
ties distinguishing h1m from the PythagoreAns, whom he followed, 
I . 
BECAUSE ( 'f"'l') his theory was derived origin.ally from the influence-
of Cratylus and Socrates. This introduction. of Ideas from these 
two influences caused certain differences diS(1ngu1shing his ph1lo· 
sophy from the Pytha.goream, which it resembled in many other 
respects. For exemple, because he separated Ideas, he differed 
from the Pythat3oreans in separating Numbers, Vl'hich were IDC:AS of 
Numbers. 
1. Aristotle's Criticism of Plato 192. 
·• 
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;tii) The Parenthesis of M.i v.:.. Assuming for the sake of argume.rfl· 
that A.v1 is a recension of M.iv, Aristotle would be justified in 
excising the parenthesis if' it was redundant, I suppose. But this 
1 s just what 1 t would be in A. vi, for the parenthesis, so far a.s 
the Pythagoreans were concerned, merely states that "they had before 
this treated of a few things, whose definitions - e.g. those of 
Opportunity, Justice, or Marrial!e - they connected with Numbers", 
and goes on to talk about Socl:·ates• dialectical power. Now as 
regards the former, A.v· already has all that is essential, to 1Yit, 
"In Numbers they seemed to see many resemblances to the things that 
exist and come into being ••• (such and such a modification of Number~ 
being Justice, another being ·soul and Feason~ another being Oppor-
tunity)", so that a parenthesis in A.vi similar to that in M.iv 
would merely repeat what had already been said in A. v, at least so 
rar as the Pythagoreans were concerned. In the case of Socrates' 
dialectical power, it can be shown that·thi~ is conclusive evidence 
that M .i v was written lat~r than A. vi, instead of being, as Cherni ss 
rnainlains, its original. Before dealing w1 th this, however, it is 
worth noticing that the very fact that .the connection of definitions 
with Numbers occurs in A.v explains not why the parenthesis was 
omitted in A.vi - for this was earlier that M.iv - but why it was 
necessary tp insert it in M.iv, which was a later recension of 
either A. vi or M.i:x:. Just because same words were necessary about 
the history of the definition in M.iv while _there was nothing to 
this yffect in A.vi - since it had already been touched upon, so 
far as the Pythagoreans were concerned, in A.v - M.1v had to 
include the relevant details about the Pythagorean definiti'on given 
in A.v in a par.anthesis. Hence, so far from being evidence of the 
lateness of A.vi, it shows that M.iv was the later. But the point 
~ 
which clinches the matter is the statement about Socrates in the 
. parenthesis. 
Stenzel1 points out that the reference to dialectical power is 
a hit against· the Academy. Aristotle is here opposing the Academy, 
which attempted to dist~nguish between the contributions of Socra-
tes and of Plato to philosophy by denjling that Socrates had ·any 
proper doctrine, basing this on his well-known pose of Ignorance. 
But, says Aristotle, this is going too far - we must at least allo~ 
him to have introduveo Induction and general concepts, but he 
grants that he could not be said to have had any dialectical power. 
This is ironical. The Platonists boasted that,without Ideas, 
socrates could have attained only Opinion and not Knowledge. Yes, 
says AristQtle, Socrates tried to syllogise, but only succeeded 1n 
reaching the Essence because the wonderful dialectical method, 
which managed to do without Essence,· and by which the Platon1sts 
boasted to have surpassed Socrates, was not yet - there was only a 
1. Paulys realencyclopadie II.11i.884-5. 
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dialectic aimed at Essence. As the Academy would be concerned with 
the distinction between the Platonic and the Socratic doctrines 
only after Plato's death, this hit at the Academy could only have 
been possible when Aristotle was in•contact with the Academy some 
time after Plato's death. Now Aristotle left Athens at Plato's 
death and did not return until some 10 or more years later, when 
he founded the Lyceum. Indeed, 1 t implies a cerjain anta.gonism 
. between the Lyceum and the Academy, whicll suits .the tone of the 
criticism of M.iv, directed chiefly against Speus1ppus ~nd Xenoc-
rates, but not that of book A, which practically ignores Plato's 
1· bttrenl.h.<tSi5 
successors, as Jaeger has shown. Thus, this l}?amek:fl:eis is perfect-
ly in place in M.i v, but would be out of place in A. vi,· and 1 ts 
reference to Socrates is such that it shows very de:finitely that 
M.iv was written later than A.vi. 
Cherniss' thesis, then, collapses at all po1nts,and as an 
alternative I offer the interpretation of the relation bejween 
() 
Plato and the phil_..sophy of the Italians, with all that this implies, 
which is the subject of the present v.ork • 
•••••••• oooo •••••••• 
1. Aristotle 177-178, cp. 172. 
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